GUARDS-See MASTER AND SERVANT (4).

HABEAS CORPUS-See CRIMINAL LAW (1).

HABITUAL CRIMINAL-See CRIMINAL LAW (8).

HEAD OF WATER-See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES (5). HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE-See INSURANCE (3, 4). HIGHWAY COMMISSIONERS-See DRAINS (1, 2).

HIGHWAYS AND STREETS.

Violation of the statute requiring steam engines, etc., operated on the public highways to send ahead a person to give warning of the approach of the vehicle, etc., constitutes contributory negligence, preventing the recovery of damages for injury done to a steam roller in a collision at a crossing of defendant electric railway company. Act No. 71, Pub. Acts 1903. 2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 4235 (amending 2 Comp. Laws, § 5543). Good Roads Construction Co. v. Port Huron, etc., R. Co., 1.

See DRAINS; STREET Railways (2, 8).

HOLDER IN DUE COURSE-See BILLS AND NOTES (3).
HOMESTEADS.

On the hearing of a suit in aid of execution to subject de-
fendant's homestead to plaintiff's claim, complainant could
not prevail unless the value of the homestead was shown
to exceed $1,500; and the trial court correctly dismissed
the bill of complaint upon a record showing that the only
evidence tending to prove the value of the homestead was
the appraisal in attachment proceedings, which complain-
ant had not offered in evidence by specific reference to
the paper as suggested on the hearing by the trial court.
Yale State Bank v. Fletcher, 585.

See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (13); LIENS (1); MORTGAGES (2). HOMICIDE.

1. Respondent, who was convicted of manslaughter committed after an altercation in which the parties decided to go into the country and fight it out, respondent striking deceased soon afterwards and knocking him down, was not prejudiced by the charge of the court that if he acted in self-defense, fearing great bodily harm or danger to life, he should be acquitted; and the instructions were not open to the objection that they confused the issue, for if they were inapplicable on the ground that the parties were engaged in carrying out an unlawful purpose, the instructions were not harmful. People v. Sauerbier, 521.

2. The fact that respondent prepared himself for the fight, ard attempted to carry out the unlawful purpose, warranted a conviction of the offense. Id.

3. Upon expert testimony that the injuries found upon the deceased victim of the assault could not have been produced by

HOMICIDE-Continued.

a blow of the fist or fall on the sidewalk, and that respondent surreptitiously left the scene immediately after the assault, returning in a few minutes, sufficiently justified the court in submitting to the jury the question whether the crime amounted to murder in the second degree. Id.

4. Nor did the court err in refusing to give several requests in the exact language used, where he instructed the jury fully, covering the same ground in the general charge. Id.

5. It was error to instruct the jury that the practical difference between the two offenses was the length of the maximum penalty, but a verdict finding respondent guilty of the lesser offense rendered the instruction harmless. Id.

6. The court was not in error in limiting further instructions asked for by the jurors, subsequent to their retiring, to the points desired by them, without instructing them a second time as to the matters of self-defense, or of reasonable doubt, that had been covered in the charge. Id. 522.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-See CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS; CONTRACTS (5); CRIMINAL LAW (5); DEEDS (2).

IMPEACHMENT-See EVIDENCE (4, 5).

IMPLIED CONTRACT-See PARENT AND CHILD (2).

IMPROVEMENTS-See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (2).

INCOMPETENCY-See CONTRACTS (4).

INCOMPETENT PERSONS-See PRACTICE (1).

INCONSISTENT DEFENSES-See BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE (1).

INCONSISTENT POSITIONS-See PLEADING (3).

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR-See MASTER AND SERVANT (6, 7). INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW-See CRIMINAL LAw (1). INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION See CRIMINAL LAW (7, 8, 18).

INDORSEMENT ON INFORMATION—See CRIMINAL Law (2). INDORSEMENTS OF PAYMENTS-See BILLS AND NOTES (2). INFANTS—See DIVORCE (2,3); PARENT AND CHILD; STREET RAILWAYS (1).

INFORMATION-See CRIMINAL Law (7, 8, 18).

INJUNCTION.

Equity has jurisdiction, in case irreparable injury is threatened, to enjoin the enforcement of such criminal laws as are contained in the salt inspection act (2 Comp. Laws, SS 4911-4953, as amended by Act No. 323, Pub. Acts 1905, 2 How. Stat. [2d

INJUNCTION-Continued.

Ed.] §§ 2544 et seq.), claimed by a manufacturer to be unconstitutional, and to restrain the collection of fees thereunder by salt inspectors. Michigan Salt Works v. Baird, 655.

See CONTRACTS (5).

INSANE PERSONS.

1. A petition for the appointment of a guardian for an incompetent is valid and sufficient to confer jurisdiction, notwithstanding that it does not contain a statement of the cause of incompetency. 3 Comp. Laws, § 8709, 4 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) § 11565. In re Miller's Estate, 467.

2. A superintendent of the poor, whose approval of a sale of the ward's realty is required by 3 Comp. Laws, § 9118, 4 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) § 11271, cannot become a purchaser of the ward's property at private sale ordered by the court, since he acts in a fiduciary capacity in relation to the incompetent. Id. 468.

INSTRUCTIONS-See BILLS AND NOTES (11); BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE (1-4); CRIMINAL LAW (3, 21); ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (7); HOMICIDE (1, 5, 6); MASTER AND SERVANT (5); MuNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1,8); NEGLIGENCE (3); SALES (4, 7); TRIAL (3).

INSURANCE.

1. Where defendant insurance corporation furnished for the use of its agents as an illustration of the working of a tontine policy a printed statement containing an estimate of the cash value, reserve and surplus at the end of the tontine period, based on past experience, stating that the reserve was guaranteed as to amount, but the surplus would depend on experience, and, although the insurer guaranteed the surplus, its amount could not be determined in advance, defendant was not a guarantor of the estimated surplus, so as to entitle plaintiff to recover the amount as estimated in the illustration blank, attached to the policy, and judgment should have been entered for the actual surplus earned. O'Brien v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 432. 2. Where plaintiff purchased property that was insured by a policy in a mutual tornado and cyclone insurance corporation, and the insurer's charter and by-laws provided that the insurance of any member should cease upon the sale of the insured property, and that the company should not insure old or dilapidated structures or buildings not on a secure foundation, provision being made also for assignment of policies with the approval of the secretary of the insurer, plaintiff could not recover for a loss occurring after the transfer of title and before he had secured the approval of the secretary to an assignment: he did not become a member of defendant corporation by the assignment of the policy; nor did the approval of the secretary indorsed on the policy after notice of the loss effect a transfer of the insurable interest, since the secretary had no authority after destruction

INSURANCE-Continued.

of the insured property to consent to the assignment. Harper v. Michigan Mutual, etc., Ins. Co., 459.

3. Under a proviso in an insurance policy limiting the recovery to two-fifths of the full amount of insurance, if death should "result from unnecessary exposure to obvious risk of injury or obvious danger," plaintiff could recover the full amount of the policy unless the insured was guilty of gross or wanton negligence. Walter v. People's Health & Accident Ins. Co.,

581.

4. Evidence that decedent, who was engaged in buying and shipping produce, was killed while walking on the railroad right of way, that he stepped off the tracks when the whistle blew and, seeming to become confused as the train approached, hesitated, turned about and fell in the way of the locomotive, that the public used the tracks at the point in question for a regular traveled way, presented a question of fact for the jury as to whether the act of decedent was intentional and whether he was guilty of gross or wanton negligence. Id. See BILLS AND NOTES (7, 9-11).

INTENT-See CRIMINAL LAW (19); ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (5);
EVIDENCE (12); FRAUD (1).

INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS-See APPEAL AND ERROR (10).
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

1. In an action under the civil-damage statute for the death of
plaintiff's father, caused by an accident while he was intox-
icated, the defendant surety company was not entitled to
defeat the action on the ground that judgments of $3,000 and
upwards, previously obtained against the principal and surety
on the bond in suit, had been paid by such company, the
liquor dealer contributing $2,000 in property towards the ob-
ligations: the surety remained bound to the extent of $2,000,
the balance of the penalty named in the instrument after de-
ducting the sums paid by the surety. 2 Comp. Laws, § 5398,
2 How. Stat. (2d Ed.), § 5074. Squires v. Miller, 304.

2. Such liquor dealer's bonds do not, however, permit a recovery in each case of the entire penalty stated; the total liability of the surety in successive cases arising under it does not exceed the penalty named. Id. 305.

3. The suit is based on the wrongful act, not on the bond, which is a joint and several obligation intended to secure the payment of any judgment obtained for violations of the statute. 2 Comp. Laws, § 5386, 2 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) § 5062. Id.

4. The obligation is not purely contractual, but must be interpreted in the light of the provisions of law regulating the liquor trade: payment by the principal of a liability incurred under the law was not intended to release to the extent thereof the liability of the surety in another case arising during the period covered by the bond, which remains in force until the full amount has been discharged by the surety. Id.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Continued.

5. Under Act No. 291, Pub. Acts 1909, 2 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) §5091, forbidding the establishment of a bar within 400 feet along the street line from the front entrance of a church, a store or building formerly occupied as a flour and feed store, leased but not actually occupied by a religious organization, and not ready for occupancy at the time a license was granted to a liquor dealer, was not a church within the meaning of the act. Starks v. Presque Isle Circuit Judge, 464.

See CRIMINAL LAW (3, 18, 19).

INVENTORY-See ATTACHMENT (3).
IRREGULARITIES-See DIVORCE (6).

ISSUES-See NEW TRIAL (3).

JOINDER-See CORPORATIONS (2).

JOINDER OF PARTIES-See PLEADING (1).

JOINT DEFENDANTS-See PLEADING (2).

JUDGMENT-See APPEAL AND ERROR (8, 10, 12); CONTEMPT (2); ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (15); GARNISHMENT (1); INTOXICATING LIQUORS (1); PRACTICE (3); WILLS (3).

JUDGMENT CREDITOR-See BANKRUPTCY.

JURISDICTION-See BANKS AND BANKING (4); DIVORCE (1); INJUNCTION; INSANE PERSONS (1); LIENS (1); WILLS (2, 4). JURY-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (14); CRIMINAL LAW (15, 28); HOMICIDE (6); NEGLIGENCE (1); NEW TRIAL (5); TRIAL (3). JUSTICES OF THE PEACE-See Logs And Logging (1). JUSTIFICATION-See LIBEL AND SLANDER (1); MASTER AND SERVANT (8).

KNOWLEDGE OF FALSITY OF REPRESENTATIONS — See FRAUD (1).

LACHES-See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (7); TAXATION (7); WILLS (4).

LAKES-See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES (6).

LAND CONTRACTS-See FRAUD (7); PLEADING (3); VENDOR AND PURCHASER (1, 2).

LANDLORD AND TENANT-See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (1). LARCENY-See CRIMINAL LAW (22).

LEASE-See MISTAKE.

LIBEL AND SLANDER.

1. While evidence was admissible, in a libel suit, to show that the article published in defendant's paper charging plaintiff, &