ing for a single family on each lot, or there is no restriction except one house on each lot, designed to be a dwelling for as many families or persons as the owner sees fit, to cost not less than $5,000. A "dwelling house" is

"The house in which a man lives with his family; a residence; the apartment or building, or group of buildings, occupied by a family as a place of residence." Black's Law Dictionary.

Literally taken, this would seem to make each apartment in an apartment house "a dwelling house." Taking the restriction in its common, ordinary, and popular sense, applying the legal definition of "a dwelling house," and construing it in the light of the surrounding conditions and circumstances as proven, we conclude it was the intention to restrict buildings on each lot to a single dwelling, with its appurtenances.

We think this construction is in harmony with the principles announced in Brigham v. H. G. Mulock Co., supra, wherein it is said:

"The covenant forbidding more than one building to be erected upon each lot for dwelling house purposes is, in my judgment, broken by the erection of what is commonly known as a double house-that is, two houses under one roof. Such a structure is as much two buildings for dwelling house purposes as as though separate roofs existed."

Also the following cases decided by this court: Harris v. Roraback, 137 Mich. 292 (100 N. W. 391, 109 Am. St. Rep. 681); Bagnall v. Young, 151 Mich. 69 (114 N. W. 674). In the latter case, which in principle is very similar to this, the following language is used:

"We decide that 'a two-story dwelling house' means, in this restriction, 'one two-story dwelling house' designed and used for a single dwelling, upon each lot."

The decree of the trial court is affirmed, with costs.

MOORE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, STONE, and BIRD, JJ., concurred.

MICHIGAN SALT WORKS v. BAIRD.

INJUNCTION-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL LAW.

Equity has jurisdiction, in case irreparable injury is threatened, to enjoin the enforcement of such criminal laws as are contained in the salt inspection act (2 Comp. Laws, §§ 4911-4953, as amended by Act No. 323, Pub. Acts 1905, 2 How. Stat. [3d Ed.] §§ 2544 et seq.), claimed by a manufacturer to be unconstitutional, and to restrain the collection of fees thereunder by salt inspectors.1

Appeal from St. Clair; Law, J. Submitted November 20, 1912. (Docket No. 188.) Decided February 19, 1913.

Bill by the Michigan Salt Works against John Baird and another for an injunction. From an order overruling a demurrer to the bill of complaint, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Frank T. Wolcott and E. S. Black, for complainant. Franz C. Kuhn, Attorney General, and Arthur P. Hicks, Assistant Attorney General, for defendants.

BROOKE, J. The questions .nvolved are, we think, correctly stated as follows in the brief of the attorney general:

"This is an appeal from an order overruling defendant's demurrer to an injunction bill filed in the circuit court for the county of St. Clair, in chancery, by the Michigan Salt Works. The complainant is a corporation organized under the provisions of Act 232, Public Acts of 1885, on April 18, 1903, and its business, as stated in its articles, is:

'As to injunction against a prosecution of criminal or quasi criminal nature, see notes in 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 631; 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 193; and 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454.

"Manufacturing salt and all kinds of products made from salt, operating such other factories as may be required to utilize the extra steam from the salt plants of this company, also generating power from such extra steam and selling the same.'

"The bill prays for a perpetual injunction restraining defendants 'from attempting to enforce the said salt inspection act herein before set forth, and from inspecting, or attempting to inspect, salt offered for sale by your orator, and from collecting, or attempting to collect, any tax or inspection fees under said act, and from commencing any suits or actions to recover any inspection fees or to recover the penalties and forfeitures provided for in said act, and from attempting to in any way enforce the provisions of said act.' The defendant John Baird is the salt inspector, duly appointed, qualified, and acting under and pursuant to the provisions of Act 29, Public Acts of 1869 (sections 4911 to 4953, Compiled Laws of 1897), as amended by Act 323, Public Acts of 1905 [2 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) §§ 2544, et seq.]; and the defendant William Hodgson is the duly appointed, qualified, and acting deputy salt inspector of the district comprising St. Clair county, in which complainant's plant is located. The bill avers further the payment of fees by complainant and other salt manufacturers for the inspection of salt, and that defendants will continue to enforce the provisions of the act; that other food products, such as flour and sugar, manufactured in this State, are not subjected to inspection; that 75 per cent. of salt manufactured in Michigan is shipped into other States and foreign countries; that the act is not adapted to the present system of manufacturing salt, which complainant somewhat fully describes; that the salt inspection act has not been enforced, except to the extent of collecting fees; that the inspection is not beneficial, and that the penalties for violation of act are excessive; that the deputy salt inspectors have in years past threatened complainant that they would enforce every provision of the salt inspection act against it if it did not pay the salt inspection fees; that the fees collected are not sufficient to pay the cost of inspection in accordance with the law; that the act places arbitrary power in the hands of the inspector to specify the quantity of salt to be placed in bags and packages; that the present deputy salt inspector in district No. 3 is engaged in the saloon business in the village of Algonac, and is not familiar with the business of manufacturing salt, and is

incompetent; that attempts have been made to secure the repeal of the law, which attempts have been ineffective; that there is no inspection of table salt manufactured in this State, although required by the statute; that complainant would be menaced with a multiplicity of actions and suits for the collection of penalties and its officers, agents and employés menaced by criminal suits, unless a temporary injunction is granted in accordance with the prayer of the bill. It is averred in the bill that the inspector and his deputies are undertaking to go beyond the plain provisions of the statute in their inspection. The only grounds alleged for the granting of a temporary injunction are the unconstitutionality of the law and the expressed fear that the inspectors will undertake to enforce it.

"The bill further alleges that the act is unconstitutional in the following particulars:

"(1) Because it violates section 15 of article 2 of the revised Constitution, which provides that 'excessive fines shall not be imposed,' etc.

(2) Because it violates section 16 of article 2 of the revised Constitution, which provides that 'no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.'

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'(3) Because certain sections of the act, to wit, sections 20, 30, 35, and 36, are without the scope of the title of the act, and therefore in violation of section 21 of article 5 of the revised Constitution which provides:

"No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be ex pressed in its title.'

"(4) That the act is in violation of section 3 of article 10 of the Constitution, which provides that

"The legislature shall provide, by law, a uniform rule of taxation, except on property paying specific taxes and taxes shall be levied on such property as shall be prescribed by law.'

“(5) That said act violates section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides:

"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property with

178 MICH.-42.

out due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'

"(6) That it violates paragraph 5 of section 9 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, which provides:

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"No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State.'

"(7) That it violates paragraph 2 of section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, which provides:

"No State shall without the consent of Congress lay any impost or duty on imports or exports, except that may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.'

"And in addition to the constitutional questions, it is alleged:

"(1) That the salt inspection act is repealed by the dairy and food law.

(2) That the salt inspection act is superseded by the Federal food and drug act.

"(3) That the salt inspection law is obsolete.

"The prayer for relief is as follows:

"That upon the hearing of said cause, a decree may be entered by this honorable court, declaring and decreeing said act, and each and every provision thereof, unconstitutional, null, and void, and that the said defendants, John Baird and William Hodgson, his or their deputies, agents, attorneys, and counselors, may be restrained by the writ of injunction issued out of this court, directed to them and each of them, from attempting to enforce the said salt inspection act, herein before set forth, and from inspecting, or attempting to inspect, salt manufactured or offered for sale by your orator, and from collecting, or attempting to collect, any tax or inspection fees under said act, and from commencing any suits or actions to recover said inspection fees, or to recover the penalties and forfeitures provided for in said act, and from attempting to in any way enforce the provisions of said act.'

"To this bill the defendants demurred upon the following grounds:

(1) That a court of equity has no jurisdiction to entertain the bill of complaint and to grant the relief, or any part thereof prayed for in complainant's bill of complaint.