simple, and they that have more than one Subject and one Predidicate are called Composed. As when I say Good and Evil, Life and Death, Poverty and Riches come from the Lord. The predicate, Come from the Lord is affirmed not only of one Subject, but of many, that is of Good and Evil, &c.

But before we explain the composed Propositions, we must observe that there are some which seem to be composed that are not so, but simple. For the singleness of a Proposition is taken for the Unity of the Subject and the Attribute. Now there are several Propositions that have properly but one Predicate and one Attribute; but of which either the Subject or the Attribute is a term complex, which includes other Propositions, that may be called Incident, which make no part of the Subject or Predicate, being joined by the Pronoun Relative, who or which, whose property it is to join together several Propositions, to the end they may all incorporate into one.

Thus when Christ says, He that does the will of my Father who is in Heaven, shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.

The Subject of this Proposition contains two Propositions, as containing two Verbs; but in regard they are joined by the Relative who, they only make a part of the Subject. Whereas when I say, good and evil proceed from the Lord, there are properly two Subjects, because I affirm equally both of the one and the other, that they come from God.

The reason is this, for that the Propositions being joined to others by the Relative who, are either Propositions but imperfectly, as shall be said hereafter; or else are not considered as Propositions then made, but as Propositions that have been made before, which are at that time only conceived like single Ideas. Whence it happens to be the same thing, whether we pronounce these Propositions by Noun-Adjectives, or by Participles without Verbs, and without the Relative, who, or with Verbs and with the Relative. For it is the same thing to say, The invisible God has created the visible world; or God who is invisible, has Created the World which is visible. Alexander the most valiant of Princes vanquished Darius, or Alexander who was the most valiant of Princes, vanquished Darius. For as well in the one as the other, my principal aim is, not to affirm that God is Invisible, or that Alexander was the most valiant of Princes; but supposing both the one and the other as affirmed before, I affirm of God, conceived as Invisible, that he Created the visible World; and of Alexander conceived to be the most valiant of Princes, that He vanquished Darius.

But if I should say, Alexander was the most valiant of Princes, and the Vanquisher of Darius, it is evident that I should no less. affirm of Alexander, both that he was the most valiant of Princes, and that he was the Vanquisher of Darius; and therefore there is good reason that the latter sort of Propositions should be called composed Propositions; whereas we may call the other Propositions complexed.

We are also to observe, that complexed Propositions may be of two sorts. For Complexity, if I may so call it, may light either upon the matter of the Proposition, that is to say, upon the Subject, or the Predicate, or both; or else upon the form only.

1. Complexity falls upon the Subject, when the Subject is a Term Complexed, as in this Proposition. He is a King who fears nothing,

Beatus ille qui procul negotiis

Ut prisca gens Mortalium,

Paterna Rura bobus exercet Suis
Solutus omni fœnore.

For the Verb Est is understood in the last Proposition; Beatus being the Predicate, and all the rest the Subject.

2. Complexity falls upon the Attribute, when the Attribute is a Term complexed, as Piety is a Virtue that renders a Man happy in the greatest Adversities.

Sum Deus, Eneas, fama super æthera notus.

But here we must observe that all Propositions composed of Verbs active, and their cases governed, may be called Complex, as containing in some manner two Propositions. For example, if I say, Brutus killed a Tyrant, this is as much as to say, that Brutus killed some-body, and that he whom he killed was a Tyrant; which is very remarkable to be observed; for when these Propositions are argued in Arguments, sometimes there is but one part proved, the other being supposed, by which we are frequently obliged to reduce those Arguments into the most natural Form, and to change the Active into the Passive, to the end, that the part which is proved may be directly expressed; as we shall shew when we come to discourse of Arguments composed of complex Propositions.

Sometimes complexity falls upon both Subject and Predicate, both the one and the other being a complex Term, as in this Proposition. The great ones who oppress the Poor, shall be punished by God, who is the Protector of the Poor.

Ille ego, qui quondum gracili modulatus avena
Carmen et egressus sylvis, vicina coegi,

Ut quamvis avido parerent arva Colono:

Gratum opus Agricolis; ut nunc horrentia Martis
Arma, virumque cano, Trojœ qui Primus aboris

Italiam, fato profugus, lavina que venit Littora.

The first three Verses, and the half of the fourth, compose the Subject of this Proposition, and the rest makes the Predicate, and the affirmation is included in the word Cano.

These are the three ways that Propositions may be complexed as to their Matter, that is to say, both as to the Subject and the Predicate.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Nature of Incident Propositions, that make a part of Propositions Complexed.

BUT before we speak of Propositions, whose Complexity may fall upon the Form, that is to say, upon the Affirmation or Negation, there are several important remarks to be made upon the nature of Incident Propositions, which make one part of the Subject or Attribute of those that are complexed according to matter.

1. It has been already said, that Incident Propositions are those whose Subject is the Pronoun, Who; as Men who are created to know and love God; or Men who are Pious, where the Term Men being taken away, the rest is an Incident Proposition.

But here we must call to mind what has been said in the sixth Chapter of the first Part. That the additions of Terms complexed are of two sorts, the one may be called simple Explications, when the addition alters nothing in the Idea of the Term, in regard that what is added, agrees generally with the term in its full extent; as Men who are created to know and love God.

The other may be called Determinations; for that, what is added to the term not agreeing with it in its full extent, restrains and determines the Signification, as in the second Example, Men who are Pious. From whence it follows that there is a Pronoun, Who, Explicative, and a Pronoun (Who) Determinative.

Now when the Pronoun (who) is Explicative, the Attribute of the Incident Proposition is affirmed of the Subject, to which the Pronoun (who) refers; though it be but incidently in respect of the total Proposition; so that the Subject itself may be substituted to the Pronoun (who) as in the first Example, Men who were Created to know and love God. For we might say, Men were created to know and love God.

But when the (who) is Determinative, the Predicate of the Incident Proposition, is not properly affirmed of the Subject to which the (who) refers. For if in this Proposition, Men who are Pious are Charitable, we should put the word Men in the place of (who) by saying, Men are Pious, the Proposition would be false, for this would be to affirm the word (Pious) of Men, as Men. But in the other Proposition, Men who are Pious are Charitable, we affirm neither of Men in general, nor of any Man in particular, that they are Pious; but the Understanding joining together the Idea of (Pious) with that of Men, and making an entire Idea, judges, that the attribute of Charitable agrees with the entire Idea. And therefore the entire Judgment which is expressed in the Incident Proposition is only that, by which our Understanding Judges that the Idea of Pious, is not incompatible with that of Men, and so they may be considered as joined together; and afterwards we may examine how they agree together, being thus united.

Many times there are Terms that are doubly and trebly Complexed, being composed of several parts, of which every one is separately complexed; and so we may meet with several Incident Propositions, and of several sorts; the Pronoun of the one being. Explicative, and the other Determinative, as in this Example. The Doctrine that places Sovereign Happiness in the pleasures of the Body, which was taught by Epicurus, is unworthy a Philosopher. The attribute of this Proposition is Unworthy a Philosopher and all the rest is the Subject: and so the Proposition is a Complex Term that includes two incident Propositions. The first, That places Sovereign happiness in the pleasures of the Body, where the Pronoun is determinative; for it determines (Doctrine) in general to be that which affirms Sovereign Felicity to consist in the pleasures of the Body; whence it would be an absurdity to substitute the word Doctrine to the Pronoun, by saying Doctrine places Sovereign Happiness in bodily Pleasure.

2. The second incident Proposition is, which was taught by Epicurus, and the Subject whereto the Pronoun [which] refers, is the whole complex Term [The Doctrine which places Sovereign happiness in bodily Pleasure] which denotes a singular and individual Doctrine, capable of divers accidents; as to be maintained by several persons; though in itself it be determined to be taken always after the same manner, at least in this precise case, as it is extended. And therefore it is, that the Relative of the second Incident Proposition, [which was taught by Epicurus] is not determinative but only Explicative; so that the Subject to

which the Pronoun refers may be substituted in the place of the pronoun, by saying, The Doctrine which places Sovereign happiness in bodily Pleasure, was taught by Epicurus.

3. The last remark is, that to judge of the nature of these Propositions, and to know whether it be determinative or explicative, it behoves us to mind rather the Sense and Intention of him that speaks, than the Expression alone.

For there are many times complexed Terms, that seem uncomplexed; or less complexed than indeed they are; for that one part of what they enclose in the mind of him that discourses, is altogether understood and not expressed, as has been said in the sixth Chapter of the first part, where we have shown that there is nothing more usual in discourse than to signify singulars by general words, for that the Circumstances of discourse make it appear that there is a singular and distinct Idea, joined to that common Idea which answers to the word, that determines it to signify only one thing.

I said that this was generally known by the Circumstances, as in French, the word Roi or King signifies Lewis XIV.

But there is yet a Rule that may serve us to judge, when a common Term retains a general Idea, and when it is determined by a distinct and particular Idea, though not expressed.

When it is a manifest Absurdity to apply a Predicate to a Subject, retaining a general Idea, we must believe that he who made that Proposition, has deprived that Subject of its general Idea. Thus if I hear a Man say, the King has commanded me such a thing, I am assured that he has not left the word King in its general Idea, for a King in general gives no particular Command.

If a Man should say to me, The Brussels Gazette of the 24th of January 1662. is false as to what was transacted at Paris, I should be assured, that there was something more in the mind of him that spoke, than what was expressed in those Terms. For those words are not sufficient to make me judge whether the Gazette be true or false: So that the Relator must have in his thoughts some piece of News Distinct and particular, which he judges contrary to the Truth; as if the Gazette had related, that the King had made a hundred Knights of the Order of the Garter.

Also in such judgments as are made of the Opinions of Philosophers, when we say, that the Doctrine of such a Philosopher is false, without expressing distinctly what that doctrine is; as (the Doctrine of Lucretius, touching the Nature of our Soul is false) it necessarily follows, that in such sorts of Judgments they who make them, do mean a distinct and particular Opinion under the