XI. CHAP. profit or pleasure. Now whether those actions, which are done upon good grounds and for a good purpose, but by a man that maketh not God the end of all his doings, are to be counted sins or not; I will not dispute. Thus much appeareth, that they, who are to be judged by the law of nature, do not always transgress the law of nature. For how should they be judged by that law, which they cannot choose but transgress? CHAPTER XII. UPON WHAT TERMS THAT WHICH IS POSSIBLE MAY BECOME FUTURE. THE Upon what which is possible may become future. THIS being the estate in which the Gospel overtaketh terms that mankind; the question concerning the concurrence of man's free will to the works of God's free grace, is that which remains. And the resolving of it lies in resolving, by what means, and upon what account, that which is of itself only possible becomes future; how it becomes certain, that such a thing shall be, which of itself only may be. For that which is possible and no more, is of itself a mere nothing. That, 81 which only may be, is not. Only it signifies withal, that there is something, that is able to reduce it to effect or being. But that which is future, signifieth here not only rò μéλλov but rò yevnσóμevov; not only that which as yet is not, but that which hereafter shall be: and that imports a certain being for that time. Seeing then, that nothing cannot reduce itself to being; the question is, what it is that renders it certain to be, for the time when it shall be. For all that God can do is absolutely possible. And God can do whatsoever can be done. God cannot deny Himself: and that XII. Some The differtheir ence be tween ne And cessity an tecedent He should do, if contradictories should be true; or things, CHAP. that destroy one another, subsist both at once. Accordingly, whatsoever God sees is certain, and God sees whatsoever shall be; so, whatsoever shall be is certain, though we know not what it is. Now I have said, that it becomes not certain by any decree or motion of God, whereby He determines the will of man, and moves it to do whatsoever it doth, before it move or determine itself; at least in order of nature". Priority in order of nature signifieth this;-that the motion of free will doth necessarily depend, and shall necessarily follow, upon the precedent determination and motion of God. § 2. But things are said to be necessary two ways. are absolutely necessary; the necessity whereof lies in cause, and the efficacy of it, which cannot be defeated. inasmuch as every cause is before the effect, therefore this and consenecessity is called antecedent. Some are necessary only upon quent. supposition; not of that which goes before (for the cause which createth absolute necessity may be supposed), but of something that follows upon the being of any thing. As that, which a man knows or sees to be, of necessity is; because he could not see it if it were not. And so, whatsoever is in the world, of necessity is; because we suppose, that it is. But this necessity is not in the thing (speaking of contingencies), but in that consequence which the mind frameth upon supposing it. And therefore it is called necessity consequent, as the other antecedent. It is not this consequent necessity, that destroyeth freedom in the will, or contingence in the effects of it; but the antecedent. For nothing is ab82 solutely necessary but God, and that which God will have come to pass. And this necessity is the necessity of a cause, that cannot be defeated: not implying any supposition of the effect which it produceth, but inferring the consequence of it; therefore natural, and antecedent, and destructive to freedom in the will, and contingence in the effects of it. And this is no more than I said aforet, why there can be no absolute predestination to glory or to shame, according to the Gospel, and Christianity; because it must come to effect by God's determining and moving the will to every step, that See Epilogue, Bk. II. Of the Cov. of Gr., c. xxi. § 1, sq. See ibid. § 7. The differ ence be CHAP. it maketh, toward life or death everlasting. And that will XII. not stand with that free will which the Gospel supposeth. § 3. For you may have observed a twofold freedom, by the tween free- premisses. The Gospel supposeth mankind born in bondage dom from to sin; and, therefore, supposeth not his will free from bondnecessity and from age: but, supposing this, tenders him life everlasting, upon bondage. condition that he accept of the ransom, which Christ hath [Rom. vi. paid for him; and, renouncing the bondage of sin, become 17, 18.] free to God and His service. And this is an act, which his free will must do; because it is the condition of that, which God does in consideration of it. The consideration is the freedom with which it is done; which if it were done of necessity, there could be no reason why God should either require or reward it. So there is a freedom from necessity, whereby mankind, though slave to sin by birth, embraceth that freedom from sin to righteousness which the Gospel tendereth; though not by the original motion of the will (which is not in slavery unless it love the slavery which it is in), yet by the free motion of it, being first moved by the Gospel to make use of the ransom. For I have shewed", that this motion bringeth with it sufficient help of God's grace, to do that which it requireth. Freedom indeter mination, indiffer ence. § 4. This freedom, then, from necessity, doth not always from neces- require indifference in the will that useth it. For that is sity always requireth properly, only when the will is balanced; not inclining any more to do, than not to do, this rather than that. But it not always requireth, that it be never determined till it determine itself. For it availeth not to say, that that freedom, which God gave man when He made him, was to do freely whatsoever God should determine him to do freely; as other things necessarily do that, which God determineth them to do necessarily. Freedom and the use of freedom is God's gift. But 83 God cannot give freedom by taking it away; nor maintain freedom by destroying it. No more can He cause the will to do that freely, which He determineth it to do necessarily, before it determine itself. Nor is there any fear of making the creature God, if we make it able to do that, which God enableth it to do, without other helps than the ability which "See Epilogue, Bk. II. Of the Cov. * See ibid., c. xxi. § 13. of Gr., c. xxii. § 1, sq. XII. He giveth it. For what is that ability, that enableth not to CHAP. do that, which it maketh a man able to do? It is a riddle when it is not understood. It is a contradiction when it is understood. The ability, which God giveth, issueth from Him, as from the fountain of all ability, every moment of time, which one and the same standing moment of eternity answerethy. So the creature cannot act but by the ability which God issueth; and therefore continueth God's creature, as depending upon God, in that which it doth, no less than in that which it is. If therefore the will of man cannot act freely by virtue of any motion of God's, determining it to act before it determine itself; then must it act freely by virtue of that power, which God giveth it every moment to determine itself. mineth the the free § 5. True it is, that, being the will of a reasonable crea- The obture, it cannot determine itself, till it be determined, in the jeet deternature of an object, by a reason, carrying an appearance of will, saving that which is best for the present". But because that ap- dom of it. pearance changeth from moment to moment; therefore the determination of the object is never peremptory, till you suppose the will to act according to it. And, therefore, though it be necessary, that the will act according to the last dictate of the understanding; yet is this necessity but upon supposition, that it is the last: and that, because you suppose, that the will proceedeth to act without employing further consideration upon the object. So the appearance of good in the object, and the ability of embracing it in the will, serve to make good the freedom of choice in human actions. But the certainty of it from everlasting must be ascribed to the incomprehensible wisdom of God; comprehending all appearance of good, which all men may be moved with at all times, and the effect, which the present disposition of every will shall allow every motion at every moment. Now providence must needs appoint from everlasting, what 84 appearance of good every will shall be moved with every moment; by resolving, what occurrence of objects every reason shall be presented with, in that estate, which it settleth "Nunc stans" is the definition (so to call it) of eternity given by S. Thom. Aquinas, Summ., Pt. I. Qu. x. art. 2. THORNDIKE. M See Epilogue, Bk. II. Of the Cov. of Gr., c. xxiv. § 1, sq. XII. CHAP. every man in, for every moment. And, upon these terms, the foreknowledge of human actions in God must needs be infallibly certain; saving as well the freedom of the will, as the contingence of the things which it doth. For compre-hending first the present disposition of every will, and the effect of every motion that is possible upon it; then, not only how it shall be actually moved, but also that it shall not be moved otherwise: how should He fail to comprehend what it will determine, while it might determine otherwise? Whence the cer ariseth. § 6. And that this is the true and due way, that we are to hold in reasoning of God's counsels, appears by the whole tainty of future con- tenor of the Scriptures; speaking of God in the language of tingencies the children of men, as the Jews' doctors speak". It pleaseth God, not only to deal with man about his salvation, but to treat with him in his own language; because he is not able to understand God otherwise. It is not possible for us to understand the wisdom of God otherwise than according to the wisdom of man, as proceeding by deliberation to resolution; though we know very well all the while, that the simple and indivisible essence of the Godhead is that, into which all variety of His decrees, which the Scripture obligeth men to order, must resolve. Now the Scripture representeth God to us everywhere, as taking the rise and the ground of His counsels and proceedings from that, which He seeth in the thoughts and dispositions of the men whom He ordereth. The instance is remarkable, and unavoidable, which you [Exod. vii. have in the whole course of His bringing the people of Israel out of Egypt, and the destroying of Pharaoh and his people for the hardness of their hearts; which He foresaw would not let them obey His message, and release His peo[1 Kings ple. The like you have in the raising up of enemies to xi. 14-23. Solomon for his sin: and the dividing of the ten tribes from his posterityd. So in the destruction of Ahab, and the representation of God's counsel and proceeding in it, which the prophet Micaiah declares beforehand to his face. So in 23, iii. 17, the crucifying of our Lord, and the means whereby it was 3, 13; 28; ix. 7, 12, 34, x. 11, 20.] 28.] [1 Kings xxii. 23 26.] 18, &c.] See Epilogue, Bk. II. Of the Cov. of Gr., c. xxiv. § 18, sq. b See ibid. § 6: and Grot. ad Rom. iii. 5. See Epilogue, ibid., c. xxiv. § 2—4. See ibid. § 6. |