voluntary power under the guidance of pleasure and pain. We learn that our happiness is ultimately promoted by remaining quiet and not actively resisting the discomfort we feel, or that it will be for our interest to oppose the promptings of a desire when it presses by dead resistance, so to speak. Endurance, then, is a state of mind exemplifying the conflict of motives. At present pain prompts to expression of the pain and movements in avoidance of it; here is a set of motives on one side; the recollection of relief from pain obtained by simply bearing it, together with the approval of others thus obtained for courage, fortitude, and virtue, and also the remembrance of unpleasant consequences which followed yielding to the natural impulses, furnish opposing motives that prevail. The state of pressure then ensuing is the state of endurance. Desire and endurance are the obverse of each other. Desire is the pulling at the rope; endurance the gravitation which opposes. Endurance is a continuing state of dead resistance. It does not aim at or result in any action which is not counter-active; and when the action subsides to which it is reaction, the state of endurance abates with it into the ordinary quiescence of the mind. It may be considered an ultimate state of volition, for it tends to nothing else, but is completed in itself, passing away when its purpose is accomplished. It is a preeminently characteristic state of passive power.

§ 32. When the pressure is of more highly representative motives, the opposition which develops endurance induces the feeling of contentment. This is a name also for happiness in general, but its specific reference is to happiness which comes from throwing off the desire for other kinds of happiness than the one possessed. A sense of the value of such other happiness is experienced, and a desire for it arises; in opposition there is an endurance coming from a counter-impulse with which is connected association of the comfort, desirability, and advantage of one's present condition. By this the desire is repelled or quenched. Repetitions establish a habit of repulsion, and contentment reigns as a prevalent and commanding state. If a person has a strong desire for wealth, power, or fame, his opposition to the cravings of such a desire from various motives, whatever they may be, nullifies the irritation, and, as the desire subsides, produces peace. If one is anxious to accomplish a certain task and the flesh is weak,' patient and indomitable bearing up subdues the offending members, and secures at length tranquillity and concentration of forces.

§ 33. From these data it will be observed that endurance is simply balanced mental reaction continuing. If a motive presents itself and is promptly met by another which nullifies it, and the whole takes place in a moment of time inappreciable, we cannot say there is endurance. The element of continuance is indispensable. And when the opposing motive overpowers its antagonist and itself runs into action, there is not endurance. But when action and reaction are balanced—equal and opposite, there is a state of endurance. This seems to be the sum of it. The idea of something painful which is attached to the word endurance comes from the fact that the opposition is not awakened except from the presence of associations calling up pain more or less, and also that opposition is itself painful, especially if the antagonist pressure is strong. There may be endurance either of a positive pain, or of the pain which is produced by denying, resisting, and endeavouring to subvert a desire for pleasure. One occurs when a man holds himself still under a surgeon's knife; and the other, when in curing himself of the habit of chewing tobacco, he places the tobacco-box on the table before him, and refrains from tasting the narcotic delight.

DELIBERATION.

§ 34. A state further illustrative of the conflict of motives is that of deliberation. In the promptings of feeling counter-motives arising hold the mind in suspense, delaying action, till what is termed a conclusion is reached; that is, till there is a sufficient preponderance of motives of one side over the other to determine action in any path. We are then said to choose; and the presence of conflicting motives weighing against each other, if they are tolerably well balanced, gives us, as has been said, the consciousness of a power of choice. There is nothing peculiar about such a state, requiring explanation; the chief remark to be made is that it exists in its perfection only in minds furnished with a considerably high representative development of thought and feeling. There must be an apprehension of a wide range of motives in order to make deliberation at all habitual, and such a range only comes with experience. The child mind is not deliberative; it does not forecast and calculate results with a far-reaching power; but it grows in experience and finds so many pains gathered from ill-considered action and so many pleasures lost thereby, that, when a course suggests itself, there springs up in opposition a representation of those pains experienced which constitutes a

motive to delay. Action being thus checked, the subject is detained in the mind, and all the associations of pleasure and pain which it is able to collect are passed in review and set off one against the other. When no new considerations occur, or if some suggestion arises of evil from further delay, action is brought on.

§ 35. It is evident that the efficacy of deliberation is variable, and dependent upon education largely. Mere delay in coming to a conclusion may occur without much activity of thought to determine whether or not the conclusion is wise. Again, there may be activity of thought, but of unbalanced thought, in which either the pros or the cons, as the case may be, have almost exclusive sway over the other. Many people delude themselves with the idea that if they take time to consider, they will necessarily thoroughly consider; whereas, in fact, their minds run over and over the same line of thought, prompted by a potent desire, and nothing contrary has any chance to come in. Still again, there may be an ability to review with fairness reasons for and against, but no power of far-reaching analysis or wide range of thought on either side. The associations may be entirely superficial and the conclusion is hence of little value, though the deliberation may be long. Whatever broadens and sublimates thought, whatever increases general culture, both creates a greater aptitude for deliberation and renders the deliberation more to a purpose. The same truth is specially illustrated in the fact that deliberation concerning something unfamiliar is a much less satisfactory exercise than when over that which we are acquainted with. This is seen in an inferior way in the perplexity which occurs when we do not know how to do a thing we feel ought to be done. When one unused to carving is called upon to cut up a fowl on the table, his unfamiliarity causes delay, slowness, and awkwardness to appear; this, however, is not a case of a high order of deliberation. But when a person is considering two courses to be followed and is ignorant of the circumstances attending each, he is at a great disadvantage as compared with him who knows thoroughly the bearings and tendencies of the opposing lines of conduct. The conclusion of the latter has a far greater chance to be valuable and safe than that of the former.

§ 36. Deliberation may of itself be either pleasurable or painful, according to the pressure of motives. If there is a strong desire, prompting resistance to it is painful; the state of endurance is generated in connection with deliberation. At other

times action is painful, and the suspense of action agreeable. There is a luxury of suspense which sometimes grows into a passion. The two extremes of hasty action and prolonged indecision may not only arise in particular cases, but may grow into confirmed habits of mind.

RESOLUTION.

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§ 37. The state of mind which marks the conclusion of the deliberative process when the mind is determined in the course of its action, but cannot yet complete that action, is termed resolution. We resolve, make up our mind,' to do something, but there are external hindrances which prevent our doing at once what we wish to do. Resolution, then, is a preliminary volition in furtherance of a more remote end. There does not seem to be any substantial difference between resolution and intention. The word resolution is generally employed to describe in its incipiency the same state which, when established, is called intention. intend to do a thing conveys rather the idea of a settled purpose; I resolve' creates the impression of having just come into the state of mind after doubt or conflict. But too much stress should not be laid upon such distinctions. The prime act in either case is that of a determination of volition toward some object which is not yet attainable, and the consequent attitude of watching for opportunity to put into action one's ultimate desire; when the time for such action comes the volition is ready to improve it. Were it not for such intermediate volitions it would be impossible to follow any consistent, settled purpose of life, or to carry over into the future the suggestions of the present which cannot be acted upon.

§ 38. If, after the mind resolves to do anything, there is some interval before it is enabled to accomplish, there are apt to be numerous distractions to weaken the force of the determination. Especially if the resolve be made in opposition to desires of considerable force which are in their nature continuing, the latter are exceedingly prone to undermine the resolution and break down its power. So, if there is a multitude of distracting forces, it is hard to sustain a resclution. Resolutions are sustained by a refreshing of the motive which prompted their adoption; and where the resolution is of such a character as to allow part performance, by an unintermitting gges regular carrying out. Motives are refreshed by dwelling upon those and calling up the associations which would

strengthen them. If a person resolves to form a habit of doing a certain act regularly, when temptation comes to depart from the resolution he may conquer the temptation by summoning up afresh the motives which led to the adoption of the resolution. And an unremitting performance of the act at the regular intervals strengthens with each additional performance the efficacy of the resolution, while a single failure weakens it more than many performances strengthen.

MISCELLANEOUS VOLITIONAL DETERMINATIONS.

§ 39. The dynamic element of volition, as we have observed, attends all conscious automatic action. It belongs to all conscious states. Every experience has relations involving automatic power either active or passive, moving outward spontaneously, or resisting inward movement. Hence all cognition postulates some volitional determination. All the processes of redintegration, whatever they may be, carry with them volitional movements with the dynamical element at any rate, and more or less of conscious choice according to circumstances. Hence attention, association, and representation have their volitional aspects. The connection of the feelings with volition we have sufficiently commented upon.

§ 40. Assent.-One form of these volitional determinations in which the dynamic element is the most conspicuous is that of assent. This state is somewhat different from resolution, in that the latter implies the putting forth of more active energy toward one's own personal actions.

In assent we agree, do not object, to a given result; in resolution we determine to actively exert ourselves to bring about the result. True assent often involves personal action in the way of co-operation, or even in the way of actively leading; but the prominent idea is that of falling in with some other mind. On the basis of assent are founded those determinations which take the form of promises and contracts. A certain state of facts is pictured to the mind, and the representation of myself as acting in a certain manner is suggested. I represent myself as so acting, with no opposing movement strong enough to hinder. I say then I intend to do thus and so, I expect to do so, I will do so, I promise to do so.

§ 41. Belief. The volitional determinations of belief require much the same processes as those of assent. I agree to something; assent to it, and govern my conduct by this assent. Since belief

VOL. II.

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