In

own material. The organised memory employed in speaking, reading, and writing is not a common basis of the two states. each there is a distinct recollection of words, graphic signs, and the movements necessary to record them. In modified cases (Azam, Dufay, somnambulism) a partial memory alternates with the normal memory. The latter embraces the totality of conscious states; the former a limited group of states which, by a natural process of selection, separate from the others and form in the life of the individual a series of connected fragments. But they retain a common basis in the less stable and less conscious forms of memory which enter indifferently into either group.'1

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

§ 39. After examining some of the leading varieties of abnormal consciousness, we are in the first place impressed with the truth of the general conclusion, that nowhere in such states do we see at work any different powers from those we see in exercise under normal conditions. A further examination fails to disclose any new laws of the operation of conscious activities. What we do find in all cases is either an exaltation or a deficiency of action in some normal mode. And abnormal conditions of some portion of the nervous system correspond exactly with and are always a key to the various sorts of abnormal consciousness. But wherever there is consciousness at all it exists according to the laws of redintegration and efferent activity, has its three aspects of feeling, cognition, and volition, and exhibits the elements which our general analysis brought out. Afferent influences, or some of them, may be cut off in one case, efferent activities may be interfered with in another, feeling may be exalted or depressed, cognitive movements may be arrested or quickened, but there is always a course of differentiation and integration according to the general laws we have laid down.

§ 40. We are also confirmed in our adhesion to the doctrine that the development of mind in the individual proceeds in correspondence with the development of life. For the result of conscious movements is the organisation of experiences so as generally to conform the individual to his environment, to effect the most perfect adjustment of inner to outer relations. Therefore, when there is any interference with the normal order of working of the mind's faculties, this adjustment is disturbed and the development 1 Ribot op. cit.

of life is also interfered with. In those abnormal states which are of a temporary character, no harm may be done; but in the proportion that they become permanent, they tend to the destruction of the organism. Abnormal consciousness is hence disease, and, unless the normal order is restored, the effect upon life is disastrous.

§ 41. While this is generally true, it also appears that consciousness can exist, temporarily at any rate, in such an independence of normal conditions as to raise many questions as to its ultimate capacities of existence. Sensation may be blunted as in dreams, and yet the consciousness may be very active in representation. On the other hand in the hypnotic condition, and in some states of intoxication, there is a tremendous exalta- · tion of the sensibilities. Whether there ever can be developed any normal conditions of these high powers of the senses and of the redintegrating activities is a query of great interest in its bearings on the future of the human race. Again, under extreme morbid conditions there appear those extraordinary exhibitions of intelligence and of feeling, which make us prone to believe that the existence of our conscious selves is not bound up with the integrity of our bodily organism. Indeed, when we consider the cases of double consciousness, the wonder comes over us whether even our birth may not be but a sleep and a forgetting.' As we move into this region of abnormal consciousness, the darkness of the unknown or the unknowable very speedily shuts in around us, with only here and there a star to guide us on our way.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

DEVELOPMENT IN THE LOWER ANIMALS.

§ 1. THE laws of development contained in the first chapter of this Part are generalisations from all the facts of consciousness wherever found. The different phases of development which form the subject-matter of the subsequent chapters have been set forth from examination of the facts of consciousness in general, and not any one individual's consciousness or the consciousness of any class or species of animate life. It is true what has been said has related more especially to human consciousness as of paramount interest in psychology, since it exhibits the highest developments

of redintegration, and since after development into the most complex phenomena has been traced, the work has been accomplished for the less complex phenomena also. We have studied the genesis of consciousness, have analysed it into its elements, have learned the factors of its development, ascertained the laws of that development, and followed it along its various lines to its most elaborate and complex results. Of course in doing this there has been no possibility of setting forth all the facts from which our inductions have been drawn, though it is certainly hoped and believed that nothing is stated which the facts do not warrant. To give in detail the data for psychological principles would require the writing of a Descriptive Psychology far larger in its proportions than the present work, and would preclude giving that attention to relations necessary for the attainment of principles, and so important to higher knowledge.

2. If we are not in error with respect to the facts of the genesis of consciousness, there is only a difference in degree between human consciousness and lower animal consciousness. The factors and laws of development of the latter are the same as those of the former. We find a great multiformity and variety of results, but a complete uniformity of law. The law of evolution is the general expression of those uniformities of modes of action. which work out different degrees of mental attainment. It is no more than we must expect, therefore, that the laws of redintegration govern the exhibitions of consciousness in the inferior creation; we observe this to be the case upon examination, whenever we can make it. And since the laws of efferent activity are common laws of all animate motor action, it is apparent that in a psychological study of the brute creation we have no new principles either to seek or find. Nevertheless the various degrees of development of mental functions and capacities in species below man are of great importance to the history of the development of mind.

§ 3. Although Comparative Psychology must be said to be in its infancy, in recent years a considerable amount of scientific attention has been bestowed upon mind in the lower animals. Most recently of all, Mr. George J. Romanes has published a volume whose expressed object is 'the mapping out of animal psychology,' in order to give a trustworthy account of the grade of psychological development which is presented by each group. In this work we have the most recent and most complete exposition of the

facts of comparative psychology, and from it I shall select the facts necessary for the purposes of the present chapter, themselves collated from numerous authors.'

6

§ 4. The knowledge we are able to gain of animal intelligence below man, like the knowledge we have of any other mind than our own, is inferential. But in the case of the lower animals the absence of an established and perfected means of communication with them on our part renders our inferences less certain; moreover, the difficulty of attaining certainty in our conclusions is enhanced the farther away we get from structures like our own organism, since then we have nothing by which to judge, for we are accustomed to measure likeness of function by likeness of structure. The criterion by which Mr. Romanes thinks he is entitled to judge of the existence of mind in the lower animals is the following: 'Does the organism learn to make new adjustments, or to modify old ones, in accordance with the results of its own individual experience? If it does so, the fact cannot be due merely to reflex action. . . . for it is impossible that heredity can have provided in advance for innovations upon, or alterations of its machinery during the lifetime of a particular individual.' I may, however, here explain that in my use of this criterion I shall always regard it as fixing only the upper limit of non-mental action; I shall never regard it as fixing the lower limit of mental action. For it is clear that long before mind has advanced sufficiently far in the scale of development to become amenable to the test in question it has probably begun to dawn as nascent subjectivity. In other words, because a lowly organised animal does not learn by its own individual experience, we may not therefore conclude that in performing its natural or ancestral adaptations to appropriate stimuli consciousness, or the mind element, is wholly absent; we can only say that this element, if present, reveals no evidence of the fact. But, on the other hand, if a lowly organised animal does learn by its own individual experience, we are in possession of the best available evidence of conscious memory leading to intentional adaptation. Therefore, our criterion applies to the upper limit of non-mental action, not to the lower limit of mental.' 2 In referring to Mr. Romanes, I shall make use of the International Scientific Series (New York, Appleton, 1883), and the reader will understand all the page references at the lower margin to be to the pages of this edition of Mr. Romanes's work, unless otherwise stated.

INVERTEBRATA.

§ 5. Below the mollusca evidence of consciousness is found; but very little to show how far it is developed. In Part IV. I gave some of the facts and conclusions on invertebrates (see Chap. XXV. § 9 ff.). In addition we may note that oysters taken from a depth never uncovered by the sea, open their shells, lose the water within and perish; but if kept in reservoirs, where they are occasionally left uncovered and are otherwise incommoded, learn to keep their shells shut and then live for a longer time after being taken out of water.' The razor fish learns to avoid salt, and yet when he apprehends danger of capture places the latter before any aversion he may have to the salt.2 Snails seem to be susceptible of some degree of personal attachment, one having apparently remembered a sickly mate and having returned to it after twenty-four hours' absence on an exploration after better circumstances, and then after finding the same having conducted its mate thither.3 Limpets return to one particular spot or home after browsing excursions, and show a precise memory of direction and locality. According to Schneider the Cephalopoda show unmistakable evidence of consciousness and intelligence. They appeared to recognise their keeper after having received food from him.

§ 6. The most highly developed intelligence among the invertebrata is found among the ants, and of their habits we have a very large number of facts collected which go to prove this assertion. Dr. Lindsay's summary we have already given (Chap. XXV. § 9). What he says is amply borne out by later investigation. Ants undoubtedly have means of mental communication, but how this is effected we do not know. They seem to have sympathy and tender emotion. As to imagination we do not find much that is satisfactory evidence, at least as to æsthetic constructiveness. Scientific and utilitarian constructions are implied in many of their most conspicuous actions. The play impulse is considerably developed. Altruism is also well developed, as shown

by their social organisations.

§ 7. Bees and wasps have much greater powers of sight than ants, but like ants their sense of hearing seems very low. Like ants, they have smell. They readily are educated to a sense of direction. Their memory of locality is sufficiently strong to bring 4 29. 5 47, 48.

1 25. 2 26.

ง

3 27.

6 87.

7 143.

S 144.