and pain in countless varieties are exhibited. The interests of introsusception, pursuit, acquisition, preservation, development, and perfection seem to exert a dominant influence upon animal action. We have seen also the development of sociality, sympathy, and all the sexual and parental emotions. Friendship, pity, gratitude, sorrow, and grief are not wanting. Favour and disfavour from others and from man are appreciated. Interests of general altruistic utility are not of far-reaching consequence, but still are recognisable as springs of action. Esthetic interests we have commented upon, though they are not highly developed. Ethical sentiments are in a very rudimentary stage even in the highest animals, though a sense of shame is clearly shown; also some sense of justice, and probably some notion of ethical punishment. All the aversions are exhibited as leading characteristics in one animal or another, anger and fear in their divers forms being prominent traits in animal psychology. Finally, passing to the volitional aspect, appetite and instinct will be questioned by no one; nor will activity toward pleasure and away from pain in the individual experience. Obedience to the word of command and imitation are every day exemplified. There is also some control of feelings. As to voluntary control of the thoughts, we do not know, except so far as indicated by selective attention, of which there is plenty of proof. Desire and endurance are seen, and apparently deliberation and resolution. Expectation and belief must be postulated, and have been noted in observed cases; while effort is not wanting. Choice is a matter of common observation. Thus, after careful examination prosecuted by many observers, with the results collated and scrutinised by the most thorough and the most eminent naturalists of the age, we are forced to the conclusion which was put forward as a thesis at the beginning of the chapter that wide as the gulf undoubtedly is between civilised man and the most intelligent of the brute creation, after all, the difference as to psychical life is wholly one of degree; and in the lower animals there is found in one stage of development or another, and in one species or another, every distinctive variety of intellectual, emotional, and volitional life.

PART VII.

COGNITIVE INTEGRATIONS.

F

VOL. II.

'The process or act of knowledge is complete when it is matured into a product and this product itself becomes an object to the mind's future knowing. At one time the whole of a mental state becomes such an object; at another, some one element of a single state is detached from the act that produced it, and becomes endowed, so to speak, with a separate life. This product, so far as it exists, exists as a mental transcript or representation of the original, whether that original were a subject-object or an object-object. It is also capable of being recalled and of itself recalling its original.'-PORTER, The Human Intellect.

CHAPTER XLIX.

PERCEPTS AND RE-PERCEPTS.

PERCEPTS.

§ 1. A PERCEPT is id quod perceptum, that which is perceived. It is the object of presentative cognition, considered as a product of an act of presentative knowing. Percepts are indefinitely divisible, that which is perceived at a given moment being a percept and there being no limit to the divisions of time. They are always to be distinguished from sensations, though the same thing in matter, the difference being one of effect in consciousness or of manner, in which the same phenomenon is viewed. Sensations are feelings; percepts are cognitions.

§ 2. Percepts are of two general classes, Sensational and Ideal; the sensational percepts being perceptions of sensations, the ideal being perceptions of ideas, as such. Sensational percepts differ from ideal in those particulars wherein sensations differ from ideas, namely, in respect to vividness, chiefly. Sensational and ideal percepts agree in the chief common feature of immediateness; generally speaking they agree in all the qualities which distinguish presentative knowledge from representative.

§ 3. Sensational percepts may be divided into classes, according to the different varieties of sensation. In this way they may be considered as making two general divisions: Organic or Systemic Sense Percepts, and Special Sense Percepts, each of which is susceptible of division into classes exactly corresponding to the divisions of sensations, as Percepts of Digestion, Percepts of Circulation, Percepts of Sight, Percepts of Touch, and so forth; the full enumeration need not be repeated.

§ 4. Percepts generally may be divided into classes corresponding to their complexity, the divisions being those (or similar to those) given as grades of presentative knowledge. The simplest percepts are hence those which localise homogeneous sensations the body. From this point they increase in complexity till

upon

the representative element exceeds the other, when the name percept ceases to be applicable.

§ 5. Percepts are united with each other, according to the laws of redintegration, and are elaborated into compound wholes by the operation of those laws. The percepts with which the mind ordinarily deals, and which we denominate products of perception, are aggregates of associated percepts in which the representative factor is conspicuous, but which, nevertheless, have their primary attachment to presentative knowledge.

RE-PERCEPTS.

§ 6. There seems need of a name to indicate the first two degrees of representative cognitions, that is to say, those in which the representation is of simple matters of experience, as the recollection of a particular impression upon the senses, like that of a tree, a ray of light, a series of events. These are nothing more than recollections of percepts, that is representations of percepts. Accordingly, the name Re-percept is here employed to designate them. A Re-percept is a represented percept.

§ 7. Re-percepts are the simplest products of representative cognition. They are never sensational, but always ideal; they are not feelings, but cognitions; they are mediate, and are indefinitely divisible in the same manner as are percepts.

§ 8. A re-percept is not an ideal percept, though the same phenomenon of mind is a re-percept or an ideal percept according to the view taken of it; the name re-percept, however, applies solely to the cognition in its representative character. We might, to be sure, regarding the close connection of the two, say that a re-percept is an ideal percept viewed as representative, but if this were done, the value of a separate name re-percept would be lessened greatly, as becoming confused with percept; and no corresponding advantage would be gained; for it is of use to keep as sharp a distinction as possible drawn between presentative and representative knowledge, and important not to confound the two either designedly or unwittingly.

§ 9. Re-percepts, then, are distinguishable from percepts by all the characteristics which separate representative from presentative cognition. They are marked off from higher representative cognitions by their relative simplicity, and by their traceable conformity to the percepts of which they are representations.