CHAP. tions were laid on ancient and free institutions,

I. which, good from the first, were still gradually 1713. improving, and which alone, amongst all others

since the origin of civil society, had completely solved the great problem how to combine the greatest security to property with the greatest freedom of action.

It is true, however, that this golden period by no means affords us unmixed cause for self-congratulation, and contains no small alloy of human frailties and of human passions. Some of the quiet I have mentioned may be imputed to corruption, as much as some of the troubles to faction. Our pride as legislators may sink when we discover that our constitutional pre-eminence has arisen still more from happy accident than from skilful design. We may likewise blush to think that even those years which, on looking back, are universally admitted as most prosperous, and those actions now considered irreproachable, were not free at the time from most loud and angry complaints. How ungratefully have we murmured against Providence at the very moment when most enjoying its bounty! How much has prosperity been felt, but how little acknowledged! How sure a road to popularity has it always been to tell us, that we are the most wretched and illused people upon the face of the earth! To such an extent, in fact, have these outcries proceeded, that a very acute observer has founded a new theory upon them; and, far from viewing them as

I.

evidence of suffering, considers them as one of the CHAP. proofs and tokens of good government.

In attempting to unfold, at least for a small period, this mingled mass of national wisdom and national folly, -of unparalleled prosperity and of stunning complaints, -I venture to promise the reader, on my part, honesty of purpose. I feel that unjustly to lower the fame of a political adversary, or unjustly to raise the fame of an ancestor―to state any fact without sufficient authority, or to draw any character without thorough conviction, implies not merely literary failure, but moral guilt. Of any such unfair intention I hope the reader may acquit me-I am sure I can acquit myself.

The published works which I shall quote I need not enumerate. The MSS. which I have consulted are the following:-The Stanhope Papers, at Chevening; the Stuart Papers, which were transmitted to the late King from Rome, and to which I obtained access by the gracious indulgence of his present Majesty; the very important collection of the Earl of Hardwicke, which he has laid open to me in the most liberal and friendly manner; the col

"J'ai toujours trouvé que le meilleur gouvernement est "celui contre lequel on crie le plus fort sur les lieux mêmes ; et "il suffit de citer l'Angleterre et les Etats Unis d'Amérique ; car "cela prouve que l'on a l'œil sur ceux qui dirigent les affaires, et "qu'on peut impunément censurer leurs mesures." (Simond, Voyage d'Italie, tom. ii. p. 286.) A still more celebrated Genevese, M. de Sismondi, makes a similar observation in his recent essay, Sur l'Elément Aristocratique.

1713.

I.

CHAP. lections (mostly copies) of Archdeacon Coxe, which were presented by his brother to the British Museum; and the Memoirs of the Master of Sinclair, with notes by Sir Walter Scott, which I owe to the kindness of J. G. Lockhart, Esq.

1713.

The administration of Marlborough and Godolphin, in the reign of Queen Anne, shines forth with peculiar lustre in our annals. No preceding one, perhaps, had ever comprised so many great men or achieved so many great actions. Besides its two eminent chiefs, it could boast of the mild yet lofty wisdom of Somers, the matured intellect of Halifax, and the rising abilities of Walpole. At another time, also, the most subtle statesman and the most accomplished speaker of their age, Harley and St. John, were numbered in its ranks. It had struck down the overgrown power of France. It had saved Germany, and conquered Flanders. "But at length," says Bishop Fleetwood, with admirable eloquence, "God for our sins permitted "the spirit of discord to go forth, and, by troubling

I.

1713.

"sore the camp, the city, and the country (and oh CHAP. "that it had altogether spared the place sacred "to his worship!) to spoil for a time this beautiful "and pleasing prospect, and give us in its stead “ - I know not what. Our enemies will tell "the rest with pleasure." To our enemies, indeed, I would willingly leave the task of recording the disgraceful transactions of that period. Let them relate the bedchamber influence of Mrs. Masham with her sovereign, and the treacherous cabals of Harley against his colleagues-by what unworthy means the great administration of Godolphin was sapped and overthrown how his successors surrendered the public interests to serve their own-how subserviency to France became our leading principle of policy-how the Dutch were forsaken and the Catalans betrayed-until at length this career of wickedness and weakness received its consummation in the shameful peace of Utrecht. It used to be observed, several centuries ago, that as the English always had the better of the French in battles, so the French always had the better of the English in treaties.* But here it was a sin against light; not the ignorance

"Jamais ne se mena traité entre les François et Anglois "que le sens des François et leur habileté ne se monstrat par"dessus celle des Anglois, et ont lesdits Anglois un mot com"mun qu'autrefois m'ont dit traitant avec eux; c'est qu'aux "batailles qu'ils ont eues avec les François toujours, ou le plus "souvent, ils ont eu le gain; mais en tous traitez qu'ils ont eu à ̧ "conduire avec eux, ils y ont eu perte et dommage." (Mém. de Comines, liv. iii. ch. viii.)

B

CHAP. which is deluded, but the falsehood which deludes.

I.

1713.

We may, perhaps, admit that it might be expedient to depart from the strict letter of the Grand Alliance-to consent to some slight dismemberment of the Spanish monarchy-to purchase the resignation of Philip, or allow an equivalent for the Elector of Bavaria by the cession of Sicily and Sardinia, or, perhaps, of Naples. So many hands had grasped at the royal mantle of Spain, that it could scarcely be otherwise than rent in the struggle. But how can the friends of Bolingbroke and Oxford possibly explain or excuse that they should offer far better terms at Utrecht in 1712, than the French had been willing to accept at Gertruydenberg in 1709? Or if the dismissal of the Duke of Marlborough had so far raised the spirits of our enemies and impaired the chances of the war, how is that dismissal itself to be defended?

It is at the conclusion of this unworthy treaty in March, 1713, and not till then, that I have fixed the commencement of my narrative.

At that period the two great contending parties were distinguished, as at present, by the nicknames of Whig and Tory. But it is very remarkable that, in Queen Anne's reign, the relative meaning of these terms was not only different but opposite to that which they bore at the accession of William the Fourth. In theory, indeed, the main principle of each continues the same. The leading principle of the Tories is the dread of popular licentiousness. The leading principle of the Whigs is the