did so, and did not again join the infantry until after Campbell had formed his junction with Mountain at the close of the battle. Campbell has in vain endeavoured to discover who the staff officer was. The artillery officers who were with those guns, Lieutenants Robertson and Heath, write that they do not know, and have been unable to find out his name. Thackwell writes that he sent no such order to the battery, and so does Brind, who commanded the horse-artillery. But the fact is undoubted that the guns were taken away as described, and that Campbell lost their services. Again, Major Mowatt, the senior artillery officer with No. 5 battery, acknowledges in writing that, when the advance of the division was ordered, Captain Haythorne, Campbell's aide-de-camp, rode up to him and communicated the brigadier's orders for him to advance his battery in line with the skirmishers whom Brigadier Pennycuick had, by Campbell's orders, thrown out to cover the front of that brigade (the right one of the division), and to open his fire as soon as he could get a good sight of the enemy.' This Mowatt did; but the rapid advance of Pennycuick's brigade carried them in front of the battery at the very commencement of the action, and rendered the battery next to useless. But this was not Campbell's fault, whoever was to blame; and I must say, all that he has shown to me completely removed the impression, which I frankly told him I had entertained, of his having neglected to avail himself of his artillery to the proper extent.

1849.] SIR P. GRANT'S LETTER OF EXONERATION. 211

He is most anxious that you should know exactly what were his proceedings throughout the day; and when you have seen all he has placed before me in original (and he will send you copies by the next mail), I feel very sure that, with me, you will think he did his duty like a brave and experienced soldier, and with consummate judgment and skill. He has the highest respect for your lordship; and in the desire and earnest hope of retaining the good opinion of his old commander, he wishes you to know the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.Believe me, my dear lord, affectionately yours, "PATRICK GRANT."

CHAPTER VI.

ENCAMPMENT NEAR CHILLIANWALA-FALL OF MOOLTAN-JOURNAL -ENEMY'S MOVEMENTS-RUSSOOL ABANDONED-STRENGTH OF SIKH POSITION-JUNCTION OF LORD GOUGH'S WITH GENERAL WHISH'S FORCE-ADVANCE TO GOOJRAT-ENEMY'S POSITION— BATTLE OF GOOJRAT-COLIN CAMPBELL'S SHARE IN THE ACTION -DEFEAT AND PURSUIT OF SIKH ARMY-COLIN CAMPBELL JOINS PURSUING FORCE-BEHAVIOUR OF SIKHS ON LAYING DOWN THEIR ARMS ATTOCK-JUMROOD-COMMAND OF SIND SAGUR DISTRICT -LETTER REGARDING OPERATIONS-13TH AND 22D N.I.-K.C.B. RECEPTION BY 61ST REGIMENT APPOINTED TO PESHAWUR COMMAND-SIR C. NAPIER AT PESHAWUR-EXPEDITION TO KOHAT -COLIN CAMPBELL VISITS CASHMERE-ILLNESS-ADDRESSES SIR H. LAWRENCE ON SUBJECT OF KOHAT PASS-RESIGNATION OF SIR C. NAPIER.

THE day after the battle, the army encamped in the immediate vicinity of Chillianwala. In this position, which he strengthened with breast works, Lord Gough determined to await the result of the final attack on Mooltan, and the reinforcements which would become available on the reduction of that fortress. The Bombay column having joined General Whish's force on the 21st December 1848, the attack was renewed six days later; and on the 22d January 1849 the place fell, Moolraj surrendered, and the besieging force forthwith commenced its

1849.]

ENEMY'S MOVEMENTS.

213

march to join Lord Gough. For many days nothing of importance was recorded by Colin Campbell in his journal. Much rain fell, causing great mortality amongst the cattle, and rendering the movement of troops, especially that of heavy artillery, wellnigh impracticable.

It

"Journal, 6th February.-Three or four days ago the enemy moved a large portion of his force from his right down upon the low ground at the spur of the hill, where he had joined the river by an intrenchment to the left of Russool, and as far as Pooran, which is close to the pass of that name. was supposed by our headquarter people that the object of the enemy was precautionary and defensive, and not aggressive; but as we were expecting a large convoy from Goojrat, the Commander-inchief became very uneasy for its safety. I looked upon the move of the enemy behind the hills, which screened the operations from our view, as intended for future offensive operations against our right flank and rear; but the Commander-in-chief thought otherwise, though a movement on our part to our right, to Khoree or Dingee, which I deemed prudent and advisable, especially as the enemy had moved the larger portion of his army to his left, could not be regarded as a movement in retreat. But the political officers were then averse to moving our position, as was also the Commander-in-chief, so that nothing was done. The convoy came in safely under a large escort the next day, and all apprehen

sion or opinion of the necessity for a movement to our right, to meet and counteract that of the enemy to their left, appears to have been given up. On the 3d, we heard of the enemy clearing the Pooran pass; on the 4th, that he had a few troops on our side of the pass; and yesterday, that he had moved eleven or twelve regiments of infantry to this side of it, with twelve guns the former being placed in front of a belt of jungle which covers the mouth of the pass, and the latter in rear of the jungle. There was a meeting of general officers, chief engineer, and Major Mackeson,' chief political authority, on the subject of our present position. Everybody condemned it as a bad one, the nature of the ground admitting of the enemy turning both our flanks and getting in our rear unseen by us, without our being able to prevent him-a movement he could effect at any moment. Major Mackeson urged strongly the move to Dingee, with a view to obtaining supplies and securing forage for our cattle, of which the possession of that place by the enemy would deprive us. An opinion, however, was expressed by Grant, the Adjutant-General, that we could manage to feed our cattle as we had done before, and that the enemy being now out of the pass, it would be as well to remain where we were until General Whish had joined or was near to us; that if the enemy moved upon Dingee, we could move and attack him; that he would not be likely 1 The late Colonel W. Mackeson, C.B.