struggle took place. The enemy, however, were chiefly contending to preserve their train of supplies, and when they had done this, fell back. Here Grant ordered the pursuit to be discontinued, since it was absolutely necessary to move to the aid of Burnside.

Of Grant's bearing in action, the following notice by Colonel E. S. Parker, one of his staff, is interesting: "It has been a matter of universal wonder in this army that General Grant himself was not killed, and that no more accidents occurred to his staff; for the General was always in the front (his staff with him, of course), and perfectly heedless of the storm of hissing bullets and screaming shell flying around him. His apparent want of sensibility does not arise from heedlessness, heartlessness, or vain military affectation, but from a sense of the responsibility resting upon him when in battle. When at Ringgold, we rode for half a mile in the face of the enemy, under an incessant fire of cannon and musketry; nor did we ride fast, but upon an ordinary trot; and not once, do I believe, did it enter the General's mind that he was in danger. I was by his side, and watched him closely. In riding that distance we were going to the front, and I could see that he was studying the positions of the two armies. Another feature in General Grant's personal movements is, that he requires no escort beyond his staff, so regardless of danger is he. Roads are almost useless to him, for he takes short cuts through fields and woods, and will swim his horse through almost any stream that obstructs his way. Nor does it make any difference to him whether he has daylight for his movements, for he will ride from breakfast until two o'clock in the morning,

and that too without eating. The next day he will repeat the dose, until he finishes his work. Now, such things come hard upon the staff, but they have learned how to bear it."

The Union loss in the battle of Chattanooga was seven hundred and fifty-seven killed, four thousand five hundred and twenty-nine wounded, and three hundred and thirty missing; a total of five thousand six hundred and sixteen. Six thousand one hundred and forty-two prisoners were captured, forty pieces of artillery, and seven thousand stands of arms, though the reported loss was less than ours. The Union force engaged was over sixty thousand men, and the Confederate force about forty-five thousand; but these last had an advantage of position, which more than counterbalanced the disparity. Taken all together, the battle was the grandest, and the victory the most brilliant, gained during the war.

At Fort Donelson, the victory was gained by hard fighting and the intuitive knowledge of when to take the initiative; at Shiloh, it had been gained by dogged perseverance and hard fighting; at Vicksburg, it had been by strategy; and here at Chattanooga, by skilful dispositions of the troops, by manoeuvring in the face of the enemy, and by the instinct of success. A General is of course unable to carry out his plans without the aid of an army to execute them; but the spirit of his army is in a great measure dependent upon his own. It is of course impossible to make heroes of poltroons, or poltroons of heroes, but it is quite possible to infuse into an army a confidence in themselves, and in their leader, which will make them capable of great deeds, as

it is also possible to so break the spirit of true men, as to make them down-hearted and indisposed to take the initiative. We have seen in this campaign instances of both these effects. The army of the Cumberland, when Grant took its command, was listless and dispirited; it felt that it was in a trap, and its tenure of Chattanooga was dependent upon the forbearance of the blockading army. The duties of every day kept thrusting the dangers of the position before the men : their rations were short; their artillery was practically useless on account of the wretched condition of their animals from want of food; an exultant enemy was strongly posted in their front; their retreat was almost as impossible as their advance; and the situation was growing daily and hourly more precarious. In five days, however, from the time Grant personally assumed the command, he had secured their lines of supplies; a bountiful supply of food had again become a part of the daily routine; reënforcements had been brought up; the initi ative had been taken, and the result of this common sense applied to war was shown in the final struggle: the men who, a month before had been listless, on that day, with an enthusiasm of victory and a confidence of success which could not be restrained, had scaled, in the face of a furious fire, heights which it would be a task to scale in times of peace. In this faculty of inspiring masses lies one of the chief qualities of the leader; and here at Chattanooga, Grant showed that he possessed it in a most eminent degree. Still suffering from his accident, and hardly able to walk alone, when he took command, yet his indomitable will, his constant energy, made him almost ubiquitous, and set in motion, while

he supervised their working, the arrangements which organized success.

Of the technical skill displayed in the plan, and the operations of the battle, the following commendations by Halleck were strictly just and well deserved. In a supplementary report this officer said, "Considering the strength of the rebel position, and the difficulty of storming his intrenchments, the battle of Chattanooga must be regarded as one of the most remarkable in history. Not only did the officers and men exhibit great skill and daring in their operations on the field, but the highest praise is also due to the commanding General for his admirable dispositions for dislodging the enemy from a position apparently impregnable. Moreover, by turning his right flank, and throwing him back upon Ringgold and Dalton, Sherman's forces were interposed between Bragg and Longstreet, so as to prevent any possibility of their forming a junction."

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE RELIEF OF BURNSIDE. — LONGSTREET'S ATTACK ON KNOXVILLE. HE IS ALLOWED TO FALL BACK UNPUR

SUED.

ON the 28th of November Grant returned to Chattanooga, from the front of the pursuit of Bragg, and found that Granger had not started with his force upon the expedition for the relief of Burnside, and hurried him off.

In the mean while General Foster had been sent to supersede Burnside, but Knoxville was so closely besieged that he could not approach it nearer than Cumberland Gap, where a force of about three thousand national soldiers were posted. On this day Grant telegraphed Foster, "The Fourth Corps, Major General Granger commanding, left here to-day, with orders to push with all possible speed through to Knoxville. Sherman is already in motion for Hiawassee, and will go all the way, if necessary. Communicate this in

formation to Burnside as soon as possible, and at any cost, with directions to hold to the very last moment, and we shall not only relieve him, but destroy Longstreet." The next day he wrote to Granger at length, "On the 23d instant, General Burnside telegraphed that his rations would hold out ten or twelve days; at the end of this time, unless relieved from the outside, he must