tom formed part of the parliamentary organization, by which the influence of the Crown and its ministers, was maintained. It was not until a government was falling, that its friends were in danger of losing their seats. The struggle between Sir Robert Walpole and his enemies was determined in 1741, -not upon any question of public policy, but by the defeat of the minister on the Chippenham Election Petition. To remedy these evils, and remove the opprobrium of notorious injustice from the House of Commons, The Grenville Mr. Grenville introduced in 1770, his celebrated Act, 1770 measure, since known as the Grenville Act, and a landmark in Parliamentary history. He proposed to transfer the judicature, in election cases, from the House itself, to a committee of thirteen members, selected by the sitting members and petitioners from a list of forty-nine, chosen by ballot, to whom each party should add a nominee, to advocate their respective interests. This tribunal, constituted by Act of Parliament, was to decide, without appeal, the merits of every controverted election: being, in fact, a court independent of the House, though composed of its own members. The main objection urged against this measure was that the privileges of the House were compromised, and its discretion limited, by the binding obligations of a statute. It is certain that much might have been done by authority of the House itself, which was henceforth regulated by statute, the only legal power required, being that of administering an oath. But Mr. Grenville distrusted the House of Commons, and saw no security for the permanence, or honest trial of the new system, except in a law which they could not set aside. This Act was at first limited to one year; and Horace Walpole insinuates that Mr. Grenville, when in opposition, was willing to give a sore wound to the influence of the Crown;" but hoping to return to office, took care not to 66 1 Parl. Hist. xvi. 904-923; Cavendish Deb. i. 476, 505. weaken his own future power as a minister.1 But the sug gestion for making the Act temporary proceeded from Lord Clare, and not from Mr. Grenville, who was honestly persuaded that the "system must end in the ruin of public liberty, if not checked." 8 At this time his health and spirits were failing; and he died a few months after the passing of his measure. ual. The Grenville Act was continued from time to time; and Made perpet- in 1774, Sir Edwin Sandys brought in a bill to make it perpetual. It encountered a strong opposition, especially from Mr. Fox, who dreaded the surrender of the privileges of the House; but the successful operation of the Act, in the five cases which had already been tried under its provisions, was so generally acknowledged, that the bill was passed by a large majority. "This happy event," wrote Lord Chatham, "is a dawn of better times it is the last prop of Parliament: should it be lost in its passage, the legislature will fall into incurable contempt, and detestation of the nation." "The Act does honor to the statute-book, and will endear forever the memory of the framer.” 5 4 This Act was passed on the eve of another general election, which does not appear so far as evidence is accessible to have been marked by so much corruption as that of 1768. But the value of boroughs had certainly not de clined in the market, as Gatton was sold for 75,0007.o For a time this measure undoubtedly introduced a marked Ite imperfect improvement in the judicature of the House of Buccess. Commons. The disruption of the usual party combinations, at that period, was favorable to its success and the exposure of former abuses discouraged their immediate renewal, in another form. But too soon it became 1 Walp. Mem. Geo. III. ii. 384, n. 2 Cavendish Deb. i. 513. 8 Hatsell's Prec. ii. 21. 4 250 to 122; Parl. Hist. xvii. 1071; Fox Mem. i. 95, 133. a evident, that corruption and party spirit had not been overcome.1 Crowds now attended the ballot, as they had previously come to the vote, not to secure justice, but to further political interests. The party which attended in the greatest force, was likely to have the numerical majority of names, drawn for the committee. From this list each side proceeded to strike thirteen of its political opponents; and the strongest thus secured a preponderance on the commit tee. Nor was this all. The ablest men, being most feared by their opponents, were almost invariably struck off. process familiarly known as "knocking the brains out of the committee;" and thus the committee became at once partial and incompetent. The members of the committee were sworn to do justice between the rival candidates; yet the circumstances under which they were notoriously chosen, their own party bias, and a lax conventional morality, favored by the obscurity and inconsistencies of the election law, and by the conflicting decisions of incapable tribunals, -led to this equivocal result: that right was generally discovered to be on the side of that candidate, who professed the same political opinions as the majority of the committee.2 A Whig candidate had scant justice from a Tory committee; a Tory candidate pleaded in vain before a Whig committee. By these means, the majority of the House continued, with less directness and certainty, and perhaps Improved with less open scandal, to nominate their own of election members, as they had done before the Grenville committees. Act. And for half a century, this system, with slight variaions of procedure, was suffered to prevail. In 1839, however, the ballot was at length superseded by Sir Robert Peel's Act: committees were reduced to six members, and nominated by an impartial body, - the general committee 1 Walpole's Mem. iv. 111 and n. constitution 2 These evils were ably exposed in the Report of the Committee on Controverted Elections (Mr. C. Buller), 1837-38, No. 44. 8 2 & 3 Vict. c. 38; Hansard's Deb., 3d Ser., xlv. 379; ibid. xlvii. 576, &c. of elections. The same principle of selection has since been adhered to in later Acts, with additional securities for impartiality; and the committee has been finally reduced to five members.1 The evil was thus greatly diminished; but still the sinister influence of party was not wholly overcome. In the nomination of election committees, one party or the other has necessarily had a majority of one; and though these tribunals have since been more able and judicial, their constitution and proceedings have too often exposed them to imputations of political bias. Distribution Such being the vices and defects of the electoral system, what were their results upon the House of of places and Commons? Representatives holding their seats pensions. by a general system of corruption, could scarcely fail to be themselves corrupt. What they had bought, they were but too ready to sell. And how glittering the prizes offered as the price of their services! Peerages, baronetcies, and other titles of honor; patronage and court favor for the rich, places, pensions, and bribes for the needy. All that the government had to bestow, they could command. The rapid increase of honors 2 attests the liberality with which political services were rewarded; while contemporary memoirs and correspondence disclose the arts, by which many a peerage has been won. From the period of the Revolution, places and pensions Restrained by have been regarded as the price of political deParliament. pendence; and it has since been the steady policy of Parliament to restrain the number of placemen, entitled to sit in the House of Commons. To William III. fell the task of first working out the difficult problem of a constitutional government; and amongst his expedients for controlling his Parliaments, was that of a multiplication of offices. The country party at once perceived the danger with which 14 & 5 Vict. c. 58, and 11 & 12 Vict. c. 98; Report on Controverted Elec. tions, 1844, No. 373. 2 See supra, p. 224 260. their newly-bought liberties were threatened from this cause, and endeavored to avert it. In 1693, the Commons passed a bill to prohibit all members hereafter chosen from accepting any office under the Crown; but the Lords rejected it. In the following year it was renewed, and agreed to by both Houses; when the king refused his assent to it. Later in his reign, however, this principle of disqualification was com menced, - the Commissioners of Revenue Boards being the first to whom it was applied.1 And at last, in 1700, i was enacted that after the accession of the House of Hanover, no person who has an office or place of profit under the king, or receives a pension from the Crown, shall be capable of serving as a member of the House of Commons." 2 This too stringent provision, however, was repealed, - before it came into operation,3 — early in the reign of Anne. It was, indeed, incompatible with the working of constitutional government; and if practically enforced, would have brought Parliament into hopeless conflict with the executive. 66 and II. By the Act of Settlement of that reign, other restrictions were introduced, far better adapted to correct the Acts of Anne, evils of corrupt influence. The holder of every George I., new office created after the 25th of October, 1705, and every one enjoying a pension from the Crown, during pleasure, was incapacitated from sitting in Parliament; and members of the House of Commons accepting any old office from the Crown, were obliged to vacate their seats, though capable of reëlection. It was the object of this latter provision to submit the acceptance of office by a representative, to the approval of his constituents; a principle which, notwithstanding several attempts to modify it, has since been resolutely maintained by the legislature. Restrictions were also imposed upon the multiplication of commissioners.5 14 & 8 Will. & Mary, c. 21 (Stamps); 11 & 12 Will. III. c. 2 (Excise) 2 12 & 13 Will. III. c. 2, s. 3. 8 4 Anne, c. 8, s. 25. 4 4 Anne, c. 8. 5 6 Anne, c. 7 |