and certain solution. The controversy has been embarrassed by the use of the term motive, which is not essential to it, and which being capable of different interpretations has left room for misapprehension and subterfuge. The proposition of the Necessitarian is precisely this, that every volition or determination of the mind is the necessary result of the state of the mind at the time when the determination is formed. Of the truth of this proposition, in regard to myself, I am conscious; and presuming that the general constitution of all human minds is the same, I suspect that, were the question closely urged, the consciousness of every other man would coincide in this respect with my own. And were it not for certain consequences, which are supposed to follow the admission of this doctrine, I am persuaded that no human being would have been found to doubt its truth. But in opposition to this statement the advocate of Liberty maintains, that there is in the human mind a self-determining power, to which, as their proper cause, all the volitions or determinations of the mind are to be referred. What, then, is the operation of this self-determining power? By the very definition, it is not governed in its exercise by the state or disposition of the mind. Does it, then, itself determine the state of mind in which a certain volition shall be formed? Then, as no mental act can be performed except in some certain state of mind, it may be asked, How came the mind to be in that state in which the self-deter * Though I have avoided the use of the term motive, I do not mean to intimate, that motives have nothing to do with volition. By motive, indeed, the Necessitarian means not only the induce ment which is presented to the mind, but the mental disposition in which a given volition is formed. But to use the term in its ordinary acceptation, it may be remarked, that every state of mind in which a volition takes place, results partly from a former state, and partly from the influence of certain motives or considerations which are suggested to the mind. And no truth in the whole circie of intellectual inquiry seems more self-evidert than this, that from a definite state of mind, nothing but a definite volition can proceed. mining power was called upon to act? Did this power of its sovereign pleasure decree this state of the mind also, and before this a former state, and so on to the first moment of conscious existence, always acting in a certain state of mind, and always determining that state? But in reality, the determining the state of the mind, in which a given volition shall take place, would not differ from determining the volition itself. In a given state of mind, then, does it determine the volition? If so, can it determine in opposition to the state of the mind at the time when the volition is formed? If not, it can do nothing that is worth contending for. If it can, whenever this case is realized the will inclines one way, and the mind another. But as the will in its exercise cannot, even in imagination, be distinguished from the mind in the act of willing, the mind wills against itself, or wills and does not will the same thing, at the same time. That this reasoning may not be confronted by classical authority, I just remark, that Homer's well-known oxymoron, exwv aɛxoti ye Suup, stands at an immeasurable distance from the case which is here supposed. But let this self-determining power be examined a little more closely. And as it is stated to be the faculty of the mind which determines the volitions, and, therefore, the actions of men, it is reasonable to ask, whether it possesses the properties of judgment, reflection and other qualities which have always been supposed to have some influence upon the determinations of the will? If so, it is no longer a faculty of the mind, but the mind itself; efficient cause of volition, all that is and when we are told that it is the meant is, that our volitions are the volitions of the mind. If it does not possess these properties, it is nothing but the simple power of volition, which, as it will not submit to be governed by the state or habit of the mind, but insists upon the privilege of determining itself, is not distinguishable from blind caprice, or what we usually term chance. Shall it be said that the mind determines its volitions by means of a self--determining power, which is inherent in it, and essential to it? Can the mind, then, form either of two opposite volitions at the same time, and in the same frame and disposition? If not, it does not possess a self-determining power, and every thing is conceded which the Necessitarian contends for. If, when the mind is said to possess a self-determining power, it were meant that the volitions of the mind originate in itself, and are not forced upon it by extraneous compulsion nothing would be said but what is true, and nothing but what the Necessitarian admits and maintains. But this will not serve the cause for which this power has been devised. In order to set aside the position of the Necessitarian, this faculty must be supposed to be altogether independent of the feelings and dispositions of the mind, and must, in the strictest sense, determine itself, and govern its own decisions. The advocate of Liberty may say, that this is not what he means, but he will hear in reply, that if he does not mean this, he means nothing. But if the mind can form either of two opposite volitions at the same time, then the true and proper cause of definite volitions is the abstract power of willing; a fit principle, in good truth, to which the government of life should be committed. properties not of a self-determining power, but of intellect and reason. They are not attributes of the will, but of the mind. But what, after all, can we understand by a self-determining power, considered as the efficient cause of volition? It is an incontrovertible truth, that the act of volition implies a certain inclination or disposition of the mind. Does, then, the self-determining power cause this disposition, or is it acted upon and governed by it? If the latter, it is not a self-determining power, and the controversy is at an end. If it be said to determine this disposition, the question arises, whether it must be considered as acting independently of every mental feeling? If so, it is a manifest nonentity, since a volition cannot take place except in some state and disposition of the mind. If it does not act independently of mental feeling, it will again be asked, does it determine that state of feeling in which it acts? To what conclusion this question would lead, it must be needless to remark. 66 But let the advocate of Liberty plead for himself in the language of that able metaphysician, Dr. Clarke : "The true, proper, immediate, physical efficient cause of action," says he, is the power of self-motion in men, which exerts itself freely, in consequence of the last judgment of the understanding." If this power always obeys the last judgment of the understanding, the Necessitarian will ask no more. But can this power, at the very time when it exerts itself freely, in consequence of the last judgment of the understanding, determine without any inducement whatever to set this last judgment at defiance, and to act in direct opposition to it? This Dr. Clarke would not have affirmed. If it cannot, what is gained by maintaining, with an appearance at least of contradiction, that it exerts itself freely, in consequence of this judgment? If it can, then it is in very deed a power of self-motion, a power which, without any reason, can act against the very reason in consequence of which it acts.* Will the advocate of Liberty lay down his proposition in terms to the following effect: that though the state of the mind has a certain influence upon the self-determining power, yet that it does not, strictly speaking, cause the volition, which is the free act of the power for which he contends? What, then, is the nature of the influence supposed? Does it in any way effect that the volition should be what it is? If so, all that the Necessitarian will be solicitous to maintain is granted. If not, we must look somewhere else, that is, to the self-determining power, for the reason why one volition takes place rather than another: that is, a power which bears the same relation to all imaginable volitions, contains in itself the sole cause of every definite and specific volition. And on this faculty depends the moral agency of man! But does the self-determining power, in fact, obey the influence which the mind exerts upon it? Why, then, does it obey it? Because it chooses. Does it, then, reflect and judge, and thus determine on the propriety of * Dr. Clarke is disposed to consider yielding this obedience? No such the last judgment of the understanding thing. Reflection and judgment are as the same with the act of volition. In a word, if definite volitions have not their causes in definite states of mind, they can be attributed to no cause distinct from the mere power of willing. But to say that the mere faculty of the will, or what would here be the same thing, the self-determining power, is the sole cause of specific volitions, does not in reality differ from saying that a definite volition is the cause of itself. The self-determining power, in itself considered, is equally indifferent to all volitions; but by a determinate act, it is supposed to cause a specific volition; but this act is the volition itself, nor can even for a moment be conceived of as distinct from it. The self-determining power, in other words, wills this or that, because it wills it; that is, the only reason for the volition is the volition itself. Were it necessary to reason any farther against this same self-determining power, this independent faculty, which will submit to no controul, and acknowledge no principle of action but the imperious maxim sit pro ratione voluntas, it might be objected in the first place, that its existence is a mere assumption; secondly, that the assumption is unnecessary, as the phenomena of volition are satisfactorily accounted for without it; thirdly, that the assumption is unwarrantable, as we are acquainted with nothing in the whole compass of nature which bears any analogy to such a faculty; and Then, as in this case the power of selfmotion has nothing to do with volition, but only acts in consequence of the determination of the will or the understanding, it may be dismissed from the controversy, as having no relation to the matter in dispute. "But," says he, "if the act of volition be distinguished from the last judgment of the understanding, then the act of volition, or rather the beginning of action, consequent upon the last judgment of the understanding, is not determined or caused by that last judgment as the physical efficient, but only as the moral motive." If the last judgment of the understanding causes the yolition, that is sufficient. By what name its operation shall be cailed, the Necessitarian will not be very anxious to determine. For what avails the distinction between the physical efficient, and the moral motive, if the volition in given circumstances could not be different from what it is? fourthly, that the supposed operation of this faculty contradicts the only notions which mankind have ever formed of the connexion between cause and effect. We are, indeed, ignorant of the operation of what we term causes, but this ignorance does not diminish the force of the objection. For a definite effect, we, in fact, look for a definite cause; and every variation in the effect is always supposed to imply a proportionable variation in the cause. Let it, then, be remembered, that the subject of controversy is not the cause of volition in general, but of definite and specific volitions. Now a selfdetermining power, if it means any thing, must mean a power which, at the same time and in the same circumstances, can form either of two different or opposite volitions. But to refer a definite volition to the act of such a faculty, is, according to the only idea which we have of causation, to say that a specific volition can be formed without a cause. The sic volo of the selfdetermining power will not be a satisfactory answer to the question, how it came to be the pleasure of the will to determine as it did. The prevalence of one inclination at the very moment when it was possible by the hypothesis that another inclination should have prevailed, requires a definite cause as much as any effect in nature; or rather the supposition involves an impossibility, unless mankind have been thus far mistaken in requiring a definite cause for a definite effect. And if they have been herein mistaken, they may also have been mistaken in requiring any cause at all for that which they have denominated an effect; since the the notion of a cause, has led them to same reasoning which has led them to conceive of it as a definite energy, from which a definite result proceeds. To deny, then, that a definite cause is necessary to a definite effect, or what is the same thing, to deny that a difference in the effect implies a difference in the cause, is to call in question the very existence of a cause. The term, indeed, may be retained, but the only idea which we have of the thing is gone. And when the advocate of Liberty imagines a power which can at the same time cause either of two different volitions, he deceives himself by a mere abuse of language. A self-determining power, then, is not only gratuitously assumed, but involves another assumption, which sets at defiance what have hitherto been thought the most certain conclusions of the human mind. I will now say one word respecting the moral consequences which are supposed to follow from the doctrine of Necessity. The most formidable of these is, that it annihilates the accountableness of man, and renders him an unfit subject of reward and punishment. I shall consider the difficulty as pressing entirely on the side of punishment, and shall observe, that as, according to the Necessitarian system, punishment can operate on the state of the mind, it may with the greatest propriety be applied. But if man had within him such a capricious principle as a self-determining power, the application of punishment would be improper, because it would be useless. What, indeed, has been called vindictive punishment, the doctrine of Necessity does exclude; but this, instead of being an objection to the doctrine, is one of its recommendations. Vindictive punishment, it is true, cannot be defended upon any system; but upon the principles of the Necessitarian it is manifestly and palpably absurd. It will easily be perceived that I have not written for those who are altogether strangers to the controversy, nor for those who thoroughly understand the subject; but, as I intimated above, for those who have conceived that it cannot be thoroughly understood. And if the light in which it has now been placed shall render it more intelligible to any who have hitherto thought it obscure and intricate, my end will be answered. E. COGAN. P.S. I am aware that I have written much more than was necessary; but the supposed difficulty of the subject seemed to require that it should be treated somewhat at length. Otherwise the argument (like most other arguments) lies in a small compass. The Necessitarian maintains, that every volition necessarily results from the state of mind in which the volition takes place. His opponent, to set aside this proposition, contends for a selfdetermining power as the efficient cause of volition. Here a simple question presents itself. Can the mind will this or that without a certain feeling or disposition that prompts the volition? Fact, to which even a self-determining power must bow, will answer, Certainly not. Consequently it cannot will against the state or disposition in which it is at any given time. And here, were impartial reason to decide, the controversy must end. I SIR, AM no infrequent reader of the English Divines of the Latitudinarian school, of whom Tillotson may be considered as the head, and I profess myself an admirer of the author last named, whom Dr. Lardner somewhere justly quotes, under the epithets of a good man and a great preacher." But I confess there are passages in his works, and incidents in his life, which grieve me, and would puzzle me if I did not know the sad influence of dignities, possessed or expected, in political churches, upon the soundest understandings and best hearts. No lover of liberty can recollect, without a sigh, that he and Burnet tampered with the conscience of the martyred Russell, in order to bewilder him into a dying confession of the abominable doctrine of passive obedience and non-resist ance. His "rare piece of Hobbism” is already explained on your pages, (Vol. III. p. 148,) but as he repented of that pulpit indiscretion, it ought not to be severely urged against his memory. There is a still worse instance of his yielding to the iniquity of the times, which I cannot forbear to point out. I do so, I am sure, with no wish to hurt his excellent name, but merely to shew in what manner the licentiousness of a court may infect the pulpit, even when most worthily filled, and how offensive to posterity, if not to contemporaries, are all accommodations of righteous principles to corrupt political maxims. * Tillotson's Sermon CXCVI (8vo. edition of his Works, Vol. X. p. 267) is on "Our Saviour's Ascension,' preached on Ascension-day, which happened to be on the 29th of May, the church festival in celebration of Charles Ind's Restoration. After reading his * In extenuation of Tillotson's conduct it should be remembered that he hoped, by extorting a political confession from Lord Russell that should be agreeable to the Court, to save his life. ED. 6 text, the solemn and sublime passage, Acts i. 9-11, the Doctor began: "There are two occasions of this day accidentally met together, which bear some resemblance to one another; the ascension of our blessed SAVIOUR into heaven, and his exaltation in his kingdom, being crowned with glory and honour, and set on the right hand of the Majesty on high:' and the restoration of our sovereign to his just rights, and royal state and dignity here upon earth, by a miraculous providence of GOD, and as it were by a kind of resurrection from the dead"! He proceeds, "The first of these being of a more spiritual and excellent nature, shall be the subject of my present discourse, not forgetting the other in application it." He then treats the subject of the ascension with his usual ability, seriousness and dexterity in the Scriptures, and comes at length to the application, in the conclusion of which he says, first, "Let us heartily thank GOD for the whole dispensation of our salvation by the incarnation and doctrine, by the holy life and meritorious death of our blessed SAVIOUR;" and secondly, And let us likewise bless GOD for the wonderful restoration of his majesty to the government of these kingdoms, who, under CHRIST, is the great defender of our faith and religion; and let us pay that duty and obedience, which becomes us, to a prince whom God hath so miraculously preserved and restored; and pour out our most fervent prayers to God, that he would long preserve him, and protect his person from all dangers, who is the great security of our religion, and the life of all our hopes, and as truly as any prince ever was to any people, THE LIGHT of our eyes AND THE BREATH OF OUR NOSTRILS; and that God would make him 'wise as an angel of GOD, to go in and out before this great people; and grant to him, and all the people of this land, to know in this our day the things that belong to our peace, before they be hid from our eyes."" In a note upon this passage it is said, "Preached towards the conclusion of the reign of King Charles II." This is meant to remind the reader, that it was penned when the Protestants and Whigs were desirous of the life of that monarch, on account of the imminent danger of a Popish succes sor. But allowing this apology its full weight, what justification can be framed for such adulation from such a man as Tillotson to any prince, and much more to such a prince as Charles II., who sold his country to France, spilled the best blood which was in it, turned his palaces into stews, and as to religion lived a hypocrite and died a dishonest Catholic? Can any thing worse be found in the sermons of the Gaudens, the Allestrees, the Sheldons, the Parkers and the Souths of that age of ecclesiastical profligacy and corruption? SIR, CANTABRIGIENSIS. Exeter, December 8, 1819. highly-valued M Rev. Joseph Bretland, of this city, having nominated me his sole executor, in trust, an honour which, though unworthy of, I cannot sufficiently appreciate, I am become, in consequence thereof, possessed of his manuscripts. It is my intention, should life and ability be granted me, with the assistance of my much-respected friend, the Rev. Thomas Jervis, to make a selection from Mr. Bretland's sermons, for the purpose of publishing two volumes; and I hope they may be ready for delivery in a few months hence. It is probably unnecessary for me to say any thing in commendation of these Discourses, as every person who knew the author is well aware that nothing but what is of sterling value, and highly adapted to promote the cause of virtue and religion, could proceed from his pen. This is one of the objects which I have in view in publishing, and the other is to hand down to posterity the name of one who, from the extreme diffidence with which he was ever accustomed to estimate his own attainments in science, has been, comparatively, but little known in the world. The confidence placed in me by my late venerable friend may, by some at least, be thought to require a panegyric on his talents and virtues; but this has been done already by two writers better qualified than myself, and whose opinions must have more weight; and I have the happiness to expect an extended memoir from the Rev. Mr. Mardon, of Glasgow. It is true my knowledge of Mr. Bretland is not of a recent date, |