THE above picture, with its warning words, was printed in the Pennsylvania Gazette, after news of the taking of Duquesne reached Philadelphia. Cut and motto were Benjamin Franklin's, and together they put the whole situation in the colonies in a nutshell. Everybody could understand the picture; all feel the warning. But England could not, or would not, understand why her colonies, which were to the French as ten to one, should want her help. The truth is that England's selfish policy kept the colonies practically defenceless as against a military colony like Canada. She was so afraid of their coming to know their own strength, that when it came to opposing Canada, it could not be done effectively for want of united effort. Canada was always on a war footing; the American colonies were not. all Canada there was but one will, while in the American colonies there were as many wills as there were governors or legislatures. Besides in Canada there was always a certain number of regular troops, that could be marched off to Detroit or Duquesne, by instant order of the governor-general. In the American colonies there were neither regular troops, officers, nor arsenals, so that

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no such prompt action could be taken. Worse still, these colonies never did pull together. Complete independence of each other made them regard their own interests first of all, and their neighbors very much in the light of foreigners. Virginia was jealous of Pennsylvania's moves in the West; Pennsylvania more so of Virginia. There was no want of men, money, or martial spirit, except among the Quakers, but a united purpose was everywhere sadly lacking. Out of a state of dependence there had grown up such a habit of dependence upon England that unless England herself took action, it was plain that the colonies would hardly exert themselves to any useful purpose, even to fight their own battles.

"Well, then,” said King George, " if England finds the soldiers to fight their battles for them it is but fair they should pay them." Cheap bargaining that between a king and his subjects! To this the colonies very plainly replied: "It is as much England's battle as ours, so long as we are part and parcel of the empire. Look at Canada! French soldiers are sent out there to fight us, who are paid out of the public chest, and you say we must

pay yours ourselves."

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we will advance the

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'Very well," said the crafty king, money ourselves from our royal

chest, merely taxing you for its repayment." "No," said the colonies again, we will do our part in our own way, but as this is practically the same proposal disguised, submit to be taxed, without a voice in your Parliament, we will not." And there the matter was dropped.

The colonies here established a principle, tersely phrased as "No taxation without representation." And that is where they were right.

Seeing that the colonies could not fight the French alone, and would not hire English soldiers to help them,

for that was just what the king's proposal amounted to, England resolved first of all to whip the French, and reckon with the colonies afterward, but to do it in such a way as to avoid a formal declaration of war. As both countries had but lately ceased from a long and bloody war, neither was half eager to renew it. They therefore kept up the same show of friendship at home, while quietly shipping off soldiers to fight one another across the Atlantic. This was wittily likened to two neighbors throwing stones at one another over the wall. And as both acted with about equal duplicity, perhaps the least said about honor the better.

After careful consideration, it was secretly planned to attack all the French forts from Lake Champlain to the Ohio, take or destroy them, and so utterly to defeat the declared purpose of crowding the English back behind the Alleghanies, and keeping them there. To make success sure, these attacks were to be made at all points at once. So much, at least, was decided upon over the council table in England.

Nothing is more simple than to trace out a plan of campaign on a map; nothing easier than to traverse lakes, mountains, or wildernesses with the forefinger. Here we march, there fight; and, presto, the thing is done. This plan covered a thousand miles of frontier, a great part of which was inaccessible for want of roads. Even the genius of a Cæsar or a Napoleon could not march an army across the Alps without a road, and here were mountains over which no carriage had ever passed.

By common consent the mastery of the Ohio valley was the most important object of all; hence the greatest effort of all was to be put forth against Fort Duquesne. Should that fall, the French would be driven from the

valley back to the lakes; should Niagara and Frontenac fall, they would be driven out of Lake Ontario, and their relaxing grasp torn from the West. For fifty years it had been constantly said in the colonies, "The French must be driven out of Canada; we shall have no peace while they remain." It now began to look as if what had been so long hoped for might really come to pass. Throughout the colonies there was a general awakening to the possibility—a listening for the tap of the wardrum.

England, therefore, first directed the assembling of a convention or congress of delegates, from each colony, to secure the alliance of the Iroquois, that being a step of the first importance. This congress met at Albany, June 14, 1754, and after listening to some very plain talk from the Iroquois chiefs, every word of which was true, engaged them in its cause, with the understanding that this time the French would certainly be driven out of Canada, bag and baggage.1

2

Something more was done. Benjamin Franklin, who had first thrown out his idea by a rude picture, and who was a member of this congress, had drawn up a plan to remedy the evils arising from a want of union. It took at once. His plan was agreed to, but never put in force, because, as we have said, England did not wish the colonies to know their own power, and Franklin's plan promised to build up a powerful confederacy, quite like that set up in New England in 1643, with similar objects. But the seed had been sowed. It was most natural that when the chief men of the colonies came together they should talk over their own needs, compare their grievances, harmonize conflicting interests and so get in touch with each other, as every one felt they ought, but no

body suggested. And though unsuccessful at this time, the plan took deep root in the minds of all thinking men.

1 THE IROQUOIS had to be first placated. They alleged first that it was their lands that the French and English were quarrelling about, and second, that the English had made paths and built forts through it without their consent. To this Conrad Weiser, the interpreter, replied as follows: "Brethren: The road to Ohio is no new road. It is an old and frequented road, the Shawnees and Delawares removed thither above thirty years ago from Pennsylvania, ever since which that road has been travelled by our traders at their invitation and always with safety, until within these few years that the French with their usual

faithlessness sent armies there, threatened the Indians, and obstructed our trade with them."-Doc. Hist. of N. Y., ii., 585.

2 FRANKLIN'S PLAN is said to be nearly identical with that outlined in 1722, in the preface to a tract entitled, "A Description of the Province of South Carolina," by Daniel Coxe. But the New England Colonies had formed their confederacy on similar lines eighty years before.

3 THOMAS POWNALL, a member of this congress, and later Governor of Massachusetts, submitted to the Earl of Halifax the danger of such a union to Great Britain.

THE TRAGEDY OF FORT DUQUESNE

"Who would have thought it?"

To take Duquesne two battalions of regular troops, with suitable artillery, were sent over, under command of General Braddock,' who was to have a like number of provincials, so raising his whole force above two thousand men. In later wars this would have been a mere detachment, but in those days it passed for a large army. It was not, however, so much the numbers, as the results, that were of importance to this campaign, and these twenty odd hundred men were considered quite enough to take Duquesne, if properly led. And so they were. Knowing but vaguely what the service was to be, the home ministry had sent over a general as ignorant as themselves. He was an indolent officer of the Guards, very soldierlike, very pompous, called very brave,