the parties is provided by that law: Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, 2 Hagg. Const. 395; Harford v. Morris, Ib. 423-436; R. v. Inhabitants of Brampton, 10 East, 282; Kent v. Burgess, 11 Sim. 361.

In Ruding v. Smith, 2 Hagg. Cons. R. 382, where the question was as to the validity of a marriage between British subjects at the Cape of Good Hope, not according to the lex loci of Holland, but celebrated according to the rites of the Church of England by the chaplain of the British forces, who then occupied the settlement under a capitulation, Lord Stowell said (p. 391): "It is true indeed that English decisions have established this rule, that a foreign marriage, valid according to the law of a place where celebrated, is good everywhere else; but they have not, e converso, established that marriage of British subjects, not good according to the general law of the place where celebrated, are universally, and under all possible circumstances, to be regarded as invalid in England. It is therefore certainly to be advised that the safest course is always to be married according to the law of the country, for then no question can be stirred; but if this cannot be done on account of legal or religious difficulties, the law of this country does not say that its subjects shall not marry abroad. . . . In my opinion, this marriage (for I desire to be understood as not extending this decision beyond cases including nearly the same circumstances) rests upon solid foundations: on the distinct British character of the parties on their independence of the Dutch law in their own. British transactions-on the insuperable difficulties of obtaining any marriage conformable to the Dutch law-on the countenance given by British authority and British ministration to this British transaction-upon the whole country being under British dominion, and upon the other grounds to which I have adverted; and I therefore dismiss this libel as insufficient, if proved, for the conclusion it prays."

In Catherwood v. Caslon, 13 M. & W. 264, it was said by Parke, B.: "It may be proper to advert to a dictum in Buller's Nisi Prius, p. 28, that a marriage according to any form of religion is a marriage de facto; and for this the case of Woolston v. Scott (ibid.), before Denison, J., in 1753, is quoted. Whether this marriage of Anabaptists before the Marriage Act was valid, is one of those doubtful disputations pressed on the House of Lords in The Queen

v. Millis, 10 Cl. & Fin. 534. The case before Denison, J., was probably upon a marriage prior to 1752, when all marriages were in the same condition. Both these marriages and Quakers', if valid at all, were valid as being formal marriages, and legal to all purposes."

The prevalent American doctrine is that a marriage valid in the State where it is contracted is good everywhere, even if prohibited by the lex fori or domicilii: see Bouvier's Dict. ii. 38.

But the rule that a "foreign marriage, valid according to the law of the country where it is celebrated, is good everywhere," | applies in England only to the form and not to the essentials of the contract, which depend on the lex domicilii-that is, the law of the country where the parties are then domiciled, and in which they contemplate to reside. In Brook v. Brook, 9 H. L. 212, Lord Campbell, L.C., said: "It is quite obvious that no civilized State can allow its domiciled subjects or citizens, by making a temporary visit to a foreign country, to enter into a contract to be performed in the place of domicile, if the contract is forbidden by the law of the place of domicile as contrary to religion or morality, or to any of its fundamental institutions." And again, p. 218: "None of these cases can show the validity of a marriage which the law of the domicile of the parties condemns as incestuous, and which could not by any forms or consents have been rendered valid in the country in which the parties were domiciled."

In a case decided in the Ecclesiastical Court in 1838, where the parties went to Scotland fraudulently to evade the English law, the Court said that marriage was a natural right, and that what was done in aid of that natural right was not a fraud. It was an evasion of the law, but no fraud. And the learned judge cited a case where a man in articulo mortis actually married to prevent his property going to a particular person; and although it might be called a fraud as regarded the person thus deprived of the property, yet the marriage was held good upon the ground that it was a natural right (1): Ann. Reg. for 1838, vol. 80, Chron. p. 24; and

(1) I have read somewhere, but the reference has escaped me, of a lady of rank who, oeing pressed by her creditors, married a convict in prison under sentence of transportation; and having become a femme covert, she was released from her debts, and from liability to arrest. She took care, however, not to follow her husband to a penal settlement.

see remarks by Sir George Hay, in Harford v. Morris, 2 Hagg. Ecc. R. 433.

creating

Where a statute is personal its force is recognized everywhere, Statutes and is as much respected in a foreign country as at home: Fœlix, personal Traité du Droit, s. 31.

Thus where a statute creates a personal incapacity of marriage between parties, this cannot be evaded by their going to a foreign country where there is no such restriction, and getting married there. This applies to the Royal Marriage Act, 12 Geo. 3, c. 11, by which the previous consent of the Sovereign is required: Sussex Peerage Case, 11 Cl. & Fin. 85; and to the Act, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 54, prohibiting marriage with a deceased wife's sister: Brook v. Brook, 9 H. L. 193. In France the age of consent required by the code is considered a personal quality of French subjects which follows them everywhere; and it was upon this ground that in 1861, the Cour Impériale held the marriage of Jerome Bonaparte with Miss Paterson, contracted in the United States in 1803, to be invalid: see Wheaton, Internat. Law, s. 93, n. 55.

A curious question might arise as to the rights inter se in this country of a husband and wife, foreigners, and resident here, but married abroad in a country where the wife's property is not vested in the husband nor subject to his control, and where the property of neither is liable for the debts of the other. I suppose there is no doubt that, as regards creditors here, he would be liable for her debts contracted in England, and that her personal property (not settled to her separate use) would be considered as his, and so be liable to his debts. But if so, then they have not the benefit of the lex loci as regards their marriage rights, for one of those rights was that the property of neither should be seized for the debts of

the other.

"What is to be done," asks Woolsey (Internat. Law, s. 74), “if the domicile is changed during marriage? Here some maintain that the law of the prior domicile, and others that of the new domicile, should be followed. Others still claim that the law of the new domicile should be applied to the property acquired since the change of residence, and the law of the earlier to all held before the change. Savigny holds that at the time of marriage

disability.

Divorce.

there was a tacit subjection of both parties to the law of their habitation, which ought therefore to be enforced afterwards. A new law might place the wife in a worse condition than she had expected at the time of marriage:" see Story, Conf. Laws, ss. 145-199.

1 As to divorce, this is governed generally by the law of domicile: Lolley's Case, 1 Russ & Ry. C. C. 236; Warrender v. Warrender, 9 Bligh, 122; Tovey v. Lindsay, 1 Dow. 117; McCarthy v. De Caix, 2 Russ. & M. 614; Conway v. Beazley, 3 Hagg. Ecc. R. 639; Argent v. Argent, 34 L. J. Prob. 133; Story, Conf. Laws, chap. 7.

Real property.
Lex Loci rei

sitæ.

Wills.

Lex Loci as to crimes.

With respect to real property, the lex loci rei sitæ universally prevails: Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Bl. 666; Doe d. Birtwhistle v. Bardill, 5 B. & C. 438; Tulloch v. Hartley, 1 Y. & C. 114; Brodie v. Barry, 2 Ves. & B. 127; Coppin v. Coppin, 2 P. Wms. 291; Curtes v. Hutton, 14 Ves. 537; Warrender v. Warrender, 9 Bligh, H. L. 127; Story, Conf. Laws, ss. 365-428.

"The right to land in Chili must, no doubt, be determined by their laws; but a contract entered into between three English gentlemen, two of them domiciled and residing in England, and the third residing in Chili, but not having acquired a foreign domicile, must, I think, be governed and construed by the rules of English law" per Sir J. Romilly, M.R., Coad v. Coad, 33 L. J. (Ch.) 278.

In Frith v. Wollaston, 7 Ex. R. 194, Parke, B., said: "At all events it seems to be clear that the law of the Cape of Good Hope cannot be taken to affect the debtor's real estate out of that country, which, being extra-territorial, is also out of the jurisdiction of the Court where the judgment was obtained."

Wills of personalty are governed by the law of the domicile of the party at the time of the execution, but wills of realty, as to the mode of transfer, by the lex loci rei sitæ: Brodie v. Barry, 2 Ves. &. B. 127; Price v. Dewhurst, 8 Sim. 279; 4 Myl. & Cr. 76, S. C.; Moore v. Darell, 4 Hagg. Ecc. R. 346; Trotter v. Trotter, 4 Bligh (N.S.) 502; Story, Conf. Laws, s. 479 a.

As regards criminal law: "The lex loci must needs govern all criminal jurisdiction, from the nature of the thing, and the purpose

of that jurisdiction:" per Lord Brougham, in Warrender v. Warrender, 9 Bligh (N. S.) 129. "It has been generally understood that whenever a crime has been committed, the criminal is punishable according to the lex loci of the country against the law of which the crime was committed:" per Heath, J., Mure v. Kaye, 4 Taunt. 43. This does not mean that in one country an offender can be punished for a crime committed in another, and that the trial must be had in the first country according to the law of the latter country, but only that by the comity of nations he should be surrendered. In Keighley v. Bell, 4 Fost. & Fin. 790, Willes, J., said: "It is the general rule and principle of law that crime is local in its trial, and that offences are to be tried where they are alleged to have been committed a principle of universal application."

The lex fori applies to all modes of enforcing rights, and Lex Fori. governs as to the nature, extent, and character of the remedy, including Statutes of Limitation and the right of set-off: Imlay v. Ellefsen, 2 East. 453; General Steam Navigation Company v. Guillou, 11 M. & W. 895; British Linen Company v. Drummond, 10 B. & C. 903; Huber v. Steiner, 2 Bing. N. C., 202; De la Vega v. Vianna, 1 B. & Ad. 284; Bhaeechund v. Partabchund Manikchund, 1 Moore, Ind. App. 172; Lopez v. Burslem, 4 Moore, P. C. 300; Her Highness Ruckmaboye v. L. Mottichund, 8 Moore, P. C. 4. Where a foreign statute of limitation not merely limits the remedy, but extinguishes the debt after the period of limitation has expired, it appears to be equivalent to a release, and to prevent an action in this country: Donn v. Lippman, 5 Cl. & F. 1; and see per cur. in Huber v. Steiner, 2 Bing. N. C. 211.

In Williams v. Jones, 13 East, 439, it was held that, assuming that the English Statute of Limitations, 21 Jac. 1. c. 16, applies to the East Indies (as it does: see Her Highness Ruckmaboye v. L. Mottichund, 8 Moore, P. C. 4), a plaintiff's right of action is not barred if he commences the action in this country within six years after the defendants return home, although more than six years have elapsed since the cause of action occurred in India, the defendant having remained there during that period. Lord Ellenborough asked in that case: "How is the plaintiff to be divested of