obligatio durat et ideo ipso iure postea de eadem re adversus te agi potest: sed debes per exceptionem rei iudicatae ad

from Dig. 44. 2. 3. (1) The right asserted in the second action must be the same as that asserted in the first. For instance, the res has not been iudicata, because the quaestio is not eadem, if what was decided in the first suit was a question of possession, while in the second we have a question of ownership, Dig. 44. 2. 14. 3, or where a condictio relates to the same object which has previously been claimed by vindicatio, Dig. ib. 11. 6. But, granted that the right alleged is the same, it is immaterial that the second action is of a different nature from the first: 'de eadem re agere videtur et qui non eadem actione agit, qua ab initio agebat, sed etiam si alia experiatur, de eadem tamen re' Dig. ib. 5. For examples of difference of actions involving the same right cf. Dig. 44. 2. 3. 7 (hereditatis petitio and vindicatio); ib. 8 (hereditatis petitio and actio familiae erciscundae); ib. 24 (vindicatio and actio Publiciana). Granted, again, that the right alleged is the same, it is immaterial that in the first action a point was decided incidentally only which forms the principal question in the second, though by the praescriptio praeiudicii or exceptio praeiudicialis (Cic. de invent. 2. 20) the defendant was enabled to postpone such incidental determination of an issue which was all-important in another suit.

It is often said that the identity of the object to which the right in either action relates is an essential condition of exceptio rei iudicatae ; e.g. cum quaeritur, haec exceptio noceat necne? inspiciendum est an idem corpus sit' Dig. 44. 2. 12; but, though it may usually be inferred that the quaestio is eadem from the identity of the res, it is really immaterial that the res are different if the right is substantially identical in the two actions; e. g. if a plaintiff demands first the whole, and later a part of that whole, Dig. ib. 7. pr., or if he claims first an ancilla, and then a child conceived by her after litis contestatio in that action, ib. 7. 1, the exceptio can be pleaded with effect.

If the right alleged in the two actions is the same, but is based, in the second, upon a different title from that affirmed in the first, a distinction must be drawn between real and personal actions. If the action was real, the defendant was not estopped from pleading the exceptio by the difference of title, for the right is the same however it may have been acquired: neque enim amplius quam semel res mea esse potest;' and consequently 'omnes causae (titles) una petitione apprehenduntur' Dig. 44. 2. 14. 2. The only exception to this rule under the older law was, that where the title advanced in the second had accrued since the decision in the first action (causa superveniens); later it seems to have been allowable to specify a single title in a real action (causa expressa agere), the plaintiff thereby being held to save his right of subsequently claiming the same property by a different one, Dig. 44. 2. 11. 2; ib. 14. 2. But in obligations the plaintiff's right differs with the mode in which the particular obligation arose : 'actiones in personam ab actionibus in rem

iuvari. Haec exempli causa rettulisse sufficiet. alioquin quam 6 ex multis variisque causis exceptiones necessariae sint, ex latioribus digestorum seu pandectarum libris intellegi potest. Quarum quaedam ex legibus vel ex his, quae legis vicem 7 optinent, vel ex ipsius praetoris iurisdictione substantiam

hoc differunt, quod cum eadem res ab eodem mihi debeatur, singulas obligationes singulae causae sequuntur, nec ulla earum alterius petitione vitiatur' Dig. ib. 14. 2; e. g. 'si is qui Stichum dari stipulatus fuerat heres exstiterit ei, cui ex testamento idem Stichus debebatur, si ex testamento Stichum petierit, non consumet stipulationem, et contra si ex stipulatu Stichum petierit, actionem ex testamento salvam habebit, quia initio ita constiterint hae duae obligationes, ut altera in iudicium deducta altera nihilominus integra maneret' Dig. 44. 7. 18.

(2) The parties in the second must be the same as in the first action ('inter easdem personas' Dig. 44. 2. 3). In Justinian's time, however, this rule had been somewhat modified. A defendant could plead the exceptio if he had previously been sued on the same ground by an agent of the present plaintiff : hoc iure utimur, ut ex parte actoris in exceptione rei iudicatae hae personae continerentur, quae rem in iudicium deducant. Inter hos erunt procurator, cui mandatum est, tutor, curator furiosi vel pupilli, actor municipum ; ex persona autem rei etiam defensor numerabitur, quia adversus defensorem qui agit litem in iudicium deducit' Dig. 44. 2. 11. 7; for the earlier law see note on Tit. 10. pr. supr. A party was also identified with those whom he had succeeded either universally or singularly, Dig. 44. 2. 9. 2; ib. 11. 3, with those who owned jointly with him land subject or entitled to a praedial servitude (though only in relation thereto) Dig. 8. 5. 4. 3 and 4, and with his correi, Dig. 12. 2. 28. 3. So, too, if in an action between the testamentary and intestate heirs of a deceased person the will was declared void or valid, the judgment bound the legatees and creditors, Dig. 20. 1. 3; 30. 5. 1; and, as a rule, all persons were bound by decisions on questions of status, so that (e. g.) if A was found to be B's son by a praeiudicium, all persons had to recognise him as the brother of B's other children, whether the finding was right or not, Dig. 25. 3. 1-3.

§ 7. Exceptiones might arise from any of the sources by which rights in general were conferred, for as a statute, a senatusconsult, or the edict could create rights, they could also, ex vi termini, create the right to an exceptio; but in form they may be said to be all praetorian, as it was the praetor who enabled them to be advanced through the formula, and in the legis actio period they were unknown, Gaius iv. 108. Among those based on statutes are the exceptio legis Cinciae, p. 225 supr., fragm. Vat. 310, legis Plaetoriae, and legis Iuliae (de bonorum cessione); on senatusconsulta the exceptiones SC. Trebelliani, Dig. 15. 2. 1. 8; SCI. Macedoniani, and SC1. Velleiani; on imperial enactment, the exceptio by which under the epistola Hadriani the fideiussor claimed the beneficium

8 capiunt. Appellantur autem exceptiones aliae perpetuae et 9 peremptoriae, aliae temporales et dilatoriae. Perpetuae et peremptoriae sunt, quae semper agentibus obstant et semper rem de qua agitur peremunt: qualis est exceptio doli mali et quod metus causa factum est et pacti conventi, cum ita con10 venerit, ne omnino pecunia peteretur. Temporales atque dilatoriae sunt, quae ad tempus nocent et temporis dilationem tribuunt: qualis est pacti conventi, cum convenerit, ne intra certum tempus ageretur, veluti intra quinquennium. nam finito eo tempore non impeditur actor rem exsequi. ergo hi, quibus intra tempus agere volentibus obicitur exceptio aut pacti conventi aut alia similis, differre debent actionem et post tempus agere: ideo enim et dilatoriae istae exceptiones appellantur. alioquin, si intra tempus egerint obiectaque sit exceptio, neque eo iudicio quidquam consequerentur propter exceptionem nec post tempus olim agere poterant, cum temere rem in iudicium deducebant et consumebant, qua ratione rem amittebant. hodie autem non ita stricte haec procedere volumus, sed eum, qui ante tempus pactionis vel obligationis litem inferre ausus est, Zenonianae constitutioni subiacere censemus, quam sacratissimus legislator de his qui tempore plus petierunt protulit, ut et indutias, quas, si ipse actor sponte indulserit vel natura actionis continet, contempserat, in duplum habeant hi, qui talem iniuriam passi sunt, et post eas finitas non aliter litem suscipiant, nisi omnes expensas litis antea acceperint, ut actores tali poena perterriti tempora

divisionis, p. 412 supr. Those which are purely praetorian form a large portion of the machinery by which the praetor enabled equity to overcome the hardship and injustice of the ius civile; e. g. the exceptiones doli, metus, pacti, rei iudicatae, and in factum; but sometimes a praetorian action is repelled by a 'civil' exception; e. g. the actio hypothecaria or constitutoria by exceptio SCI. Velleiani, Dig. 16. 1. 8. pr.; ib. 29. pr.

§ 8. In drawing this distinction Justinian would have done well to follow Gaius, who does not (iv. 120) use the alternative terms temporales and perpetuae; for, as Mr. Poste points out, in Cod. 5. 12. 30 and elsewhere temporalis exceptio' denotes the plea of prescription (longi temporis exceptio) which was perpetual and peremptory.

§ 10. The enactment of Zeno referred to already explained, Tit. 6. 33 supr. and notes.

(Cod. 3. 10. 1) has been Under Justinian, when a

defendant had proved his dilatory exception, he was not absolutely

litium doceantur observare. Praeterea etiam ex persona dila- 11 toriae sunt exceptiones: quales sunt procuratoriae, veluti si per militem aut mulierem agere quis velit: nam militibus nec pro patre vel matre vel uxore nec ex sacro rescripto procuratorio nomine experiri conceditur: suis vero negotiis superesse sine offensa disciplinae possunt. eas vero exceptiones, quae olim procuratoribus propter infamiam vel dantis vel ipsius procuratoris opponebantur, cum in iudiciis frequentari nullo perspeximus modo, conquiescere sancimus, ne, dum de his altercatur, ipsius negotii disceptatio proteletur.

acquitted; the judge's sententia (which modern writers call absolutio ab instantia as contrasted with absolutio ab actione) was that at that time he did not owe the plaintiff what had been demanded from him, and the latter could renew his action when the obstacle was removed, though he had to wait twice as long as would otherwise have been necessary, pay all the plaintiff's costs hitherto incurred, and in the meanwhile could claim no interest on the debt. As appears from the text (ante tempus pactionis vel obligationis) the procedure was the same whether the obligation was originally ex die, or payment was postponed subsequently by a 'pactum de non petendo intra certum tempus.' Among dilatory pleas 'quae ad tempus nocent' were in Gaius' time (iv. 122) the exceptiones litis dividuae and litis residuae.

§ 11. Gaius exemplifies exceptiones ex persona dilatoriae (iv. 124) by the plea that the plaintiff was suing by a cognitor when the edict disqualified him from being so represented, or had appointed as his cognitor a person similarly disabled from acting in that capacity; he does not mention the exceptio procuratoria, though infames were disabled from both representing others and being themselves represented in that form, fragm. Vat. 322-3. For infamia generally see on Tit. 16. 2 inf. Justinian's enactment in the last lines of the paragraph seems merely to have formally deprived defendants of a right which they had practically ceased to exercise, and not to have affected the disability of infames to appoint or appear as procurators; the judge could still reject an agent because either he could not act as such, or the true party could not be so represented, but the defendant could not.

Women could not be procurators on the principle of the SC. Velleianum, that all interventio was a virile munus. By Cod. 2. 13. 25 state officials of higher rank were ordered to conduct their suits by agents, lest by appearing personally they should disturb the impartiality of the court.

As a general rule exceptions are not subject to prescription, for a defendant cannot advance them when he will, but must wait till he is sued: 'cum actor quidem in sua potestate habeat, quando utatur suo iure, is autem, cum quo agitur, non habet potestatem quando conveniatur' Dig. 44. 4. 5. 6. When, however, a party can assert his right by

XIV.

DE REPLICATIONIBUS.

Interdum evenit, ut exceptio, quae prima facie iusta videatur, inique noceat. quod cum accidit, alia allegatione opus est adiuvandi actoris gratia, quae replicatio vocatur, quia per eam replicatur atque resolvitur vis exceptionis. veluti cum pactus est aliquis cum debitore suo, ne ab eo pecuniam petat, deinde postea in contrarium pacti sunt, id est ut petere creditori liceat: si agat creditor et excipiat debitor, ut ita demum condemnetur, si non convenerit, ne eam pecuniam creditor petat, nocet ei exceptio, convenit enim ita: : namque nihilo minus hoc verum manet, licet postea in contrarium pacti sunt. sed quia iniquum est creditorem excludi, replicatio ei dabitur ex posteriore pacto convento. 1 Rursus interdum evenit, ut replicatio, quae prima facie iusta sit, inique noceat. quod cum accidit, alia allegatione opus 2 est adiuvandi rei gratia, quae duplicatio vocatur. Et si rursus ea prima facie iusta videatur, sed propter aliquam causam inique actori noceat, rursus allegatione alia opus est, qua

either action or exception (as e. g. in dolus and metus), it is held by some writers that he loses the latter in the same period of prescription as he loses the former, by others that even here the exception is indestructible; whence the two opposed maxims, 'tant dure l'action, tant dure l'exception,' —' quae ad agendum sunt temporalia, ad excipiendum sunt perpetua.' The truth seems to be that if the right upon which both action and exception rest is in rem, the latter continues to exist even after the former is barred, because the real right itself is not affected by the prescription; but if they both have their source in an obligation, the obligation itself is extinguished by the prescription of the action (Dig. 46. 1. 37; 13. 5. 18. 1), and therefore the exception expires as well; cf. Dig. 12. 2. 9. 4.

Tit. XIV. For the nature of duplicatio, replicatio, etc., and the form which they assumed under the system of formulae see the reference in the General Index to Excursus X inf. Gaius (iv. 126) further exemplifies duplicatio by an action brought for the price of goods sold to which the defendant pleads an exceptio that as they have not yet been delivered he ought not to be condemned, and is met by the plaintiff's duplicatio that the sale was made upon condition that there should be no delivery until the price had been paid. For other illustrations see Dig. 3. 3. 48; 16. 1. 32. 2; 50. 17. 154.