tled by decisions, though surprising, is not to be altered by courts of justice.-Queensberry Leases P. 344 Whether entails before the stat. 1449 are to be considered as odious or not, or whether the statute of 1685 is or is not to be considered as purging them of all odious qualities, it is clear that if the statute of 1685 authorizes the entail, and if the entail, by force of that statute, prohibits a tack of fifty-seven years as an alienation, the statute of 1449 cannot prevent the effect of the statute of 1685. The statute of 1449 does not afford any objection to the conclusion of law.-Ibid. - 395 A tenant in tail in England has an estate that may endure Since the whole fee, after the heir of tailzie is served heir, TAXES. According to the law of Scotland, as it existed formerly, in calculating the teinds, the estimate was made by looking only at the rent reserved, and no benefit was given in that valuation to those who were entitled to the teinds, with respect to any grassums that had been taken; but at a period long subsequent, the Court of Session having reconsidered the statutes, with reference to this matter of teinds, put a construction upon the words, "the rents of lands constantly paying," and held under these words, that a grassum was worth so much, with reference to the calculation of rent, and that instead of estimating the teinds by the rent reserved, they would take a proportion of the grassum, though the land did not constantly pay that grassum, and consider as the rent, ! not the rent which the land constantly paid, but the rent which they thought in justice they ought to consider it as paying between the persons entitled to the teinds and the landholder. Whether the Court of Session, after their predecessors, for nearly a century together, had said that the statute afforded the rule, and the words were what they were to go by, could give a construction which the words do not bear, in order to reach the justice of the case, quære.— Queensberry Leases p. 393, 394 From a particular period, long before the year 1600, and down to the year 1732, it was the constant doctrine, and the uniform decision of the Courts of Scotland with respect to teinds, that they were to be valued upon the rent constantly paid, and without reference to grassums taken by the person to whom that rent was constantly paid.-Ibid. 456 Yet in the year 1732, the Court of Session itself decided, that all this practice, and all these decisions, were not according to the law of Scotland.—Ibid. TERM OF YEARS. Vide HUSBAND AND WIFE. VALUE. Vide RENT. - ib. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. Vide CONTRACT. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. If a vendor agrees to make title to appurtenances and privileges, which do not belong to lands sold, his obligation rests only in covenant and agreement.-Paton v. Brebner, 65 It is the settled doctrine of English law, that if a lease be made of a house or an estate, the lessor having no title, and the instrument by which the lease is made, contain nothing more than words of demise, with a general covenant that the lessee shall enjoy the premises (that is as long as the relation of lessee and lessor continues): in such a case the lessee does not usually look into the lessor's title, but he takes a covenant, which binds the lessor that he shall have the enjoyment of the thing demised. If that lessee afterwards becomes the purchaser of the inheritance of the estate, the consequence is, that hav ing assumed the character of vendee, it becomes his duty to call upon the vendor to show that he can make a title to the inheritance, and as vendee he must investigate that title, which he takes or refuses, as he may be advised, from the person who, as lessor, had entered into an absolute covenant for his enjoying the premises in the relation of lessee; he can have no covenants, except such as belong to the title and interest vested in the individual, who, ceasing to be lessor, takes upon himself the new character of vendor. If he claims his estate under a will, the vendor covenants only against the acts of his devisor and himself. If he claims by descent, his covenant is adapted to that species of title; but inasmuch as he and those under whom he claims had taken the title at the hazard of limited covenants, he transmits the estate and title, with such limited covenants, from himself; and the relation of vendor and vendee, when acquired by conveyance of the inheritance, puts an end to the covenants, though ever so large and general, which existed between lessor and lessee.Paton v. Brebner p. 68, 69 There may be special agreements which might entitle the vendee to call for much larger covenants than those to which he is entitled under ordinary contracts; but accord. ing to the established principles of the law, unless there be such explicit terms in the contract, giving more than ordinary covenants, he is not entitled, in his relation of vendee, to covenants so express as those which he had in his relation of lessee.-Ibid. 69 Where a lessor warrants a privilege, which perhaps he cannot secure, and for the failure of which he must be answerable in damages if the lessees are disturbed in their enjoyment; if the inheritance has been purchased by the lessee, such a purchase may be so managed as to prevent a merger of the lease, but in the absence of special provision there will be a merger of the lease, and the lessee having become the purchaser, in law, has taken upon himself all the obligations by which the former owner of the inheritance had bound himself to his lessee; in other words, the quondam lessee, in his new character p. 75 of purchaser, would be the person to warrant to himself the liberties and privileges which the former lessor had agreed to assure to him as long as the old relation of lessor and lessee continued.-Paton v. Brebner The vendor may concede the advantage, which, by law, he derives from the new relation of vendor and vendee, and as the purchase was a matter of option, the vendor may warrant, at the risk of any damages which could be recovered against him, those liberties and privileges which he, as lessor, had agreed to give the lessee. But according to all laws which rest on principle, such a contract between vendor and vendee must be expressed in terms which are free from all doubt or ambiguity. The terms of a contract so special must indicate unequivocally what was the intention of the parties.— Ibid. - 76 Upon a contract for purchase of the inheritance, the parties may, by the specialties of their contract, preclude the application of that rule which governs such transactions between the vendor and vendee of an inheritance, that the vendee takes upon himself the relation of the vendor with respect to lessees, and as to the claims which the vendor had created, if the terms of the agreement expressly shut out the application of such a rule to the case. -Ibid. 83 The sale of a superiority of a 40s. land, of old extent, with warrandice, does not necessarily imply a warranty of a freehold qualification. (L. R.)—Hughes v. Gordon VOTE. Vide FRAUD. QUALIFICATION. VOYAGE, CHANGE OF. Vide INSURANCE. - 287 WARRANDICE. Vide CONTRACT. PLEADING. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. WARRANTY. Vide ENTAIL. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. Where a will has made the land personal estate, and in one part of that will the land is disposed of, and in another part the personal estate, if the will is not executed according to the statute, it is no will of land; but as a bequest of personalty does not require attestation, the will is good to that extent. WORDS. Vide ALIENATION. CLERGY. CONSTRUCTION. CROWN LANDS. PRACTICE. TEINDS. The word "sell" imports a gratuitous donation.-Queensberry Leases • p. 361 The words "annailzie" and "dispone" being coupled in sense are equivalent.-Ibid. ib. END OF VOL. I. Luke Hansard & Sons, near Lincoln's-Inn Fields. |