With respect to the conduct of the arbitration, on the part of our government, there are some circumstances I think deeply to be regretted. The plan adopted by the late administration was to have retained Mr. Hughes at the Hague, elevated him to the rank of minister plenipotentiary, and send out Mr. Preble as a public agent to be associated with him. I scarcely know any man so well qualified for such a service as Mr. Hughes. He had the benefit of much diplomatic experience, and he had been very successful in various negotiations which he had conducted. Commencing his career as secretary of the commission at Ghent, he subsequently had creditably represented his government at Stockholm, and at St. Petersburgh, and at Copenhagen, on temporary missions; and he had been some time at the court of the Netherlands. Wherever he had been, he uniformly made good impressions, and conciliated the esteem and friendship of all whose acquaintance he formed. He was well versed in the language of the court of the Hague, and well acquainted with all the persons having access to, or surrounding the king. Of pleasing and winning manners, a general favorite, he was exactly such a person as was well fitted for the service. The rank of minister plenipotentiary was necessary to entitle him to approach the person of the king, according to established usage. It was a point of more importance that this government should have had such a representative at Holland, as the British government was there represented by an accomplished ambassador, (sir Charles Bagot,) well known here. Mr. Hughes, intimately acquainted with the corps diplomatique, with all the avenues of access to the king, and with all persons likely to influence the mind or judgment of the monarch or his ministers, would have been able to discover and avert the exercise of any undue influence, if any should be brought to bear upon the government of the Netherlands, in this delicate transaction.

It was among the early acts of this administration, to overturn the plan which had been thus resolved on by its predecessors, and, in place of Mr. Hughes, to send out Mr. Preble, in the sole charge of conducting a difficult arbitration. I have had only a limited acquaintance with this gentleman; but he was destitute of all diplomatic experience, had never been in the councils of the general government, and I understand could not either speak or write the language of the court to which he was sent, and where he was a total stranger. He was indeed a respectable lawyer in his own state, but of what avail would professional eminence be, where tact, insinuating manners, and thorough acquaintance with the persons of the court, were indispensable?

The result of an arbitration conducted under such auspices was to be feared. During its progress, and before the king's decision, he was stripped, by the revolution in Belgium, of the better half of his dominions. Had he been monarch of Holland alone, I think

I hazard nothing in saying, that, notwithstanding the confidence which Mr. Adams reposed in his personal character, he would not have been selected, with the concurrence of the late administration, as the sovereign arbiter. It was to an independent sovereign, one the extent of whose power and dominions placed him at the head of the second-rate states of the continent of Europe, that the controversy was submitted. It was not to the king of Holland, but to the king of Holland and Belgium, that the question was referred. It was to a monarch supposed to be unbiased, powerful, and independent, that the question was referred, and not to a sovereign, who, whilst he was arbitrating between Great Britain and the United States as to the territory of Maine, by the uncontrollable force of events found one half of his own dominions the subject of British arbitration or decision, in conjunction with the other allied powers.

By the loss of Belgium, the political character of the king was entirely changed, his identity altered, and he ceased to be that monarch, whose friendly arbitration had been solicited. Mr. Preble saw the matter in its true light, and expected to have been notified by the minister of foreign affairs of the king's declining to proceed in the arbitration. But he said nothing, and did nothing, to produce that result. Had Mr. Hughes been there, he would, by a suggestion or a hint, not at all offensive, (such as, whether the critical condition of his own domestic affairs did not afford sufficient occupation for his majesty, without troubling himself with the concerns of foreign governments, in which his own subjects had no interest,) have prevailed on the king to give up the papers; or, at least, to suspend proceeding in the arbitration until he could receive fresh instructions from his own government, adapted to the great event which had happened.

But nothing was done at the Hague or at Washington to arrest or suspend the progress of the arbitration. We have neither seen nor heard of any instructions from our secretary of state, founded on the event just mentioned. A senator (now in my eye) informed me, that he had conversed with the late secretary of state about the revolt of Belgium, and asked him, if it would not put a stop to the arbitration. To which the secretary answered, that he supposed of course it would; and yet, as far as we know, he gave no

instruction whatever in relation to that event!

Under all these circumstances, our surprise at the issue of the arbitration ought to be less than it otherwise would have been. If the king of the Netherlands had definitively decided the questions actually submitted to him, in consequence of the silent acquiescence of our government in the progress of the arbitration, the honor and faith of the nation might have bound us to submit to the decision, however unjust we deem it. But, Mr. President, I cannot concur with the committee of foreign relations, in considering the paper

communicated by the king of Holland to the two governments as containing a decision. It seems to me to express only the opinion of that monarch, as to what he thinks might be a suitable boundary, and to operate as a recommendation to the parties to adopt it; but leaving them, at the same time, at full liberty to adopt it or not, at their discretion. So far from being a decision, the king professes his inability to decide the question submitted to him, for reasons which he states, and he does not decide it, according to the terms of the submission.

Nor can I concur with that committee in believing, that we shall be in danger of incurring the reproaches of the world for not submitting to such an award, if award it can be called. I am quite sure, that the chairman of the committee of foreign affairs, or the present secretary of state, would be fully competent to make out an argument in behalf of the rights of Maine, that would fully vindicate them, and vindicate the course of government, from all reproaches, founded on noncompliance with the advice and recommendation of the sovereign arbiter.

Entertaining these sentiments, as a private citizen, I have no hesitation in expressing my opinion that the American government, disregarding, and declining to be bound by, the award, ought to open a negotiation with Great Britain on the subject of this disputed boundary. I have no apprehensions that such a step would, necessarily, bring on war. Great Britain might have adopted one of two courses; either to proceed to occupy the territory which the sovereign arbiter thinks it would be suitable for her to possess, and signified her determination to do so; or, to communicate to our government her willingness to be governed by the advice of the arbiter, and inquired as to the intentions, on that subject, of this government. The former course would have been harsh, and might have involved the two countries in war. The latter was more respectful, and, having been adopted by Great Britain, it will be natural and easy to return an answer to the diplomatic note which has been received, stating the grounds and arguments which induce the American government to believe itself not bound by what has been done by the king of Holland. Such an answer would be preliminary to a negotiation, which would necessarily follow. It is desirable, undoubtedly, to have all controversies between nations. settled, and amicably, if possible. But this is not the only question remaining to be decided between the two powers, and if that mutual respect and friendly disposition which, it is to be hoped, may predominate in the official intercourse between the two countries, should prevail, although the dispute, by the intervention of the Dutch king, has been somewhat complicated, we need not, I think, despair finally of some satisfactory arrangement.

These are my private views, Mr. President. But I think the president has come to the senate too soon, or come to it in a wrong

character. As a part of the executive government, I think the senate has nothing to do with the question, in the present state of it. Holding this opinion, I shall vote against the resolution reported by the committee of foreign affairs, and I shall vote against any other resolution or proposition which may imply or assume a power in the senate of the United States to act in the case. The president, it seems to me, is invested, exclusively, with the power of deciding, in the first instance, whether any and what obligations, if any, have been created upon the American government, in consequence of the act of the king of the Netherlands; and whether it be expedient or not to open a negotiation with Great Britain. And I think he should be left to his constitutional responsibility, to pursue such a course as a sense of duty may prompt.

ON PRESIDENT JACKSON'S VETO OF THE BILL TO

RECHARTER THE UNITED STATES BANK.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JULY 12, 1832.

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[THE charter of the bank of the United States, incorporated in 1816, expired by its limitation, in 1836. An act extending the charter, having passed the senate, by a vote of twenty-eight to twenty, and the house of representatives, by a vote of one hundred and five to eighty-three, was returned to the senate on the tenth of July, 1832, by president Jackson, with his objections at length, against signing the bill, and less than two thirds voting for its passage, it was rejected. On the twelfth, the veto message being under consideration, Mr. Clay delivered his sentiments in the following words.]

I HAVE Some observations to submit on this question, which I would not trespass on the senate in offering, but that it has some command of leisure, in consequence of the conference which has been agreed upon, in respect to the tariff.

A bill to recharter the bank, has recently passed congress, after much deliberation. In this body, we know that there are members enough who entertain no constitutional scruples, to make, with the vote by which the bill was passed, a majority of two thirds. In the house of representatives, also, it is believed, there is a like majority in favor of the bill. Notwithstanding this state of things, the president has rejected the bill, and transmitted to the senate an elaborate message, communicating at large his objections. The constitution requires that we should reconsider the bill, and that the question of its passage, the president's objections notwithstanding, shall be taken by ays and noes. Respect to him, as well as the injunctions of the constitution, require that we should deliberately examine his reasons, and reconsider the question.

The veto is an extraordinary power, which, though tolerated by the constitution, was not expected, by the convention, to be used in ordinary cases. It was designed for instances of precipitate legislation, in unguarded moments. Thus restricted, and it has been thus restricted by all former presidents, it might not be mischievous. During Mr. Madison's administration of eight years, there occurred but two or three cases of its exercise. During the