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nos eandem adquisitionem, quae per adrogationem fiebat, coartavimus ad similitudinem naturalium parentum: nihil etenim aliud nisi tantummodo usus fructus tam naturalibus patribus quam adoptivis per filios familias adquiritur in his rebus quae extrinsecus filiis obveniunt, dominio eis integro servato: mortuo autem filio adrogato in adoptiva familia etiam dominium eius ad adrogatorem transit, nisi supersint aliae personae, quae ex nostra constitutione patrem in his 3 quae adquiri non possunt antecedunt. Sed ex diverso pro eo,
quod is debuit qui se in adoptionem dedit, ipso quidem iure adrogator non tenetur, sed nomine filii convenietur et, si noluerit eum defendere, permittitur creditoribus per competentes nostros magistratus bona, quae eorum cum usu fructu futura fuissent, si se alieno iuri non subiecissent, possidere et legitimo modo ea disponere.
gator had no rights whatever : the rest of his property, not being derived ex re patris (adoptivi), would constitute peculium adventitium, so that the usufruct of it would belong to the adrogator. For the 'aliae personae ' see on Tit. 1. 15 supr. (succession to filiusfamilias having peculium).
§ 3. Though under the ius civile neither adrogator nor adrogatus could be sued for debts incurred by the latter before his capitis deminutio, the debts remained as obligationes naturales, Dig. 4. 5. 2. 2, and the praetor granted actiones utiles against adrogatus himself (Gaius iii. 84) under the fiction that he was still sui iuris : 'rescissa capitis deminutione, id est [actio] in qua fingitur capite deminutus non esse' Gaius iv. 38. This was a genuine in integrum restitutio of the creditors : 'integri restitutionem praetor tribuit ex his causis quae per ... status permutationem gesta esse dicuntur' Paul. sent. rec. 1. 7. 2. Delictual obligations were never extinguished by capitis deminutio minima ('nemo delictis exuitur, quamvis capite minutus sit' Dig. 4. 5. 2. 3), neither was the obligation arising ex deposito if the depositee remained in possession after the capitis deminutio, Dig. 16. 3. 21, nor debts owed by an inheritance accepted by adrogatus before adrogation, Gaius iii. 84. Under Justinian, after having been in integrum restituti against the civil extinction of their claims (Dig. 4. 5. 2. 1), the creditors sued the adrogator as adrogatus' representative; but the restitutio in this particular case was abnormal, being claimable as a matter of right, 'sine causa cognita' Dig. loc. cit., and not being subject to the ordinary rules of prescription : 'hoc iudicium perpetuum est' Dig. 4. 5. 2. 5.
Accessit novus casus successionis ex constitutione divi Marci. nam si hi, qui libertatem acceperunt a domino in testamento, ex quo non aditur hereditas, velint bona sibi addici libertatium conservandarum causa, audiuntur. et ita rescripto divi Marci ad Popilium Rufum continetur. Verba 1 rescripti ita se habent: “Si Virginio Valenti, qui testamento suo libertatem quibusdam adscripsit, nemine successore ab intestato existente in ea causa bona esse coeperunt, ut veniri debeant: is cuius de ea re notio est aditus rationem desiderii tui habebit, ut libertatium tam earum, quae directo, quam earum, quae per speciem fideicommissi relictae sunt, tuendarum gratia addicantur tibi, si idonee creditoribus caveris de solido quod cuique debetur solvendo. et hi quidem, quibus directa libertas data est, perinde liberi erunt, ac si hereditas adita esset: hi autem, quos heres rogatus est manumittere, a te libertatem consequantur: ita ut si non alia condicione velis bona tibi addici, quam ut etiam qui directo libertatem acceperunt tui liberti fiant, nam huic etiam voluntati tuae, si ii de quorum statu agitur consentiant, auctoritatem nostram accommodamus. et ne huius rescriptionis nostrae emolumentum alia ratione irritum fiat, si fiscus bona agnoscere voluerit : et hi qui rebus nostris attendunt scient commodo pecuniario praeferendam libertatis causam et ita bona cogenda, ut libertas his salva sit, qui eam adipisci potuerunt, si hereditas ex testamento adita esset. Hoc 2 rescripto subventum est et libertatibus et defunctis, ne bona eorum a creditoribus possideantur et veneant. certe si fuerint
Tit. XI. § 1. The estate would be adjudged to the creditors, in order to be sold in satisfaction of their claims, only after being rejected by the instituti, all the intestate heirs, and the fiscus. The rescript of M. Aurelius seems to have contemplated only addictio to one of the slaves manumitted by the will (Popilius Rufus being eis TÔV TUXóvrwv élevde pias év tŷ daðýãn Theophilus); Gordian permitted it to be made to any one who would give the security'de solido quod cuique debetur solvendo,' Cod. 7. 2. 6.
ex hac causa bona addicta, cessat bonorum venditio : extitit enim defuncti defensor, et quidem idoneus, qui de solido 3 creditoribus cavet. Inprimis hoc rescriptum totiens locum habet, quotiens testamento libertates datae sunt. quid ergo si quis intestatus decedens codicillis libertates dederit neque adita sit ab intestato hereditas? favor constitutionis debet
locum habere. certe si testatus decedat et codicillis dederit 4 libertatem, competere eam nemini dubium est. Tunc con
stitutioni locum esse verba ostendunt, cum nemo successor ab intestato existat: ergo quamdiu incertum sit, utrum
existat an non, cessabit constitutio : si certum esse coeperit 5 neminem extare, tunc erit constitutioni locus. Si is, qui in integrum restitui potest, abstinuit se ab hereditate, an, quamvis potest in integrum restitui, potest admitti constitutio et addictio bonorum fieri? quid ergo, si post addictionem libertatum conservandarum causa factam in integrum
sit restitutus ? utique non erit dicendum revocari libertates, 6 quae semel competierunt. Haec constitutio libertatum tuen
darum causa introducta est : ergo si libertates nullae sint datae, cessat constitutio. quid ergo, si vivus dedit libertates vel mortis causa et, ne de hoc quaeratur, utrum in fraudem creditorum an non factum sit, idcirco velint addici sibi bona, an audiendi sunt? et magis est, ut audiri debeant, etsi deficiant verba constitutionis. Sed cum multas divisiones eiusmodi constitutioni deesse perspeximus, lata est a nobis plenissima constitutio, in quam multae species collatae sunt, quibus ius huiusmodi successionis plenissimum est effectum : quas ex ipsa lectione constitutionis potest quis cognoscere.
DE SUCCESSIONIBUS SUBLATIS, QUAE FIEBANT PER
$ 5. For in integrum restitutio see on Bk. iv. 6. 33 inf. The causa for the restitutio here is minor aetas.
§ 7. Justinian's own constitution is in Cod. 7. 2. 15. 1-6.
universitatem successiones. qualis fuerat bonorum emptio, quae de bonis debitoris vendendis per multas ambages fuerat introducta et tunc locum habebat, quando iudicia ordinaria in usu fuerunt: sed cum extraordinariis iudiciis posteritas usa est, ideo cum ipsis ordinariis iudiciis etiam bonorum venditiones exspiraverunt et tantummodo creditoribus datur officio
iudicia ordinaria see Excursus X at the end of this volume, and Mr. Poste's note on Gaius iii. 77. He adopts Savigny's theory that there were, from the first, two different modes of proceeding against insolvent debtors : the one-manus iniectio or personal execution-applying only where the judgment or confession on which execution issued was on a money loan, real (mutuum) or fictitious (nexum) or on certain other obligations assimilated by statute to mutuum, Gaius iv. 22; the other, or execution against the property, being resorted to in all other cases. A commoner view is that, until about 100 B.C., manus iniectio (though its severities were mitigated by the lex Poetelia, Livy viii. 28) was the only remedy open to a creditor if his debtor refused or was unable to satisfy a judgment debt ; about which time a new form of execution against the property, or real execution, was introduced by the Edict, of which a leading feature was sale of the bankrupt's universitas iuris by auction to the bidder who offered the creditors the highest percentage on their claims, this praetorian form of bankruptcy execution being called bonorum emptio or venditio, and being described by Gaius (iii. 77–81) as one of the kinds of universal succession.
Though it is difficult to come to any definite conclusion on so obscure a topic, the latter view seems best supported by the facts, apart from its inherent probability on grounds of historical jurisprudence. Savigny has to prove two positions : first, that personal execution was confined to the classes of debts specified ; and second, that a system of real execution was in vogue at Rome from the earliest times.
In support of the former he calls attention to what seems an undeniable fact, viz. that the Romans always drew a broad distinction between debts incurred by money loans and all other debts, and cites various authors (e. g. Gellius 20. 1, quoting the Twelve Tables, and Livy vi. 14, viii. 28, xxiii. 14) to show that manus iniectio is almost invariably associated with debts of the first kind. On the other hand, we have the explicit statement of Gaius (iv. 21) that it was the proper procedure on every judgment debt, however incurred. Savigny, however, relies most on chaps. 21 and 22 of the lex Rubria or lex Galliae Cisalpinae, in which it is provided that when an action is brought for pecunia certa credita, manus iniectio shall be employed: when on any other liability, another procedure may be resorted to-'eos duci, bona eorum possideri iubeto.' On his interpretation, this means that, for pecunia certa credita, the execution must be personal, while in other cases it must be real; but it is far more natural to suppose that, except for money loans, the statute
iudicis bona possidere et prout eis utile visum fuerit ea disponere, quod ex latioribus digestorum libris perfectius ap
gave the magistrate the option of either applying the harsher procedure, or putting the creditor in possession of the debtor's property.
In the second place, if a system of real execution had existed at Rome from the time of the Twelve Tables onwards, and with the width of operation which Savigny assigns to it, the rules by which it was regulated must have formed no inconsiderable body of law, which (one might reasonably suppose) would have been mentioned by general writers, and even been described at length by those who specially concerned themselves with legal topics. This, however, is not the case. It can hardly be denied that in isolated cases the praetor allowed a debtor's estate to be seized and sold, and Savigny cites an instance of this even before the lex Poetilia (Livy ii. 24); but we have the express statement again of Gaius (iv. 35) that the systematic employment of such a procedure was believed to date from the praetorship of Publius Rutilius, doubtless the well known statesman and jurist who was consul B.C. 105: 'quae species actionis ... a praetore Publio Rutilio, qui et bonorum venditionem introduxisse dicitur, comparata est. If bonorum venditio, as a system of execution in bankruptcy standing in contrast with manus iniectio, had existed from the beginning of Roman legal history, we may surely presume that the fact would have been known to Gaius.
In the text before us Justinian connects the disappearance of bonorum venditio with the abolition of the iudicia ordinaria. It seems more probable that both its disappearance, and the procedure in use under Justinian himself, were in some way due to or connected with a senatusconsult passed under one of the earlier emperors, and mentioned in Dig. 27. 10. 5 and 9, by which it was provided that where the bankrupt was of senatorial rank, and the creditors assented, instead of the estate being sold en bloc (bonorum venditio), a curator bonorum should be appointed by the magistrate for the purpose of disposing of the assets piecemeal and in lots, and paying the creditors pro rata out of the proceeds. The ordinary execution in bankruptcy of Justinian's time (bonorum distractio, Bk. ii. 19. I supr.) was very similar in character. The creditors, or some of them, applied to the magistrate for missio in bona : from the granting of this application an interval was allowed for others to come in and prove their claims by action, those who resided in the same province having two, others four years for this purpose. As soon as it had elapsed, those who had not yet proved their claims were excluded from all benefit in the proceedings, and could demand satisfaction out of the bona possessa only if a balance remained after paying the rest in full, Cod. 7. 72. 10, unless they were hypothecary creditors, in which case, if they preferred it, they could rely exclusively on their real right, and take no part in the liquidation at all. During the two or four years the estate, though technically possessed by the creditors who had been missi in possessionem, was admistered by a curator, whom other creditors made their defendant (and not the bankrupt himself) in