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observandum est, qui litem suam fecerit. Item exercitor 3 navis aut cauponae aut stabuli de dolo aut furto, quod in nave aut in caupona aut in stabulo factum erit, quasi ex maleficio teneri videtur, si modo ipsius nullum est maleficium, sed alicuius eorum, quorum opera navem aut cauponam aut stabulum exerceret: cum enim neque ex contractu sit adversus eum constituta haec actio et aliquatenus culpae reus est, quod opera malorum hominum uteretur, ideo quasi ex maleficio teneri videtur. in his autem casibus in factum actio competit, quae heredi quidem datur, adversus heredem autem non competit.
duntaxat de peculio posse conveniri' Dig. 9. 4. 34 and 35. If the dangerous object had been positum or suspensum by a slave, the praetor had allowed a noxal action, Dig. 9. 3. 1. pr. ; ib. 5. 6, and doubtless the practice had been the same with children in power ; for this subject see Tit. 8 and notes inf.
$ 3. The penalty to which shipowners, inn and stable keepers were liable for such delicts of their employés was twice the value of the property stolen or damaged, Dig. 4. 9. 7. 1; 47. 5. 2. The same classes of persons were bound ex contractu to restore in safety and uninjured the property of travellers and others which was placed in their custody (receptum nautarum, cauponum et stabulariorum), unless the loss was occasioned by vis maior, unavoidable accident, or contributory negligence of the owner : 'ait praetor, nautae, caupones, stabularii, quod cuiusque salvum fore receperint, nisi restituent, in eos iudicium dabo' Dig. 4. 9. I. pr.
There is apparently no reason why the liability of masters for their slaves' delicts in general (Tit. 8 inf.) and of owners of animals for damage done by them (Tit. 9) should not be considered quasi-delictual, for it was enforced by special actions, which were at least as penal as that against the judge 'qui litem suam fecerit.' The fact seems to be that the cases mentioned in this Title are intended only as examples of quasidelicts, and that the other two would naturally have found a place among them but for Justinian's inveterate habit of following the arrangement of Gaius. As the latter does not treat quasi-delict at all, he discusses the liability of masters and fathers for the delicts of their slaves and children in power in close connection with a cognate question
-their liability upon their contracts ; so that Justinian, in his anxiety to adhere to the latter arrangement, has committed a fault of classification.
Before proceeding to the subject of actions in the next Title, it is recommended that the student should read the Excursus at the end of this Book on the earlier history of Roman civil procedure.
DE ACTIONIBUS. Superest, ut de actionibus loquamur. actio autem nihil aliud est, quam ius persequendi iudicio quod sibi debetur.
Tit. VI. Actio is a term which has a variety of meanings, more or less cognate to one another. From signifying a mere act (as in Dig. 48. 1. 7) it becomes limited to a processual act, an act done as part of a judicial proceeding, whether by one of the parties (Gaius iv. II sq., Dig. 1. 2. 2. 6) or by the magistrate (Dig. 1. 7. 4). In Dig. 47. 20. I it indicates a public prosecution, and in Cod. 10. 1. 6 it is used altogether improperly in the sense of an evidentiary document.
But by far its commonest senses are two in number: (1) as here in the text, it means 'a right of action. The expression ‘ius persequendi quod sibi debetur' at first might be taken to imply that actio is here used as equivalent to actio in personam, for it is difficult to represent a person who denies one's right to property as 'owing' one a debt; and it is plain from the next paragraph that Justinian is using actio in its widest sense : cf. Dig. 50. 16. 178. 3 'hoc verbum “debuit” omnem omnino actionem comprehendere intellegitur.' (2) The actual exercise of such right of action (as in the expressions actionem dare, denegare, actione experiri), or, more generally, a "legal remedy.' This sense in some passages is narrower than in others; its extension in fact is threefold : (a) in its narrowest signification it denotes an actio in personam as distinct from an actio in rem (p. 332 supr.), and here there is a close correlation between actio and obligatio ; for every personal action asserts a right in personam, and presupposes an obligatio. A real action, on the other hand, though brought against a definite person, does not (as is remarked in $ 1) presuppose any vinculum iuris' between plaintiff and defendant; the latter is sued, not because he'owes' anything, properly speaking, but because he will not recognise a right which the plaintiff has and can assert against the world. After such action has been definitely commenced, the parties are bound to one another (Gaius iji. 180); but the action does not originate in an obligatio as personal actions do. (6) Somewhat more widely, actio denotes a judicial proceeding which (in the formulary period) commenced with a formula, in contradistinction to interdicts and the extraordinaria cognitio ; and (c) finally, in some passages it bears the sense of any legal remedy whatsoever : 'actionis verbo continetur in rem, in personam, directa, utilis, praeiudicium, sicut ait Pomponius stipulationes etiam, quae praetoriae sunt, quia actionum instar obtinent, ut damni infecti, legatorum, et si quae similes sunt. Interdicta quoque actionis verbo continentur' Dig. 44. 7. 37, 'integri restitutio est redintegrandae rei vel causae actio Paul. sent. rec. 1. 7. 1, "agere etiam is videtur, qui exceptione utitur, nam reus in excipiendo actor est’ Dig. 44. 1. 1 : but cf. Dig. 50. 16. 8. 1 'actionis verbo non continetur exceptio.'
Omnium actionum, quibus inter aliquos apud iudices arbi- 1 trosve de quaque re quaeritur, summa divisio in duo genera deducitur : aut enim in rem sunt aut in personam. namque agit unusquisque aut cum eo, qui ei obligatus est vel ex contractu vel ex maleficio, quo casu proditae actiones in personam sunt, per quas intendit adversarium ei dare aut dare facere oportere et aliis quibusdam modis: aut cum eo agit, qui nullo iure ei obligatus est, movet tamen alicui de aliqua re controversiam. quo casu proditae actiones in rem sunt. veluti si rem corporalem possideat quis, quam Titius suam esse affirmet, et possessor dominum se esse dicat : nam si Titius suam esse intendat, in rem actio est. Aeque si agat 2 ius sibi esse fundo forte vel aedibus utendi fruendi vel per fundum vicini eundi agendi vel ex fundo vicini aquam ducendi, in rem actio est. eiusdem generis est actio de iure praediorum urbanorum, veluti si agat ius sibi esse altius aedes suas tollendi prospiciendive vel proiciendi aliquid vel immittendi in vicini aedes. contra quoque de usu fructu et de servitutibus praediorum rusticorum, item praediorum urbanorum invicem quoque proditae sunt actiones, ut quis intendat ius non esse adversario utendi fruendi, eundi agendi aquamve ducendi, item altius tollendi prospiciendi proiciendi immittendi : istae quoque actiones in rem sunt, sed negativae. quod genus actionis in controversiis rerum corporalium proditum non est: nam in his is agit qui non possidet: ei vero qui possidet non est actio prodita, per quam neget rem actoris esse. sane uno casu qui possidet nihilo minus actoris partes optinet, sicut in latioribus
$1. The distinction of actions into real and personal is based in origin on difference of formula (Excursus X inf.), to which there is an obvious reference in Justinian's words intendit ... dare facere oportere,'' (rem) suam esse intendat,' which, however, have no technical meaning in the text, but merely describe in general terms the plaintiff's contention, as expressed in the libellus conventionis, or writ of summons by which the action was commenced. Other differences, e.g. in procedure, and in the nature of the security to be given by the parties (Tit. 11 inf.), have now disappeared, and a real differs from a personal action only in the nature of the right for whose protection it is brought : the opposition is material only, not formal. It will be found that in $ 20 inf. Justinian interposes a third class-actiones mixtae-between actions which are real and those which are personal. § 2. For the rights to which the remedies described in this section
3 digestorum libris opportunius apparebit. Sed istae quidem actiones, quarum mentionem habuimus, et si quae sunt similes, ex legitimis et civilibus causis descendunt. aliae autem sunt, quas praetor ex sua iurisdictione comparatas habet tam in rem quam in personam, quas et ipsas necessarium est exemplis ostendere. ecce plerumque ita permittit in rem agere, ut vel actor diceret se quasi usu cepisse, quod usu non ceperit, vel ex
diverso possessor diceret adversarium suum usu non cepisse quod 4 usu ceperit. Namque si cui ex iusta causa res aliqua tradita
fuerit, veluti ex causa emptionis aut donationis aut dotis aut legatorum, necdum eius rei dominus effectus est, si eius rei casu possessionem amiserit, nullam habet directam in rem
relate see Bk. ii. 3-5 and notes supr. The actio confessoria, affirming a right of servitude in the plaintiff, lay not only against the dominus of the res serviens, but against any one by whom the right was violated, and its objects were recognition of the right and damages for its infringement: in form it was arbitraria (§ 31 inf.). In many cases, especially of praedial servitudes, the person entitled was not limited to this remedy, but could use an interdict, and thereby compel the dominus, if he wished to contest the right, to bring the actio negatoria. By this he asserted the freedom of his property from the servitude affirmed by the other ; its object being restoration of the property itself (if the other claimed a use or usufruct) or cessation of the act by which the rights of ownership had been interfered with ; damages for what had been done, and security by stipulation against its repetition. For these actions generally cf. Mr. Poste's note on Gaius iv. 3.
The single case referred to at the end of the section, in which a possessor can be plaintiff in a real action, and of which Justinian says fuller information may be found in the Digest, may be either where a person, though not ceasing to 'possess' his property, has given it as precarium to another, Dig. 43. 26. 15. 4: or where one person possesses ex iusta causa (i.e. as dominus) and another vi aut clam, but not from him (so that the interdict Uti possidetis does not lie), Dig. 43. 17. 3. pr.; or where a civil possessor brings vindicatio against another who has detention in his name, Dig. 6. 1.9; 7. 9. 7. pr. .
$ 3. For the history of the distinction here drawn between actiones civiles or legitimae, and actiones honorariae (the latter comprising the two classes of utiles and in factum) see Excursus X. Actiones honorariae in rem are exemplified in 3-7, in personam in $ $ 8-12 inf.
By possessor at the end of this section can only be meant ‘is qui olim possederat' (referring to § 5 inf.), cf. domino for 'ei qui dominus fuerat' in § 5, and Dig. 41. I. 56. 1; 27. 3. 13. 4.
§ 4. The actio Publiciana was the proper remedy of any one who had actionem ad eam rem persequendam : quippe ita proditae sunt iure civili actiones, ut quis dominium suum vindicet. sed quia sane durum erat eo casu deficere actionem, inventa est a praetore actio, in qua dicit is, qui possessionem amisit, eam rem se usu cepisse et ita vindicat suam esse. quae actio Publiciana appellatur, quoniam primum a Publicio praetore in edicto pro
commenced the usucapion of property without being able to complete it because some other person had obtained possession, and so interrupted its operation, before his title had become indefeasible, p. 187 supr. The conditions of success were as follow :
(1) The object must be capable of being acquired by usucapio or prescription, Dig. 6. 2. 9. 5.
(2) The plaintiff must have had possession : 'ante traditionem, quamvis bonae fidei quis emptor est, experiri Publiciana non poterit' Dig. ib. 7. 6. By the edict the possession must have been acquired by traditio : 'ait praetor, si quis id, quod traditur ex iusta causa non a domino et nondum usucaptum petet, iudicium dabo’ Dig. ib. 1.; but by construction the remedy was extended to modes of acquiring possession generally : 'quaecunque sunt iustae causae adquirendarum rerum, si ex his causis nacti res amiserimus, dabitur nobis earum rerum persequendarum gratia haec actio’ Dig. ib. 13. pr. This rule, however, does not apply in those exceptional cases (e. g. sometimes in legatum) where ownership vested without possession being actually delivered, Dig. ib. I. 2. ; ib. 7. pr. Moreover, the possession must be usucapion possession : it must have been derived ex iusta causa (p. 216 supr.), Gaius iv. 36, and be accompanied by bona fides, Dig. 6. 2. 1. pr. : whether throughout its continuance, or only at its inception, is matter of doubt.
(3) The action can be brought with success only against a defendant who possesses with less right than the plaintiff, and therefore neither against the dominus, Dig. 6. 2. 16. 17 (unless the case is one in which, supposing the owner brought vindicatio against the possessor, he could be repelled by a iusta exceptio, e.g. doli, rei venditae et traditae, or rei iudicatae), nor against any other person whose possession is as righteous in respect of bona fides, iusta causa, etc., as the plaintiff's had been, unless both derived their possession from the same person, Dig. 6. 2. 9. 4.
The actio Publiciana could be used to establish servitudes no less than dominium : 'si de usufructu agatur tradito, Publiciana datur, itemque servitutibus urbanorum praediorum per traditionem constitutis, vel per patientiam, forte si per domum quis suam passus est aquaeductum transduci : item rusticorum, nam et hic traditionem et patientiam tuendam constat’Dig. 6. 2. 11. 1. The Publicius by whom the action was introduced was perhaps the Quintus Publicius who is mentioned by Cicero as having been praetor circ. B.C. 66 : pro Cluent. 45. It was in existence certainly in the time of Neratius, and perhaps of Sabinus, Dig. 6. 2. 15 and 17.