II. I was employed in the army of the Alps. (p. 7.)

II. Napoleon was never employed in the army of the Alps, and he never was upon Monte Genevre.

III. Because it obtained the rank of captain for me. (p. 7.)

III. Napoleon was promoted to be a captain in 1789, four years before the commencement of the war.

IV. I made known my plan to Barras. (p. 10.).

IV. Napoleon, chief of a battalion of artillery, commanded that corps at the siege of Toulon. He was not at all acquainted then with Barras, who, at that time was either employed upon a mission at Marseilles, or with the army of Italy. The representative of the people, who first distinguished and supported by his authority the plans which succeeded in effecting the capture of Toulon, was called Gasparin, deputy for Orange, a very warm conventionalist, an old captain of dragoons; a man greatly enlightened, and who had received an excellent education. He was the deputy who first divined the great military talents of the commandant of artillery. It was not until the well-known day of Vendemiaire that Napoleon was united with Barras.

V. A general but without employment I went to Paris. (p. 11.)

V. Napoleon never was without employment. After the siege of Toulon, he was named commandant of the artillery of the army of Italy, and directed that army: the execution of his plans procured to France the capture of Saorgio, Oreille, the Col de Tende, and Ormea. In a similar manner he directed the army of Italy, in October, in its movements upon the Bormida, at the action of Dego and the capture of Savona. In February 1795, he commanded at Toulon the artillery of the maritime expedition, destined first for Corsica, and afterwards for Rome. He recommended that the convoy should not sail until the French squadron had driven off the English one; which gave rise to the naval action at Noli, where the Caira was taken, and the French squadron returned. The maritime expedition was countermanded. During this time, by means of his influence over the minds of the gunners, he appeased an insurrection at the arsenal, and saved the lives of the representatives Mariette and Chambon. In May 1795, at the work of Ombri, he was placed upon the MONTHLY MAG. No. 342.

list as general of infantry, and to serve in the army of La Vendée; but this was to continue so only until there was a vacancy in the corps of artillery. He went to Paris, and refused to serve in the army of La Vendée. About ten days afterwards, however, Kellerman having been beaten on the coast of Genoa, and the army of Italy obliged to retreat, Napoleon was required by the Committee of Public Safety, then composed of Sieyes, De la Tourneur, and Pontecoulant, to draw up instructions for that army. Shortly afterwards arrived the 13th Vendemiaire, and he commanded in chief the army of the interior at Paris. VI. A handful of men, and two pieces of cannon, (p. 12.)

VI. It is notorious, that, on the 13th Vendemiaire, the convention had 6,000 men, and 30 pieces of cannon to defend them.

VII. The army of Italy, "était en rebut." (p. 15.) [Synonimous with being dilapidated, or the refuse of an army.]

VII. Napoleon was called to the chief command of the army of Italy, by the desire of the officers and soldiers who had executed his plan in 1793 at Toulon, in 1794 and 1785 in the Comté de Nice, as already stated. This army cost a great deal of money, and the treasury was empty; a strange kind of "rebut," certainly, to be appointed commanderin-chief of a frontier and a large army!

VIII. By good fortune, they surrendered even more shamefully than I could have flattered myself. (p. 22.)

VIII. Malta could not have held out against a bombardment of twenty-four hours. It had certainly immense physical powers of resistance, but no moral

ones.

IX. On my return to Egypt, I received newspapers by the way of Tunis. (p. 23.)

After the battle of Aboukir, on the 3d of August 1799, Sir Sidney Smith sent English newspapers, of the months of April and May, to Alexandria, in which were mentioned the disasters of the armies of the Rhine and of Italy at the commencement of the campaigns of 1799.

X. Any general was good enough to sign a capitulation, which time would render inevitable; and I departed without any other design than that of re-appearing at the head of the armies, to bring back victory again to them. (p. 24.) X. Napoleon returned to France: 1st. Because he was authorised to do so by 4 M

his

The

his instructions. 2d. Because his presence was necessary to the republic. 3d. Because the army of the east, victorious and numerous, had no longer an enemy before it, and the first object of the expedition had been fulfilled. The second object could not be obtained as long as the Republic was beaten upon the frontiers, and torn to pieces in the interior by anarchy. The army of the east was victorious over the armies of Syria commanded by Djezzar Pacha, which had been nearly destroyed successively at the battles of El-arish, Gaza, Jaffa, and at Acre. At the battle of Mount Tabor, from 50,000 to 60,000 Ottoman troops had been either killed, taken, or dispersed, as well as their park of artillery of 40 field pieces, all their stores, and their General-in-chief Abdallah. French army was equally victorious over the army of Rhodes, which had perished, partly of St. Jean de Acre and partly at Aboukir, where 40,000 had been killed, taken, or dispersed, as well as their park of artillery, consisting of 32 pieces of cannon, which the vizier of the Turks, Mustapha Pacha, who commanded them. The French army was numerous, because it mustured more than 25,000 fighting men, of whom 3,500 were cavalry, and had a very considerable force of field and siege artillery. The libels have said that Napoleon ran away, and deserted his army; that he abandoned it, because it was in distress; that it had no more artillery, no more clothing, and was reduced to 8000 combatants. These false reports influenced the British cabinet so much that it refused to ratify the convention of El-arish. On the 20th of March, 1800, the Grand Vizier was beaten at Heliopolis, nine months after Napoleon's departure: and 21 months afterwards, 19,000 or 20,000 English troops disembarked at Aboukir, 6000 more arrived at Suez from India, and 20,000 Turks under the orders of the Grand Vizier and the Cap. tain Pacha. These 45,000 men were obliged to make a campaign of six months, and to fight several battles. This expedition cost the lives of about 10,000 of the choicest troops in England as many of the Turks, and several millions sterling to the government: and had it not been for the silliness of Menou, who had succeeded by seniority after the assassination of Kleber, the expedition would have failed. Such were the consequences produced to the English nation by their having given faith to

libellers. In October 1801, nearly three years after the departure of Napoleon, the army of the east disembarked at Marseilles and Toulon, in number 24,000 men, of whom 23,000 were in a fit state to bear arms. It had been originally composed of 32,000 men, on its departure from Toulon in 1798; 4000 were left in Malta, but, in place of them, 2000 Maltese troops were incorporated with the French army, which was 30,000 strong, on its arrival in Egypt, and received there 3000 men, the remains of crews of the French squadron, and then was 33,000 strong, composed of French, Italians, Poles, and Maltese, amongst whom there were 24,000 real Frenchmen. Thus then the loss sustained was about 9000 men; from which must be deducted about 2000 who returned individually, or in convoys of wounded, which reduces the difference to 7000; counting all losses by diseases during four years, and those sustained at the assault of Alexandria, at the battles of Chebreiss, the Pyramids, the actions at Salhiéh, the campaigns of Syria, that of Desaix in Upper Egypt: in fact, during the command of Kleber at the actions of Damietta, the battle of Heliopolis, the siege of Cairo; under Menou, in the actions in the month of March 1801, against the English, and until the surrender. It is well known that Napoleon, in leaving Egypt, firmly believed it to belong for ever to France, and hoped to be able to realize the second object of the expedition.

XI. We had our fortune to make. (p. 31.)

XI. At the moment of crossing Mount St. Bernard, in May and June 1800, Napoleon had fought twenty pitched battles; in every one of which he had been victorious-conquered Italy; dietated peace to Austria, at twenty leagues distance from Vienna; negociated at Radstadt with Count Cobenzel the surrender of the strong city of Mayence; raised near 300 millions of contributions, which had served to feed, clothe, and furnish with necessaries, the army during two years; and to create the Cisalpine army; to pay the army of the Rhine, the squadron of Toulon at Brest, and even to pay some of the offices of government in Paris. He had sent to the museum 300 chef d'œuvres, ancient Grecian statues or pictures, chef d'œu vres of the age of the Medici. He had conquered Egypt; had established the French power there upon a firm basis,

after

after having surmounted what was then, in Volney's opinion, the greatest difficulty, viz. to conciliate the precepts laid down in the Koran and the Mohammedan religion, with the presence of a foreign army. For six months he had been at the head of the Republic, by the choice of three millions of citizens, and of which he had re-established the finances, calmed the factions, eradicated the war in La Vendee, and moderated that in the west. After so many occurrences how is it possible to say that he had his fortune to make?

XIE. The factions appeared to be silenced. (p. 33.)

XII. It is notorious, that, from Marengo until the INFERNAL MACHINE, that is to say during the last six months of 1800, the factions were more active than

ever.

XIII. Unfortunately, at this decisive moment, one of those chance strokes which destroy the best resolutions, presented itself to me. (p. 46.)

XIII. The Duke d'Enghien perished because he was one of the principal actors in the conspiracy of Georges, Pichegru, and Moreau. Pichegru was arrested the 28th of February; Georges the 9th of March; and the Duke d'Enghien the 18th of March, 1804.

XIV. My advanced guard encountered the Austrians at Ulm, and overwhelmed them. (p. 59.)

XIV. At Ulm 80,000 Austrians were made prisoners, from 26 to 30 generals, 60 to 80 colours, and from 200 to 300 pieces of cannon. Truly, this was a notable rencontre of an advanced-guard! XV. The Russians retired in good order and abandoned the Austrian empire to me. (p. 59.)

XV. The Russians made no retreat: all their park of artillery was taken. The wreck of their army which was saved had abandoned their wallets and their arms. The Emperor Alexander, surrounded in Holich, would have been made prisoner, if he had not given his word to evacuate Hungary by such daily routes as were pointed out to him. XVI. The campaign re-commenced. I pursued the retreat of the Russians. I arrived in Poland. (p. 60.)

XVI. The campaign did not recommence. The French did not follow the Russians into Poland. The Russians retreated with the greatest precipitation beyond the Niemen. Peace was signed with Austria at Vienna, an agreement was likewise signed with Prussia, and

Napoleon returned to Paris. Although he was in Poland, it was not in consequence of the battle of Austerlitz, but after the campaign of Jena, and not by the route of Vienna, but by that of Berlin. There is an anachronism of a year. The battle of Austerlitz took place on the 2d of December, 1804; that of Jena the 14th of October, 1806; that of Eylau the 8th of February, 1807; that of Friedland, the 14th of June, 1807; the peace of Tilsit, the 7th of July, 1807. XVII. If the Russians had attacked us the morning afterwards, we would have been beaten. (p. 26.)

XVII. The Russians had it not in their power to attack the morning after the battle of Eylau, that is to say, the 9th of February; because, at five o'clock in the evening of the 8th, they were no longer on the field of battle, which was occupied by the third corps of the French army. At three o'clock on the morning of the 9th, the Russian army was under the ramparts of Konigsberg, at six leagues distance from the field of battle, having abandoned all their wounded. This supposition therefore is inadmissible. But even supposing that the Russian army had remained upon the field of battle, and that it might have made an attack the morning after, the corps of Marshalls Ney and Bernadotte, which had taken no part in the battle, arrived during the night. If the Russians had been beaten by the French army during the absence of those two corps, how is it to be conceived that they would have been victors, after the arrival of a reinforcement of six divisions against them?

XVIII. The youngest was still young enough to wait. (p. 65.)

XVIII. Jerome was the cadet who, at the moment the author is speaking of was king of Westphalia, and therefore, had no occasion to wait. But the writer is continually led astray by his anachronism, in supposing that Jena was after Tilsit.

XIX. The neutrality of Prussia would have been above all essential to me in the last campaign. In order to assure myself of it, some overtures were made to him about the cession of a part of Hanover. (p. 74.)

Two days before the battle of Austerlitz, Count Haugwitz, first minister to the King of Prussia, came to Brunn in Moravia, where he had two audiences with Napoleon. But the advanced posts were already engaged; and Napoleon

told

told him to go and await at Vienna the result of the battle, saying, "I will beat them; therefore wait and say nothing to me. To-day I will know nothing." Haugwitz was no novice in the affairs; he did not require to be told so a second time. The battle of Austerlitz took place, Napoleon returned to Vienna, and a convention was signed the 15th of December 1805, between France and Prussia, in order to tranquillize the last with respect to the treaty which her king had signed with the Emperor of Russia some weeks before. Prussia promised to disarm; and, in return, obtained a promise from France that the latter would not interfere or oppose her annexing Hanover to her possessions; and, in exchange for so doing, required Wesel, Bareuth, and Neufchatel. Prussia could not demand Hanover at Tilsit: Tilsit was after Jena. This mistake in the date throws an air of obscurity over a great part of the pamphlet.

XX. I refused every thing, and Hanover received another destination. (p. 76.) XX. The convention signed with, Haugwitz at Vienna, in December 1805, only received a conditional ratification at Berlin; which being contrary to custom gave room to a discussion during the exchange of ratifications, and produced difficulties which occupied a portion of 1806; but which were finally removed. Prussia declared war in the month of October, without any reason, and not in consequence of cabinet councils, or the will of the king, but by the effervescence of passion. It is a fact, that at the end of the summer of 1806, Prussia flew to arms, deceived by a false dispatch of the Marquis Luchesini, who assured the court of Berlin, that in the treaty which had been just signed at Paris between France and Russia by the Count d'Oubril, these two great powers had entered into engagements contrary to the interests of Prussia. In the first moment of alarm, the Court of Berlin took up arms against both the Russians and French, but were not long, however, before an explanation took place, and Prussia was perfectly well assured on the part of Russia, as this last disavowed what d'Oubril had done, and refused to ratify the treaty, in which, moreover, there was no question of Prussia. After having so gal lantly armed against both Russia and France, the court of Prussia finding that there was only occasion to fight with France, and being moreover assured of

assistance from Russia, made sure of victory. Some weeks afterwards, however, the battle of Jena, which took place the 14th of October 1806, decided the question.

XXI. I was desirous of at least correcting what I had done in Prussia, by organizing the Confederation of the Rhine. (p. 80.)

XXI. The Confederation of the Rhine preceded the battle of Jena. It was formed on the 12th of June, 1806. It was not therefore, as appears to the author, after that battle and after Tilsit, that it was organized.

XXII. Nevertheless, after the battle of Jena, I did not feel within myself that plenitude of confidence, nor that contempt of futurity, to which I was indebted for so many of my first successes. (p. 87.)

XXIÍ. The capture of Magdeburg, Spandau, Custrin, and Stettin, the battle of Pultusk, the capture of Dantzig, Glogau, Breslau, Brieg, Schweidnitz, the battle of Friedland, and the conferences at Tilsit, took place in 1807, and posterior to the battle of Jena, which happened on the 14th of October, 1806. The capture of Madrid, the battles of Espinosa, Burgos, and Tudela, the operations against Sir John Moore's army, were in 1808. The battle of Alensberg, the manœuvres of Landshut, the battle of Eckmuhl, the capture of Vienna, the battles of Esling and Wagram, the peace of Presburg, were in 1809, and three years subsequent to the battle of Jena. The battle of Alensberg, the manœuvres of Landshut, and the battle of Eckmuhl, were the most brilliant and skilful manœuvres of Napoleon.

XXIII. In revenge, the Archduke performed an excellent march: he guessed my project, and was before hand with me; he proceeded rapidly upon Vienna by the left bank of the Danube, and took up a position at the same time that I did. (p. 99.)

XXII. The archduke Charles did nothing else than commit faults during that campaign; he was beaten when he had four times the numbers of his opponents; he did not proceed rapidly upon Vienna, but he placed himself opposite to it, which is essentially dif ferent. The plan of the French ruler was to take that capital, to disengage his arms of Italy, and to join it to his

own.

He succeeded in all: he took the capital, turned the army of Italy commanded by Prince John, and establish

ed