a Sound, because the sound with which the Name of God is pronounced, awakens the Idea of God in our Minds. It is therefore false that all our Ideas proceed from the Sense.

If any one object that at the same time that we have an Idea of spiritual things, as of Thought, we entertain also a Corporeal Image of the sound that expresses it, they affirm nothing contrary to what we have proved; for that form of the Sound which. is present in the imagination is not the Image of the Thought, but of the Sound, nor does it serve to represent it otherwise, than as the Soul being accustomed when she hears this Sound to conceive the thought, forms at the same time an Idea of thought altogether Spiritual, which has no reference to the Idea of Sound, but as annexed to it by Custom. This is apparent in Deaf people, who have no Ideas of Sound, yet have the Ideas of their thoughts, at least when they reflect upon their thoughts.

CHAP. II.

Of the Objects of IDEAS.

WHATEVER we conceive is represented to our Minds, either as a Thing, or a manner of a Thing, or as a Thing modified.

I call that a Thing which is conceived to consist of itself, and as the Subject of all those things which are comprehended in it, which by another name is called Substance.

The Manner, Attribute, or Quality of a Thing, I call that, which when it is conceived to be comprehended in the Substance, and not to be able to subsist without it, determines it to exist after a certain manner, and gives it a certain denomination.

A Thing modified, I call a substance, as it is determined by a certain mode or manner.

All which things will be apprehended more clearly by examples. When I consider a Body, the Idea of it represents to me a Thing or Substance: because I consider it as a thing subsisting by itself, and which has need of no other to exist.

But when I consider this Body to be round, I consider a RoundBody, and this Idea represents to me the Thing modified.

The names which are used to express these things are called Substantives, or absolute, as the Earth, the Sun, the Soul, God.

Those also that primarily and directly signify the Modes or Manners, because they have some Correspondence with Substantives and Absolutes, as Hardness, Heat, Justice, Prudence, &c.

Such names as signify the Things as modified, marking out primarily and directly the Substance, though more confusedly and No. 14.

E

indirectly the Manner, though more distinctly, are called Adjectives, and Connotatives, as Round, Hard, Just, Prudent.

But here we are to observe, that the Mind, being accustomed to know most things as modified (in regard she attains not the knowledge of them but only by accident, or by those qualities that strike the Senses) often divides one essence of a Substance into two Ideas, of which the one she takes for the Subject, the other for the Mode. Thus although there be nothing in God, which is not God himself, yet we apprehend him as an Infinite Being; and with us infinite is the Attribute of God, as being the Subject of the Attribute. Thus also we consider Man as the Subject of Humanity, and consequently as a Thing modified.

And then the essential Attribute, which is the thing most itself, is apprehended by the Manner of the Manner, because it is as it were inherent in the Subject. And this is called the Substantive Abstracted, as Humanity, Corporeity, Reason.

Nevertheless it is of great importance to distinguish that which is truly the Mode from that which only seems to be so, for the Confounding of Manners with Substances, and Substances with Manners is the chief ground of all our Errors. Therefore the Nature of the true Mode is such, that the Substance of which it is the Manner, may be clearly and distinctly conceived without it; but the manner cannot be alternately clearly conceived; unless the Relation which it has to its Subject be as readily apprehended. This relation of the Manner to the Subject is contained, at least, confusedly, in its conception; because we cannot deprive the Manner of that Relation, without at the same time destroying the Idea of it. On the other hand, when we conceive two Substances, we may deny one thing of the other, yet never destroy the Ideas of

either.

For example, I cannot conceive Prudence, and at the same time deny the Relation, which it has to Man, or any other intelligible Nature capable of Prudence.

On the contrary, when I consider what appertains to an extended substance, which is called a Body, as Extension, Figure, Mobility, Divisibility, and on the other side whatever belongs to the Mind, as Thinking, Doubting, Memory, Will, Discourse, I may deny all that of the Extended Substance, which I conceive belongs to the Thinking Substance, and yet distinctly apprehend the Extended Substance, and all the Adjuncts that belong to it. And I may reciprocally deny of the Thinking Substance whatever I apprehend of the Extended Substance, without considering what I have conceived of the Thinking Substance.

Which also proves, that Thinking is not the Manner of the Extended Substance, because Extension, with all the rest of the Attributes belonging to Extended Substance may be denied of thought, and yet a man may rightly apprehend of Thinking.

It may be here farther observed, that there are some of these Modes or Manners, which may be called intrinsic; because they are apprehended to be in the Substance, as round or square; others may be said to be extrinsic; because they are taken from something which is not inherent in the Substances, as beloved, seen, desired; but these things depend upon the Actions of others. And these sorts of Modes, or Manners, are called in the Schools, Extrinsical Denominations. But if these Modes are taken according to the Manner whereby things are apprehended, they are called Second Intentions. Thus, to be subjected, to be predicated, are second intentions, because they are the manners whereby the things themselves are apprehended, as they are in the Understanding, conjoining two ideas, affirming one to be the other.

It is farther to be observed, that there are other modes, which we may call substantials, because they represent to us true substances applied to other substances like to manners; of which sort are cloathed, armed, &c.

There are others which we may call simply real, and these are the true manners, which are not substances, but manners of substance.

Lastly, there are others which we may call negatives, because they represent the Substance to us with a Denial of some real or substantial manner.

Now if the Objects represented by these Ideas, whether substances or manners, are really such as they are represented to us, we call them true. If not, they are false ideas, in such a manner as they may be. And these are they which in the Schools are called Entia Rationes, Entities of Reason, which happen for the most part when the mind conjoins two ideas real in themselves, but distinct; thus the idea of a Golden Mountain is an Entity of Reason, compounded of two ideas of a Mountain and Gold, which the Mind represents as conjoined, when really they are not so.

CHAP. III.

Of Aristotle's Ten Predicaments.

TO this Head of the Objects of Ideas, the ten Predicaments of Aristotle may be reduced; as being but several Classes, under which that Philosopher comprehended all the Objects of our

Thoughts; comprehending all Substances under the First, and all accidents under the other Nine.

The First, Substance, which is either Spiritual or Corporeal; the Second, Quantity, which is either discrete, when the Parts are divided as Numbers.

Or Continued, when the parts are conjoined, and then either successive, as Time and Motion; or Permanent, which by another name is called Space, or Extension in Length, Breadth, and Profundity; length alone making lines, Length and Breadth making surface, and all together causing Solidity.

Third, Quality, of which Aristotle makes four Kinds.

The first comprehends Habitude, a disposition of Mind or Body, acquired by reiterated Acts, as the Sciences, Virtue, Vice, Excellency in Painting, Writing, Dancing.

The Second, Natural Ability; such as are the Faculties of the Soul or Body, the Understanding, the Will, the Memory, the Five Senses, Swiftness of Foot.

The Third, Sensible Qualities, as Hardness, Softness, Ponderosity, hot, cold, colours, sounds, odours and several sorts of Relishes. The Fourth, Form and Figure, which is the extrinsical determination of Quantity, as Round, Square, Spherical, Cubical.

Fourthly, Relation of one thing to another, as of Father to Son, Master to Servant, King to Subject, of Power to the Object, of Sight to the Thing Visible; to which may be added all things denoting Comparison; as like, equal, greater, less.

Fifth, Action, either considered in itself; as to walk, leap, to know, to love; or externally, as to strike, to saw, to break, to manifest, to hear.

Sixth, Suffering; as to be stricken, broken, to be manifested, heated.

Seventh, where; as when we answer to Questions about Place; He is at Rome, at Paris, in his Study, or a bed.

Eighth, When we answer to questions about Time, as when did he Live? a hundred Years ago; When was this done? Yesterday.

Ninth, Situation, as Sitting, Standing, Lying, behind, before, upon the Right-hand, on the Left.

The Tenth, the manner of having, as to have any thing about a Man for Cloathing, Ornament, Armour; or to be Cloathed, Adorned, Armed, to wear Breeches, &c.

These are Aristotle's Ten Predicaments formed for the Birth of so many Mysteries, though to say truth, of very little use, and so far from rectifying of Judgment, which is the Scope of Logic, that

they frequently do much mischief; and that for two Causes which it will be worth while to display in this place.

The first is that these Predicaments are things looked upon as things grounded upon Reason and Truth, whereas they are things merely Arbitrary, and which have no ground but the Imagination of a Man that has no Authority to prescribe Laws to others, who have as much Right as he, to dispose in the same, or any other order the Objects of Thinking, according to the Rules of Philosophy, which every one embraces. In a word, the following Distic contains whatever falls under our Consideration according to the new Philosophy.

Mens, Mensura, quies, motus, Positura, Figura,

Sunt cum materia Cunctarum Exordia rerum. For the followers of this Philosophy believe they have drained all Nature out of these seven Heads.

1. Mens or the Thinking Substance. 2. Matter or the Extended Substance. 3. Measure, or the Largness or Smallness of every part of the Matter. 4. Position, or Situation one in respect of another, 5. Figure. 6. Their Motion. 7. Their Rest, or slower Motion, The other Reason why we think this Series of Predicaments to be pernicious is this, because it occasions Men to satisfy themselves with the outward Rind of Words, instead of Profiting by the wholesome Fruit, and to believe they know all things, so they are able to say by rote certain names of Arbitrary Signification, which yet imprint no clear or distinct Ideas, as we shall afterwards demonstrate.

Here something might be said of the Attributes of the Lullists, Goodness, Patience, Magnitude, and the rest. But it is such a ridiculous Invention, to think that they are able to give a Reason of all things by the application of a few Metaphysical words, that it is not worth refuting.

And therefore a very Modern Author has affirmed with great Reason, that the Rules of Aristotle's Logic are serviceable, not so much to discover what we are Ignorant of, but to explain to others what we know already: but that Lully taught us to prattle fluently and without Judgment of that of which we know nothing at all. And therefore Ignorance is to be preferred to false Knowledge; for as St. Austin judiciously observes in his Book of the utility of Belief, such a disposition of the Mind is highly to be blamed for two Reasons. One, for that he who is persuaded that he understands the Truth, renders himself incapable of Learning any more: and Secondly, because such a Presumption and Rashness is a sign of an ill-governed and ill qualified Mind. Opinari, saith he, Duas