State, ex rel., v. Smith. division where the owner resides, or that in which the mortgaged premises are situate." It must be admitted, of course, that the constitution of New Jersey does not require all property to be taxed, but the point in the case lies in the fact that it recognizes the right of the legislature, when it determines to tax lands, to permit mortgage values to be deducted therefrom, notwithstanding the requirement that property is to be assessed at its "true value". We are not led to doubt whether the conclusion we have reached is right because of the contention under former legislation taxes have not been treated as debts which the owner was bound to pay. As before shown, they may be so treated, and we must regard the statute as a legislative recognition of the fact that, substantially speaking, the burden is upon the owner. Nor can we accept the view that the enactment in question is sporadic, and therefore to be treated as a legislative misfit in our system of taxation. In Lutz v. City of Crawfordsville, 109 Ind. 466, 468, the court said of the construction of statutes enacted at different times, but upon the same subject-matter: "If the legislature manifests an intention to create a system for the government of any subject, it is the duty of the court to effectuate that intention by such a construction as will make the system consistent in all its parts, and uniform in its operation. It would violate all rules of logic, as well as settled principles of law, to dissect the system into parts and assign effect to each part irrespective of its effect upon the uniformity and consistency of the entire system. Statutes are to be construed as part of a uniform. system, and such a scheme adopted as will give each part its appropriate place, and not destroy uniformity and harmony by cutting the system into disjointed and incongruous parts." The authorities are against appellee on the subject of classification. In addition to the authorities cited in the principal opinion, we cite Edwards v. People, 88 Ill. 340, State, ex rel., v. Smith. 347, and People v. Barker, 155 N. Y. 330, 332, 49 N. E. 940. In the former case the supreme court of Illinois said: "It is also objected, that the revenue law is unconstitutional, because the method of assessing is not uniform. The fact that certain credits and deductions may be allowed in the assessment of personal property, does not establish a want of uniformity. Where a law operates alike upon all persons and property like situated, it may be regarded as uniform. This, as we understand our revenue law, is its practical operation. Perfect equality in taxation is a problem of difficult solution." In the New York case the court of appeals reached the same conclusion, but upon a somewhat different course of reasoning. The court said: "The right to have debts deducted from the value of taxable property is not an absolute one, but in the nature of a favor. The state may grant or withhold it at pleasure. It was in the power of the state to tax all the property the relator had without providing for any deduction on account of debts. It cannot, therefore, be said that a law which permits the deductions as to certain debts and forbids it as to other debts, violates any constitutional provision." On the subject of classification it is not difficult to accumulate extreme statements made by courts in the condemnation of statutes that so offend, but it materially conduces to a more intelligent understanding of the effect of such decisions if such statements are read in connection with the enactments they condemn. But if we may venture to attempt to extract the cardinal principle from the many discordant opinions upon the subject of classification, we may say that it will be found that what they condemn is a classification that is arbitrary, because it is not founded on differences recognized by the constitution, or naturally inhering in the subject-matter of the legislation to an extent that would at least suggest some reason why the lawmaking power, acting in a presumed spirit of fairness, should have made the distinction. As stated before, we perceive in the State, ex rel., v. Smith. statute under consideration a substantial reason for distinguishing between mortgages or defeasible sales and mere liens. And there is also a substantial reason for not permitting such deductions from personal property generally, since it is a fact, so well known as to be judicially recog nized, that real estate bears more than its proportion of the burdens imposed by the State government. The provision that not more than one-half of the assessed value of the property shall be allowed as a deduction is not arbitrary, although some mortgagors may gain a greater benefit from the law than others. There is a basis in reason for such requirement, in that a wise public policy is conserved by an enactment that, even if it releases a property owner from a part of the burden of taxation, still leaves him some portion of such burden, because his vote or influence is by that consideration likely to be cast on the side of holding public officers to due economy in the administration of public affairs. In Cooley on Taxation, p. 170, it is said: "Even within the class taxed, however, there may be rules of distinction; and these are perfectly admissible, provided they are general rules and are observed." While the fact that the result of the upholding of this law may be to take millions of dollars worth of property from the State's assessment sheet has caused us to consider this case with great care, yet we cannot strike down the law for that reason. The question is political in its character, and, if the act is inimical to the interests of the State, the argument mentioned should be addressed to the General Assembly. The petition for a rehearing is overruled. All concur, except Dowling and Monks, JJ., who dissent. Ludwig v. Cory. 158 582 159 504 e159 585 158 582 e160 377 158 582 162 566 LUDWIG v. CORY ET AL. [No. 19,615. Filed May 23, 1902. ] INTOXICATING LIQUORS. - Application for License. - Remonstrance.· From Hancock Circuit Court; E. W. Felt, Judge. From a judgment affirming an order of the board of county commissioners refusing the application of John M. Ludwig for a license to sell intoxicating liquors, the applicant appeals. Transferred to Supreme Court, under §1337u Burns 1901. Affirmed. J. E. McCullough, for appellant. C. W. Smith, J. S. Duncan, H. H. Hornbrook and A. Smith, for appellees. JORDAN, C. J.-Appellant, John M. Ludwig, applied to the board of commissioners of Marion county, under 87278 Burns 1901, §5314 Horner 1901, for a license to sell intoxicating liquors at the village of Oaklandon, in Lawrence township, Marion county, Indiana. Written remonstrances, based on $7283i Burns 1901, purporting to have been signed by a majority of the legal voters of Lawrence township, were filed with the auditor of said county. By virtue of these remonstrances Ludwig v. Cory. the board denied appellant's application, and adjudged that he pay the costs of the proceeding. From this decision of the board he appealed to the Marion Superior Court, from which the venue was changed to the Hancock Circuit Court. In the latter court appellant unsuccessfully moved to strike out and reject the remonstrances. A trial by the court resulted in a finding in favor of the remonstrators, and, over appellant's motion for a new trial, the court adjudged that he take nothing by the proceeding, and that the remonstrators recover of him their costs laid out and expended. To reverse this judgment this appeal is prosecuted, and the errors assigned are based on the rulings of the lower court in denying the motion to strike out the remonstrances, and in permitting appellees, remonstrators below, to introduce and read in evidence certain written instruments denominated "Power of Attorneys", and in overruling the motion for a new trial. The record discloses the following facts: Appellant gave the notice required by $7278 Burns 1901, §5314 Horner 1901, of his intention to apply for a license to sell intoxicating liquors, at the regular session of the board of commissioners of Marion county, beginning on the first Monday in May, 1900. On May 3, 1900, three days before the commencement of said session, two written remonstrances were filed with the auditor of said county. These remonstrances, which for convenience may be denominated number 1 and number 2, are as follows: "We, the undersigned residents and voters of Lawrence township, Marion county, Indiana, do hereby remonstrate against the granting of a license to John M. Ludwig to sell intoxicating, spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors in less quantities than five gallons at a time, with the privilege of allowing the same to be drank on the premises, in said township, as described in his application, in the town of Oaklandon." "We, the undersigned residents and legal voters of Lawrence township, Marion county, State of Indiana, do hereby remonstrate against the |
