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other such a declaration, as there is nothing te be set over against, or answer, on the part of vice. So that were a man, laying aside the proper proof of religion, to determine from the course of nature only, whether it were most probable, that the righteous or the wicked would have the advantage in a future life; there can be no doubt, but that he would determine the probability to be, that the former would. The course of nature, then, in the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real prac tical proof of the obligations of religion.

Secondly, When, conformably to what religion teaches us, God shall reward and punish virtue and vice, as such, so as that every one shall, upon the whole, have his deserts; this distributive justice will not be a thing different in kind, but only in degree, from what we experience in his present government. It will be that in effect, toward which we now see a tendency. It will be no more than the completion of that moral government, the principles and beginning of which have been shewn, beyond all dispute, discernible in the present constitution and course of nature. And from hence it follows,

Thirdly, That, as under the natural government of God, our experience of those kinds and degrees of happiness and misery, which we do experience at present, gives just ground to hope for, and to fear, higher degrees and other kinds of both in a future state, supposing a future state admitted: so under his moral government, our experience, that virtue and vice are, in the manners above-men

tioned, actually rewarded and punished at present, in a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and to fear, that they may be rewarded and punished in an higher degree hereafter. It is acknowledged, indeed, that this alone is not sufficient ground to think, that they actually will be rewarded and punished in a higher degree, rather than in a lower : but then,

Lastly, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these tendencies are essential, and founded in the nature of things: whereas the hindrances to their becoming effect are, in numberless cases, not necessary, but artificial only. Now it may be much more strongly argued, that these tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and punishments, of virtue and vice, which arise directly out of the nature of things, will remain hereafter, than that the accidental hindrances of them will. And if these hindrances do not remain; those rewards and punishments cannot but be carried on much further towards the perfection of moral government; i. e. the tendencies of virtue and vice will become effect: but when, or where, or in what particular way, cannot be known at all, but by revelation.

Upon the whole: there is a kind of moral govérnment implied in God's natural government * : virtue and vice are naturally rewarded and punished as beneficial and mischievous to society t; and

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rewarded and punished directly as virtue and vice*. The notion, then, of a moral scheme of government is not fictitious, but natural; for it is suggested to our thoughts by the constitution and course of nature: and the execution of this scheme is actually begun, in the instances here mentioned, And these things are to be considered as a declaration of the Author of Nature, for virtue, and against vice: they give a credibility to the supposition of their being rewarded and punished hereafter; and also ground to hope and to fear, that they may be rewarded and punished in higher degrees than they are here. And as all this is confirmed, so the argument for religion, from the constitution and course of nature, is carried on farther, by observing, that there are natural tendencies, and, in innumerable cases, only artificial hindrances, to this moral scheme's being carried on much farther towards perfection than it is at present †. The notion, then, of a moral scheme of government, much more perfect than what is seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural notion; for it is suggested to our thoughts, by the essential tendencies of virtue and vice. And these tendencies are to be considered as intimations, as implicit promises and threatenings, from the Author of Nature, of much greater rewards and punishments to follow virtue and vice, than do at present. And, indeed, every natural tendency, which is to continue, but which is hindered from becoming effect

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by only accidental causes, affords a presumption, that such tendency will, some time or other, become effect: a presumption in degree proportionable to the length of the duration, through which such tendency will continue. And from these things together arises a real presumption, that the moral scheme of government, established in nature, shall be carried on much farther towards perfection hereafter; and, I think, a presumption that it will be absolutely completed. But from these things, joined with the moral nature which God has given us, considered as given us by him, arises a practical proof* that it will be completed: a proof from fact; and therefore a distinct one from that, which is deduced from the eternal and unalterable relations, the fitness and unfitness of actions.

* See this proof drawn out briefly. Ch. vi.

CHAP. IV.

Of a state of Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, and Danger.

THE general doctrine of religion, that our present life is a state of probation for a future one, comprehends under it several particular things, distinct from each other. But the first, and most common meaning of it, seems to be, that our future interest is now depending, and depending upon ourselves; that we have scope and opportunities here for that good and bad behaviour, which God will reward and punish hereafter; together with temptations to one, as well as inducements of reason to the other, And this is, in great measure, the same with saying, that we are under the moral government of God, and to give an account of our actions to him. For the notion of à future account, and general righteous judgment, implies some sort of temptations to what is wrong: otherwise there would be no moral possibility of doing wrong, nor ground for judgment or discrimination. But there is this difference, that the word probation is more distinctly and particularly expressive of allurements to wrong, or difficulties in adhering uniformly to

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