such sentences as Achilles vulneravit, Lysippus fecit. But though this be evident and clearly understood, the mind is still in suspence, and finds its conception incomplete. Action, it well knows, not only requires some agent, but it must have a subject also to work on, and it must produce some effect. It is, then, to denote one of these (that is, the subject or the effect) that the authors of language have destined the accusative. Achilles vulneravit Hectorem; here the accusative denotes the subject. Lysippus fecit statuas; here the accusative denotes the effect. By these additional explanations the mind becomes satisfied, and the sentences acquire a perfection which before they wanted. In whatever other manner, whether figuratively, or with prepositions, this case may have been used, its first destination seems to have been that here mentioned, and hence therefore we shall form its character and description: the accusative is that case which to an efficient nominative and verb of action subjoins either the effect or the passive subject. We have still left the genitive and the dative, which we investigate as follows.

It has been said in the preceding chapter," that when the places of the nominative and the accusative are filled by proper substantives, other substantives are annexed by the help of prepositions. Now though this be so far true in the modern languages, that (a very few instances excepted) they know no other method; yet is not the rule of equal latitude with respect to the Latin or Greek, and that from reasons which we are about to offer.

Among the various relations of substantives denoted by prepositions, there appear to be two principal ones; and these are, the term or point which something commences from, and the term or point which something tends to. These relations the Greeks and Latins thought of so great importance, as to distinguish them, when they occurred, by peculiar terminations of their own, which expressed their force without the help of a preposition. Now it is here we behold the rise of the ancient genitive and dative: the genitive being formed to express all relations commencing from itself; the dative all relations tending to itself. Of this there can be no stronger proof than the analysis of these cases in the modern languages which we have mentioned already."

It is on these principles that they say in Greek, deoμaí σov, Siswμi ooi, "of thee I ask," "to thee I give." The reason is, δίδωμί σοι, in requests, the person requested is one whom something is expected from; in donations, the person presented is one whom something passes to. So again, TETоinтai Xilov, "it is made of stone." Stone was the passive subject, and thus it appears in

"See before, p. 194.

See before, p. 196, 7.

X

"made of gold and ivory." So says Pausanias of the Olympian Jupiter, l. v. p. 400,

* Χρυσοῦ πεποιημένος καὶ ἐλέφαντος, See also Hom. Iliad. Σ. 574.

the genitive as being the term from, or out of which. Even in Latin, where the syntax is more formal and strict, we read,

Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguisque ferinæ.

Virg.

The old wine and venison were the funds or stores of or from which they were filled. Upon the same principles, Пív Toû udatos, is a phrase in Greek; and Je bois de l'eau, a phrase in French; as much as to say, I take some or a certain part, from or out of a certain whole."

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When we meet in language such genitives as "the son of a father;""the father of a son;" "the picture of a painter;" "the painter of a picture," &c., these are all relatives, and therefore each of them reciprocally a term or point to the other, from or out of which it derives its essence, or at least its intellection."

The dative, as it implies tendency to, is employed among its other uses to denote the final cause, that being the cause to which all events, not fortuitous, may be said to tend. thus used in the following instances among innumerable others.

Tibi suaveis dædala tellus

Submittit flores.

Tibi brachia contrahit ardens
Scorpius.

Tibi serviat ultima thule.

Lucret.

Virg. Georg. i.

Ibid.

And so much for cases, their origin and use; a sort of forms or terminations which we could not well pass over, from their great importance both in the Greek and Latin tongues; but which, however, not being among the essentials of language, and therefore not to be found in many particular languages, can be hardly said to fall within the limits of our inquiry.

CHAPTER V.

CONCERNING INTERJECTIONS.

RECAPITULATION,

CONCLUSION.

BESIDES the parts of speech before mentioned, there remains the interjection. Of this kind among the Greeks are 'N, Þeû, Ai,

All relatives are said to reciprocate, or mutually infer each other, and therefore they are often expressed by this case, that is to say, the genitive. Thus Aristotle: Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος, καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δοῦλου δεσπότης λέγεται εἶναι, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον, Kal To μov dinλaolov μov: Omnia vero, quæ sunt ad aliquid, referuntur ad ea, quæ reciprocantur. Ut servus dicitur domini servus; et dominus, servi dominus; necnon duplum, dimidii duplum; et dimi

dium, dupli dimidium. Categor. c. vii.

Annon et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis modernis spiritus nonnihil redundat) antiquas linguas plenas declinationum, casuum, conjugationum, et similium fuisse; modernas, his fere destitutas, plarima per præpositiones et verba auxiliaria segniter expedire? Sane facile quis conjiciat (utcunque nobis ipsi placeamus) ingenia priorum seculorum nostris fuisse multo acutiora et subtiliora. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. vi. 1.

&c.; among the Latins, Ah! Heu! Hei! &c.; among the English, Ah! Alas! Fie! &c. These the Greeks have ranged among their adverbs; improperly, if we consider the adverbial nature, which always coincides with some verb as its principal, and to which it always serves in the character of an attributive. Now interjections coincide with no part of speech, but are either uttered alone, or else thrown into a sentence, without altering its form, either in syntax or signification. The Latins seem therefore to have done better in separating them by themselves," and giving them a name by way of distinction from the rest.

Should it be asked, if not adverbs, what then are they? It may be answered, not so properly parts of speech, as adventitious sounds; certain voices of nature, rather than voices of art, expressing those passions and natural emotions which spontaneously arise in the human soul, upon the view or narrative of interesting events.

"And thus we have found that all words are either significant by themselves, or only significant when associated; that those significant by themselves, denote either substances or attributes, and are called for that reason substantives and attributives; that the substantives are either nouns or pronouns; that the attributives are either primary or secondary; that the primary attributives are either verbs, participles, or adjectives; the secondary, adverbs. Again, that the parts of speech, only significant when associated, are either definitives or connectives; that the definitives are either articular or pronominal; and that the connectives are either prepositions or conjunctions."

And thus have we resolved language as a whole into its constituent parts, which was the first thing that we proposed in the course of this inquiry.

a Vid. Servium in Æneid. xii. 486.

b Interjectiones a Græcis ad adverbia referuntur, atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius. Et recte quidem de iis, quando casum regunt. Sed quando orationi solum inseruntur, ut nota affectus, velut suspirii aut metus, vix videntur ad classem aliquam pertinere, ut quæ naturales sint notæ ; non, aliarum vocum instar, ex instituto significant. Voss. de Anal. 1. i. c. 1. Interjectio est vox af fectum mentis significans, ac citra verbi opem sententiam complens. Ibid. c. 3. Restat classium extrema, interjectio. Hujus appellatio non similiter se habet ac conjunctionis. Nam cum hæc dicatur conjunctio, quia conjungat; interjectio tamen, non quia interjacet, sed quia interjicitur, nomen accepit. Nec tamen de ovolą ejus est, ut interjiciatur; cum per se compleat sententiam, nec raro ab ea incipiat oratio. Ibid. I. iv. c. 28. Interjectionem non esse partem orationis sic ostendo: quod naturale est, idem est apud omnes: sed gemitus et

signa lætitiæ idem sunt apud omnes: sunt igitur naturales. Si vero naturales, non sunt partes orationis. Nam eæ partes, secundum Aristotelem, ex instituto, non natura, debent constare. Interjectionem Græci adverbiis adnumerant; sed falso. Nam neque, &c. Sanct. Miner. 1. i. c. 2. Interjectionem Græci inter adverbia ponunt, quoniam hæc quoque vel adjungitur verbis, vel verba ei subaudiuntur. Ut si dicam-papœ! quid video-vel per se-papa!-etiamsi non addatur, miror; habet in se ipsius verbi significationem. Quæ res maxime fecit Romanorum artium scriptores separatim hanc partem ab adverbiis accipere; quia videtur affectum habere in sese verbi, et plenam motus animi significationem, etiamsi non addatur verbum, demonstrare. Interjectio tamen non solum illa, quæ dicunt Græci oxerλiaoμdv, significat; sed etiam voces, quæ cujuscunque passionis animi pulsu per exclamationem interjiciuntur. Prisc. I. xv. Sec before, p. 119.

But now, as we conclude, methinks I hear some objector demanding, with an air of pleasantry and ridicule, “Is there no speaking, then, without all this trouble? Do we not talk every one of us, as well unlearned as learned, as well poor peasants as profound philosophers?" We may answer, by interrogating on our part, Do not those same poor peasants use the lever and the wedge, and many other instruments, with much habitual readiness? And yet have they any conception of those geometrical principles from which those machines derive their efficacy and force? And is the ignorance of these peasants a reason for others to remain ignorant, or to render the subject a less becoming inquiry? Think of animals and vegetables that occur every day; of time, of place, and of motion; of light, of colours, and of gravitation; of our very senses and intellect, by which we perceive every thing else: that they are we all know, and are perfectly satisfied; what they are is a subject of much obscurity and doubt. Were we to reject this last question, because we are certain of the first, we should banish all philosophy at once out of the world.d

But a graver objector now accosts us. "What (says he) is the utility? Whence the profit, where the gain?" Every science whatever (we may answer) has its use. Arithmetic is excellent for the gauging of liquors; geometry, for the measuring of estates; astronomy, for the making of almanacks; and grammar, perhaps, for the drawing of bonds and conveyances.

Thus much to the sordid. If the liberal ask for something better than this, we may answer and assure them, from the best authorities, that every exercise of the mind upon theorems of science, like generous and manly exercise of the body, tends to call forth and strengthen nature's original vigour. Be the subject itself immediately lucrative or not, the nerves of reason are braced by the mere employ, and we become abler actors in the drama of life, whether our part be of the busier or of the sedater kind.

Perhaps, too, there is a pleasure even in science itself, distinct from any end to which it may be further conducive. Are not health and strength of body desirable for their own sakes, though we happen not to be fated either for porters or draymen? and have not health and strength of mind their intrinsic worth also,

ὰ Ἀλλ ̓ ἔστι πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων, ἃ τὴν μὲν ὕπαρξιν ἔχει γνωριμωτάτην, άγνωστοτάτην δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν· ὥσπερ ἥτε κίνησις, καὶ ὁ τόπος, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ χρόνος. Εκάστου γὰρ τούτων τὸ μὲν εἶναι γνώριμον καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτον τις δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ οὐσία, τῶν χαλεπωτάτων δραθήναι. Ἔστι δὲ δὴ τι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ ψυχή τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τι τὴν ψυχὴν, γνωριμώτατον καὶ φανερώτατον· τι δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν, οὐ ῥᾴδιον καταμαθεῖν : "There are in the

number of things, many which have a most known existence, but a most unknown esence ; such for example as motion, place, and, more than either of them, time. The existence of each of these is known and indisputable, but what their essence is, or nature, is among the most dificult things to discern. The soul also is in the same class : that it is something, is most evident ; but what it is, is a matter not so easy to learn. Alex. Aphrod. de Anima, p. 142.

though not condemned to the low drudgery of sordid emolument? Why should there not be a good (could we have the grace to recognise it) in the mere energy of our intellect, as much as in energies of lower degree? The sportsman believes there is good in his chase, the man of gaiety in his intrigue, even the glutton in his meal. We may justly ask of these, Why they pursue such things? but if they answer, "they pursue them because they are good," it would be folly to ask them further, Why they pursue what is good? It might well, in such case, be replied on their behalf, (how strange soever it may at first appear,) that if there was not something good, which was in no respect useful, even things useful themselves could not possibly have existence." For this is in fact no more than to assert, that some things are ends, some things are means; and that if there were no ends, there could be, of course, no means.

It should seem, then, the grand question was, What is good? that is to say, what is that which is desirable, not for something else, but for itself? for whether it be the chase, or the intrigue, or the meal, may be fairly questioned, since men in each instance are far from being agreed.

In the mean time, it is plain, from daily experience, there are infinite pleasures, amusements, and diversions; some for summer, others for winter; some for country, others for town; some easy, indolent, and soft; others boisterous, active, and rough; a multitude diversified to every taste, and which for the time are enjoyed as perfect good, without a thought of any end that may be further obtained. Some objects of this kind are at times sought by all men, excepting alone that contemptible tribe, who, from a love to the means of life, wholly forgetting its end, are truly, for that reason, called misers, or miserable.

If there be supposed, then, a pleasure, a satisfaction, a good, a something valuable for itself without view to any thing further, in so many objects of the subordinate kind; shall we not allow the same praise to the sublimest of all objects? Shall the intellect alone feel no pleasures in its energy, when we allow them to the grossest energies of appetite and sense? Or if the reality of all pleasures and goods were to be controverted, may not the intellectual sort be defended, as rationally as any of them? Whatever may be urged in behalf of the rest (for we are not now arraigning them) we may safely affirm of intellectual good, that it is "the good of that part which is most excellent within us; that it is a good accommodated to all places and times; which neither depends on the will of others, nor on the affluence of external fortune; that it is a good which decays not with decaying appetites, but often rises in vigour when those are no more."e

There is a difference, we must own, between this intellectual e See before, p. 48.