excess, and they are only overcome oftentimes after something of a conflict. A disposition toward temperance is often helped by one toward occupation. Gentle speech and demeanour express another collection of ends which relate to a habit of action. Dispositions toward these ends are opposed to those connected with aggression and conflict, but are concurrent and coalescent with most of the social dispositions. Occupation is an end quite similar to temperance in its character, and very often comes to be an end in itself. Dispositions toward occupation are opposed by dispositions toward repose and its associates. Another variety of these ends is exhibited by the term Security, where the end is a state from which is absent a feeling of the promixity of causes tending to produce pains. This is an important end of human volition, and is a selfsufficient as well as an intermediate end; it is highly ideal and representative, its various means are the acquisition and possession of protective articles of different sorts, and the formation of habits which experience has shown to be protective; in the broadest sense of the word, for security the maintenance of public social order is a prime means. The predatory dispositions are toward secondary ends, and many of them grouped under the head of Aggression, Conflict, and Triumph. These dispositions are readily traceable through successive generations; an appetite for killing exists very frequently in men irrespective of any end of the killing, and is sometimes very strong. Conspicuously these are ends in themselves. As before remarked, the sexual and social dispositions are the chief antagonists to those of this group. Such pleasures as those associated with a fine spectacle, as a sunset for example, are mainly æsthetic. They are consequently self-sufficient ends, for the most part, though an aesthetic delight may be a means, as for example to a high development of character. But as ordinarily sought, they are ends in themselves. The æsthetic pleasures are pleasures of the eye and the ear, and some degree of repose and leisure is requisite to their enjoyment and cultivation; accordingly dispositions toward repose favour the æsthetic dispositions, though dispositions toward those activities which secure for us such pleasures cannot be dispensed with as auxiliaries. A man will go a great way and take a great deal of trouble to enjoy a fine sunset, but his mind must be free from care and anxiety and somewhat above the ordinary toils of life to be willing to go far for such a purpose and to appreciate it fully when the view is present. Dispositions toward these and other aesthetic pleasures do not subsist

to any great extent where there is a necessity to make the attainment of things requisite to sustain life an end engrossing much attention and desire. Dispositions toward the presentative primary pleasures are antagonistic to æsthetic dispositions. Lastly, the happiness of others is an end which has been growing in importance as civilisation has progressed. With a great many and at many times it is a self-sufficient end; with some a principal end. Its intermediate characters are many, for everyone sees a thousand advantages resulting from the happiness of those near him. Dispositions toward this end, happily, often show marks of inheritance; they are, as a rule, concurrent and coalescent with the social and sexual dispositions, and antagonistic to the predatory. The operation of the economical prudent dispositions produces deterrents, and sometimes the antagonism between the two is pretty evenly balanced; oftener the economical are in the ascendant.

§ 6. Those most highly representative pleasures described in this work as the tertiary do not differ much in their character as ends from those just referred to; they are, however, much broader in their scope and include much more. The pleasures of living as opposed to dying, which constitute the first group of ends, have a strong hold upon all men. A long life, or a life to the full measure of one's days, is a prominent end with all, and as constituting that end all the pleasures experienced in living or expected to be experienced are associated in thought. To live and preserve one's life is a self-sufficient end, and yet we often hear people speak of living only to certain ends, to do certain things, as to be of service to one's family or country. It is by no means infrequent for people to say that all they care to live for is to do thus and thus. Similarly with the hero, who gives his life for a cause or an idea. In such cases the mind makes the pleasure of living in general subordinate and intermediate to some particular pleasure of living. But much allowance is to be made for extravagance of language, and ordinarily when people who make the statements just referred to have accomplished the end which they seem to make superior, they have just as strong a disposition toward life as before. And even with the hero or the martyr the disposition toward life is strong enough to make him sell his life as dearly as possible. Characteristically, therefore, living is an end in itself, though intermediate as well to certain special pleasures of living. We notice here the same condition of things we commented upon in discussing some of the primary ends. That which we constantly

have and enjoy, we do not desire, and it does not consciously appear as an end to be sought, but becomes intermediate to and a basis of other enjoyments. From moment to moment we do not desire to live, because we are living; but looking forward to the future and seeing the contingencies of life and its uncertainty, while observing also that some do attain a maximum of years, we desire to prolong our existence and make a long life an end of pursuit. Living then, as thus explained, becomes a principal end with human beings. It sometimes sinks to the level of an inferior end, as with the martyr, or the suicide, and probably with many others who are absorbed in the pursuit of special pleasures. But let life actually be endangered, and its preservation, the preservation of the integrity of the body, in the vast majority of instances becomes an end of paramount importance. Looking at the dispositions, we find those of an egoistic character on the whole favour the disposition toward living, and yet this must not be interpreted too broadly, for men often are anxious to live for the sake of their families or those dependent on them. Besides those dispositions which lead to aggression and conflict are antagonistic to the dispositions toward living, though they too are formed in furtherance of a disposition to prolong life. It is hazardous to say without qualification that dispositions toward any one large class of ends are as a whole either concurrent with or antagonistic to those of another large class. Some of them are one way and some another; and they vary according to circumstances.

§ 7. Health is an end partially coincident with life. Good health is generally considered a means to long life, and a person desiring the latter directs his attention to securing the former. So also health is regarded as a means toward almost all other pleasures. Its character is more that of an intermediate end, consequently, than of the other class. It seldom appears as a principal end. Dispositions toward health are often weakened and opposed by dispositions toward particular appetites, and by dispositions toward such pleasures as knowledge and power.

§ 8. Knowledge, power, and wealth are allied as ends, and yet opposed, in the manner indicated in the chapter on the tertiary pleasures and pains. They are means to each other and to other pleasures, and ends in themselves. Men naturally make the associations which constitute these three groups; and, probably, no three collections of pleasures could be selected which are more prominently before the mind as ends than are these. They require

labour to attain and care to keep. They are to be regarded as self-sufficient, characteristically, and also as principal ends. With the same person, however, not more than two of them, at any rate, are principal; wealth and power may go together, and knowledge and power, but the three do not have equal rank in any one mind, and wherever two of them occur, one will usually be subordinate, though they may keep along concurrently. Dispositions toward these pleasures are substantially egoistic, and are opposed by the altruistic dispositions, and also by the less far reaching egoistic dispositions. Nevertheless, when these ends are made subordinate to altruistic ends, the dispositions must be characterised as altruistic. The power of inheritance may be marked here in very many cases; with some the disposition toward the acquisition of knowledge is very evidently connatural; with others, the disposition to acquire wealth; with others, power.

§ 9. Good repute and good character, as ends, have reference to society very prominently, especially the former, and, like those. we have just left considering, are fairly entitled to be called principal ends. As with all others, however, these ends have their intermediate offices. Good repute is often essential to wealth and power, and to almost all the wider range of social pleasures. Good character bears the same relation to the mind as good health to the body. Probably the dispositions toward these pleasures are not as strong as toward some of those last mentioned, but the prevailing ends differ during different periods and epochs of the world. Fame and power are kindred objects of desire. Character, as apart from fame, is a somewhat rarer end. Perhaps the dispositions toward good repute and good character should be classified as prevailingly ego-altruistic, since they are not so fully altruistic as those seeking the welfare of one's family or one's country, but yet have more reference to, and are more dependent upon, the conditions of others than the tertiary ends we have. previously noticed. The more engrossing appetitive demands, and such ends as the acquisition of wealth and power, are frequently antagonistic to dispositions in these directions, while the social dispositions, for the most part, are concurrent and coalescent with them.

§ 10. Under the titles social order, liberty, and the like, are collected a great many altruistic ends. Among a people like the Romans in their earlier days, or in the earlier history of the United States, such ends as these were principal with a large fraction of the people; at the present time in America, particu

larly in the large cities, they are usually subordinate to many egoistic ends of personal profit and aggrandisement. The variations of patriotism as a prominent end show the changes from the highest self-sufficiency to various grades of intermediacy.

§ 11. Heaven is characteristically an ego-altruistic end; with most I am inclined to believe it actually is egoistic. But whatever desires and ends a person has with regard to his future on earth are projected forward into the other life; and if his desires with regard to this life are egoistic, they will be egoistic with respect to heaven; if altruistic as respects the life that now is, they will be altruistic with respect to the life to come. Heaven is a self-sufficient end, and highly ideal. It cannot be said that with the majority of people its pleasures are principal ends; their ideality and remoteness prevent their occupying a very large place in thought. Persons of a religious nature, however, in large numbers do, according to their respective ideas of heavenly delights, make them principal ends; and they make their various ends, appertaining to the present life, ministers to the higher end. As most men view the subject, carnal pleasures and worldly pleasures generally create antagonistic dispositions to the disposition toward the joys of a heaven, while spiritual or ethical pleasures give rise to concurrent and coalescent dispositions. Almost everything altruistic is favourable. Generally speaking, ethical ends are self-sufficient, but not absolutely so. They are sometimes, but with the few rather than the many, made principal ends. Of course they are favoured by altruistic dispositions, and opposed by egoistic. Esthetic dispositions, inasmuch as they have a considerable element of altruism, upon the whole assist ethical dispositions, though some of the most refined and most incorrigible egoism is developed through a pursuit of æsthetic ends.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

ELEMENTS OF THE VALUE OF ENDS AND DISPOSITIONS.

§ 1. WE have thus far been trying to ascertain what ends and dispositions do as a fact exist in minds and the relative positions they actually occupy, so as to present a fair and accurate picture of the human mind as it is in these respects. This would be a necessary