justice of the nation, is a strong aggravation of the affray, though no mischief has actually ensued." Another aggravation is, when thereby the officers of justice are disturbed in the due execution of their office or where a respect to the particular place ought to restrain and regulate men's behaviour, more than in common ones; as in the courts of justice, and the like. And upon the same account also all affrays in a church or churchyard are esteemed very heinous offences, as being indignities to Him to whose service those places are consecrated. And therefore' by statute 5 & 6 Edw. VI. c. 4, if any 'clerk in orders' shall, by words only, quarrel, chide, or brawl, in a church or churchyard, the ordinary shall suspend him from the ministration of his office during pleasure. But if 'he,' in such church or churchyard, proceeds to smite or lay violent hands upon another person, he shall be excommunicated ipso facto." Laymen guilty of riotous, violent, or indecent behaviour in any church or chapel, churchyard or burying ground, or who molest, disturb, trouble, or misuse any preacher or any clerk in holy orders, incur on conviction a penalty of five pounds for each offence, or an imprisonment not exceeding two months.' Two persons may be guilty of an affray: but 8. Riots, routs, and unlawful assemblies must have three persons at least to constitute them. An unlawful assembly is when three or more do assemble themselves together to do an unlawful act, as to pull down enclosures, to destroy a warren or the game therein; and part without doing it, or making any motion towards it." A rout is where three or more meet to do an unlawful act upon a common quarrel, as forcibly breaking down fences upon a right claimed of common or of way; and make some advances towards it. A riot is where three or more actually do an unlawful act of violence, either with or without a common cause or quarrel; as if they beat a man; or hunt and kill game in another's park, chase, m 1 Hawk. P. C. 138. n 'This statute extended until quite recently to laymen, 23 & 24 Vict. c. 32, s. 5, and was originally of a highly penal character. For if any person' struck with a weapon, or drew any weapon with intent to strike, the offender was, besides excommunication, being convicted by a jury, to have one of his cars cut off; or, having no cars, to be branded with the letter F in his cheek. 'By the statute 9 Geo. IV. c. 31, however, "the punishment of persons convicted of striking with any weapon, or drawing any weapon with intent to strike" was repealed.' • 3 Inst. 176. P Bro. Abr. tit. Riot, 4, 5. 6 warren, or liberty; or do any other unlawful act with force and violence; or even do a lawful act, as removing a nuisance, in a violent and tumultuous manner. Unlawfully assembling, if to the number of twelve, we have just now seen,' may constitute a felony ;' but, from the number of three to eleven, 'the offence is a misdemeanor, punishable by fine' and imprisonment only, 'to which hard labour may be added.'" The same is the case in riots and routs by the common law; to which the pillory in very enormous cases was, while that species of punishment existed,' sometimes superadded. Moreover, by the statute 13 Hen. IV. c. 7, any two justices, together with the sheriff or under-sheriff of the county, may come with the posse comitatus, if need be, and suppress any such riot, assembly, or rout, arrest the rioters, and record upon the spot the nature and circumstances of the whole transaction; which record alone shall be a sufficient conviction of the offenders. In the interpretation of which statute it has been held, that all persons, noblemen and others, except women, clergymen, persons decrepit, and infants under fifteen, are bound to attend the justices in suppressing a riot, upon pain of fine and imprisonment; and that any battery, wounding, or killing the rioters, that may happen in suppressing the riot is justifiable. So that our ancient law, previous to the modern Riot Act, seems pretty well to have guarded against any violent breach of the public peace; especially as any riotous assembly on a public or general account, as to redress grievances, or pull down all enclosures, and also resisting the military if sent to keep the peace, may amount to overt acts of high treason, by levying war against the sovereign. 9. Nearly related to this head of riots is the offence of tumultuous petitioning; which was carried to an enormous height in the times preceding the grand rebellion. Wherefore by statute 13 Car. II. st. 1, c. 5, it is enacted, that not more than twenty names shall be signed to any petition to the king or either house of parliament, for any alteration of matters established by law in church or state; unless the contents thereof be previously approved, in the country, by three justices, or the majority of the grand jury at the assizes or quarter-sessions, and, in London, by the lord mayor, aldermen, and common council;" and that no r 3 Geo. IV. c. 114. 1 Hawk. P. C. 159. 1 Hal. P. C. 495; 1 Hawk. P. C. 161. "Sir W. Blackstone observes, in a note to this passage, that the enactment referred to might be one reason, among petition shall be delivered by a company of more than ten persons; on pain in either case of incurring a penalty not exceeding 1007. and three months' imprisonment. But as the Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2, expressly declares the right of the subject to petition the crown, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning to be illegal, the statute of Charles is practically repealed.'v The provision preventing the assemblage of persons near the houses of parliament, or courts of justice in Westminster, has been already noticed.' 10. Another' offence against the public peace is that of a forcible entry or detainer; which is committed by violently taking or keeping possession of lands and tenements, with menaces, force, and arms, and without the authority of law. This was formerly allowable to every person disseised, or turned out of possession, unless his entry was taken away or barred by his own neglect, or other circumstances; which were explained more at large in the third volume of these commentaries. But this being found very prejudicial to the public peace, it was thought necessary by several statutes to restrain all persons from the use of such violent methods, even of doing themselves justice; and much more if they have no justice in their claim." So that the entry now allowed by law is a peaceable one; that forbidden is such as is carried on and maintained with force, with violence, and unusual weapons. By the statute 5 Rich. II. st. 1, c. 8, all forcible entries are punished with imprisonment and ransom at the king's will. And by the several statutes of 15 Rich. II. c. 2, 8 Hen. VI. c. 9, 31 Eliz. c. 11, and 21 Jac. I. c. 15, upon any forcible entry, or forcible detainer after peaceable entry into any lands, or benefices of the church, one or more justices of the peace, taking sufficient power of the county, may go to the place, and there record the force upon his own view, as in case of riots; and upon such conviction may commit the offender to gaol, till he makes fine and ransom to the king. And moreover, the justice or justices have power to summon a jury to try the forcible entry or detainer complained of: and, if the same be found by that jury, then, besides the fine on the offender, others, why the corporation of London, after the Restoration, usually took the lead in petitions to Parliament for the alteration of any established law. V w 1 Hawk. P. C. 111. the justices shall make restitution by the sheriff of the possession, without inquiring into the merits of the title; for the force is the only thing to be tried, punished, and remedied by them: and the same may be done by indictment at the general sessions. But this provision does not extend to such as endeavour to maintain possession by force, where they themselves, or their ancestors, have been in the peaceable enjoyment of the lands and tenements for three years immediately preceding.* 11. The offence of riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the land; and is particularly prohibited by the statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. III. c. 3, upon pain of forfeiture of the arms, and imprisonment during the king's pleasure: in like manner, as by the laws of Solon, every Athenian was finable who walked about the city in armour." 12. Spreading false news, to make discord between the king and nobility, or concerning any great man of the realm, is punishable by common law with fine and imprisonment; which is confirmed by statutes Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I. c. 34, 2 Rich. II. st. 1, c. 5, and 12 Rich. II. c. 11. 13. False and pretended prophecies, with intent to disturb the peace, are equally unlawful, and were formerly' more penal; as they raise enthusiastic jealousies in the people, and terrify them with imaginary fears. They are therefore punished by our law, upon the same principle that spreading of public news of any kind, without communicating it first to the magistrate, was prohibited by the ancient Gauls. Such false and pretended prophecies were punished capitally by statute '33 Hen. VIII. c. 14,' which was 'altered' in the reign of 'Edw. VI.' By the statute 5 Eliz. c. 15, the penalty for the first offence was a fine of ten pounds and one year's imprisonment; for the second, forfeiture of all goods and chattels, and imprisonment during life." "This latter statute is now repealed, and the offenders are therefore only punishable by fine and imprisonment, or as vagabonds, on summary conviction."' 14. Besides actual breaches of the peace, anything that tends to provoke or excite others to break it, is an offence of the same denomination. Therefore challenges to fight, either by word or letter, or to be the bearer of such challenge, are punishable by fine and imprisonment, according to the circumstances of the offence.b 15. Of a nature very similar to challenges, are libels, libelli famosi, which, taken in their largest and most extensive sense, signify any writings, pictures, or the like, of an immoral or illegal tendency; but, in the sense under which we are now to consider them, are malicious defamations of any person, and especially a magistrate, made public by either printing, writing, signs, or pictures, in order to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, 'or' ridicule. The direct tendency of these libels is the breach of the public peace, by stirring up the objects of them to revenge, and perhaps to bloodshed. The communication of a libel to any one person is a publication in the eye of the law: and therefore the sending an abusive private letter to a man is as much a libel as if it were openly printed, for it equally tends to a breach of the peace. For the same reason it is immaterial 'at common law,' with respect to the essence of a libel, whether the matter of it be true or false; since the provocation, and not the falsity, is the thing to be punished criminally; though, doubtless, the falsehood of it may, 'independently of any statutory provision,' aggravate its guilt, and enhance its punishment. In a civil action, we may remember, a libel must appear to be false, as well as scandalous; for, if the charge be true, the plaintiff has received no private injury, and has no ground to demand a compensation for himself, whatever offence it may be against the public peace: and therefore, upon a civil action, the truth of the accusation may be pleaded in bar of the suit. In a criminal prosecution, on the other hand, the tendency which all libels have to create animosities, and to disturb the public peace, is what' the law considers; and at common law, therefore, the truth of the libel not only constitutes no defence to the charge, but cannot even be given in evidence in mitigation of punishment. The statute 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, now, however, enables a defendant, when put on his trial for a defamatory libel, to plead and prove b 1 Hawk. P. C. 135, 138. เ Rice's case, 3 East, 581.' 1 Hawk. P. C. 193. d Moor. 813. |