forward and alternating, my hand reaching out to take the coat, my arm swinging it behind my back, and then both arms going into the armholes and adjusting the garment on my person. Supposing there is an adequate motive for doing all this lying behind, as the desire to go out of doors, these successive pictures rise in the mind and become antecedents of the various intermediate and final actions accomplished. This is one method by which representative cognitions act upon volition. As associations become more firmly cemented and more highly representative, an abridgment of this process occurs. The idea of the effect to be produced takes the place of the idea of the movements to be accomplished. For instance, in the example just taken, the idea of the coat on my back and the feeling of warmth consequent thereon would be the intellectual antecedent to the actions necessary to secure the effect; the intermediate associations being integrated, merged, and consolidated, so as to occupy no appreciable portion of our consciousness. This is the highest and most complete development of volitional power. It is scarcely necessary to observe that such is not acquired instantaneously. The number of acquisitions of this character varies with different individuals and different times of life, but in no case can any such become fixed till a considerable amount of representation has taken place. First, simpler movements become involuntary. Then, as the mind grows in complexity, the more complicated operations pass into permanent acquisitions, so that they may be performed with promptness and machine-like precision, the idea of the effect to be produced being sufficient to set a train in motion to proceed infallibly to its end.

GENERAL CONTROL OF FEELINGS.

§ 16. The general control of feelings and thoughts is attained only through the opposition of motives. The one who has the best control over himself is he in whom there is the most complete poise or balance of feelings. So that one emotion or another can be suppressed or excited upon occasion. The direct control of feelings is reached through the voluntary muscles. Indirectly, however, the organs of the body which are not amenable to direct control are affected by various muscular efforts, and with the effects feelings are inflamed. Sobbing is a proper involuntary act, but may be promoted by voluntary movements. Where, however, the organs are far removed from connection with

voluntary muscles, as the heart, there is no voluntary power. Now, when feeling is experienced, it manifests itself through the muscular system in one place or another, and, of course, throughout the regions of the voluntary muscles. The physical effect also pervades the involuntary regions. If, then, upon impulse to movement under strong or weak feeling, a counter feeling is excited from some motive presented by past experience, the former moving toward expression, the latter opposing in case the latter is the stronger, movement is suppressed and outward manifestations are checked. By the checking of external indicia the entire physical system seems affected indirectly; the wave of emotion seems to regurgitate and abate its force, being overbalanced by the contrary feeling. Feelings thus balance each other in various degrees. Frequently there is an alternation of strength, and the will inclines first to one side and then to another. The beginning of a control of the emotions in human beings occurs largely through parental assistance. The child manifests violent emotions prompted by the lawlessness of central power bursting forth at the inspiration of some pleasure or pain, or taking its earliest rise from its own exuberance. These emotions are checked by parental command or physical punishment, and it frequently requires considerable of both to accomplish subjugation. Suppose, however, that in one instance a child's emotion is suppressed by the pain of parental interference. The next time the motive for a similar emotion is present there is an association between the yielding to this emotion and pain of punishment, together, of course, with a representation of that pain in some degree. A counter-motive in a counter-pleasure is thus generated. The represented pain may not be strong enough to overcome the motive to expression. The expression is repeated. If not, the punishment is repeated, the link of connection between the expression of the given emotion and the pain consequent is much strengthened. A third time, the motive to resist and suppress will be far greater. Perhaps a few repetitions will make the counteracting motive so strong as to give it the entire supremacy. In some cases a single infliction of pain is quite sufficient to give full control in a particular case. In all cases much depends upon the uniformity of the sequence of the pain upon the manifestation designed for suppression. Every one is familiar with the bad effect of irregular and variable discipline of a child. If he is forbidden to do a thing and rebuked for doing it once, while the next time he is

suffered to have his own will, the process of education is much retarded. The beginning having been made by parental control, no different procedure intervenes to establish self-restraint. Intellectual associations revive pains and discomforts connected with a given action, and when the motive to that action rises there rise also the counter-emotions suggested thereby. As the reach of association is widened, remote consequences and connections are apprehended, and the force of motives is enhanced until there comes the large range of thought and admirable self-command of the highly-cultured man. Between this and the uncontrolled nature of the infant, the profligate, or the savage, are all degrees.

§ 17. It must be observed that this control of emotion implies not merely suppression, but also the evoking of feeling. This may be accomplished in two general ways, the one to act out the external manifestations, and the other to direct the thoughts as exclusively as possible to the end desired. The latter course. involves the assumption that the thoughts themselves are under control, and its consideration may well be deferred till the matter of control of thoughts is referred to. Upon the former it may be remarked for raising emotions there seems to be some efficacy in 'going through with the motions.' If we draw down the features, indulge in sighs and lugubrious moans, we may actually induce grief; if we attempt to look cheerful, we may really become cheerful. So a fit of anger may be excited by violent movements; it is possible for us in these ways to summon up the blood.' Precipitate motion may create fear. But when an actor represents feelings, there may be an absence of the effect just commented upon from the fact that the actor is aiming at effect upon others rather than on himself. In the best acting, however, when the actor loses himself in his subject,' we have real feeling evoked.

§ 18. In closing this topic, we may observe that the measure of control of the emotions is very largely the measure of restraint of the outward manifestations. He who can control his features can control his feelings. Self-control and self-restraint mean little more than control over the various modes of action. He who can hold the tongue' is a man of self-control.

GENERAL CONTROL OF THOUGHTS.

§ 19. The control of feelings implies the control of thoughts, and the education of the feelings is an education of the thoughts;

but there are some ways in which the thoughts exercise a reactive control over the feelings, and some ways in which voluntary action seems to have power of control over the thoughts. The mind can arrest the current of association, can dwell upon particular topics, can exclude or lightly pass over others, and thus exercise a general, though not unlimited, restraint over its intellectual operations. The activity of the mind in association is not a strictly voluntary activity; that is to say, there is no balance of active forces in obedience to the behest of pleasure and pain; association takes place automatically. There is, however, a voluntary interference at which the opposition of motives is observable and a conscious preponderance of one set over another. This voluntary control does not appear to be direct. It operates by concentrating the mind upon a given point; that is, by inducing a flow of strong feeling toward that point. This feeling may be pleasurable or painful; in any event, if the feeling be strong, the attention will be detained. As it is detained there will be a greater stimulus to all the associations connected with the topic upon which there is detention. Each one of these will bring with it divergent impulses strong enough to create the consciousness of an opposition, and to require an effort to maintain attention in a given direction. If the motive to particular attention is strong enough, it will control; if a divergent force is more powerful, it will draw away the attention. Attention is arrested not only by pleasurable and painful feelings, but also by indifferent ones. Sensations, irrespective of their quality, secure the attention oftentimes; some emotions are neither pleasurable nor painful, and yet absorb attention. This is not the kind of operation which secures voluntary control over the thoughts. There must be a play of motives, the results of experience, in order to produce the most highly complex and perfect exercises of volition. These motives are no different from all other motives that affect voluntary action. They take their rise in pleasure and pain, and the connections between the given action and associated pleasure or pain may be direct or remote. "The intellectual basis of a selective attention is known to be the process of identification of the present with the past. We think of the round form of a shilling when the shilling recalls the collective past impression of round things. On this ground the occurrence of some other round things along with the shilling, as a ring and a circular stamp upon the table, would make us tend to think rather of the roundness of the shilling than of its colour or its

weight. This is a purely intellectual determination; yet it is often the cause of our attending to one quality rather than to another for the time being. Short of this effect of an identity with the past, we do not make any property an object of attention. When a voluntary preference induces attention, it induces this effect of reviving by similarity the past accumulated impressions; roundness with accumulated round figures; silvery whiteness, with the accumulated visible effects of the same whiteness, and so on. Thus, on the one hand, an intellectual suggestion may be the proximate cause of the selective attention; and, on the other hand, a volitional impulse under the attraction of a feeling may be the cause. Now we have the power to overbear all these commanding attractions-pleasure, intensity, pain, intellectual coincidence-in favour of some property that has nothing in itself to force it upon our notice. This power, however, means nothing but the existence of other motives still, having a superior degree of force; for example, the motive of some great utility, as when we are looking at a signal-post, and attending to nothing but the characteristic movement that conveys the message.' When we are freely venting random impulses, being under no specialising motives, the course seems to be this: there is a complex solicitation of the sense or senses; some one effect, however, is more agreeable than the rest, and, by the primary law of our voluntary framework, will attract our attention to the neglect of the others.

'After a time sensibility is exhausted or enfeebled, and the act of attending ceases; the other effects now rise into prominence, and some circumstance gives a superior impressiveness to one of these.' (Bain.)

§ 20. It is not an easy matter to trace the operation of the will in the control of ideas to and through the muscular movements. The effect is in many cases so minute that it cannot be observed; but so far as observation has gone there is here also confirmation of the general truth that the voluntary activity is an activity which chiefly concerns the muscular system. It is sufficiently evident that when an impression is made upon the mind through the epi-periphery, the mind meets the impression and apprehends the sensation through the muscular system. Now our ideas or cognitions are but representations of our presentative knowledge, and there is no mode of explaining the effects of the presence of those representations except by the fact that the representations occupy exactly the same channels and cover exactly