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to the equitable relief demanded. Brewer v. Marshall, ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DE19 N. J. Eq. 537, is oited by the respondent as requir
CISIONS. ing a different construction. The general rules in regard to such covenants are not stated differently in
ATTORNEYS - MISCONDUCT- DISBARMENT -- OFFERthat case; but in the opinion of the court, it was not
ING MONEY FOR TESTIMONY - PROCURING PERSON TO one for the interference of the court of equity.
| STEAL PAPERS — EVIDENCE.-An attorney, believing a Among many other cases, Tulk v. Moxhay, supru, 18 I certain paper to be a forgery, hired an expert to excited; and the learned court say: "It will be found,
amine it. The expert expressed his doubt as to the upou examination, that these decisions proceed upon
forgery; and the attorney, supposing that the expert the principle of preventing a party having knowledge
believed the paper a forgery, and only expressed a of the just rights of another from defeating such
doubt to extort money, offered him a large sum of rights, and not upon the idea that the engagements
money to testify in regard to the forgery. Held, that enforced create easements, or are of a nature to run such conduct was subject to criticism, but not surfiwith the land. In some of the instances the language | cient ground for disbarment. The respondent was of the court is very clear on this point." And from a charged with procuring one to steal a paper, but the “review of the authorities," the court say “it is en
only evidence against him was the testimony of the tirely satisfied that a court of equity will sometimes
party who lost the paper that the person who stole it impose the burden of a covenant relating to lands on
said that respondent had hired him to steal it. Held, the alienee of such lands, on a principle altogether that such statement was not evidence, and the reaside from the existence of an easement or the ca
spondent could not be disbarred on the charge. Howpacity of such covenant to adhere to the title." The
ever much it may be regretted, we know that experts only questiou which the court regarded as possessed
are often employed and paid 'arge sums for their serof difficulty was whether the covenant then in contro vices, and practically for their testimony; for it often versy was embraced within the proper limits of this
requires labor as well as skill to examine and deterbranch of equitable jurisdiction. By a divided court,
mine the question upon which an opinion is to be an injunction was denied. The circumstances were
giveu, aud sometimes to prepare an effective exhibit quite unlike those before us, and the decision furn
of the facts for the court. The money paid was unishes no precedent for us to follow. All concur, ex derstood by both parties to be for such services, aud I cept Peckham, J., not voting, and Andrews and Earl, | do not believe that Barnes thought that the money JJ., dissenting, on the ground that the covenant did would cause the witness to change his opinion or his not run with the land. Oct. 28, 1887. Hodge v. Sloan. evidence as to the genuineness of the signature. The Opinion by Danforth, J.
respondent knew, or thought he did, that the sigua.
ture was a forgery, aud he seems never to have ESTOPPEL - BY DEED.-A grantor cannot, after con
doubted that Gumpel was of the same opinion, and veying land, estop his grantees and their successors
he regarded, as he well might, the occasional argufrom denying the validity of an incumbrance on the
ments of the witness on the other side as mere intiland, by a certificate that such incumbrance is valid
mations that he wanted some money. Under such and binding on the land. A clause in a deed that the
circumstances, no doubt, it would have been more in title conveyed shall be “subject to all liens of mort
accordance with exalted ideas of propriety for Barues gages" on the land is not an admission, on the part of
to have denounced the witness and dismissed him, a subsequent purchaser, that a mortgage which such
but I doubt whether many practitioners would have purcbaser had herself sigued as wife of a former
acted very differently from the course of the respond. owyer is valid aud binding on the land. Juue 5, 1888.
ent. Lawyers meet and are compelled to contend Purdy v. Coar. Opinion by Finch, J.
with all sorts of people. They have in their hands the MASTER AND SERVANT - NEGLIGENCE — ASSUMP
interests of their client, and they should not permit TION OF RISK.--Plaintiff, who had been for some time
him to lose the benefit of important testimony upon a 'longshoreman, while loading defendant's vessel was
any refined ideas of propriety. Frequently witnesses thrown into the water and injured by the fall of the
whose testimony is essential know the value of their platform between the vessel and the dock. Accord
position, and too often attempt to realize upon it. It ing to plaintiff's evidence, it is the anty of 'longshore
is a trying thing for au attorney to be placed in a situmen to attend to the fastenings of the platform,
ation where he must deal with such a witness; and which is left loose on the shore side, and to regulate
while an honorable attorney would be careful to make the fastenings to the rise and fall of the tide. The
no payments or promises which could affect the truth. platform was in good order, and no neglect was showu
fuluess of the evidence, all would try to retain the on the part of defendant. Held, that plaintiff could
wituess, however much he would be compelled to denot recover. June 5, 1888. Hudson v. Ocean S. S. Co.
spise him. I have considered the matter entirely from Opiniou by Gray, J.
the stand-point of the respondent; and while I think
his conduct, according to his own testimouy, may MISTAKE — REFORMATION OF CONTRACTS - WAIVER. justly be criticised, I do not think it sufficient ground -In an action upon a written contract, where defend. | for a disbarment. Cal. Sup. Ct., March 2, 1888. In re ants allege a mistake in reducing the same to writing, Barnes. Opinion by Temple, J. but do not pray judgment for a reformation of the contract, the defect in the answer is waived, if not AUCTION-AUCTIONEER BIDDING FOR PURCHASER. raised until after the trial. In such case, if the facts, If an auctioneer, without the seller's assent, makes as found by the court, show that defendants were en bids for a purchaser, his conduct is fraudulent, and titled to a reformation of the contract, the technical the sale is not enforceable by the purchaser. Whether error of decreeing a dismissal of the bill instead of a Lif due notice was given that the auctioneer would bid reformation of the contract is not cause for remaud- | for an intending purchaser, and the sale was in other ing the case, but the decree will be modified to con respects unimpeachable, the seller would be estopped form to the findings. Where it is sought to reform a from objecting afterward to the sale is not decided. written instrument on the ground of mistake in re An autioneer is the agent of the seller in making the ducing the same to writing, there having been po mis. sale. When however the property is struck off, he betake in the contract as agreed upon, it is not necessary comes also the agent of the purchaser to the extent of to allege that the mistake was mutual. June 5, 1888. binding both parties by his memorandum of sale. Up Born v. Schrenkeisen. Opinion by Ear), J.
to this point his duty is to the vendor. Bateman Auo,
*20, *126, note (x). It is a well settled rule that a trus I BANKS--CONVERSION OF SPECIAL DEPOSIT-INSOI-
| and upon his discharge had left it, and his successor
bad used it, a verdict fuding him guilty of larceny “bonnet” in this country? What was its meaning on was not sustained by the evidence, although there March 3, 1883? The lexicons are of course the first was testimony that the former employer of the de- | authority to be consulted upon such a question. But feudaut bad accounted to him for the value of the bell I do not understand, under the decisions, that they in a settlement had between them, but which the de are the sole fountain of authority, and that the court fendant denied. The authorities are abundant that, | in deciding the question, is restricted to the precise when one takes property under a fair claim of right, it is definition used in any particular dictionary. Two pot larceny; and the publicity of the taking is very dictionaries are recognized as the standards for this powerful evidence to establish the bona fides of the country-Webster and Worcester. The edition of claim of right. There could hardly have been greater Worcester which has been put in evidence gives as the publioity, because this was done in an open street, first definition, “a cap or hat worn by men," with a pear the heart of the city, as we would infer from the quotation from Shakespeare in illustration, coupled evidence, and the ringing of the bell was loud enough | however with a sign indicating that it was obsolete at to be beard in adjacent streets; so the witnesses testi the time that edition of the dictionary was published, fied. It seems he made a sort of bell-ringing proclama which was in the year 1860. Webster's dictionary, tion that he was about to resume his ancient pos edition of 1865, does not contain any express statesession, and seemed to desire it to be known and ob ment that the word has become obsolete when used in served of all men; and that is a very strong circum- that sense; but the phraseology of the first definition stance in favor of the man's innocence. In addition which it gives is such as not necessarily to be in conto this be proved a good character for honesty and in flict with the statement in Worcester. It is: “A cap tegrity. He appears from this record to be a man of or covering for the head, in common use before theinexcellent standing for a colored man, and it is very troduction of hats, and still used by the Scotcb." probable that he is innocent of the crime of larceny; Whether or not that particular paragraph means that and we reverse the judgment and direct that the case the cap or covering was in common use, or that the be tried again. As to claim of right see 1 Hale P. C. | name of bonnet in that sense was in common use, is 509; 2 Russ. Crimes, 163; 2 Archb. Crim. Pl. & Pr. | not entirely clear-grammatically clear-upon the face 1183; 1 Whart. Crim. Law, $ 884: 1 Bish. Crim. Law, 1 of the paragraph. If there is no conflict between the $ 884; id., $ 297 ; id., $ 851. As to open taking see 1 | two authorities, then the statement in Worcester may Hale P. C. 509; 2 Russ. Crimes, 158; 2 East P. C. 661; be taken as conclusive. If however there is a con2 Bish. Crim. Law, 842, note 1: 2 Archb. Crim. Pl. & | flict between them, then the court must determine Pr. 1183, note 1. Ga. Sup. Ct.. Jan. 30, 1888. Causey | this question from its awn knowledge as to the use of v. State. Opinion by Bleckley, C. J.
the word. Three witnesses, and I do not refer to their CUSTOMS DUTIES-CLASSIFICATION-WOOL COVER
testimony as enlightening the court upou the meaning INGS FOR THE HEAD—" BONNETS.''- Articles made of
of the word, wor do I predicate my ruling upon their wool, knit ou frames, imported from Scotland, and
testimony, but I refer to it in illustration merelyused for a covering for the head, are properly assessed
tbree witnesses gave suggestive testimony upon this
point. Mr. Duulap sells a great many of these capsfor duty under the Tariff Act, par. 363, which reads: "Flannels, blankets, hats of wool, kuit goods, and all
imports and sells them--and buys them also, I pregoods made on knitting frames," etc., and not under
sume, from manufacturers here. He sells them on paragraph 400, which provides for duty on “bonnets,
the call of his customers as caps, except that Scotchhats and hoods for men, women and children, com
men have called and asked for a bonnet. Mr. Russell,
himself a Scotchman, kuows what & bonuet is : but posed of chip, grass, palm leaf," etc., as the word "bonnet" in the statute is not sufficiently broad, vor
though he has been in business here long, and sold such peculiar, technical trade-meaning coupled with
many of them, he testifies that no one here has asked it as to cover these goods. The first thing to be deter
for these goods, asking for them by the name of bone mined is the meaning of the word “bonnet." What
net. The other, a most important witness on that is its ordinary and received acceptation in the English
point, is the plaintiff himself. No one arriving in a language as used in this country, where Congress leg
strange city anywhere in this country, and wishing to iblates? What is its popular and received import?
purchase a Scotch cap, who should look over a busiSuch, under the decisions. is the question which is to
ness directory to find a shop at wbich to buy it, would be answered. Now it needed not a reference to the
go to a person who advertised himself as a dealer in
bonnets. The plaintiff seems to have recoguized that quotations which were read here on this trial to sat
fact fully, for upon bis sign he described himself as au isfy us all that heretofore, at the time when the Bible
importer of Scotch caps. U.S. Cir. Ct., S. Dist. N. Y., was translated, at the time when Shakespeare wrote his
Jan. 12, 1888. Toplitz v. Hedden. Opinion by Laplays, at the time that Walter Scott wrote his novels, and to-day even, in norels, narratives or poems de
combe, J. scriptive of Scotch life--the word “bonnet" was and
INFANCY – AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACT -- RECOVERY is used as meaning and including a cover for the head. | OF CONSIDERATION.-An infant may, before or on arIs it in use in that sense however now-by now, I mean riving at age, disaffirm a purchase of personalty, other March 3, 1888-in this country? Several lexicons and
than necessaries, made by him during his minority, of clopædias published in England aud in Scotland | and recover back the consideration paid, without rehave been referred to, but I suppose there is no better storing the property sold and delivered him, where it authority upon the English language to-day, so far as I
has been taken from him, whether rightfully or not, it goes-for the first volume oviy is out--than the Eng
upon an execution against a third person. In such lish dictionary published under the auspices of the case he is not required, as a condition of his right to Philological Society, and edited by Mr. Murray. That | recover, to take any steps to recover tbe property dictionary, under the definition of “bonnet," de-| taken from him. It is sufficieut in such case that the scribes it as a “head dress of men and boys, usually property ceases to be in his possession or subject to soft, and distinguished from the bat by want of a his control. The true doctrine now seems to be that Drim; in England superseded in common use appar- | the contract of an infant is in no case absolutely void. ently before 1700 by cap. but retaiaed in Scotland: | 1 Pars. Cont. 295, 348; Pol. Cout. 36; Harner V. Dinhence sometimes treated as equivalent to a Scotoh ple, 31 Ohio St. 72; Williams V. Moor, 11 Mees. & W. cap.” That seems to be the Englisb authority on the 256. An infant may, as a general rule, disaffirm any use of the term. But it is not its use in England which contract into which he has entered; but until he does concerns us here. What is the meaning of the word so, the contract may be said to subsist, capable of be.
ing made absolute by affirmance, or void by disaffirm- the right of the plaintiff to recover; but a careful ex.
- NEGLIGENCE — PRESUMPTION. - Between the the case of an adult, the ground being minority, inde
ages of seren and fourteen a child is prima facie pendent of questions of fraud or mistake. But in all
incapable of being guilty of contributory negligence: else the general doctrine of rescission is departed
hence, in an action to recover damages for injury from no further than is necessary to preserve the
done to such a child, a demurer to the complaint, on grounds upon which the priviiege is allowed; and is
the ground that it does not allege that the child was governed by the maxim that infancy is a shield and
free from negligence, is bad. Ala. Sup. Ct., Feb. 2, not a sword. He is not in all cases, as is an adult, re
1888. Pratt Coal & Iron Co. v. Brawley. Opinion by quired to restore the opposite party to his former con
Clopton, J. dition; for it he has lost or squandered the property received by him in the transaction that he rescinds, INSURANCE-SOCIETIES-STATUS OF.-A corporation and so is unable to restore it, he may still disaffirm organized to provide for its members during life, and the contract and recover back the consideration paid their families after death, provided in its constituby him without making restitution; for if it were tion and by-laws for the payment to the member at otherwise, his privilege would be of little avail as | death of a certain sum in consideration of the payshield against the inexperience and improvidence of ment of a membership fee and certain future assessyout. But when the property rescinded by him from ments. Every candidate was obliged to be examined the adult is in his possession, or under his control, to by a physician and found to be in good health before permit him to rescind, without returning it or offer. becoming a member. The officers and agents of the ing to do so, would be to permit him to use his privi. corporation received good salaries. Held, that the lege as a sword, rather than as a shield. This view is organization was not a corporation for benevolent pursupported, not only by reason, but by the greater poses, but was an insurance company, and subject to weight of authority. It was recognized and applied | all the provisions relating to such companies. This by this court in Cresinger v. Welch, 15 Ohio, 156, deci. contract has all the features of a life insurance policy. ded in 1846. The following is the language used by | It is a contract by which one party, for a consideraMr, Tyler ou the subject: "If the contract has been tion, promises to make a eertain payment of money executed by the adult, and the infant has the property | upon the death of the other; and it is well settled or consideration received at the time he attains full that whatever may be the terms of payment of the age, and he then repudiates the transaction, he must consideration by the assured, or the mode of estimatreturn such property or consideration or its equiva- ing or securing payment of the iusurance money, it is lent to the adult party. If however the infant has still a contract of insurance, no matter by what name wasted or squandered the property or consideration, it may be called. Com. v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 149; received during infancy, and on coming of age repudi. State v. Benevolent Ass'n, 18 Neb. 281. It is in effect ates the transaction, the adult party is remediless." the ordinary contract made by insurance companies He then adds that “there are expressions of judges with the assured, differing from it in no important reand text writers against the latter proposition, but," spect. The terms of payment are somewhat different, he says, "the weight of authority is in harmony with the amount being greater or less according as the it, and is decidedly in accord with the general princi- member lives long or dies early; still it is a payment ples of law for the protection of infants." Tyler Iul. | to be made at his death. The assured cannot be (2d ed.) 80, and cases cited by the author. See also the forced by suit to pay future premiums; but he loses case of Price v. Furman, 27 Vt. 268, and the notes his membership if he defaults in this respect. It is a thereto of Mr. Ewell, in his Leading Cases on Infancy common provision in insurance policies that if the as& Coverture, 119. After an exhaustive review of the sured fails to perform some of the conditions of this cases, this author says: “The true doctrine, and the contract, that his policy may be cancelled, and the one supported by the weight of authority (at least in premiums paid shall in that event become forfeited to the United States), would seem tu be that when an in the company. The provision that membership may be faut disaffirms his executed contract, after arriving at | forfeited for non-payment of assessments is in effect age, and seeks a recovery of the consideration moving the same thing; for the assessments serve the purposes from him, and whero the specific consideration re- of premiums in an ordinary life policy. The examinaceived by him remains in his hands, in specie at the tiou too which precedes admission into membership is time of disaffirmance, and is capable of return, it the same as that which occurs before the issuance of must be returned by him; but if he has during in- I a policy, and is intended to secure the society against fancy wasted, sold or otherwise disposed of, or ceased | fraud or imposition; to prevent an unsound person to possess the consideration, and bas none of it iu his from becoming insured, and to reduce its risks of loss hands in kind on arriving at majority, he is not liable and increase its chances of profit. It matters not that therefor, and may disaffirm without tendering or ac the member was entitled to benefits in case of sickcounting for such consideration." This statement of 1 ness. Insurance can be effected upon the health as the law, supported, as it is, not only by the greater | well as the life of an individual. These benefits too weight of authority, but also of reason, meets with are incidental to the main object of the institution, our full approval. There is however much conflict in and the certificates issued by it are noue the less polithe decisions of the different States; greater perhaps cies of insurance, though the insured derive sums of than upon any other question connected with the law | money from the contract other than those for which of infancy (Metc. Cont. 76); but we deem it unneces he has specially bargained. We are of opinion theresary to attempt to review or discuss them, for the fore that appellants constituted an insurance comvery good reason that it has been done with thorough- pany within the spirit and true meaning of tha: term, ness and ability by the authors just referred to. See | and not an association conducted in the interest of also the notes of Mr. Ewell to the recent case of benevolence, as contemplated by title 20 of our ReAdams v. Beall, decided by the Maryland Court of vised Statutes. This question has been frequently beAppeals, 26 Am, Law Reg. 710. We have been cited fore the courts of other States, and so far as we can by counsel for the defendant below to a number of ascertain has been universally decided in accordance the previous decisions of this court, supposed to affect | with the opinion above expressed. In Bolton v. Bol
ton, 73 Me. 299, the subject underwent thorough iu | to its tenor, if the acceptance be absolute. It is in vestigatiou, and an institution, with purposes similar substance an agreement to pay the sum of money to the present, was held to be a mutual life insurance specified in the bill as therein directed. I Chit. Bills, company. In State v. Critchett, 32 N. W. Rep. 787, the 281; Story Bills, $ 238; 1 Pars. Notes, 281. No parSupreme Court of Minnesota held a company formed ticular words, or form of words, or manner are necesby married men for the purpose of endowing the wife sary to a valid acceptance, but it sbould generally be of each member upon marriage with a sum of money in writing, because this is orderly, promotes the conequal to the then number of members, not to be a be venience of business transactions, renders them more nevolent association. The members paid quid pro quo, certain, and facilitates the proof of acceptance. Writand did not receive their money as an act of benevo ing however is not essential in the absence of statulence on the part of their fellow members. In State tory regulation requiring it. The acceptance may be v. Benevolent Ass'u, supra, A society with a constitu. verbal or in writing. Either method is valid, but it tion like the present, was held an insurance company must appear by express words or reasonable implicawithin the meaning of a statute similar to our own. tion. The intention of the acceptor to pay the bill The benefits received are not gratuitous. They are due must clearly appear, in whatever manner evinced. to the member on account of the money he pays into the Usually the donee makes his acceptance by writing society. It takes the risk of his continued existence his name across the face of the bill, and just over it and good health. Jf it be benevolent to pay one money the word "Accepted : " but it may be made by any under such circumstances, then every mutual life in word or phraseology implying substantially the same gurance company is acting in a benevoleut manner thiug. Any words used by the drawee to the drawer toward the family of an insured member when it pays or holder, or the agent of either, which by reasonable the policy it had issued thereon for a moneyed con intendment signify that he honors (the bill (will pay sideration. It matters not what name the association it) will amount to an acceptance. And though he may may assume. The law looks to the real objects of the not, on presentment of the bill, accept at once, if he body, and not to the name indicative of benevolence afterward does so, this will be sufficient to bind him, which it may bave assumed. These views will be found although the holder would have the right to insist supported by the following authorities, in addition to upon prompt acceptance according to the terms of the those already cited : May Ins., $ 550; State v. Citizens' bill. N. C. Sup. Ct., Feb. 21, 1888.' Short v. Blount. Ass'n, 6 Mo. App. 163; State v. Merchants', etc., Opinion by Merrimon, J. Ass'n, 72 Mo. 146; People v. Wilson), 46 N. Y. 477; NEW TRIAL -- MISCONDUCT OF JURY - DRINKING State v. Life Ass'n, 38 Ohio St. 281. Iu some of the WITH PARTY.-During the progress of the trial of the States these societies have been exempted by special cause in the District Court, while the court had ad#tatute from the requirements exacted of other insur journed for dinner, the defendant took two certain ance companies. In Illinois a special statute which members of the jury in said cause, who were engaged in provides that “associations intended to benefit wid- | trying the same, into a public liquor saloon, and treated ows, orphans, heirs and devisees of deceased members, them to intoxicating liquor, which was then and there and when no annual dues are required, and where the drunk by said jurors. Held, that the verdict be set members receive no money or profit or otherwise, shall | aside and a new trial granted. One of the earliest not be deemed insurance companies." Heuce it is of | American cases involving a question of this character course held in that State that a society with the fea. is that of People v. Douglass, 4 Cow. 26, which was tures prescribed, and lacking in those excepted by the | tried in 1825. The facts out of which the question statute, is not an insurance company. It is admitted arose iu that case were as follows: "The trial comthat without such a statute they would be included in menced on the 11th of January; at about 2 P. M. the the general sense of that term. League v. People, 90 jury had liberty to retire from the box, under the Ill. 166. In Ohio a statute declares that such associa charge of two sworn constables, and the direction of tions shall in no mavner be subject to the laws of the the court to keep together and return speedily. This State relating to life insurance companies. Hence the was before the trial was coucluded. The jury re. decisions of that State are inapplicable to the present tired to consider their verdict about 11 P. M., and recase. State v. Protection Ass'u, 26 Ohio St. 19. The turned a verdict of guilty about 4 the next morning. decision in Com. v. Aid Ass'n, 94 Peun. St. 481, is ex After the conviction a motion was made * * * for pressly founded upon a statute of similar character. a new trial, on the ground that two of the jurors, Aud we think this will be found to hold true as to all while out under the care of the constables, separated cases, which hold such societies exempt from statu from their fellows, ate, drank whisky, put cakes in tory provisions as to other insurance companies. See their pockets, and conversed with by-standers on the Supreme Council v. Fairman, 62 How. Pr. 386; State subject of the trial.” A new trial being refused, the v. Bankers' Ass'n, 23 Kaus. 499. Tex. Sup. Ct., Jan. case was brought to the Court of Errorg. In deliver31, 1888. Farmer v. State. Opinion by Willie, C. J. ing the opinion of the court, Woodworth, J., said:
"Clearly we should disregard the fact of eating as NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — ACCEPTANCE - WHAT forming any ground for setting aside the verdict; for CONSTITUTES.-The drawee of an order, on present though this might be a contempt of court, being withment and demand, after taking time to consider, told out their leave, yet an opportunity to take reasonable the payee, “ I think there will be money enough to refreshments would always be granted at a proper seapay you, and it will be all right, and I will pay it." son; and the circumstance of their being obtained On another occasion the payee's ageut asked the somewhat irregularly could not prejudice the prisoner. drawee about the order, and he said he “would not But here the doubt is whether there was not further pay it that afternoon; but tell Short (the payee) it is abuse in drinking spirituous liquors. This should not all right, and I will pay it;" and the agent so in be tolerated in any shape in the jury during the proformed payee. Held, that these words, though not in gress of the trial; and we have uniformly held that it writing, in absence of a statute requiring written ac
vitiated the verdict in a civil cause, even where the ceptances, constituted a valid acceptance. By the ac
liquor was given to the jury by consent. It will not ceptance of a bill of exchange is meant the act or
I do to weigh and examine the quantity which may declaration by which the drawee therein named
have been taken by the jury, nor the effect produced." evinceg.-makes iranifest-hig assent and agreement
etc. A new trial was granted. The case of Brant v. to comply with, and be bound by the request and
Fowler, Cow. 502, was a civil case before the same order contained in the bill directed to him, according court two years later. Ou the trial, after the judge