beginning; thence easterly along said north line of said plot of ground ten and feet to the place of beginning." This description is between the residences occupied by the parties to this litigation.

At the close of plaintiff's testimony, the court directed a verdict for the defendant, basing such direction upon the decision of this court in Sheldon v. Railroad Co., 161 Mich. 503 (126 N. W. 1056).

Title to the premises of plaintiff is traced back to ownership by one Mary Ann Ockford, who, by warranty deed, dated June 8, 1875, granted to John T. Martin and James Martin lot No. 39, in block 3, of part of the Thompson farm, so-called, according to the recorded plat. By warranty deed, dated February 17, 1886, John T. Martin and his wife conveyed to James Martin the north half of this property, which includes the plaintiff's premises, but not the strip in dispute, which appears to be a part of the adjoining lot 40. By warranty deed, dated March 8, 1886, James Martin and his wife conveyed the north half of this property to Patrick Sullivan, who by warranty deed, dated September 7, 1887, conveyed the same to Carl D. Brandt and Rosa Brandt, his wife. By warranty deed, dated May 9, 1889, Brandt and wife conveyed the same description to the plaintiff, Mary Gildea, and her sister, Catherine Gildea. By warranty deed, dated August 14, 1902, Catherine Gildea conveyed her interest in the premises to her sister, the plaintiff. All the conveyances included the hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or appertaining.

It is the claim of the plaintiff that her house was built where it now stands more than 50 years ago, and that the strip of land in controversy had been occupied as part of the yard surrounding the residence for more than 30 years, and up to the time in 1901 when she was dispossessed by the defendant. She offered testimony tending to support her claim. It will be noticed by referring to the date of her deed that her own possession did not continue for 15 years. Was the court right in holding that the case of

Sheldon v. Railroad Co., 161 Mich. 503 (126 N. W. 1056), was controlling? A reference to that case will show it is clearly distinguishable. In the prevailing opinion in that case, the court used the following language:

"It is important to bear in mind that in every conveyance of the several grantors of the complainant, after the deed of right of way was given to the defendant Jackson, Lansing & Saginaw Railroad Company, there was the following exception:

"Except, however, all that part of said above-described piece or parcel of land heretofore conveyed by Stanislaus Legault and wife to the Jackson, Lansing & Saginaw Railroad Company by deed, dated the 18th day of September, 1880.'

"It clearly appears from this record that there is no evidence of any parol permission, or authorization of any kind, given by the grantor Bell to the complainant, to take the place of the said Bell in the wrongful possession which Bell held of the strip of land in controversy in this case. Nor is there any evidence in the record of any parol permission or authorization of any of the grantors in the deeds herein before referred to to their grantees to take the places of their grantors in the wrongful possession of said described strip of land. The record also shows that there was no parol agreement, understanding, permission, or authorization respecting the premises which complainant's grantor had held, or would deliver."

In the case before us there is no exception of the disputed strip in the various conveyances, and there is an abundance of testimony that the several grantees took possession of the disputed strip with the rest of the premises, regarding it as conveyed.

In Dupont v. Starring, 42 Mich. 492 (4 N. W. 190), this court held:

"It has been repeatedly held by this court that a boundary line long treated and acquiesced in as the true line, ought not to be disturbed on new surveys. Smith v. Hamilton, 20 Mich. 438 [4 Am. Rep. 398]; Joyce v. Williams, 26 Mich. 332. Fifteen years' recognition and acquiescence are ample for this purpose (Stewart v. Carleton, 31 Mich. 270); and in view of the great difficulties which often attend the effort to ascertain where the orig

inal monuments were planted, the peace of the community requires that all attempts to disturb lines with which the parties concerned have long been satisfied should not be encouraged. Diehl v. Zanger, 39 Mich. 601."

See, also, Green v. Anglemire, 77 Mich. 168 (43 N. W. 772); Sauers v. Giddings, 90 Mich. 50 (51 N. W. 265); Flynn v. City of Detroit, 93 Mich. 590 (53 N. W. 815); Lamoreaux v. Creveling, 103 Mich. 501 (61 N. W. 783); Darrow v. Village of Homer, 122 Mich. 229 (81 N. W. 262); Lang v. Mining Co., 145 Mich. 370 (108 N. W. 678); Triece v. City of South Haven, 154 Mich. 129 (117 N. W. 555).

We think the case comes within the reasoning of these cases, and that the case should have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions.

Judgment is reversed, and a new trial is granted. STEERE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, KUHN, STONE, OSTRANDER, and BIRD, JJ., concurred.

BRANCH v. KLATT.

1. EVIDENCE-SIMILAR ACCIDENTS-NOTICE-NEGLIGENCE — THEATERS AND SHOWS.

Evidence of accidents similar to the one that is in litigation, and occurring prior thereto, is admissible to prove both notice of the defect and negligence: subsequent occurrences are not, however, competent.1

1 The authorities on the question of the admissibility of evidence of condition, before and after accident, of property whose defects are alleged to have caused injury, are reviewed in an exhaustive note in 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1084.

As to liability generally of one maintaining place of amusement to which the public are invited, for safety of patrons, see notes in 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1182; 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 772; 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 713.

2. SAME.

And a general question calling for testimony as to accidents either before or after plaintiff's injury, and assuming, without any basis, that certain disputed facts were proved, was correctly ruled out.

8. SAME-NEW TRIAL.

Under conflicting testimony of interested and disinterested witnesses on both sides, claiming on one side that the hall in which plaintiff fell was not lighted and that railings had not been constructed at the place where plaintiff claimed to have fallen, but disputed on the other side, the court was justified in refusing a new trial.

4. SAME-MOTIONS-NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.

Certain testimony taken before a circuit court commissioner after judgment, and used as a basis for a motion for a new trial, considered by the trial judge to be merely cumulative and not liable to cause a different result on a new trial, addressed itself to the discretion of the court, and unless such discretion was manifestly abused, it could not be reversed.

5. SAME.

Held, also, that the newly discovered evidence related only to an issue that might not have been decisive of the case, i. e., the presence of handrails, and the jury may have determined that the hall and stairway was properly lighted and handrails unnecessary.

Error to Wayne; Codd, J. Submitted October 11, 1912. (Docket No. 28.) Decided November 8, 1912.

Case by Teresa Branch against William F. Klatt for personal injuries. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Patrick J. Kelaher (McHugh, Gallagher & McGann, of counsel), for appellant.

lee.

Luman W. Goodenough and Irvin Long, for appel

STEERE, J. Plaintiff instituted this action to recover damages for personal injuries imputed to defendant's negligence in failing to provide and maintain a safe and suitable stairway leading to his theater.

Defendant was proprietor of a place of public entertainment known as the Bijou Theater, located on the second floor of a building numbered 24, on Monroe avenue, in the city of Detroit. The ticket office of said theater was situated on the first floor of the building at the street entrance, where patrons attending the performances purchased tickets of admission. Having procured these, they were allowed to ascend the stairway leading to the second floor and enter the theater. On the afternoon of October 21, 1909, plaintiff patronized said place of amusement where a continuous moving picture performance was in progress. She took a seat, witnessed the regular bill of said show, and then withdrew. On making her exit by said stairway, she fell down a flight of eight steps, sustaining, as is alleged, serious injuries.

This case has been twice tried in the circuit court, and is now here a second time for review. On the first trial the case was taken from the jury; a verdict and judgment being directed and entered by the court in favor of the defendant, on the ground of contributory negligence. Plaintiff thereupon brought the proceedings to this court for review on a writ of error. It was here held on the record as then made that issues of fact were involved which should have been left to the jury to decide under proper instructions. The judgment was reversed and a new trial granted. The opinion then rendered, reported in 165 Mich. 666 (131 N. W. 107), furnishes a complete and clear statement of the case, and contains a diagram of the entrance to the theater, showing the landings and steps constituting part of the stairway down which plaintiff fell. On a retrial in the circuit court the case was submitted to a jury, again resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of defendant. A motion for a new trial was made and denied. Plaintiff again seeks a reversal, presenting two assignments of error, as follows:

"(1) The court erred in excluding the following question: How many times per day while you were standing

178 MICH.-8.