to allow our reinforcement (Schenck's brigade and Ayres' battery) to join us.

his most annoying batteries planted. the removal of the abattis across the road, Across the road from this hill was another hill, or rather elevated ridge, or table of land. The hottest part of the "The enemy was evidently disheartcontest was for the possession of this ened and broken. But we had been fighthill with a house on it. The force en- ing since half-past ten o'clock in the morngaged here was Heintzelman's division. ing, and it was after three o'clock in the Wilcox's and Howard's brigades on the afternoon. The men had been up since right, supported by part of Porter's brig- two o'clock in the morning, and had made ade and the cavalry under Palmer, and what to those unused to such things Franklin's brigade of Heintzelman's divi- seemed a long march before coming into sion, Sherman's brigade of Tyler's divi- action, though the longest distance gone sion in the centre and up the road, whilst over was not more than nine and a half Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division was on miles; and though they had three days' the left, attacking the batteries near the provisions served out to them the day stone bridge. The Rhode Island battery before, many no doubt either did not eat of Burnside's brigade also participated in them, or threw them away on the march, this attack by its fire from the north of or during the battle, and were therefore the turnpike. The enemy was under- without food. They had done much stood to have been commanded by J. E. severe fighting. Some of the regiments Johnston. Rickett's battery, which did which had been driven from the hill in such effective service and played so bril- the first two attempts of the enemy to liant a part in this contest, was, together keep possession of it had become shaken, with Griffin's battery, on the side of the were unsteady, and had many men out hill, and became the object of the special of the ranks. It was at this time that attention of the enemy, who succeeded- the enemy's reinforcements came to his our officers mistaking one of his regiments aid from the railroad train, understood for one of our own, aud allowing it to to have just arrived from the valley with approach without firing upon it-in dis- the residue of Johnston's army. They abling the battery, and then attempted threw themselves in the woods on our to take it. Three times was he repulsed right and towards the rear of our right, by different corps in succession, and and opened a fire of musketry on our driven back, and the guns taken by men, which caused them to break and hand, the horses being killed, and pulled retire down the hillside. This soon deaway. The third time it was supposed generated into disorder, for which there by us all that the repulse was final, for was no remedy. Every effort was made he was driven entirely from the hill, and to rally them, even beyond the reach of so far beyond it as not to be in sight, and the enemy's fire, but in vain. The batall were certain the day was ours. He talion of regular infantry alone moved had before this been driven nearly a mile up the hill opposite to the one with the and a half, and was beyond the Warren- house on it, and there maintained itself ton road, which was entirely in our pos- until our men could get down to and session from the stone bridge westward, across the Warrenton turnpike, on the and our engineers were just completing | way back to the position we occupied in

GENERAL MCDOWELL'S REPORT.

389

the morning. The plain was covered seeing great activity in this direction, with the retreating troops, and they much firing, and columns of dust, I beseemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic. Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on the field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form in line, and offer the appearance at least, of organization. They returned by the fords to the Warrrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost.

"Orders had been sent back to Miles' division for a brigade to move forward and protect this retreat, and Colonel Blenker's brigade was detached for this purpose, and was ordered to go as far forward as the point where the road to the right left the main road. By referring to the general order it will be seen that, while the operations were to go on in front, an attack was to be made at Blackburn's Ford by the brigade (Richardson's) stationed there. A reference to his report, and to that of Major Hunt, commanding the artillery, will show that this part of the plan was well and effectively carried out. It succeeded in deceiving the enemy for a considerable time, and in keeping in check a part of his force. The fire of the artillery at this point is represented as particularly destructive. At the time of our retreat,

came anxious for this place, fearing if it were turned or forced the whole stream of our retreating mass would be captured or destroyed. After providing for the protection of the retreat by Porter's and Blenker's brigades, I repaired to Richardson's, and found the whole force ordered to be stationed for the holding of the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, on the march, under the orders from the division commander for Centreville. I immediately halted it, and ordered it to take up the best line of defence across the ridge that their position admitted of, and subsequently taking in person the command of this part of the army, I caused such disposition of the forces, which had been added to by the 1st and 2d New Jersey and the De Kalb regiments, ordered up from Runyon's reserve, before going forward, as would best serve to check the enemy. The ridge being held in this way, the retreating current passed slowly through Centreville to the rear. The enemy followed us from the ford as far as Cub Run, and owing to the road becoming blocked up at the crossing, caused us much damage there, for the artillery could not pass, and several pieces and caissons had to be abandoned. In the panic, the horses hauling the caissons and ammunition were cut from their places by persons to escape with, and in this very much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and the road encumbered. Not only were pieces of artillery lost, but also many of the ambulances carrying the wounded.

"By sundown most of our men had gotten behind Centreville Ridge, and it became a question whether we should or

ments of the day. Time was taken for its preparation, and its writer had consequently the advantage, of which he availed himself, of the published reports of the Union officers; so that the paper is much more complete than is usual with documents of this kind. It bears date August 26, 1861, but was not given to the public for some time after, and then, as it was said, in a somewhat abridged form, curtailed of the comments of the writer on the subsequent conduct of the campaign by the Confederate government. The report was not in fact published till more than six months after the battle which it described, about the time of General Beauregard's departure from Manassas for a new field of operations in the South.

not endeavor to make a stand there. The condition of our artillery and its ammunition, and the want of food for the men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter disorganization and consequent demoralization of the mass of the army, seemed to all who were near enough to be consulted-division and brigade commanders and staff to admit of no alternative but to fall back; the more so as the position of Blackburn's Ford was then in the possession of the enemy, and he was already turning our left. On sending the officers of the staff to the different camps, they found, as they reported to me, that our decision had been anticipated by the troops, most of those who had come in from the front being already on the road Immediately on the advance of Generto the rear, the panic with which they al McDowell from before Washington, came in still continuing and hurrying on the 17th July, as appears from this them along. At o'clock the rear-document, General Beauregard apprised guard (Blenker's brigade) moved, cover- the Confederate War Department at cover-the ing the retreat, which was effected dur-Richmond, by telegraph, of the fact, ing the night and next morning. The when government orders were at once troops at Fairfax station leaving by the transmitted for the reinforcement of his cars, took with them the bulk of the sup- command. General Johnston was directplies which had been sent there. My ed to bring his forces, if possible, from aide-de-camp, Major Wadsworth, stayed Winchester, and General Holmes, who at Fairfax Court-House till late in the was in the rear of Manassas, in Eastern morning, to see that the stragglers and Virginia, at Fredericksburg, was sent weary and worn-out soldiers were not forward with his brigade. On being adleft behind." vised of these measures, General BeaureFrom this account of the battle of Bull gard at first intended that one portion Run, as it is succinctly narrated by the of Johnston's force should advance by a Union general with the candor of a gen-route below Leesburg and take the Union tleman and soldier, we may turn to the forces on their right flank and in the complement of the picture in the official rear at Centreville; but it was found report of the rebel commander, General that the means of transportation did not Beauregard. Like his statement of the admit of this, and a junction of the forces preceding engagement at Blackburn's was resolved upon within the lines of Ford, it is a minute, elaborate and well Bull Run, with the view of an immediate presented exhibition of the military move-attack on the enemy. General Johnston