ence to that learned Judge, whose opinion upon this subject I respect, I should beg to express a doubt upon that point. The sheriff has not done his duty when he seizes the goods; his duty requires him to go further; his duty requires him to sell those goods, and deliver the money to the Plaintiff. It seems to me that it is necessary for him to show, not that he has partially done his duty, but that he has done his whole duty; and that cannot be done without shewing, as it is set out on the face of this plea, that, having seized the goods, he proceeded to sell the goods, and, having sold them and raised the money, he handed it over to the Plaintiff. It appears to me there is nothing unimportant in that. But, perhaps, it is enough for me to say, whether unimportant or not, here it is, and it does not lie in the mouth of the Plaintiffs in error to say it was not competent to the party to go into this question. The learned Judge has added, in support of this argument, "Suppose he could not sell; what is he to do?" He would be justified, there being no buyers: he is not bound "to sell;" but the learned Judge knows, if that was the case, he must have specially returned that fact; he must have said, I have taken the goods, and they remain in my hands for want of buyers. There cannot be a stronger circumstance to show, that all that is stated upon the record is most material to show that the sheriff has not done his duty. I take that to be a principle of law, not confined to cases of this sort, but extending over a large surface. Suppose a person commits a felony, and another person indicts him; though his motives are most malicious, still if the man has committed the felony, he is justified in doing that

1833.

LUCAS

V.

NOCKELI.S.

1833.

LUCAS

v.

NOCKELLS

which is done, though no one would approve of the motive. But the motive is not to be enquired into, unless there is no foundation for the proceed. ing. But what is the distinction in the cases mentioned ? It is this, that in all those cases the writ had completely justified the party in all that he had done. If it could be shown that the sheriff was justified in all he had done by this writ, then these cases would bear upon it; and though: I should have lamented it, the majority of the Judges would have been against the Plaintiff; and upon their authority I should have advised your Lordships to set aside this judgment. But, if I have taken a correct view of this case, the sheriff was not justified in all he had done. There was a great deal of that which he has done the most important part of his acts-altogether unwarranted by any authority given to him by the writ. That writ told him to enter and take possession of the goods that he did; but immediately after he entered, he put those goods directly under the control of other persons, whom he ought not to have permitted to have had the control over them.

}

This case is not like the cases adverted to, be cause in those cases the party had an authority to cover him in whatever he did, though he exer cised the authority with improper motives; but in this case, although the motives were unquestionably as bad as they could be, the sheriff was not justified by any thing contained in the writ in doing what he has done to co

you

The next question is, whether will add any thing to the affirmance of that judgment? If it be possible that your Lordships could approve of the conduct of Hopley and Lingham, in dealing with this property as theirs, after they had caused this

writ and execution to be issued; if you can ́ ap-TM prove of the conduct of a merchant of London attempting to get hold of this property by cheating (for no softer name can be applied to it) the party entitled to the freight of his ship, by which those goods were brought to England, and by which a value was given to them (for the goods were of trifling value in New South Wales com pared with their value in England); if it is possible that any Noble Lord can approve of the conduct of a British merchant, attempting to get the benefit of the labour of others and at their expense, without making a proper return for it, then this judgment will be simply affirmed. But I am persuaded that this country is indebted for the state of its commerce to the confidence that is reposed in the integrity of British merchants, and that the commerce will no longer continue in that flourishing state, if that confidence should ever be withdrawni I therefore submit to your Lordships, that it is fit that in all cases in which conduct comes under your Lordships' consideration tending to destroy that confidence, your Lordships should mark it with your disapprobation; and I say again, if the learned Judge to whom I have alluded, and of whom I can never speak but with respect and affection, could have entertained any doubt upon the justice of the case, I would not have recommended your Lordships to have given costs; but, being persuaded that that is not so, and putting my own authority out of the question, but standing upon the authority of a great majority of the learned Judges, and under all the circumstances of the case, I recommend to your Lordships to affirm the judgment, and to affirm it with 2004 costs.

Judgment affirmed, with 2007. costs.

1833.

LUCAS

v.

NOOK ELES.

202

1833.

CADELL U. PALMER.

A will devising land, &c. to trustees upon trusts, for accumu lation during twenty-one years, without reference to the minority of any described person, or any of the purposes of marriage; and also creating a term in the trustees for 120 years, if twenty-eight persons named, or any or either of them should so long live; many of the persons named being unconnected with, and taking no benefit under, the trusts; with a term in gross of twenty years, upon trust, after the expiration of the terms of 120 years and twenty years, determinable as before provided, that the trust estates should be conveyed by the trustees to such person as would be entitled to the same, by purchase or descent, for the first or immediate estate for life, in tail or in fee in the same trust estates, as if they had by the will been devised, &c. to the use of G. B. (a nephew of the testator) for life, remainder to his sons successively in tail male, with similar remainders to other nephews and nieces upon the like limitations; with a declaration that the person to whom the conveyances should be made should have such estate as he, &c. would be entitled to take under the limitations, if they had been made by the will; with the like remainders over, &c.; and that no

person should be entitled to a vested estate or any other than a contingent interest until the expiration, or other sooner determination of the 120 years, determinable, &c., and twenty years.

Held, that the will was valid, by way of executory devise, both as to the trust for accumulation under the 39 & 40 Geo. 3., and also as to the limitations to take effect at the expiration of the lives named, and twenty-one years absolute as a term in possession, without reference to infancy or minority.

1833.

CADELL

v.

PALMER.

HENRY BENGOUGH, by his will, dated the 9th of April, 1818, and duly executed, charged all his real and personal estates with an annuity of 4000l. to his wife; and after the decease of his wife (to whom he gave a life interest in a house and premises in Saint James's Square), devised thé said messuage or tenement, gardens, or out-let land, coach-houses, stables, buildings, and premises, unto the Rev. Charles Lucas Edridge, doctor of divinity (since deceased), and to the Respondent, Arthur Palmer the younger, and the Rev. Charles Cadell Edridge, and to George Wright, banker, their heirs and assigns; to hold the same hereditaments unto and to the use of the said Charles Lucas Edridge, Arthur Palmer, Charles Cadell Edridge, and George Wright, their heirs and assigns, for ever; upon trust, that his trustees, or the survivors or survivor of them, or the heirs of such survivor, should at any time within seven years after the decease of his wife, or as they or he should think fit and proper and most advantageous, sell and dispose of the same messuage or tenement, gardens, ground, or out-let land, coach-houses, stables, buildings, offices, and hereditaments, either