thing that could taint it with unfairness or imposition. But if the sound construction be not at least as broad as I have supposed, we shall be at some loss to know what meaning the words "inferior disabilities," used in the concluding sentence of the 14th section, were intended to convey. It may, perhaps, be said, that to earn the bounty, the disability should have been incurred by accidents or sickness peculiar to the employments of military men, and such as it may reasonably be supposed would have been avoided in other occupations. But it is conceived that this would prove a vague or deceptious rule of interpretation. With what safety, or with what certainty, could it be applied? The soldier asleep in garrison may suddenly, when he wakes, find his eyesight gone, without being sensible himself, or without its being imagined by others, that the predisposing and leading cause of his affliction was imbibed in ascending the Mississippi months before, whilst a hot and vertical sun was flashing its fires around him. Another may linger in consumption; the consequence, perhaps, of a slight cold in the beginning, but of which the labors and hardships of his life may never have allowed him opportunity to get rid. And a third may lie bedridden under a palsy, which the change of habits and aliment after his enlistment may have been the chief though occult causes in producing. It would be easy to multiply indefinitely such illustrations, applicable alike to the condition of officers and men. I would remark, as giving strength to the principles which I suppose the legislature to have had in mind in framing this section, that we find it recorded in the Digest of Justinian, that "he who has hired his services is to receive his reward for the whole time, if it has not been his fault that the service has not been performed." So, too, by the maritime law, it is well understood, that if sickness or disability overtake a seaman, which was not brought on by vicious or unjustifiable conduct, he is entitled to his full wages for the voyage. Nor does it make any difference whether during the time he was on actual duty, or was merely accidental while he continued in the service. These principles have been Sanctioned by time; and it is hoped that it will not have been deemed out of place to advert to the analogies they hold up.

It come on

RICHARD RUSH,
Attorney General.

To the SECRETARY OF WAR.

WARRANTS FOR BOUNTY LANDS.

Non-commissioned officers and soldiers enlisted after 10th December, 1814, as well as before, on the proper certificates, are entitled to a bounty of three hundred and twenty acres of tand; and minors, bringing themselves within the requirements, are entitled in like manner as

Chose of full age.

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1815. SIR: 1. I think that every non-commissioned officer and soldier enlisted Since the 10th of December, 1814, is entitled to a bounty of 320 acres of land, provided that he obtain, on his discharge from service, a certificate from the commanding officer of his company, battalion, or regiment, that he had faithfully performed his duty whilst in service.

2. I do not think that the fact of minority creates any incapacity to

take the land bounty, any more than the bounty in money or pay. The contract of the legislature must be fulfilled in this, as in all other respects. The minor who brings himself within all the other requisites is, I think,, entitled to his land-warrant in like manner with persons of full age. RICHARD RUSH,

To the SECRETARY OF WAR.

Attorney General.

PROSECUTIONS FOR PIRACY.

Prosecutions for alleged acts of piracy committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, should take place in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may be first brought.

AUGUST 29, 1815.

SIR: In answer to the question growing out of the letter from Commo dore Patterson to the Secretary of the Navy, dated New Orleans, July 21, 1815, and submitted for my opinion by the Secretary of the Treasury on the 29th instant, I have the honor to state: That if the prosecutions al luded to have reference to persons for alleged acts of piracy committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, they should take place in the district where the offender is appre hended, or into which he may first be brought. In this case, (that is, where the crime is committed on the high seas, or out of the jurisdiction of any particular State,) I apprehend it would be at the option of the cap turing vessels to carry the offender or offenders to such port or district of the United States, for trial, as was thought proper.

But where the capture or seizure takes place for any alleged breach of the revenue laws, the trial should be had in the district within which the seizure was made, or penalty incurred.

RICHARD RUSH, Attorney General United States.

To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

RIGHTS OF CAPTORS IN PRIZES OF WAR.

Where a brig captured off Tripoli, as prize of war, by a part of a squadron, and condemned was afterwards taken by the commodore at a valuation, and placed in the service of the United States, decided that the captors were entitled to their prize interest of the govern ment, and that the other moiety should be applied to the navy pension fund.

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1816. SIR: I have examined the papers transmitted to me with your letter of the 12th of last month, and have now the honor to submit, according to your request, the following opinions upon the cases which they present:

1. It appears that the brig Transfer was captured off Tripoli, for 3 breach of blockade, on the 17th of March, 1804, by a part of the squad ron under the command of Commodore Preble; that she was regularly condemned as prize of war; and that she was taken by the commodore at a valuation of five thousand dollars, and placed in the service of the

United States, where she co-operated as a cruiser with the squadron aforesaid, in the course of its subsequent belligerent operations.

Under such a state of facts, I do not think that the captors are divested of their prize interest. They are entitled to it at the hands of the gov ernment, which thus became the purchaser of the prize. Considering this interest as a vested one on their part, I can see no objection to a payment of the amount by the Navy Department, provided there be any existing appropriation of money to cover such payment. I also think that the portion of the prize to which the United States are entitled should, as in other cases, be applied to the use of the navy pension fund, as directed by the ninth section of the act of Congress of the 23d of April, 1800.

2. In regard to the ship Madonna Catapoliana, captured by a part of the same squadron off Tripoli on the 22d of March, 1804, and restored to the former owners, by the authority of the commodore, before any condentation or judicial proceedings had, it would seem alike equitable that the captors should be reimbursed. I forbear, at this time, the expression of any more direct opinion upon this case, the power of Congress being fully competent to act upon it, as in the case now before that body of the Algerine vessels lately surrendered, from which the present is not in principle distinguishable.

I

pray you, sir, to receive as an apology for this late answer to your letter, that, when it was received, and for some weeks afterwards, my constant public engagements at the Supreme Court of the United States prevented an attention to other subjects.

With great respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant, RICHARD RUSH.

To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

COURTS-MARTIAL

Cearts-martial of marine officers stationed on shore, and convened under the articles of war, try and sentence to suffer corporeal punishment marines who have deserted from the peutic ships.

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1816. SIR: "Is it competent for a general court-martial of marine officers stationed on shore, and convened under the articles of war, to try and senlence to suffer corporeal punishment marines who have deserted from the public ships, where they were liable to such punishment under the regulations of the navy, but which has been forbidden by the act of Congress of May 16, 1812, in regard to the army?"

Answer.-I can see no objections to such a course. It would be otherwise, had the offence been committed while the marines were employed in any service upon the land, under the act of July 11, 1798. In such case, the subsequent abolition of corporeal punishment, by the 7th section of the act of May 16, 1812, in reference to the army, would, under the 4th section of the act of July 11 aforesaid, be applicable, and exclude also its infliction upon the marines.

RICHARD RUSH, Attorney General. To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

ENDORSEMENT OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

Bills of exchange may be endorsed by an attorney in fact, having competent authority derive from a power.

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1816.

SIR: In answer to the question submitted by the Secretary of the Navy in his letter of the 12th of this month, the Attorney General has the hono

to state

That he sees no objection, in point of law, to the endorsement of a bil of exchange under an authority derived from a power of attorney. Th Attorney General begs leave to refer to his absence from the city, as a rea son for not having transmitted an earlier answer.

RICHARD RUSH, Attorney General.

To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

ALLOWANCES TO NAVY AGENTS.

Under the act of 3d March, 1809, navy agents may be allowed two thousand dollars per year, over and above office rent, clerk hire, fuel, stationery, &c.

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1816.

THE accounts of the navy agent at Boston being presented for settlement at the office of the accountant of the Navy Department, they are found to contain certain charges for contingent expenses, which have been disallowed by the accountant as not warranted by law.

It does not appear that the charges are, in themselves, deemed to be unjust; but the accountant supposes that the sum of two thousand dollars, allowed by law as the annual compensation of the agent, was intended to cover all his expenses, and that no sum beyond this can be admitted to his credit upon any ground.

The agent still claiming to be allowed the items in question, which are for such charges as office rent, clerk hire, fuel, and stationery, the Secretary of the Navy requests that the Attorney General will be pleased to state his opinion upon the meaning of the law in this respect.

Answer-The law fixing the compensation of navy agents will be found at the close of the 3d section of the act of the 3d of March, 1809, entitled "An act to amend the several acts for the establishment and regulation of the Treasury, War, and Navy Departments." It runs as follows: "Provided, That the compensation allowed to either [alluding to navy agents and certain other officers mentioned in the foregoing part of the section] shall not exceed one per centum on the public moneys bursed by him, nor in any instance the compensation allowed by law to the purveyor of public supplies.'

dis

The law creating the office of purveyor of public supplies is that of the 23d February, 1795, and is in the words following: "That there shall be in the Department of the Treasury an officer to be denominated 'purveyor of public supplies,' whose duty it shall be, under the direction and supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury, to conduct the procuring and

providing of all arms, military and naval stores, provisions, clothing, Indian goods, and, generally, all articles of supplies requisite for the service of the United States, and whose salary shall be a compensation of two thousand dollars per annum." This is all that is said about the compen

sation of this officer.

It is agreed that, before the passage of the act of 3d of March, 1809, above recited, the purveyor of public supplies had been allowed, in the settlement of his accounts, credit for contingent disbursements, such as office rent, clerk hire, fuel, and other like expenses necessarily incurred in the performance of his official duty. This fact I take to be conclusive in favor of such a construction of the act of the 3d of March, 1809, as will allow to the navy agents, in the settlement of their accounts, credits for the same necessary and reasonable disbursements. The act of the 3d March, 1809, in adopting the rule of compensation from the act of the 23d February, 1795, must, I think, have intended to place navy agents (in case of their compensation reaching its maximum) upon a footing of equal advantage, in all respects, with the purveyor. No sufficient reason is perceived why any difference should be made.

I am, therefore, of opinion that the act of the 3d March, 1809, intended that the compensation of the navy agents should be two thousand dollars a year, clear of alt deductions; in like manner as was the case, before its passage, with the purveyor of public supplies.

RICHARD RUSH, Attorney General.

To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

NEUTRALITY.

There is no law that can prevent a merchant or ship-owner selling his vessel and cargo to a za or inhabitant of Buenos Ayres; but if a vessel be fitted out, furnished, &c., with into employ them in the service of any foreign state, to cruise or commit hostilities, &c., i would be unlawful.

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1816. SIR: Upon the letter of the collector of Baltimore, dated the 24th of this month, submitted to me yesterday, I have to state:

That I am aware of no law of the United States that can prevent a mer. chant or ship owner selling his vessel and cargo (should the latter even consist of warlike stores) to a citizen or inhabitant of Buenos Ayres, or of any part of South America. Nor will it, do I think, make any difference whether such sale be made directly in a port of the United States, with immediate transfer and possession thereupon; or under a contract entered into here, with delivery to take place in a port of South America.

If vessels be fitted out, furnished, or armed, within the waters of the United States, and there be sufficient grounds for believing that it is done with intent to employ them in the service of any foreign prince or state,. to cruise or commit hostilities upon the subjects or property of another foreign prince or state with whom the United States are at peace, it would be unlawful.under the act of Congress.

If the English vessel alluded to in the collector's letter be seeking an armament with the latter purpose, it will consequently be unlawful. But