what does Lord Mansfield say of their Bye-laws? "If this be so, how can any Bye-laws, which exclude the possibility of admitting such persons (persons who would do honour to the College by their skill and learning, &c.) stand with the "trust reposed in them, of admitting all that

are fit?" Mr. Justice Aston, and Mr. Justice Yates, entertained similar opinions. As authorities, I think, we may with confidence, place these luminaries of the law, in the scale against Lord Kenyon, Mr. Justice Lawrence, and Mr. Justice Grose. We shall also find the high authority of Lord Ellenborough, on the same side: for, on Mr. Justice Grose thus addressing him, (being then, as Mr. Law, counsel for Dr. Stanger) "Mr. Law, had not you better advise your client, whether this Bye-Law is not as reasonable as possibly can be?" He replied," Being of opinion, that, as a law of exclusion, it is not a good Bye-Law, I cannot advise him this."

In support of this extraordinary Bye-Law, limiting the admission to the Fellowship to graduates of Oxford and Cambridge,-a Bye-Law, which, as assuming powers not granted, either by their Charter, or by Acts of Parliament, is obviously illegal, the counsel for the College have very appropriately quoted an arbitrary mandate of King Charles II, But even Lord Kenyon,

favourable as he was to the pretensions of the College, makes this remark, on the arguments of counsel deduced from that inaudate: "One cannot rely much upon that letter. You know that, prior to the Revolution, letters were sent, which were not very agreeable to the Constitution."

Upon the whole, the decision of the Bench, that, although, coming within the description of the Charter, the College might, by virtue of one of their own Bye-Laws, refuse to admit Dr. Stanger to examination, i. e. might refuse to take the only steps, by which they could judge of his fitness, if it had not been pronounced at an era, in which, from the circumstances of the times perhaps, it` was deemed expedient to give an indiscriminate support to the pretensions of corporate bodies, whether legal, or illegal, constitutional, or unconstitutional, could not fail to excite the utmost astonishment, and, let me add, no small degree of indignation. Lord Mansfield (and even those, who may be disposed to deny, that the integrity of that accomplished lawyer, was commensurate with his ability, will admit, that, in deciding against corporate pretensions, his judgment might be relied on) has pronounced his opinion decidedly, and without reserve, while those delivered by his successors, are marked with a hesitation, and ambiguity, denoting, at least, a considerable

confusion of ideas, if not a degree of doubt in their own minds, as to the legality of their decision.

Whether Lord Mansfield, if he had tried the cause in 1796, would have thought it expedient to lean to the pretensions of the College, as a body corporate, is a subject of conjecture, into which it is quite unnecessary to enter. We find his interpretation of the law clear, and explicit. We find his learned colleagues coincide with him. We find reason, and common sense unequivocally on the same side. Surely, when backed by such authority, it cannot be thought very presumptuous in us to deny the validity of opposite interpretations, from whatever quarter they may come.

.

It is not a little remarkable that, in delivering their decision in the case of Dr. Stanger, the judges seem cautiously to have avoided calling the bye-laws of exclusion, which formed the ground of that decision, legal. Lord Kenyon and Mr. Justice Lawrence* called it only reasonable, and

The Bye-Laws in question were drawn up, in consequence of the observations of Lord Mansfield, but by no means according to his ideas, while Dr. Lawrence, the father of Mr. Justice Lawrence, one of the judges of their validity, was President of the College.

"It is very remarkable, and perhaps unfortunate," says Dr. Stanger, "that one of the judges, who presided on this trial, had been employed, when a counsel, to sanction the very Bye-Laws, which

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Mr. Justice Ashurst a bye-law of regulation. But besides that bye-laws of exclusion are generally in their nature bad, it does not require much legal knowledge to perceive that a bye-law may be good and reasonable otherwise, and yet militate directly against the law of the land. In this case, it was shown by the arguments of counsel, strengthened by the former decision of Lord Mansfield, that the bye-laws of the college are not only not good or reasonable, but even contrary to the meaning and intent of their own charter. Mr. Justice Chambre (then counsel for Dr. Stanger) expresses himself in the most clear and forcible terms: "If these opinions," said he," are not to

prevail now, I wonder when we can ever meet "with a decision that is to be relied upon. When "has the court been filled with persons of greater "eminence, of greater ability; with

persons who were more an honour and ornament to their pro❝fession? There never was a period in which the "court was filled with more respectable judges, " and never did any cause come before the court, "which was heard with more patience, with more

attention, and more deliberation, and after more

were contended against by the licentiates; and that the father of another of those judges was President of the College when they were made. Three of the same judges were graduates of the uni versities, whose exclusive privileges were contended against."

"frequent arguments, than that very case which "was so decided, and upon which all the judges, "in expressing their opinion, were unanimous.

This opinion, given in the first instance, in "the King v. Dr. Askew, was afterwards, in "Dr. Archer's case, confirmed. If these opinions "are not to form an authority, to which resort 26 may be had in construing the Charter, and in "determining what is the law upon the present

subject, I do not know that any decision, or any series of decisions, can in any case be resorted

to. It will be in vain that the judges, from time "to time, have laid down rules, and have decid"ed cases which have been always understood "to serve as a guide to those who come after "them; it will be in vain, to look to any of the cases heretofore reported, if we are not to look to them as strong authority as can be to the "present point."

The bench that on this occasion, decided in a contrary sense, could not meet the opinion of Lord Mansfield fairly. The grounds of their decision are consequently perplexed, and to me I confess unintelligble. Even the counsel for the College, especially Mr. Gibbs, declared in express terms, that their Charter has nothing of the doctors of Oxford and Cambridge.

It has, I think, been fully established that the power assumed by the College, under their own