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The next attack which they suffered in order of time, was by the statute 32 Henry VIII, c. 28, whereby certain leases made by tenants in tail, which do not tend to the prejudice of the issue, were allowed to be good in law, and to bind the issue in tail. But they received a more violent blow in the same session of parliament, by the construction put upon the statute of fines, (q) by the statute 32, Henry VIII, c. 36, which declares a fine duly levied by tenant in tail to be a complete bar to him and his heirs, and all other persons claiming under such entail. This was evidently agreeable to the intention of Henry VII, whose policy it was (before common recoveries had obtained their full strength and authority) to lay the road as open as possible to the alienation of landed property, in order to weaken the overgrown power of his nobles. But as they, from the opposite reasons, were not easily brought to consent to such a provision, it was therefore couched, in his act, under covert and obscure expressions. And the judges, though willing to construe that statute as favorably as possible for the defeating of entailed estates, yet hesitated at giving fines so extensive a power by mere implication, when the statute de donis had expressly declared, that they should not be a bar to estates-tail. But the statute of Henry VIII, when the doctrine of alienation was better received, and the will of the prince more implicitly obeyed than before, avowed and established that intention. Yet, in order to preserve the property of the

(q) 4 Hen. VII, c. 24.

crown from any danger of infringement, all estates-tail created by the crown and of which the crown had the reversion, are excepted out of this statute. And the same was done with regard to common recoveries, by the statute 34 and 35 Henry VIII, c. 20, which enacts, that no feigned recovery had against tenants in tail, where

the estate was created by the *crown, (r) and [*119] the remainder or reversion continues still in the

crown, shall be of any force and effect. Which is allowing, indirectly and collaterally, their full force and effect with respect to ordinary estates-tail, where the royal prerogative is not concerned.

Lastly, by a statute of the succeeding year, (s) all estates-tail are rendered liable to be charged for payment of debts due to the king by record or special contract; as since, by the bankrupt laws, (t) they are also subjected to be sold for the debts contracted by a bankrupt. And, by the construction put on the statute 43 Eliz., c. 4, an appointment (u) by tenant in tail of the lands entailed, to a charitable use, is good without fine or recovery.

Estates-tail, being thus by degrees unfettered, are now reduced again to almost the same state, even before issue born, as conditional fees were in at common law, after the condition was performed, by the birth of issue. For, first, the tenant in tail is now enabled to aliene his

(r) Co. Litt. 372.

(s) 33 Hen. VIII, c. 39, § 75.

(t) Stat. 21 Jac. I, c. 19.

(u) 2 Vern. 453. Chan. Prec. 16.

lands and tenements by fine, by recovery, or by certain other means; and thereby to defeat the interest as well of his own issue, though unborn, as also of the reversioner, except in the case of the crown: secondly, he is now liable to forfeit them for high treason; and lastly, he may charge them with reasonable leases, and also with such of his debts as are due to the crown on specialties, or have been contracted with his fellow-subjects in a course of extensive commerce.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF FREEHOLDS, NOT OF INHERITANCE.

We are next to discourse of such estates of freehold as are not of inheritance, but for life only. And of these estates for life, some are conventional, or expressly created by the act of the parties; others merely legal, or created by construction and operation of law. (a) We will consider them both in their order.

1. Estates for life, expressly created by deed or grant (which alone are properly conventional), are where a lease is made of lands or tenements to a man, to hold for the term of his own life, or for that of any other persons, or for more lives than one: in any of which cases he is styled tenant for life; only when he holds the estate by the life of another, he is usually called tenant per auter vie. (b) These estates for life are, like inheritances, of feudal nature; and were, for some time, the highest estate that any man could have in a feud, which (as we have before seen) (c) was not in its original hereditary. They are given or conferred by the same feudal rights and solemnities, the same investiture or livery of seisin, as fees themselves are; and they are held by fealty, if demanded, and such conventional rents and services as the lord or lessor, and his tenant or lessee, have agreed on.

(a) Wright, 190.

(b) Litt. § 56.

(c) Page, 55.

the

*Estates for life may be created, not only by

express words before mentioned, but also by [*121] a general grant, without defining or limiting

any specific estate. As, if one grants to A B the manor of Dale, this makes him tenant for life. (d) For though, as there are no words of inheritance or heirs mentioned in the grant, it cannot be construed to be a fee, it shall however, be construed to be as large an estate as the words of the donation will bear, and therefore an estate for life. Also such a grant at large, or a grant for term of life generally, shall be construed to be an estate for the life of the grantee; (e) in case the grantor hath authority to make such grant; for an estate for a man's own life is more beneficial and of a higher nature than for any other life; and the rule of law is, that all grants are to be taken most strongly against the grantor, (f) unless in the case of the king.

Such estates for life will, generally speaking, endure as long as the life for which they are granted: but there are some estates for life, which may determine upon future contingencies, before the life for which they are created expires. As, if an estate be granted to a woman during her widowhood, or to a man until he be promoted to a benefice; in these, and similar cases, whenever the contingency happens, when the widow marries, or when the grantee obtains a benefice, the respective estates are absolutely determined and gone. (g) Yet while they

(d) Co. Litt. 42. (f) Ibid. 36.

(e) Ibid.

(g) Co. Litt. 42. 3 Rep. 20.

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