« PreviousContinue »
servum, in quo usum fructum vel usum habetis, similiter ex duabus istis causis vobis adquiritur. Communem servum pro 3 dominica parte dominis adquirere certum est, excepto eo, quod uni nominatim stipulando aut per traditionem accipiendo illi soli adquirit, veluti, cum ita stipuletur: 'Titio domino meo dare spondes?' sed si unius domini iussu servus fuerit stipulatus, licet antea dubitabatur, tamen post nostram decisionem res expedita est, ut illi tantum adquirat, qui hoc ei facere iussit, ut supra dictum est.
Tollitur autem omnis obligatio solutione eius quod debetur, vel si quis consentiente creditore aliud pro alio solverit. nec tamen interest, quis solvat, utrum ipse qui debet an alius pro
ii. 9. 4, and what is said here, that all commodum arising ex operis suis accrues to the person having the use, seems irreconcileable with Dig. 7. 8. 14. pr. 'per servum usuarium si stipuler vel per traditionem accipiam, an adquiram, quaeritur, si ex re mea vel ex operis eius, et si quidem ex operis eius, non valebit, quoniam nec locare eius operas possumus ; sed si ex re mea, dicimus servum usuarium stipulantem vel per traditionem accipientem mihi adquirere, cum hac opera eius utar.' The truth seems to be that the benefit of any contract made by a slave ex re usuarii vested in the latter, though he could not let out the slave's services : if the latter let them out himself the merces could be claimed by the usuary, Dig. 7. 8. 13.
$ 3. Cod. 4. 27. 3: cf. Tit. 17. 3 and notes, supr.
Tit. XXIX. After describing how obligations may arise from contract and quasi-contract, Justinian proceeds to show how they are discharged. Here the metaphor by which their creation is so vividly presented is consistently continued : an obligation is dissolved by the untying of the knot by the tying of which it was imposed, the general term employed being solvere, in the sense of loosing or releasing : 'solvisse accipere debemus non tantum eum, qui solvit, verum omnem omnino qui ea obligatione liberatus est, quae ex causa iudicati descendit’ Dig. 42. 1. 4. 7, "solvere dicimus eum, qui id facit quod facere promisit' Dig. 50. 16. 176, 'solutionis verbum pertinet ad omnem liberationem quoquo modo factam, magisque ad substantiam obligationis refertur quam ad nummorum solutionem' Dig. ib. 47. In connection with the different classes of contracts indeed the jurists love the conceit, that to the causa by which the obligatio is engendered in each of them respectively there should be a peculiarly corresponding mode of release : nihil tam
eo : liberatur enim et alio solvente, sive sciente debitore sive ignorante vel invito solutio fiat. item si reus solverit, etiam
naturale est quam eo genere quidque dissolvere quo colligatum est. Ideo verborum obligatio verbis tollitur ; nudi consensus obligatio contrario consensu dissolvitur' Dig. 50. 17. 35 ; cf. Dig. 46. 3. 80. Obligations incurred literis (Excursus VIII inf.) could be extinguished by the creditor's entering the receipt of an equivalent sum from the debtor on the opposite page of the ledger (accepti relatio : cf. Gaius iv. 64); and Gaius tells us (iii. 173-5) that debts incurred in mancipation form or by judgment were properly dissolved by a corresponding nexi liberatio, a 'species imaginariae solutionis per aes et libram,' employed even in his own day to acknowledge payment of judgment debts and legata per damnationem ; see Poste's Gaius pp. 443, 672.
But a more important distinction between the modes in which obligations may be invalidated or rendered ineffectual, not alluded to in this Title, is the following. To some events the law attaches the effect of altogether extinguishing the obligatio ; it ceases to exist, and there is no longer any vinculum iuris between the parties; the obligatio, as it is said, ipso iure tollitur, perimitur, evanescit. Under the older law, unless it was discharged in this manner, an obligation was altogether unaffected ; so that (e. g.) if a solemn form of payment was prescribed which the debtor did not observe, he could be sued and forced to pay again. But later a new mode arose in which a debtor could defeat his creditor ; though he could not deny the existence of the obligatio, he might himself have a right which he could set up against that of the other, whereby his claim, if asserted by legal process, could be successfully repelled ; ipso iure, the obligatio still subsists, but it is rendered inoperative, and in effect cancelled, by the counter right of the debtor, or, as it is said, ope exceptionis actor summovetur, removetur, expellitur, excluditur ; he is kept at bay by the plea of the defendant. The processual significance of exceptiones is treated in the notes to Bk. iv. 13 inf. ; here all that need be considered is their operation. In some cases this is stronger and more potent than in others ; in some the plea will avail at all times and under all circumstances, in others it will be only temporary (Bk. iv. 13. 8-11 inf.). Those which have the stronger effect practically (though not in form) extinguish the obligation, or, as Mr. Poste puts it, they neutralize naturalis as well as civilis obligatio, as is shown by the fact that if the debtor pays by mistake he can recover by condictio indebiti ; 'indebitum autem solutum accipimus non solum si omnino non debeatur, sed et si per aliquam exceptionem peti non poterat ; quare hoc quoque repeti poterit, nisi sciens se tutum exceptione solvit’ Dig. 12. 6. 26. 3, 'adeo autem perpetua exceptio parit condictionem, ut Iulianus scripsit, si emptor fundi damnaverit heredem suum ut venditorem nexu venditi liberaret, mox venditor ignorans rem tradiderit posse eum fundum condicere, idemque et si debitorem suum damnaverit liberare et ille ignorans solverit' Dig. ib. 7. Among exceptions with this greater
ii qui pro eo intervenerunt liberantur. idem ex contrario contingit, si fideiussor solverit: non enim solus ipse liberatur, sed
potency are exceptio pacti, Dig. ib. 40. 2; exceptio doli, ib. 65. 1; exceptio metus, Dig. 12. 5. 7, and exceptio Sci. Velleiani (p. 416 supr.), Dig. 12. 6. 40. pr. ; and their protection is so nearly on a par with that of extinction ipso iure that it is said in Dig. 50. 17. 112'nihil interest ipso iure quis actionem non habeat, an per exceptionem infirmetur ;' cf. Dig. 40. 12. 20. 3'obligatum accipere debemus, qui exceptione se tueri non potest; ceterum si potest, dicendum non esse obligatum. Those exceptions which have only the weaker effect, though they prevent the creditor from succeeding in an action, yet leave the obligatio subsisting naturaliter, with all or most of the incidents which characterise such relations (Excursus V inf.). As a general rule every exceptio will have the stronger efficacy if based upon the ius gentium and natural equity : 'desinit debitor esse is, qui nactus est exceptionem iustam nec ab aequitate naturali abhorrentem' Dig. 50. 17. 66.
Thus the distinction between extinction ipso iure, and invalidation ope exceptionis, is not one of degree, for some exceptions produce an effect undistinguishable from extinction ; it consists in the mode of their operation. A right extinguished ipso iure can never recover its vitality; but, given an event which operates only ope exceptionis, i.e. confers a countervailing right on the debtor, the obligatio still subsists, and should the debtor's right be itself destroyed, will once more become enforceable, and recover its original value. In the first case only a new right can come into existence, which implies that all the conditions ordinarily required for the creation of an obligation must be satisfied, so that a mere renunciation by the debtor of the benefit which has accrued to him in the destruction of the creditor's right will not reestablish the creditor in statu quo unless such renunciation suffices in the particular case for the creation of an obligatio ; 'si pactum conventum tale fuerit, quod actionem [ipso iure] tolleret, velut iniuriarum, non poterit, postea pacis. cendo ut agere possit, agere, quia et prima actio sublata est, et posterius pactum ad actionem reparandam inefficax est .... idem dicemus et in bonae fidei contractibus, si pactum conventum totam obligationem sustulerit, veluti empti, non enim ex novo pacto prior obligatio resuscitatur, sed proficiet pactum ad novum contractum' Dig. 2. 14. 27. 2. But in the second case it would be otherwise ; the old right is not destroyed, but only balanced by a colliding or countervailing right in the debtor ; and if the latter right is in any way extinguished, even by mere waiver, the former will recover all its original force : pactus ne peteret, postea convenit ut peteret. Prius pactum per posterius elidetur ; non quidem ipso iure, sicut stipulatio tollitur per stipulationem, si hoc actum est, quia in stipulationibus ius continetur, in pactis factum versatur, et ideo replicatione (Bk. iv. 14 inf.) exceptio elidetur' Dig. loc. cit.
In this Title Justinian touches only upon those modes in which obligations are extinguished ipso iure and absolutely; this is the meaning of
1 etiam reus. Item per acceptilationem tollitur obligatio. est autem acceptilatio imaginaria solutio. quod enim ex verborum obligatione Titio debetur, id si velit Titius remittere, poterit sic fieri, ut patiatur haec verba debitorem dicere : ‘quod ego tibi promisi habesne acceptum ?' et Titius respondeat ‘habeo :' sed et Graece potest acceptum fieri, dummodo sic fiat, ut Latinis verbis solet: éxels daßùy önvápia Tóca; čxw daß6v. quo genere ut diximus tantum eae obligationes solvuntur, quae ex verbis consistunt, non etiam ceterae: consentaneum enim visum est verbis factam obliga
the word “tollitur,' which apparently is not used when the creditor's right is merely deprived of its efficacy ope exceptionis. This treatment, however, is open to the criticism that, if it is intended to relate to the modes in which all obligations may be dissolved, it is wrongly placed, its proper position being between Titles 5 and 6 of Book iv., and also omits one important mode in which some obligations ex delicto could be extinguished ; while, if it purports to describe only the discharge of contractual obligation, it is pro tanto inadequate, and even on that supposition inexhaustive ; yet this seems to be what was in fact intended by Gaius, whom Justinian here follows closely.
The effect of datio in solutum, the payment of aliud pro alio with the creditor's consent, was in Gaius' time (iii. 168) matter of dispute. The Sabinians (whom Justinian follows) held that it operated ipso iure, the Proculians, that it only gave rise to an exceptio doli if an action were subsequently brought on the debt. The creditor must take "aliud pro alio' nolens volens if it becomes impossible to discharge the obligation in the proper way without the debtor's default, and at the same time without entirely releasing the latter ; e. g. where the obligation is to convey a res aliena which the owner will not sell (Dig. 30. 71. 3) he must accept its value. By Nov. 4. 3 Justinian enacted that if a person was absolutely unable to pay a money debt, he might compel the creditor to select an equivalent from his property, provided he gave security against eviction.
Solutio must be made to either the creditor in person or his agent; guardians and persons solutionis causa adiecti (e. g. mihi aut Titio dare spondes ? Tit. 19. 4 supr.) were regarded as his mandataries. If the debtor was unable to pay the creditor, either because he could not find him, or because the latter refused to accept payment, or from uncertainty as to who his real creditor was, he could release himself by deposit in court, Cod. 8. 43. 9, Dig. 18. 6. 1. 3. Payment by the fideiussor released the principal only if the former had not previously procured an assignment to himself of the creditor's rights against him (p. 413 supr.). If the suretyship took the form of mandatum it was never so, Dig. 17. 1. 28: cf. note on Tit. 26. 5 supr.
§ 1. Acceptilatio is a formal release from an obligation incurred by tionem posse aliis verbis dissolvi : sed id, quod ex alia causa debetur, potest in stipulationem deduci et per acceptilationem dissolvi. sicut autem quod debetur pro parte recte solvitur, ita in partem debiti acceptilatio fieri potest. Est prodita 2 stipulatio, quae vulgo Aquiliana appellatur, per quam stipulationem contingit, ut omnium rerum obligatio in stipulatum deducatur et ea per acceptilationem tollatur. stipulatio enim Aquiliana novat omnes obligationes et a Gallo Aquilio ita composita est : 'quidquid te mihi ex quacumque causa dare facere oportet oportebit praesens in diemve quarumque rerum mihi tecum actio quaeque abs te petitio vel adversus te persecutio est erit quodque tu meum habes tenes possides possideresve dolove malo fecisti, quo minus possideas: quanti quaeque earum rerum res erit, tantam pecuniam dari stipulatus est Aulus Agerius, spopondit Numerius Negidius.' item e diverso Numerius Negidius interrogavit Aulum Agerium : 'quidquid tibi hodierno die per Aquilianam stipulationem spopondi, id omne habesne acceptum?' respondit Aulus
stipulation, perhaps employed for security's sake even where the debt was otherwise discharged (e. g. by payment), and not only (as the text suggests) when a gratuitous release was intended. Its specialisation to the extinction of obligations incurred verbis is alluded to in Terence, Adelph. 2. I. 10 'neque tu verbis solves unquam, quod mihi re male feceris. Whether an acceptilatio in partem debiti was valid had been disputed in Gaius' time, iii. 172. Justinian's statement of the law must be taken subject to the distinction drawn by Ulpian: 'si id, quod in stipulationem deductum est, divisionem non recipiat, acceptilatio in partem nullius erit momenti, ut puta si servitus fuit praedii rustici vel urbani. Plane si ususfructus sit in stipulationem deductus, puta fundi Titiani, poterit pro parte acceptilatio fieri et erit residuae partis fundi ususfructus: si tamen viam quis stipulatus accepto iter vel actum fecerit, acceptilatio nullius erit momenti' Dig. 46. 4. 13. 1. The words
ut diximus' in this section are taken from Gaius iii. 170, and apparently refer to some passage in his Institutes which has not come down to us, or perhaps to one of his other works.
$ 2.·As is said in the preceding section, a debt incurred in any way whatsoever could be transformed by novatio into a verbal obligation and then released by acceptilatio. To Gallus Aquilius (note on Bk. ii. 13. I supr.) must be awarded the merit of having devised a formula by which all obligations in which one and the same person was debtor, and another and the same creditor, could be embraced in a single novatio, and thereby be converted into a single obligation, which could then, if re