the King's county. It was very observable, that the counties in which defenderism had prevailed, easily became converts to the new doctrines; and in the Summer of 1797, the usual concomitants of this species of treason, namely, the plundering houses of arms, the fabrication of pikes, and the murder of those who did not join their party, began to appear in the midland counties. In order to engage the peasantry in the southern counties, particularly in the counties of Waterford and Cork, the more eagerly in their cause, the United Irishmen found it expedient in urging their general principles, to dwell with peculiar energy on the supposed oppressiveness of tithes, which had been the pretext for the old White Boys' insurrections. And it is observable, that in addition to the acts of violence usually resorted to by the party for the furtherance of their purposes, the ancient practice of burning the corn, and houghing the cattle of those, against whom their resentment was directed, was revived, and very ge, nerally practised in those counties.

With a view to excite the resentment of the Catholics, and to turn that resentment to the purposes of the party, fabricated and false tests were represented as having been taken to exterminate Catholics, and were industriously disseminated by the emissaries of the treason throughout the provinces of Leinster, Munster, and Connaught. Reports were frequently circulated amongst the ignorant of the Catholic persuasion, that large bodies of men were coming to put them to death. This fabrication, however extravagant and absurd, was one among the many wicked means by which the deluded peasantry were engaged the more rapidly and deeply in the treason.

This honourable testimony of the loyalty of the Catholics of the three provinces of Leinster, Munster, and Connaught, is an authentic admission by the secret committee, that the Catholic body was not at all implicated in that rebellion and treason, which had then been so repeatedly proclaimed to exist in the north. It also proves the execrable hypocrisy, with which those leaders of the rebellion endeavoured to connect themselves with every description of persons, to seize on their passions, and direct them to their own traitorous purposes. Their objects were to prepare the people by disaffection to unite with the enemy in case of a future landing, and to dispose the enemy to take advantage of the discontents of the people, whilst they were in actual fermen

tation.

In the spring of 1797 the executive of the union thinking the French dilatory in their preparations, dispatched Mr. Lewins as a confidential person to press for assistance. This agent left London in March, and proceeded to Hamburgh, but did not

reach Paris till the end of May or beginning of June, from which time hecontinued to be the accredited minister of the Irish union to the French Directory. And in the summer of 1797 the executive of the union, apprehensive lest a premature insurrection in the north before the promised succours from France could arrive might disappoint their prospects, thought it necessary to send a second agent to the French government, to urge with increased earnestness, that the promised assistance should be immediately sent. He left Dublin in the end of June, and presented himself with the necessary letters of credence to the French minister at Hamburgh. Meeting with some difficulty in obtaining a passport to proceed to Paris, he delivered to the minister of the Republic a memoir to be forwarded to the Directory.

This agent was authorized to give France assurances of being repaid the full expenses of any future armament she might send to Ireland, as well as of the last, which had miscarried; to be raised by the confiscation of the lands of the church, of the property of all those who should oppose the measures of the party. He was also particularly charged to negociate, if possible, a loan on the above security to the amount of half a million, or at least three hundred thousand pounds, for the immediate purposes of the union; and directions were given to him, that in case France could not be prevailed on to advance so large a sum, he should address himself to the court of Spain for that purpose.

It appeared to the committee, that the executive of the union, though desirous of obtaining assistance in men, arms, and money, yet were averse to a greater force being sent than might enable them to subvert the government, and retain the power of the country in their own hands; but that the French shewed a decided disinclination at all times to send any force to Ireland, except such as from its magnitude might not only give them the hopes of conquering the kingdom, but of retaining it afterwards as a French conquest, and of subjecting it to all the plunder and oppressions which other countries, subdued or deceived by that nation, had experienced. A remarkable illustration of which sentiment in the Directory of France occurs in the substance of a letter said to have been received from Lewins, the Irish agent at Paris, and shewn by lord Edward Fitzgerald to John Cormick, a colonel in the rebel army, who fled from justice on the breaking out of the rebellion, and whose voluntary confession upon his apprehension in Guernsey before sir Hugh Dalrymple, is to be seen in the papers annexed to that report. This letter, although written apparently on money business, which is the cloak generally made use of by the party to conceal their real views, was perfectly intelligible when connected with and explained by the me

moir presented by dr. M'Nevin,* the Irish agent to the French Directory. The letter states, that the trustees, that is, the Directory, would not advance the five thousand pounds, that is, the smaller number of troops asked for in M'Nevin's memoir, say

It is a most remarkable circumstance, that the memoir to the French Directory, with which dr. M'Nevin was charged, should have fallen into the hands of government: it is a proof either of their vigilance or of the perfidy of the Irish traitors, or of the French allies. Messrs. O'Connor, Emmett, and M'Nevin tell us in the memoir, p. 21 (they were in fact petrified at their first examination to see it lie on the table before them), that government had some how or other obtained their original memoir, to which they therefore refer; and the account, which the secret committee has given us of that memoir is as follows. The next communication of consequence was in June, 1797, when an accredited person went from hence to communicate with the French Directory by their desire: he went by Hamburgh, where he saw the French minister, who made some difficulty about granting a passport, and demanded a memorial, which was written by the accredited person, and given to the French minister under the impression that the passport was not to be granted.

The memoir was written in English, and contained the objects of his mission according to the instructions which he had received from the executive. It began by stating, that the appearance of the French in Bantry Bay had encouraged the least confident of the Irish, in the hope of throwing off the yoke of England with the assistance of France: that the event of that expedition had proved the facility of invading Ireland: that in the event of a second expedition, if the object were to take Cork, Oyster Haven would be the best place of debarkation; that the person who had been before accredited was instructed to point out Oyster Haven as the best place of debarkation; and it stated the precautions which had been taken by throwing up works at Bantry, Fermoy, and Mallow. It further stated, that the system of the United Irishmen had made a rapid progress in the county of Cork, and that Bandon was become a second Belfast; that the system had made great progress in other counties, and that the people were now well inclined to assist the French; that 150,000 United Irishmen were organized and enrolled in Ulster, a great part of them regimented, and one third ready to march out of the province. It detailed the number of the king's forces in Ulster, and their stations; recommended Loughswilly as a place of debarkation in the north, and stated, that the people in the peninsula of Donegal would join the French. It stated also the strength of the garrison in Londonderry, and that one regiment which made a part of it was supposed to be disaffected. It mentioned Killybegs also as a good place of debarkation, and stated that the counties of Tyrone, Fermanagh, and Monaghan, were amongst the best affected to the cause. In case of a landing at Killybegs, it recommended a diversion in Sligo, and stated, that a force of 10,000 United Irishmen might be collected to fall upon Enniskillen, which commanded the pass of Lough Erne: that it was easy to enter the bay of Galway, but very difficult to get out of it: that the counties of Louth, Armagh, Westmeath, Kildare, King's county, and city of Dublin, were the best organized: that the Catholic priests had ceased to be alarmed at the calumnies which had been propagated of French irreligion, and were well affected to the cause: that some of them had rendered great service in propagating with discreet zeal the system of the union. It declared that the people of Ireland had a lively sense of gratitude to France for the part which she took, and also to Spain for the interests she took in the affairs of Ireland. It engaged on the part of the National Directory, to reimburse the expenses of France in the expedition which had failed, and of another to be undertaken. The number of troops demanded was a force not exceeding 10,000, and not less than 5000 men. It stated, that a brigade of English artillery had been already sent over, and that a large body of troops would

ing, they would make no payment short of the entire sum of, that is the larger force, which they always declared their intention of sending, and that this payment could not be made in less than four months from that time.

The demands of the party by their first agent went to a force not exceeding ten thousand nor less than five thousand men, with forty thousand stand of arms, and a proportionate supply of artillery, ammunition, engineers, experienced officers, &c.

A still larger supply of arms was solicited by the second messenger, on account of the growing number of their adherents, and of the disarming of the north, in which province above ten thousand stand of arms and as many pikes had been surrendered to the king's troops.

Attempts were certainly made to procure the assistance of such Irish officers then in foreign service as might be prevailed upon, by receiving high rank, to engage in the service of the union, and a negociation was actually set on foot for that purpose; but it has been stated, that from the over caution of the agent who was employed in conducting this transaction, nothing in consequence of it was effected.

A second memoir was presented by this confidential agent

probably be sent if Ireland were attacked. A considerable quantity of artillery and ammunition, with a large staff, and a body of engineers, and as many Irish officers as possible, whose fidelity they were assured of, were demanded as necessary to accompany the expedition. A recommendation was given to separate the Irish seamen who were prisoners of war from the British, supposing they would be ready to join in an expedition to liberate their country. It further recommended a proclamation to be published by the French general, on his arrival there, that the French came as allies to deliver the country, not to conquer it: it also recommended to the Directory to make the independence of Ireland an indispensable condition of the treaty of peace then depending; and stated, that a proceeding so authentic could not be disguised or misrepresented, and would very much encourage the people of Ireland. It con tained also an assurance, that the Irish militia would join the French if they landed in considerable force.

Immediately after this memoir was given in to the French minister, a passport was granted to the writer to go to Paris, where he had several conferences with people in authority, some of them members of the Directory: the object of these conferences was to obtain some assurances of succour from them that their agents had before given. The negociation for peace was then going on at Lisle. He was told by persons in authority, that he did not think the English cabinet sincere, but that if France could get the terms she had a right to expect, the Directory would make peace.

A second memoir was presented at Paris by the same person soon after his arrival there; its object was to impress on the Directory the necessity of expe diting the armament for Ireland by every argument which the writer could

use

After the breaking off of the negociation, and Lord Malmesbury's return to England, assurances were given, that the French government would send a new expedition to Ireland, and that they would never abandon Ireland till she was separated from Great Britain, and these assurances were afterwards renewed.

upon his arrival at Paris, in which he urged such arguments as he conceived most likely to induce the Directory not to postpone the invasion. He endeavoured to demonstrate, that so favourable a disposition as then existed in the Irish mind was in no future contingency to be expected; and he artfully represented, that the delusions held out by reform might cease from delay, and thus render more difficult to France and the true republicans of that country their endeavours to separate the two kingdoms, and to establish a republic in Ireland.

Previous to that mission from Ireland, a confidential person was sent over by the French Directory to collect information respecting the state of Ireland. Failing to obtain the necessary passports in London to pass into Ireland, he wrote over to request that one of the party might meet him in London. Edward Fitzgerald was sent over, and did not fail to furnish the French agent with every necessary intelligence.

Lord

The Directory gave the Irish agents sent to Paris the strongest assurances of support, and did accordingly, during the summer, make preparations of very extensive nature, both at the Texel and at Brest, for the invasion of Ireland; and in the autumn, intelligence was received by the executive of the union, that the troops were actually embarked in the Texel, and only waited for a wind.

In consequence of this communication, great exertions were made by the party, and in the beginning of October, when the Dutch fleet was on the point of sailing, the approach of the enemy was announced to the societies as at hand.

The troops had been actually on board, commanded by Gen. Daendells, but were suddenly disembarked. The Dutch fleet, contrary to the opinion of their own admiral, as is believed generally, was, at the instance of the French government, obliged to put to sea, which led to the ever memorable victory of the 11th of October, 1797, gained by lord Duncan.

The traitorous triumvirate, who have given to the public their own report of the case and examination before the secret committee, have appeared uncommonly anxious, that their negociations with the enemy should not be misrepresented; particularly that they should not be supposed to have intended to throw their country under the dominion or power of France. By both their agents say they, (p. 20) rather a small number of men, with a great quantity of arms, ammunition, artillery, and officers, were required; a small force only was asked for, because the executive, faithful to the principle of Irish independence, wished for what they deemed just sufficient to liberate their country, but incompetent to subdue it. This most determined resolution, and that of the whole body being collected as far as its opinion could be taken, always has been in no event to let Ireland come under