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left to our choice: either to improve ourselves, and better our condition; or, in default of such improvement, to remain deficient and wretched. is therefore perfectly credible, from the analogy of nature, that the same may be our case, with respect to the happiness of a future state, and the qualifications necessary for it,

There is a third thing, which may seem implied in the present world's being a state of probation; that it is a theatre of action, for the manifestation of persons characters, with respect to a future one: not, to be sure, to an all-knowing Being, but to his creation, or part of it. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence of our being in a state of probation in the other senses. However, it is not impossible, that mens shewing and making manifest what is in their heart, what their real character is, may have respect to a future life, in ways and manners which we are not acquainted with: particularly it may be a means, for the Author of Nature does not appear to do any thing without means, of their being disposed of suitably to their characters; and of its being known to the creation, by way of example, that they are thus disposed of. But not to enter upon any conjectural account of this; one may just mention, that the manifestation of persons characters contributes very much, in various ways, to the carrying on a great part of that general course of nature, respecting mankind, which comes under our observation at present. I shall only add, that probation in both these senses,

as well as in that treated of in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government: since by persons behaviour under it, their characters cannot but be manifested, and, if they behave well, improved.

I

CHAP. VI.

Of the Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing Practice.

THROUGHOUT the foregoing Treatise it appears> that the condition of mankind, considered as inhabitants of this world only, and under the government of God, which we experience, is greatly analogous to our condition, as designed for another world, or under that farther government, which religion teaches us. If, therefore, any assert, as a fatalist must, that the opinion of universal necessity is reconcileable with the former; there immediately arises a question in the way of analogy, whether he must not also own it to be reconcileable with the latter, i. e. with the system of religion itself, and the proof of it. The reader, then, will observe, that the question now before us is not absolute, Whether the opinion of Fate be reconcileable with religion; but hypothetical, Whether, upon supposition of its being reconcileable with the constitution of nature, it be not reconcileable with religion also or, what pretence a fatalist,-not other persons, but a fatalist,—has to conclude, from his opinion, that there can be no such thing as religion. And as the puzzle and obscurity, which must unavoidably arise from arguing upon so absurd a supposition as that of universal necessity,

will, I fear, easily be seen; it will, I hope, as easily be excused.

But since it has been all along taken for granted, as a thing proved, that there is an intelligent Au thor of Nature, or natural Governor of the world; and since an objection may be made against the proof of this, from the opinion of universal neces+ sity, as it may be supposed that such necessity will itself account for the origin and preservation of all things; it is requisite that this objection be distinctly answered; or that it be shewn, that a fatality, supposed consistent with what we certainly experience, does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of Nature; before we proceed to consider, whether it destroys the proof of a moral Governor of it, or of our being in a state of religion.

Now, when it is said by a fatalist, that the whole constitution of nature, and the actions of men, that every thing, and every mode and circumstance of every thing, is necessary and could not possibly have been otherwise; it is to be observed, that this necessity does not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain principles, and to certain ends: because all this is matter of undoubted experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man may, every moment, be conscious of. And from hence it follows, that necessity, alone and of itself, is in no sort an account of the constitution of nature, and how things come to be and to continue as they are; but only an account o this circumstance relating to their origin and continu

ance, that they could not have been otherwise than they are and have been. The assertion, that every thing is by necessity of Nature, is not an answer to the question; Whether the world came into being as it is, by an intelligent Agent forming it thus, or not but to quite another question; Whether it came into being as it is, in that way and manner which we call necessarily, or in that way and manner which we call freely. For, suppose farther, that one, who was a fatalist, and one, who kept to his natural sense of things, and believed himself a free agent, were disputing together, and vindicating their respective opinions; and they should happen to instance a house: they would agree that it was built by an architect. Their difference, concerning necessity and freedom, would occasion no difference of judgment concerning this; but only concerning another matter; whether the architect built it necessarily or freely. Suppose, then, they should proceed to enquire concerning the consitution of nature: in a lax way of speaking, one of them might say, it was by necessity; and the other, by freedom: but, if they had any meaning to their words, as the latter must mean a free agent, so the former must at length be reduced to mean an agent, whether he would say one or more, acting by necessity: for abstract notions can do nothing. Indeed, we ascribe to God a necessary existence, uncaused by any agent. For we find within ourselves the idea. of infinity, i. e. immensity and eternity, impossible, even in imagination, to be removed out of being. We seem to

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