VI.

To pass from sense divided to sense composed, or from sense composed to sense divided.

The one of the Sophisms is called Fallacia Compositionis, Fallacy of Composition; and the other Fallacy of division: which are both apprehended better by examples.

Jesus Christ saith in his Gospel, speaking of his Miracles, The Blind see, the Lame walk, the Deaf hear. This cannot be true, while we take things separately and not conjointly, that is to say, in a sense divided, and not in a sense composed. For the blind see not, while they are blind, neither do the deaf hear, while they remain so; but after they had recovered their sight and hearing by the Miracles of Christ they both heard and saw.

In the same sense it is said in Scripture that God justifies the wicked. Not that he accounts those for just who abide in their wickedness; but that by his Grace he justifies those who were Impious before.

On the other side there are some Propositions, which are not true but in a sense opposed to that which is the sense divided. As when St. Paul says, that Slanderers, Fornicators, and Covetous men shall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. For it is not meant that none of those who are Guilty of those vices shall be saved; but only those who remain impenitent, and obstinately go on in their sins shall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.

It is manifest now that there is no Transition from one of these senses to the other without a Sophism. And for example, it is apparent that they would argue very ill, that should hope for Heaven, that persevere in their sins, because that Christ came to save sinners, and because he says, that wicked women shall precede the Pharisees in the Kingdom of Heaven; seeing that he did not come to save sinners abiding in their sins, but to teach and admonish them to forsake their sins.

VII.

To pass from what is true in some respect to what is simply true. This is called in the Schools a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. As for example the Epicureans prove that the Gods had human shape, because there is no form so lovely as that, and for that all that is lovely ought to be in God. For human form is not absolutely Beautiful, but only in respect of other Bodies. And so being a Perfection only secundum quid, or in some respect and not simply, it does not follow that it ought to be the shape of God,

because all perfections are in God, there being no perfections but what are simply so, that is, which exclude all manner of Imperfection, that can be ascribed to God.

We find also in Cicero, 1. 3. de natura Deorum, a Ridiculous Argument of Cotta, against the existence of God, which may be reduced to this Sophism. How, says he, can we conceive God, when we can attribute no virtue to him? for shall we say that he has Prudence? Prudence consists in the choice of good and evil: now God can have no need of this choice, not being capable of any evil. Shall we say that he has understanding and Reason? we make use of understanding and Reason to discover what is unknown to us by what we know now there can be nothing unknown to God. Nor can Justice be in God which only relates to Human Society: Nor temperance, because he has no pleasures to govern; nor Fortitude, for that pain never oppresses God, nor labour wearies him; and besides he is exposed to no danger. How then can that be God, which has neither understanding nor virtue?

Nothing can be conceived more impertinent than this manner of arguing. For thus might any Country man discourse, who never having seen any other than Thatched Houses, and having heard that in Cities there are no houses covered with Thatch, should thence conclude that there are no houses in Cities, and that they who live in Cities live miserably exposed to all the Injuries of the weather. For thus Cotta, or rather Cicero argues. There can be no virtues in God like to those which are in men ; therefore there can be no virtue in God. And what is more wonderful is this, that he does not conclude, that there is no virtue in God but only because the imperfections of human virtue cannot be in God. So that it is one of his proofs that God wants understanding and knowledge, because all things are known to him. That is, that God sees nothing, because he sees all things: that he is unable because he is Omnipotent: that he enjoys nothing of happiness, because he enjoys all felicity.

VIII.

To abuse the Ambiguity of words because it may be done diverse

ways.

To this sort of Sophism may be referred all Syllogisms that are vicious, as having four Terms. Whether it be that the middle Term be taken twice particularly, or whether it be that it is taken in one sense in the first Proposition; and in another sense in the second, or lastly whether the Terms of the Conclusion be not taken in the same sense in the Premises, as in the Conclusion.

For we do not restrain the word Ambiguity to the only words which are grossly equivocal; for they rarely fail, but we mean by that whatever can change the sense of words, especially when men are not easily aware of the change, in regard that divers things being signified by the same sound they take them for the same thing. In reference to which may be seen what has been said already toward the end of the first Part, where we have not only spoken of the Remedies against the Confusion of Ambiguous words, by defining them so clearly that no man can be deceived.

I shall therefore produce some examples of this Ambiguity that many times deceives men of ripe apprehensions. Such is that, which is found in words that signify some Whole, which may be taken either collectively or distributively; thus ought the Sophism of the Stoics to be resolved, who argued that the world was an Animal endued with reason.

For that which has the use of Reason is better than that which has not.

Now there is nothing, say they, can be better than the world. Therefore the world hath the use of Reason.

The Minor of this Argument is false, because they attribute to the world what is only to be ascribed to God. Who is such a Being, than which there can be nothing greater or more perfect. But if it be spoken of the Creatures only nothing can be more perfect than the world, if it be collectively taken for the Uni versality of things created by God. But hence it can only be inferred that the world is endued with reason in some of its parts, as Angels, and Men; but conjunctively it cannot be said to be a rational Animal.

It would be also a bad way of Arguing to say, that a man thinks, or a man is composed of Soul and Body, therefore the Soul and Body think. For it is sufficient to say that a man thinks, when one part of him only is said to think; from whence it no way follows that the other part thinks.

XI.

To draw a general Conclusion from a defective Induction. We call induction, when the search of several particulars leads us to the search of a general Truth.

Thus when we have experimented that most Seas are salt, and that the water of most Rivers is fresh, we generally conclude that the Sea water is salt and River water fresh. The various experiments which we make that Gold looses nothing in the fire, gives

us reason to Judge that this is true of all Gold. And in regard we never met with any people but what spoke we believe that all men speak, that is make use of Sounds to signify their thoughts. From this Induction also all our knowledge takes its rise, in regard that particulars present themselves to us before Universals; though afterwards we make use of universals to understand particulars.

However it is equally certain that Induction alone is never any assured means to acquire perfect knowledge, as we shall demonstrate in another place. The consideration of singulars, affording an apportunity only to the understanding to be more attentive upon natural Ideas, according to which we Judge of the Truth of generals. For example I should never have thought of considering the nature of a Triangle, had I never seen a Triangle which gave me an occasion to think of it. However it is not the particular Examination of all Triangles which makes me conclude generally and certainly of all, that the space which they comprehend is equal to that of a Rectangle of all the Base, and the half of their Height (for this examination would be impossible) but the sole consideration of what I know is included in the Idea of a Triangle which I find in my understanding.

However it be, having resolved to treat of this matter in another place, it suffices here to say that defective Iuductions, that is to say, such as are not entire, are the causes of manifold Errors. I shall only produce one memorable example.

All Philosophers to this day have held it for an unquestionable Truth, that a Pipe being stopped, it was impossible to pull out the stopple without breaking the Pipe, and that water might be forced as high as a man pleases by the help of Crisilian Engines called Aspirant Pumps. And that which made them so confident was, that they thought themselves assured of it by a most certain Induction, as having made an infinite number of Experiments. But both the one and the other is found to be false; for that new Ex. periments have since been made that a Stopple may be drawn out of a Syphon however well stopped without breaking the Pipe, provided the force be equal to the weight of the Cylinder of the Water, thirty-three feet high, and of the same thickness with the Pipe: and that in Pumps aspirant the water does not ascend higher thau from thirty-two to thirty-three feet.

CHAP. XX.

Of bad reasoning in civil conversation and common discourse. HITHERTO we have shewn examples of false Argumentations in matters of science. But because the principal use of reason does not consist in acquiring Sciences that are of little use for the conduct of well living, wherein it is of dangerous consequence to be deceived; it will be of much more advantage to consider generally that which engages men into these false Judgments which are made of all sorts of things, and blind men with prejudice in matters chiefly importing manners, and conducing to the Government of Civil Life, and are the general Subjects of our Common discourse. But in regard this design would require a Treatise by itself, which would comprehend almost all morality; we shall only mark out here in general a part of the causes of those false Judgments that are so common among Men.

We shall not here spend time in distinguishing false Judgments from bad reasoning; as well for that false Judgments are the sources of bad Reasonings, which they draw after them by a necessary Consequence; as also for that there is for the most part an Implicit and latent ratiocination in that which to us appears a simple Judgment, there being always something that serves as a Motive and Principle to that Judgment. For example, when we say that a stick is crooked in the water, because it so appears to us; This Judgment is grounded upon this general and false Proposition, that what appears crooked to our senses is crooked indeed, and so includes a reason which does not display itself, generally therefore considered, the causes of our Errors may be referred to two heads; the one internal, which is the Irregularity of our will, that troubles and disorders our Judgment; the other External, which consists in the Objects of what we Judge, and which delude our understanding by a false appearance. Now that these causes are seldom separated; nevertheless, there are certain Errors wherein the one discovers itself more plainly than the other; and therefore we shall treat of them apart.

Of the Sophisms of self Love, Interest, and Passion.

If we carefully examine why some men so obstinately dote, rather upon one Opinion than another, we shall find it to be not through any penetration into the Truth, or force of Arguments, but some engagement of self Love, Interest or Passion. This is the weight that weighs down the Balance, and which determines the most part of our doubts; this is it which gives us the greatest shock to our Judgment, and stops the career of Consultation.