CHAPTER IX.

IMPROVEMENT OF DEFENCES-INTERRUPTIONS-BATTLE OF INKERMAN -RUSSIAN FORCE IN TCHERNAYA VALLEY- -REINFORCEMENTSHURRICANE OF 14TH NOVEMBER-EFFECTS OF WEATHER-MORTALITY AMONGST TURKS-SIR COLIN'S ANXIETY—WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIANS ACROSS THE TCHERNAYA-SIR COLIN AMONGST HIS TROOPS - LABOUR OF ALLIED TROOPS ON FATIGUE SERVICE COLONELCY OF 67TH REGIMENT-WINTER-SIR COLIN'S RELATIONS WITH GENERAL VINOY PRESENTS FROM SCOTLAND TO HIGHLAND BRIGADE-VISIT OF SIR H. KEPPEL-LETTER FROM SIR J. BURGOYNE-INCREASED VIGILANCE-ABORTIVE EXPEDITION OF 20TH FEBRUARY-LETTER TO COLONEL H. EYRE-APPREHENSIONS OF ATTACK-RECONNAISSANCE-VOLUNTEERS-SIR COLIN'S OBJECTIONS TO THEM SIR COLIN'S DISAPPOINTMENT ON DEPARTURE OF KERTCH EXPEDITION 1ST DIVISION LEAVES BALAKLAVA-DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN-SIR COLIN IN THE TRENCHES -HIGHLANDERS DETACHED TO KAMARA-LETTER PREVIOUS TO ASSAULT OF 8TH SEPTEMBER-OFFER OF COMMAND AT MALTALETTER TO COLONEL EYRE-DETERMINATION TO QUIT THE ARMY.

THE weather still continuing fine, advantage was taken of every available hour to strengthen and improve the defences. Though Sir Colin was indefatigable in his exertions to accomplish this object, he had many difficulties to encounter. His troops were at that time unaccustomed to the use of the spade and mattock, and strangers to the shelter-trench exercise,

now so wisely constituting an integral portion of the soldier's instruction. More than this, there was an apparent unwillingness, originating in the fine courage of his troops, to fight behind cover. When on one occasion he reasoned, as he was wont, with some working-parties of the 42d and 79th Highlanders for not making greater progress with the deepening of the ditch in their front, he was met with the rejoinder, "If we make it so deep we shall not be able to get over it to attack the Russians." Amongst other additions to the defences a dam was constructed to flood the low ground between No. 4 battery at Kadiköi and the foot of the Marine heights, by means of the rivulet which, winding through the vineyards, covered this part of the position. It was further strengthened with trous de loups and abatis. No pains were spared to render the eastern approach to the Marine heights as difficult as possible. A deep cutting, strengthened with an oaken fraise, was made across the Baidar pathway. At the end of it, towards and some way down the valley, a treble line of trous de loups was constructed. In the other or southern direction it extended to the cliffs above the sea. This cutting was commanded by a battery situated 200 yards above it, and was exposed to musketry-fire from a loopholed trench, connected by a covered-way with the heights above, to which a safe retreat, in case of necessity, could be made. To meet the contingency of the lines being forced, a square redoubt was eventually constructed on the

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INKERMAN.

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highest point of the position, and was armed with

six heavy guns.

There were, however, manifold interruptions to the trench-work, occasioned by the menacing attitude of the enemy, who was observed to be turning his attention towards the eastern portion of the lines of Balaklava. On the 2d November he made a reconnaissance in that direction, and tried the range from the opposite hills with some 32-pounder howitzers. The projectiles, however, fell far short of the Marine heights. These movements demanded corresponding action on the part of Sir Colin's troops, who had, for the moment, to exchange their intrenching tools and working dress for their arms and accoutre

ments. At the same time, intelligence reached the Allies of the continuous arrival of fresh reinforcements for the Russian army; and this, coupled with many other circumstances indicative of increased activity on the enemy's side, betokened the probability of an approaching crisis. All this time Sir Colin had established his headquarters in No. 4 battery, though his tent, together with those of the 93d Highlanders, remained standing in front of that work.

Early in the morning of the 5th November the Russians delivered their attack on Mount Inkerman, directing it against the right of the English besieging force. Through the grey fog, consequent on the drizzling rain, which had been falling since the previous day, the enemy's troops were discerned from

the Balaklava lines forming soon after daybreak in battle array opposite the plateau of the Chersonese, and extending in a long line far down the Tchernaya valley, with their left resting on Kamara and threatening Balaklava. This was the force under Prince Gortschakoff, who had moved from his headquarters at Tchorgoun with the intention of distracting the attention of the Allies from the main point of attack, and of seizing the opportunity of ascending the Sapouné heights, supported by the powerful mass of cavalry at his disposal. Though it was soon evident to both Sir Colin and Vinoy that the movements of the enemy in their front were not directed against Balaklava, their anxiety was none the less trying by reason of the prolonged suspense they endured in listening for so many hours to the sound of the conflict raging on the neighbouring plateau, without receiving any intelligence of the course of the struggle. Nor was it till a late hour in the afternoon that they learned authoritatively that fortune had favoured the Allies, and that the Russians had experienced a signal defeat.

Gortschakoff withdrew at the close of the day to Tchorgoun without striking a blow, his force resuming at nightfall the original position taken up by it on the 25th October. The necessity, therefore, for vigilance on the part of the defenders of Balaklava was not diminished. On the contrary, the frequency of apprehended attacks proved very harassing to the handful of troops occupying such extensive lines;

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POSITION OF THE DEFENDERS.

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for it may without exaggeration be asserted that the duty imposed upon them was that of a continuous picket, every hour that could be spared from guard during the day being employed in the works, every soldier not in the works lying down at night with his rifle by his side, to meet the contingency of a night attack. After one of these alarms on the 12th November, the troops on the Marine heights received a welcome addition to their numbers in the shape of a battalion of Zouaves, 500 strong. A few days previously the left wing of the 2d battalion Rifle Brigade had been placed at Sir Colin's disposal, so that the combined reinforcement constituted a material acquisition of strength in that part of the position, which he still continued to regard with the greatest anxiety; for should the enemy succeed in establishing himself on the Marine heights, Balaklava would be lost. The movements amongst the enemy's troops which caused several of the alarms at this period, were traceable to the presence at the Russian field-army of the two young Grand Dukes-Nicholas and Michael-who had reached Sebastopol on the eve of Inkerman. At the time, it was evident to those who kept the look-out from the English position that some persons of consideration were amongst the Russians, and were occupying themselves with a keen inspection of the lines of Balaklava. This surmise was confirmed by the reports of deserters, several of whom, including even some from the garrison of Sebastopol, escaped by way of the Kamara outposts.