terms with that of Piedmont, Egypt, and the Levant; a suppression of the duties on our wheat, flour, furs, &c; the suppression of the monopoly for making and selling spermaceti candles; the naturalization of our ships; a mitigation of the monopoly of our tobacco trade by the farmers-general of France; a reduction of the duties on our tar, pitch, and turpentine; and the free admission of our productions generally, into their West India islands. In exchange, the United States received, by direct trade, the wines, brandies, oils, and productions and manufactures generally, of France. These objects were not accomplished, however, without a series of difficult and laborious negotiations, aided by the mutual good temper and dispositions of both parties, and by the mediation of whose ara powerful auxiliary and friend at that court, duous and disinterested services in the cause of America can never be forgotten.

'On these occasions,' says he, 'I was powerfully aided by all the influence and the energies of the Marquis de la Fayette, who proved himself equally zealous for the friendship and welfare of both nations; and, in justice, I must also say, that I found the government entirely disposed to befriend us on all occasions, and to yield us every indulgence, not absolutely injurious to themselves. The Count de Vergennes had the reputation with the diplomatic corps, of being wary and slippery in his diplomatic intercourse; and so he might be, with those whom he knew to be slippery, and double faced themselves. As he saw that I had no indirect views, practised no subtilties, meddled in no intrigues, pursued no concealed object, I found him as frank, as honorable, as easy of access to reason, as any man with whom 1 had ever done business; and I must say the same for his successor, Montmorin, one of the most honest and worthy of human beings.'

Our commerce in the Mediterranean having, at this time, been suddenly placed under alarm, by the capture of two of our vessels and crews by the Barbary cruisers,

Mr Jefferson projected a coalition of the principal European powers subject to their habitual depredations, to compel the piratical States to perpetual peace, and to guaranty that peace to each other. He was early and resolutely determined, so far as his opinions could have weight, that the United States should never acquiesce in the European humiliation,' as he termed it, of purchasing their peace of those lawless pirates. Millions for defence, but not a cent for tribute,' was his celebrated motto. The following is a statement of his reasons for this policy, addressed to Mr Adams, soon after returning to Paris, with a view to obtain his concurrence in the proposition.

1. Justice is in favor of this opinion. 2. Honor favors it. 3. It will procure us respect in Europe; and respect is a safeguard to interest. 4. It will arm the federal head, with the safest of all the instruments of coercion over its delinquent members, and prevent it from using what would be less safe. I think, that so far you go with me. But in the next steps we shall differ. 5. I think it least expensive. 6. Equally effectual. I ask a fleet of one hundred and fifty guns, the one half of which shall be in constant cruise. This fleet, built, manned, and victualled for six months, will cost four hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling. Its annual expense will be three hundred pounds sterling a gun, including every thing: this will be forty-five thousand pounds sterling a year. I take British experience for the basis of my calculation: though we know, from our own experience, that we can do in this way for pounds lawful, what costs them pounds sterling. Were we to charge all this to the Algerine war, it would amount to little more than we must pay if we buy peace. But as it is proper and necessary, that we should establish a small marine force, (even were we to buy a peace from the Algerines) and as that force, laid up in our dock-yard, would cost half as much annually as if kept in order for service, we have a right to say, that only twenty-two thousand and five hundred pounds sterling, per annum, should be charged to the Algerine war.

7.

It will be as effectual. To all the mismanagements of Spain and Portugal, urged to show that war against those people is ineffectual, I urge a single fact to prove the contrary, where there is any management. About forty years ago, the Algerines having broke their treaty with France, this court sent Monsieur de Massiac, with one large and two small frigates: he blockaded the harbor of Algiers three months, and they subscribed to the terms he proposed. If it be admitted, however, that war, on the fairest prospects, is still exposed to uncertainties, I weigh against this the greater uncertainty of the duration of a peace bought with money, from such a people, from a Dey eighty years old, and by a nation who, on the hypothesis of buying peace, is to have no power on the sea to enforce an observance of it.

So far I have gone on the supposition, that the whole weight of this war would rest on us. But 1. Naples will join us. The character of their naval minister (Acton,) his known sentiments with respect to the peace Spain is officially trying to make for them, and his dispositions against the Algerines, give the best grounds to believe it. 2. Every principle of reason assures us, that Portugal will join us. I state this as taking for granted, what all seem to believe, that they will not be at peace with Algiers. I suppose, then, that a convention might be formed between Portugal, Naples, and the United States, by which the burden of the war might be shared with them, according to their respective wealth; and the term of it should be, when Algiers should subscribe to a peace with all three on equal terms. This might be left open for other nations to accede to; and many, if not most of the powers of Europe (except France, England, Holland, and Spain, if her peace be made) would sooner or later enter into the confederacy, for the sake of having their peace with the piratical States guarantied by the whole. I suppose, that, in this case, our proportion of force would not be the half of what I first calculated on.'

Presuming on Mr Adams' concurrence, and without waiting his answer, Mr Jefferson immediately draughted and proposed to the diplomatic corps at Paris, for con

sultation with their respective governments, articles of special confederation and alliance against the Barbary powers; the substance of which was that the parties should become mutually bound to compel these powers to perpetuate peace, without price, and to guaranty that peace to each other, the burden of the war to be equitably apportioned among them.

The proposition was received with applause by Portugal, Naples, the two Sicilies, Venice, Malta, Denmark, and Sweden. Spain had just concluded a treaty with Algiers, at the expense of three millions of dollars, and was indisposed to relinquish the benefit of her engagement, until a first infraction by the other party, when she was ready to join. Mr Jefferson had previously sounded the dispositions of the Count de Vergennes; and although France was at peace, by a mercenary tenure, with the Barbary States, and fears were entertained that she would secretly give them her aid, he did not think it proper, in his conference with that minister, to insinuate a doubt of the fair conduct of his government; but on stating to him the proposition, he mentioned that apprehensions were felt that England would interfere in behalf of the piratical powers. 'She dares not do it,' was his reply. Mr Jefferson pressed the point no farther. The other ministers were satisfied with this indication of the sentiments of France, and nothing was now wanting to bring the measure into direct consideration, but the assent of the United States, and their authority to make the formal stipulation.

Mr Jefferson communicated to Congress the favorable prospect of protecting their commerce from the Barbary depredations, and for such a term of time, as by an exclusion of them from the sea, would change their characters from a predatory to an agricultural people; towards which, however, should the measure be approved, it was expected they would contribute a frigate, and its expenses, for constant cruise. But the United

States were in no condition to unite in such an undertaking. The powers of Congress over the people for obtaining contributions, being merely recommendatory, and openly disregarded by the States, they declined entering into an engagement, which they were conscious they could not fulfil with punctuality. The association consequently fell through; but the principle has ever since governed in the American councils.

The remaining public objects of importance, which engaged his attention, were: 1st, The settlement of the financial concerns with our bankers in France and Holland, which were in a most critical and embarrassing. state. Owing to the partial suspension in the action of our government, while passing from the confederation to the constitutional form, the credit of the nation stood, at one time, on the verge of bankruptcy. Seeing there was not a moment to lose, Mr Jefferson went directly to Holland, joined Mr Adams at the Hague, where, without instructions and at their own risk, they executed bonds for a million of florins and pledged the credit of the United States in security for three years to come; by which time they thought the new government would get fairly under way. 2d, The conclusion of a consular convention with France, based upon republican principles. 3d, The restoration of certain prizes taken from the British during the war, recaptured by Denmark, and delivered up to the British. He instituted measures to recover indemnification from Denmark; but the negotiation, by unavoidable circumstances, was spun out beyond the term of his ministry. 4th, The redemption of American citizens taken captive by the Algerines; and the formation of treaties with the Barbary States. The inability of the United States to supply him with the necessary funds, prevented the redemption of the Algerine captives, until after his return from France; and the only treaty which he succeeded in concluding with the