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EFFECT OF THE MOVEMENT.

the nature of the ground it was not sent for that night, and under cover of darkness the enemy recovered it. The guns engaged in this singular conflict on our side were three 6-pounder rifle pieces and four ordinary 6-pounders, all of Walton's battery-the Washington Artillery of New Orleans."

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a critique of the affair. In fact, he seems to have considered it something of an unnecessary trial of strength, and injudiciously carried far beyond the bounds of the simple observation of the enemy's force, which was designed. After the position of the enemy's battery was ascertained by the replies to the fire of the Parrott guns and battery of rifled 6-pounders, the affair, he thinks, should have ended; "but General Tyler, though warned that no serious engagement was intended at this point, persisting in the belief that the enemy would

"As a part of the history of this engagement," adds General Beauregard, calling to mind doubtless the frequent statements of advantages of this kind sheltering the Confederate troops, "I desire to place on record that, on the 18th of July, not one yard of intrench-run whenever menaced by serious attack, ment, not one rifle-pit sheltered the men at Blackburn's Ford, who, officers and men, with rare exceptions, were on that day for the first time under fire, and at once, it is quite possible, so much dewho, taking and maintaining every posi-pends upon moral effect in operating tion ordered, cannot be too much commended for their soldierly behavior."

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had determined, I believe, to march to Manassas that day. Had he made a vigorous charge and crossed the stream

with raw troops, that he might have succeeded. But he only filed his brigade down to the stream, drew it up parallel to the other shore, and opening an unmeaning fusilade, the results of which were all in favor of the enemy, and before which, overawed rather by the tremendous volley directed at them than suffering from heavy loss, one of the regiments broke in confusion and the whole force retired. This foolish affair had a marked effect upon the morale of our raw forces."*

* The C. S. A. and the Battle of Bull Run. By J G Barnard; pp. 48-9.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

THE day following the engagement | renton turnpike to de end the passage of described in the last chapter, the 19th Bull Run; has seized the stone bridge of July, was passed by General McDow- and made a heavy abattis on the right ell and his staff in a thorough reconnois- bank, to oppose our advance in that disance of the region round about the ad-rection. The ford above the bridge is vanced Union lines, the result of which, also guarded, whether with artillery or in connection with General Tyler's prac- not is not positively known, but every tical experience in the neighborhood of indication favors the belief that he proBlackburn's Ford, was a conviction that poses to defend the passage of the stream, the strength and position of the enemy It is intended to turn the position, force rendered it unadvisable, without a diver- the enemy from the road, that it may be sion, to risk the main attack directly in reopened, and, if possible, destroy the front, or make the attempt, of which railroad leading from Manassas to the much had been said, to gain Manassas by valley of Virginia, where the enemy has an approach from the east. Above a large force. As this may be resisted Stone Bridge, however, the ground ap- by all the force of the enemy, the troops peared more practicable. The stream, will be disposed as follows: The first Bull Run, might readily be forded, and division (General Tyler's) with the exthough there were no good roads leading ception of Richardson's brigade, will, at from the camps in that direction, the half-past 2 o'clock in the morning precountry afforded no serious obstacle to the cisely, be on the Warrenton turnpike to movement of troops. It was accordingly threaten the passage of the bridge, but resolved, by a flank movement, to turn will not open fire until full daybreak. the enemy's position on their left with a The second division (Hunter's) will move sufficient force which should coöperate from its camp at two o'clock in the mornwith a direct attack on their position at ing precisely, and, led by Captain WoodStone Bridge, and thus open the turnpike bury, of the Engineers, will, after passroad from Centreville, and cut off the ing Cub Run, turn to the right and pass railway communication of Manassas with the Bull Run stream above the ford at the army of Johnston in and about Win- Sudley's Spring, and then turning down chester. to the left, descend the stream and clear In pursuance of this plan, General away the enemy who may be guarding McDowell, on the 20th, issued the fol- the lower ford and bridge. It will then lowing military orders for an advance bear off to the right and make room for early the following morning. "The en- the succeeding division. The third diviemy has planted a battery on the War-sion (Heintzelman's) will march at half

DISPOSITION OF THE UNION FORCES.

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past 2 o'clock in the morning, and follow ness, simplicity and truthfulness, "to the road taken by the second division, move the several columns out on the but will cross at the lower ford after it road a few miles on the evening of the has been turned as above, and then, 20th, so that they would have a shorter going to the left, take place between the march in the morning; but I deferred to stream and second division. The fifth those who had the greatest distance to division (Miles') will take position on the go, and who preferred starting early in Centreville Heights, (Richardson's brig- the morning and making but one move. ade will, for the time, form part of the On the evening of the 20th, my command fifth division, and will continue in its was mostly at or near Centreville. The present position.) One brigade will be enemy was at or near Manassas, distant in the village, and one near the present from Centreville about seven miles to station of Richardson's brigade. This the southwest. This the southwest. Centreville is a village division will threaten the Blackburn of a few houses, mostly on the west side Ford, and remain in reserve at Centre- of a ridge running nearly north and ville. The commander will open fire south. The road from Centreville to with artillery only, and will bear in mind Manassas Junction was along this ridge, that it is a demonstration only he is to and crosses Bull Run about three miles make. He will cause such defensive from the former place. The Warrenton works, abattis, earthworks, etc., to be turnpike, which runs nearly east and thrown up as will strengthen his position. west, goes over this ridge, through the Lieutenant Prime, of the Engineers, will village, and crosses Bull Run about four be charged with this duty. These move- miles from it, Bull Run having a course ments may lead to the gravest results, between the crossing from northwest to and commanders of divisions and brig-southeast. The first division (Tyler's) ades should bear in mind the immense consequences involved. There must be no failure, and every effort must be made to prevent straggling. No one must be allowed to leave the ranks without special authority. After completing After completing the movements ordered, the troops must be held in order of battle, as they may be attacked at any moment."

A general engagement was evidently looked for in these dispositions, which were well planned, and had, as we shall see, the effect of taking the enemy by surprise, and disconcerting their scheme of attack upon the Union lines. "It had been my intention," says General McDowell in his subsequent final report of the action which ensued a masterpiece of military narrative in its clear

was stationed on the north side of the Warrenton turnpike, and on the eastern slope of the Centreville ridge, two brigades on the same road, and a mile and a half in advance, to the west of the ridge, and one brigade on the road from Centreville to Manassas, where it crosses Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, where General Tyler had the engagement of the 18th. The second division (Hunter's) was on the Warrenton turnpike, one mile east of Centreville. The third division (Heintzelman's) was on a road known as the Old Braddock road, which comes into Centreville from the southeast, about a mile and a half from the village. The fifth division (Miles') was on the same road with the third division, and between it and Centreville.

"On Friday night, the 10th, a train the Warrenton road, and commence canof subsistence arrived, and on Saturday its contents were ordered to be issued to the command, and the men required to have three days' rations in their haversacks. On Saturday orders were issued for the available force to march. My personal reconnoissance of the roads to the South had shown that it was not practicable to carry out the original plan of turning the enemy's position on their right. The affair of the 18th at Blackburn's Ford showed that he was too strong at that point for us to force a passage there without great loss, and if we did that it would bring us in front of his strong position at Manassas, which was not desired. Our information was that the stone bridge, over which the Warrenton road crossed Bull Run, to the west of Centreville, was defended by a battery in position, and the road on his side of the stream impeded by a heavy abattis. The alternative was, therefore, to turn the extreme left of his position. Reliable information was obtained of an undefended ford about three miles above the bridge, there being another ford between it and the bridge, which was defended. It was therefore determined to take the road to the upper ford, and after crossing, to get behind the forces guarding the lower ford and the bridge, and after occupying the Warrenton road east of the bridge, to send out a force to destroy the railroad at or near Gainesville, and thus break up the communication between the enemy's forces at Manassas and those in the valley of Virginia, before Winchester, which had been held in check by MajorGeneral Patterson.

"Brigadier-General Tyler was directed to move with three of his brigades on

nonading the enemy's batteries, while Hunter's division, moving after him, should, after passing a little stream called Cub Run, turn to the right and north, and move around to the upper ford, and there turn south and get behind the enemy. Colonel Heintzelman's division was to follow Hunter's as far as the turning off place to the lower ford, where he was to cross after the enemy should have been driven out by Hunter's division; the fifth division (Miles') to be in reserve on the Centreville Ridge. I had felt anxious about the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, along the ridge, fearing that whilst we should be in force to the front, and endeavoring to turn the enemy's position, we ourselves should be turned by him by this road; for if he should once obtain possession of this ridge, which overlooks all the country to the west to the foot of the spurs of the Blue Ridge, we should have been irretrievably cut off and destroyed. I had, therefore, directed this point to be held in force, and sent an engineer to extemporize some field-works to strengthen the position. The fourth division (Runyon's) had not been brought to the front further than to guard our communications by way of Vienna and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. His advanced regiment was about seven miles in the rear of Centreville. The divisions were ordered to march at halfpast 2 o'clock A. M., so as to arrive on the ground early in the day, and thus avoid the heat which is to be expected at this season. There was delay in the first division getting out of its camp on the road, and the other divisions were, in consequence, between two and three hours behind the time appointed a

OPENING OF THE BATTLE.

great misfortune, as events turned out. The wood road leading from the Warrenton turnpike to the upper ford was much longer than we counted upon, the general direction of the stream being oblique to the road, and we having the obtuse angle on our side.

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ley's Spring south, and over which Burnside's brigade marched, was for about a mile from the ford thickly wooded, whilst on the right of the road for about the same distance the country was divided between fields and woods. About a mile from the road the country on both sides of the road is open, and for nearly a mile further large rolling fields extend down to the Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what became the field of battle through the valley of a small watercourse, a tributary of Bull Run.

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Shortly after the leading regiment of the first brigade reached the open space, and whilst others and the second brigade were crossing to the front and right,

"General Tyler commenced with his artillery at half-past 6 A. M., but the enemy did not reply, and after some time it became a question whether he was in any force in our front, and if he did not intend himself to make an attack, and make it by Blackburn's Ford. After firing several times, and obtaining no response, I held one of Heintzelman's brigades in reserve, in case we should have to send any troops back to reinforce the enemy opened his fire, beginning Miles' division. The other brigades moved forward as directed in the general orders. On reaching the ford at Sudley's Spring, I found part of the leading brigade of Hunter's division (Burnside's) had crossed, but the men were slow in getting over, stopping to drink. As at this time the clouds of dust from the direction of Manassas indicated the immediate approach of a large force, and fearing it might come down on the head of the column before the division could all get over and sustain it, orders were sent back to the heads of regiments to break from the column and come forward separately as fast as possible. Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman's division to come by a nearer road across the fields, and an aide-de-camp was sent to Brigadier-General Tyler to direct him to press forward his attack, as large bodies of the enemy were passing in front of him to attack the division which had crossed over. The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sud

with artillery and following up with infantry. The leading brigade (Burnside's) had to sustain this shock for a short time without support, and did it well. The battalion of regular infantry was sent to sustain it, and shortly afterwards the other corps of Porter's brigade, and a regiment detached from Heintzelman's division to the left, forced the enemy back far enough to allow Sherman's and Keyes' brigades of Tyler's division to cross from their position on the Warrenton road. These drove the right of the enemy, understood to have been commanded by Beauregard, from the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and down to the road, and across it up the slopes on the other side. Whilst this was going on, Heintzelman's division was moving down the field to the stream, and up the road beyond. Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of the road, down which our troops had marched from Sudley's Spring, is a hill with a farm-house on it. Behind this hill the enemy had, early in the day, some of

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