ment of the electors who had been proved to be corrupt.1 But under the act which authorized these inquiries, voters giving evidence were entitled to claim an indemnity; and it was now successfully contended that they were protected from disfranchisement, as one of the penalties of their offence. These bills were accordingly withdrawn. Again in 1858, a commission having reported that one hundred and eightythree freemen of Galway had received bribes, a bill was introduced for the disfranchisement of the freemen of tha borough; but for the same reasons, it also miscarried. In 1860 there were strange disclosures affecting the anGloucester cient city of Gloucester. This place had been election, 1859. long familiar with corruption. In 1816 a single candidate had spent 27,500l. at an election; in 1818 another candidate had spent 16,000l.; and now it appeared that at the last election in 1859, two hundred and fifty electors had been bribed, and eighty-one persons had been guilty of corrupting them.1 Up to this time, the places which had been distinguished Wakefield by such mal-practices, had returned members to election, 1859. Parliament prior to 1832; but in 1860 the perplexing discovery was made, that bribery had also extensively prevailed in the populous and thriving borough of Wakefield, the creation of the reform act. Eighty-six electors had been bribed; and such was the zeal of the canvassers, that no less than ninety-eight persons had been coucerned in bribing them.5 The writs for Gloucester and Wakefield were suspended, as a modified punishment of these corrupt places; but the House of Commons was as much at fault as ever, in providing any permanent correction of the evils which had been discovered. In 1854, a more general and comprehensive measure was 1 Hans. Deb., 3d Ser., cxxxi. 1018. 2 Ibid. cxxxiii. 1064. 8 lbid. cxlix. 378, &c. 4 Report of Commissioners, 1860 5 Ibid. 1854. devised, for the prevention of corrupt practices at elections.1 It restrained candidates from paying any election Corrupt pracexpenses, except through their authorized agents, tices Act. and the election auditor; and provided for the publication of accounts of all such expenses. It was hoped that these securities would encourage, and perhaps enforce, a more legal expenditure; but they have since received little credit for advancing the cause of purity. of 1858. This temporary act has since been continued from time to time, and in 1858 was amended. The legality of Bribery Act travelling expenses to voters had long been a mat- Travelling exter of doubt, having received discordant con- penses. structions from different committees. The payment of such expenses might be a covert form of bribery; or it might be a reasonable accommodation to voters, in the proper exercise of their franchise. This doubt had not been settled by the act of 1854; but it had been adjudged in a court of law," that the payment of travelling expenses was not bribery, if paid bonâ fide to indemnify a voter for the expenses he had incurred in travelling to the poll, and not as a corrupt inducement to vote. The act of 1858, following the principle of this judgment, but adding a further security for its observance, permitted the candidate, or his agent appointed in writing, to provide conveyance for voters to the poll; but prohibited the payment of any money to voters themselves, for that purpose. But it was objected at the time, - and the same objection has since been repeated, that the legalizing of travelling expenses, even in this guarded manner, tends to increase the expenses of elections; and this debatable question will probably receive further consideration from the legislature. It is the policy of these recent acts to define clearly the expenses which a candidate may lawfully incur, and to in 1 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102. 2 Cooper v. Slade; 6 E. and B. 447; Rogers on Elections, 334 8 21 & 22 Vict. c. 87. cerning bri bery. sure publicity to his accounts. So far their provisions are a Policy of leg- security to the candidate who is resolved to resist islation con- the payment of illegal expenses; and an embarrassment, at least, to those who are prepared to violate the law. That they have not been effectual in the restraint of bribery, the recent disclosures of election committees, and commissions sufficiently attest. Though large constituencies have, in some instances, proved themselves accessible to corruption, bribery has prevailed most extensively in the smaller boroughs. Hence some remedy may be sought in the enlargement of electoral bodies, and the extension of the area of voting. To repress so grave an evil, more effectual measures will doubtless be devised; but they may still be expected to fail, until bribery shall be unmistakably condemned by public opinion. The law had treated duelling as murder, yet the penalty of death was unable to repress it; but when society discountenanced that time-honored custom, it was suddenly abandoned. Voters may always be found to receive bribes, if offered; but candidates belong to a class whom the influence of society may restrain from committing an offence, condemned alike by the law, and by public opinion. Other questions affecting the constitution of Parliament, and the exercise of the elective franchise, have been discussed at various times, as well before as since the reform act, and here demand a passing notice. Duration of To shorten the duration of Parliaments, has been one of the changes most frequently urged. Prior to Parliaments. 1694, a Parliament once elected, unless dissolved by the Crown, continued in being until the demise of the The Septen- reigning king. One of the Parliaments of Charles II. had sat for eighteen years. By the Triennial Act 1 every Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, came to a natural end in three years. On the accession of George I. this period was extended to seven years, by the well known nial Act. 16 Will. and Mary, c. 2. Septennial Act. This act, though supported on the ground of general expediency, was passed at a time of political danger; when the country had scarcely recovered from the rebellion of 1715, and the Jacobite adherents of the Pretender were still an object of apprehension to the govern ment. In the reign of George II. attempts were made to repeal the Septennial Act; 2 and early in the next reign, Alderman Sawbridge submitted motions, year after year, until his death, for shortening the duration of Parliaments. In 1771 Lord Chatham "with the most deliberate and solemn conviction declared himself a convert to triennial Parliaments." The question afterwards became associated with plans of Parliamentary reform. It formed part of the scheme proposed by the "Friends of the People" in 1792. At that period, and again in 1797, it was advocated by Mr. Grey, in connection with an improved representation, as one of the means of increasing the responsibility of Parliament to the people. The advocates of a measure for shortening the duration of Parliaments, were not then agreed as to the proper limit to be substituted whether one, three, or five years.5 But annual Parliaments have generally been embraced in schemes of radical reform. In times more recent, the repeal of the Septennial Act, as a distinct question of public policy, has often been fairly and temperately discussed in Parliament. In 1817 Mr. Brougham gave notice of a motion on the subject; but did not bring it forward. In 1818 Sir Robert Heron moved for leave to bring in a bill, and was supported by Sir Samuel Romilly and Mr. Brougham; but the proposal met with little favor or attention. The subject was not revived until after the passing of the reform act. It was then argued with much ability by Mr. Tennyson, in 1833, 1834, and 11 Geo. I. c. 38. 2 In 1734 and 1741. Parl. Hist. xvii. 223 4 Parl. Hist. xxxiii. 650. 5 Rockingham Mem. ii. 395. 6 Hansard's Deb., 1st Ser., xxxviii. 802. 1837; and on each occasion met with the support of considerable minorities.1 On the last occasion. the motion was defeated by a majority of nine only. It did not, however, receive the support of any of the leading statesmen, who had recently carried parliamentary reform. That measure had greatly increased the responsibility of the House of Commons to the people; and its authors were satisfied that no further change was then required in the constitution of Parliament. In 1843, Mr. Sharman Crawfurd revived the question; but met with scant encouragement. Lastly, in 1849, Mr. Tennyson D'Eyncourt obtained leave to bring in a bill, by a majority of five. But notwithstanding this unexpected success, the question, if discussed elsewhere as a matter of theoretical speculation, has since ceased to occupy the attention of Parliament. Arguments - The repeal of the Septennial Act has been repeatedly advocated on the ground that the Parliament of George I. had abused its trust, in prolonging its own existence; and that, even admitting the overruling necessity of the occasion, the measure should at least have been temporary. To this it has been answered, that if any wrong was done, it was committed against the people of that day, to whom no reparation can now be made. But to contend that there was any breach of trust, is to limit the authority of Parliament, within bounds not recognized by the constitution. Parliament has not a limited authority, — expressly delegated to it; but has absolute power to make or repeal any law; and every one of its acts is again open to revision. Without a prior dissolution of Parliament, the Unions of Scotland and Ireland were effected, at an interval of nearly a century; measures involving the extinction of the Parliaments of those countries, 1 Hansard's Deb., 3d Ser., xix. 1107; Ibid. xxiii. 1036; Ibid. xxxviii. 630. 2 Ayes 87, Noes 96. 8 Hansard's Deb., 3d Ser., Ixix. 490. 4 Ayes 46, Noes 41. Hans Deb., 3d Ser., cv. 848 |