going intimations, that in the judgment of the negotiators of the several treaties between Great Britain and the United States, and in contemplation of Parliament, the subjects of the first country and the citizens of the last were considered as foreigners to each other?

Yet are we still told that those people of the United States, who were born British subjects, even now continue to be entitled to their original birthrights; and for this singular notion the Great Charter of English liberties is quoted, that no freeman shall be outlawed, or any way destroyed, except by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. But is not this argument conceived upon too narrow principles to apply appositely to the present question, relative to thousands of men, rather than to one man? The fundamental principle is sound law, but it does not reach the case of the inhabitants of thirteen colonies, who revolted from the British Empire, who rose in arms against the King's government, renouncing their allegiance, and claiming their freedom from any further obedience to British laws, and acting thus against all law during seven years, were recognized by the King, in pursuance of the high trust invested in him by those laws, to be independent and sovereign, without subjection or obedience. Is it not a sufficient answer to such pretensions, as a claim of rights without submission volenti non fit injuria: you have elected to be aliens, and you have been recognized by the King, the fountain of all jurisdiction, to be what you have chosen for yourselves; and the laws, from which you claim your rights, cannot acknowledge you in any other character than you have chosen for yourselves and have been recognized to belong to you; you profess not to owe any allegiance to the King, or obedience to his laws, and under such circumstances you cannot receive protection from either, whatever rights you may have once possessed, quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem, non permissum est in lege (1)?

In the argument of the instructive case of Campbell v. Hall, in Hilary Term, 1744, it was said by Mr. Alleyn, the learned

for encouraging the settling of the British colonies by inhabitants from the United States, required such emigrants to the British colonies to take the oath of allegiance upon their arrival and settlement; but in this case none but aliens would have been required to take the oath of allegiance to the King.

(1) Co. Litt. 178.

counsel for the plaintiff: "The technical learning of Westminster Hall can give but little assistance to the decision of this question. The great principles of the law of empire must determine it, and the political history of England affords particular illustrations of it." This course must again be pursued, in illustrating the question of the alienage of the American citizens, which may be inquired into under two heads:

1. How aliens may become subjects.

2. How subjects may become aliens.

As to the first head, it is in general true that an alien born, coming into England, and desiring to become a subject, cannot be naturalized but by Parliament, that is, without the consent of the nation this seems to have been always the law of England, though it was otherwise of old in Normandy, where the prince might naturalize. An Act of Naturalization, thus obtained from Parliament, cures the alien's disabilities, as if he had been born in England, and by apt clauses an Act of naturalization may be so made as to cure other disabilities; yet is it inaccurate to say that a person may be naturalized by being born in any dominion of the King while he was King of England, or born upon the King's seas, or born under the statute of Edward III., de natis ultra mare ; for such subjects never were aliens.

During the late reign the Parliament extended the benefits of naturalization to such foreign Protestants as should reside for a limited time in the King's plantations (1); and Protestant officers, being foreigners, were naturalized by Parliament upon performance of special services; and foreign seamen, upon performing nautical services on board British shipping. The colonial assemblies did pass Acts of Naturalization, which were limited in their operation by several statutes imposing disabilities on aliens and denizens; they were bound also by the limited nature of their jurisdictions, and at the beginning of the present reign, a general instruction was given by the King to his governors of colonies not to assent to any Act of assembly granting naturalization to any foreigners, as such Acts might trench upon the statute law of the land, and thus operate against the policy of the State.

(1) 7 Geo. 2, c. 21; 13 Geo. 2, c. 4; 20 Geo. 2, c. 45; 2 Geo. 3, c. 25 ; 13 Geo. 3, c. 25; 20 Geo. 3, c. 20.

Yet, Ventris hath reported Sir Matthew Hale, the Chief Baron, to have said in Lord Holderness' case, that "Naturalization, according to our law, can only be by Parliament, and not otherwise" (1). There must be surely some mistake here, as such a judge could not have so far allowed his vigilance of observation to have slumbered, as to say that naturalization cannot be otherwise than by Parliament. The Chief Baron, it seems, did not advert that thousands and tens of thousands, millions and tens of millions of people have been naturalized by the act and operation of law, and thus became subjects. Mr. Wallace, who argued for the defendant in the case of Campbell v. Hall, remarked, what may well be remembered: "It is not, as formerly, when the conqueror gained captives and slaves and absolute rights by the law of nations, but now the conqueror obtains dominion and subjects." This beneficial change probably took place as early as the age when the ravages of the Danes were softened by the introduction of Christianity, or prevented by the progress of civilization. There is, however, but little in our law-books, as hath been already intimated, of naturalization by conquest, for slow is the progress of jurisprudence as a science; yet was it said: "If the King of England make a new conquest, the persons there born are his subjects; but if it be taken from him again, the persons there born afterwards (after being conquered) are aliens" (2). This was saying but very little in advance of a more rational construction; as it is not said that the alien people who had been conquered by the arms of the Crown became subjects of the Crown by act and operation of the law. It is not easy to ascertain the epoch when the law became thus understood; I should guess that such a principle of law became prevalent soon after the arrival of the Normans, who argued very acutely about sovereignty and subjection. It was certainly understood as early as the reign of Henry II., when the people of Ireland were supposed to have become his subjects, from his conquest.

Let us now listen to the soft voice of Lord Mansfield, when delivering the judgment of the King's Bench, in the well-known case of Campbell v. Hall. "In the acquisition of conquests, it is limited by the Constitution," says he, "to the King's authority, (1) 1 Vent. 419-20. (2) Dyer, 224; Vaughan, 281-2.

to grant or refuse a capitulation; if he refuse, and put the inhabitants to the sword, all their lands belong to him; if he receive the inhabitants under his protection and grant them their property, he has the power to fix the conditions; he is entrusted with making the treaty of peace, and he may yield up the conquest, or retain it, upon such terms as he shall think fit to agree to." These powers (in the King), no man ever disputed; neither has it hitherto been controverted but that the King might change part of the government of Grenada, or all the political form of the government of a conquered dominion. He afterwards added: "It is not to be wondered that an adjudged case in point has not been produced; no dispute ever was started before upon the King's legislative authority over a conquest; it never was denied in Westminster Hall; it never was questioned in Parliament; it was so decided in Calvin's Case." Lord Mansfield then ran over the history of the conquests made by the Crown of England, in order to confirm and illustrate his judicial doctrines; beginning with that of Ireland and ending with that of New York. In all those cases of conquest, the previous aliens became subjects of the crown, by subsequent conquest; and of course were virtually naturalized by the act and operation of law. The conquered inhabitants, once received under the King's protection," said Lord Mansfield, in judgment, "became subjects, and were to be universally considered in this light, and not as enemies or aliens” (1).

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The first opinion which I have found on such topics is that of John de Witt, in 1667, with the remarks thereon by Sir William Temple, who was then ambassador in Holland. This opinion, which was called a discourse, was given in consequence of the Treaty of Breda (1667), whereby England ceded Surinam to Holland, and

(1) Cowper's Reports, 204.-But Lord Mansfield, while he paid the greatest deference to the opinions of the Law Officers of the Crown, when formally given, seems not to have been aware of the opinion of the Attorney General Northey, in 1704, with regard to the part of St. Christopher's then recently conquered. "Her Majesty may," said Northey, "if she shall be so pleased, under her great seal of England, direct that the like duty (of four-and-a-half per cent.) be levied, for goods to be exported, from the conquered part; and that command will be a law there; her Majesty, by her prerogative, being enabled to make laws that will bind places obtained by conquest, and all that shall inhabit therein." This proves also that those conquered people, being now obedient to her power, were subjects and not aliens; as she could only legislate for such a people, by Acts under the Great Seal of England.

Holland ceded New York to England, with plenary right of sovereignty, propriety, and possession. These expressions were deemed by De Witt, and tacitly acknowledged by Temple, of sufficient force to transfer the allegiance of the Dutch colonists at New York to the English Crown, who thereby became subjects, as Lord Mansfield remarked, and ceased to be considered as enemies and aliens. The next opinion which I have found is that of the Attorney General Pratt, in August, 1759, who, with the Solicitor General Yorke, was consulted by the Board of Customs on the effect of the . recent capitulation of Guadaloupe. His opinion was, that this island must be considered as now one of the British plantations; the right of sovereignty being changed, the whole island is the King's, in right of conquest, and the whole colonists are become his Majesty's subjects. Mr. Solicitor General C. Yorke gave a separate opinion on that occasion to the same effect: "I am of opinion," said he, "that Guadaloupe is now to be considered as a plantation or territory belonging to the King by conquest; and the people thereof owed in consequence an allegiance to his Majesty, as his subjects resident in a plantation belonging to his crown. Yet some doubts being entertained, by persons abroad and at home, whether the French and Spaniards who remained in the ceded countries after the peace of 1763 were aliens or subjects, the Attorney General (Norton) gave it as his opinion to the Board of Trade, that "those French and Spaniards are not to be considered in the light of aliens, but as his Majesty's liege subjects." Yet the Bill in Parliament which he advised for quieting those doubts, was never passed, perhaps never proposed; as wiser men than Norton, probably, considered such advice as weak. The law being clear, who could doubt whether such French and Spaniards, being the King's subjects and not aliens, were not entitled to the rights of subjects? Lord Mansfield delivered it as the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, in the before-mentioned case of Campbell v. Hall, "that the law and legislative government of every dominion equally affects all persons and property within the limits thereof, and is the true rule for the decision of all questions arising there: whoever purchases, lives, or sues there, puts himself under the law of the place. An Englishman in the island of Minorca, the Isle of Man, or in the plantations, has no privilege distinct from the