tites of those who crave and the greed of those who sell the hellish potion. IN NOTES OF CASES. 6 Penn. St. 404, to discuss at some length the question of privileged communications. I do not propose to go over the same ground again. It is sufficient to refer to the conclusions arrived at in that case. It was there said that a communication to be privileged must be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or proper cause. When so made in good faith, the law does not imply malice from the communication itself, as in the ordinary case of libel. Actual malice must be proved before there can be a recovery. And whether a communication be privileged or not is a question for the court, not the jury.' And tested by this rule, we are of opinion that the article in question is privileged, not absolutely, but in a qualified sense; in that sense however which makes it the duty of the court to instruct the jury that it is privileged, and that because of such privilege, no presumption, etc., of malice arises from the mere fact of publication, but malice must be proved as a fact in the cause before the plaintiff can recover. If we are asked why this article is so privileged, I answer, because it was proper for public information. This plaintiff was holding himself out to the world as a teacher and guide of youth. He was seeking to attract them to his place by signs, placards, and advertisements, some of them, at least, of an extraordinary nature. This gave him a quasi public character. Whether he was a proper person to instruct the young, and whether his school was a proper place for them to receive instruction, were matters of importance to the public, and the Press was in the strict line of its duty when it sought such information and gave it to the public; and if that information tended to show that the plaintiff was a charlatan and his system an imposture, the more need that the public, and especially parents and guardians, should be informed of it. Aside from this, we do not regard the article as a libel. At most, it is a harmless bit of pleasantry in which the reporter has succeeded in making himself somewhat ridiculous. The matter has been very much magnified, and an importance attached to it which it does not deserve. An actionable libel cannot be created out of nothing." [N Press Co. v. Stewart, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, April 9, 1888, the publication claimed to be libelous appeared in an issue of defendant's daily paper, and was as follows: "A School for Reporters. How Col. Stewart Proposes to Manufacture City Editors. On the north-east corner of Thirteenth and Market streets there is a building. On the third story of the building there is located the office of the School of Clerks, Salesmen and Reporters.' A green and innocent Press reporter, with a bucketful of trade dollars, (in his mind's eye) climbed up three flights of stairs yesterday afternoon to have a talk with the proprietor of the school.. Col. Stewart, the principal, was seated in a 6 x 8 ante-room north of the school. He was not particularly enthusiastic over the prospect of the school's' prosperity, or the visitor's chances of becoming a bloated millionaire. Are you a short-hand writer?' was the first question he asked. 'No, sir,' replied the visitor. Do you wish to become a salesman?' 'No, sir.' 'Are you after a position as amanuensis in a mercantile house?' No; I would like to be a reporter.' 'Well,' said Col. Stewart, as he tugged at his beard, 'the school is intended as a place where persons can learn short-hand, type-writing, and phono-scribbling." But,' ventured the visitor, can not a man become a reporter without understanding short-hand? Is that a requisite?' 'For sermons and speeches it is,' was the reply. The class of reporters you refer to are known as city editors; they are all gentlemen of high education and are generally graduates of colleges. Newspapers are besieged constantly by applicants for such positions. These men are not reporters; they are city editors; there are about three dozen of them in the city.' 'Oh!' said the reporter. 'Yes,' continued Col. Stewart, 'it requires a vast amount of experience to become a city editor. You must be well educated and have a general knowledge of 'Suppose,' interrupted the green reporter, 'that a reporter is sent to a fire in a large pretzel establishment, must he 'Certainly,' responded Col. Stewart, of course he must. It requires men of classical education. We do not pretend to instruct applicants for such positions. The school teaches short-hand and type-writing and phono-scribbling, but a change is to be made here shortly. I would advise you to consult with Mr. Kerr, who will take charge in a few days. Mr. Kerr has an office on Walnut street. He is twenty-four years of age He will tell-Ta, ta,' said the applicant. So long,' responded Col. Stewart. 'If you want to learn any of the branches, $20 a quarter,-goodbye!'" The court charged that the jury might infer malice from the article in question. The court said: "We had occasion in Briggs v. Garrett, 111 years, In Teachout v. Des Moines Broad-Gauge St. Ry. Co., Iowa Supreme Court, May 17, 1888, it was held that a city ordinance, which confers upon a company power to construct street-car lines, and provides that "such tracks shall be operated with animal power only," and that the city shall not, until after thirty "confer upon any person or corporation any privileges which will impair or destroy the rights and privileges herein granted," does not preclude the city from granting another company the right to operate lines by other means than animal power, as electricity. The court said: "It seems to us, keeping in mind the fundamental rule that corporations are invested with such powers only as are expressly conferred upon them, and such other powers as are necessary to carry out those expressly granted, there is little ** room for discussion or debate as to the powers conferred upon the Narrow-Gauge Company by this ordinance. It has the exclusive right to operate its railways by animal power; and it has no more right❘ to interpose objections to the building and operation of other street railroads, to be operated by other power, than if no grant of power has ever been made to it. * It is strenuously contended that the granting of the right to operate other street cars will necessarily impair the rights of the Narrow-Gauge Company by diminishing its revenue, which is derived from the carriage of passengers. Perhaps this argument is sufficiently answered by the thought, that when the city made the contract, based upon this ordinance, the parties thereto were dealing with the known, and not with the unknown. It may well be questioned whether the city had any power to contract that no other means of public travel should be allowed upon the streets of the city except by cars drawn by horses for the period of thirty years. If so, the establishment of hack lines or omnibus lines, or other means of public conveyance, would impair the revenue of the Narrow-Gauge Company, and thus impair its rights under this ordinance. Its right is to operate a horse-railroad. It is entitled to the exclusive right to do so, and to use all improvements that may be made thereto; but to nothing more. The city cannot impair that right; but it does not follow that it may not authorize other means of street travel. It did not undertake to confer upon the company the right to carry all the passengers who might desire to travel by public conveyance upon the streets; and it did not, by the ordinance, contract that new and improved and undiscovered methods of travel might not be adopted as the public wants might demand. This ordinance and contract were made by the city in behalf of the public, and it should not be so construed as to fetter and prevent the right to use new methods and appliances, the result of the inventive genius of the age, or to apply the discovery and application of the latent powers of nature to the use of man. As well might the chartered owner of a rope-ferry have insisted, years ago, that his exclusive right to that method of transportation prevented the right to charter a ferry propelled by steam when that element of nature was discovered as a propelling power. As sustaining these views, see Gas-light Co. v. City of Saginaw, 28 Fed. Rep. 529; Railway Co. v. Tramway Co., 30 id. 324; Bridge v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116." In Blackwood v. Cutting Packing Co., California Supreme Court, May 19, 1888, the court said: "The first question is whether there was any warranty. The defendant relies upon section 1768 of the Civil Code, which is as follows: Sec. 1769. One who agrees to sell merchandise not then in existence thereby warrants that it shall be sound and merchantable at the place of production contemplated by the parties, and as nearly so at the place of delivery as can be secured by reasonable care.' The plaintiff contends in the first place that apricots are not 'merchandise.' A walk through the markets would probably convince him that he is mistaken. It is said however that such fruit comes under the head of produce.' Very likely it does. But we think the word 'merchandise' is used in the above section in a larger sense, and covers all kinds of personal property which is ordinarily bought and sold in the market. Whether it covers more than that need not be decided in this case. This point of plaintiff is not unlike saying that a promissory note between farmers is not a negotiable instrument because such an instrument is a creation of the law between 'merchants."" In Chapman v. Withers, 20 Q. B. Div. 824, a horse was sold, warranted quiet to ride, but to be returned on the second day after the sale if not corresponding to warranty, and if not so returned no action to be maintainable for a breach. The horse fell while being ridden, and was so injured that he could not safely be returned on the second day, but plaintiff notified the seller on that day that he was not as warranted and unfit to travel. Held, the non-return was no bar to an action on the warranty. Lord Coleridge said: "It became useless, and a mere mass of flesh and bones. To send back the carcass reduced to that state would have been futile. The learned counsel could hardly have contended that if the horse had been killed outright by the accident the dead body must nevertheless have been returned." That defendant could not say, the galled jade wince, my withers are unwrung." "Let CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY BOYCOTTING. VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS, MAY 24, 1888. CRUMP V. COMMONWEALTH. A conspiracy to boycott is criminal. Rufus A. Ayers, attorney-general, and Wm. L. Royall, for Commonwealth. THIS C. V. Meredith and George D. Wise, for defendants. HIS is a writ of error to a judgment of the Hustings Court of the city of Richmond, rendered on the 23d day of May, 1887. FAUNTLEROY, J. The plaintiff in error, W. F. Crump, was on the 28th day of September, 1886, indicted for a criminal conspiracy by a grand jury impanelled in the said court. The indictment was against the said Crump and others-his co-conspirators; and it contained two counts. A general demurrer was filed to the indictment, and to each count thereof, which was sustained as to the second count, but was overruled as to the first count, which charges that "there is, and for more than twelve months last past there has been, in the city of Richmond a certain trades-union or association, called and known as Richmond Typographical Union, No. 90; that there is in said city and has been for more than twelve months last past a mercantile firm or partnership composed of G. H. Baughman, E. A. Baughman and C. C. Baughman, who do business under the firm name and style of Baughman Brothers as printers and stationers; that there is in the said oity and has been for more than twelve months last past another trades-union or labor association called the Knights of Labor; that the said partnership of Baughman Brothers have a lawful right to follow and pursue their said business as printers and stationers without being molested or interfered with by any one so long as they peaceably pursue the same according to the laws of the land; that the trades-union or association called Richmond Typographical Union, No. 90, is composed of about one hundred members, most of whom are to the grand jurors unknown; that the said trades-union or labor association called the Knights of Labor is composed of several thousand members, most of whom are to the grand jurors unknown; that Joseph M. Shelton, G. Waddy Wilde and W. F. Crump are members of said trades-union or association called Richmond Typographical Union, No. 90, and W. H. Mullen, James A. Healy, J. M. Lewis, Perry Jones and J. H. Schonberger are members of said tradesunion or labor association called Knights of Labor; that within twelve months last past-to-wit, on the 4th day of February, 1886, and on many days thereafter the said G. Waddy Wilde, Joseph M. Shelton and W. F. Crump, together with all the other members of the said trades-union or association called Richmond Typographical Union, No. 90, and W. H. Mullen, James A. Healy, J. M. Lewis, Perry Jones and J. H. Schonberger, together with all the other members of the said trades-union or labor association called the Knights of Labor, who are to the grand jurors unknown, with force and arms, at the said city, and within the jurisdiction of the said Hustings Court, well knowing the facts herein before averred, didfunlawfully, maliciously, wickedly and corruptly, knowingly and intentionally combine, conspire and confederate together to injure, ruin, break up and destroy the said G. H. Baughman, E. A. Baughman and C. C. Baughman, trading as Baughman Brothers, in their said business as printers and stationers as aforesaid, by unlawfully, wickedly, maliciously and corruptly, knowingly and intentionally making threats to a great number of persons-to-wit, to H. J. Meyers, a member of a mercantile firm in said city, trading as Slater, Myers & Co., which firm is composed of William L. Slater, Herman J. Myers and John S. Wade; to William F. Seymore, a member of a mercantile firm in said city, trading as J. H. Griffith & Co., which firm is composed of J. H. Griffith & Co., and William F. Seymore; to Luke Harvey, a member of a mercantile firm in said city, trading as Ellison & Harvey, which firm is composed of William Ellison, Luke Harvey and Fred. L. Swift; to G. A Lathrop, a member of a mercantile firm in said city, trading as G. A. Lathrop & Co., which firm is composed of the said G. A. Latbrop and to many other persons to the grand jurors unknown -all of whom had theretofore been regular customers of the said firm of Baughman Brothers-that if they, the said H. J. Myers, W. F. Seymore, Luke Harvey, G. A. Lathrop, or their said mercantile firms as above named, or other persons to the grand jurors unknown, thereafter bought anything from the said firm of Baughman Brothers, or employed the said Baughman Brothers in their said business as printers, they, the said Wilde, Shelton, Crump and all the members of the said trades-union or association called Richmond Typographical Union, No. 90, and they, the said Mullen, Jones, Lewis, Healy and Schonberger, and all the other members of the said trades-union or labor association called the Knights of Labor, would do all in their power to break up and destroy the business of the said H. J. Myers, W. F. Seymore, Luke Harvey, G. A. Lathrop, and their said mercantile firms as above named, and many other persons to the grand jurors unknown, who had theretofore been cus tomers of the said Baughman Brothers, and by and through said threats they, the said Crump, Wilde, Shelton, Mullen, Lewis, Healy, Jones and Schonberger, and all the other members of the said tradesunion or association called Richmond Typographical Union, No. 90, and all the other members of the said trades-union or labor association called the Knights of Labor, did, then and there, by reason of said threats, drive off, hinder, deter and prevent the said H. J. Myers, W. F. Seymore, Luke Harvey, G. A. Lathrop and their said mercantile firms as above named and many other persons to the grand jurors unknown, who had theretofore been customers of the said Baughman Brothers, from buying any thing from or from dealing with in any way, or from employing as printers the said firm or partnership of G. H. Baughman, E. A. Baughman and C. C. Baughman, doing business as Baughman Brothers as aforesaid; and they did then and there, by their said unlawful, malicious, wicked and corrupt threats, and by their said unlawful acts as hereinbefore set forth, do a serious injury to the business of the said Baughman Brothers, against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Virginia." The defendant, W. F. Crump, thereupon pleaded not guilty; and electing to be tried separately, he was so tried, and the jury, on the 13th day of May, 1887, found him guilty by their verdict and fined him $5, which verdict the court, upon motion of the defendant, refused to set aside and grant a new trial, but approved the said verdict and entered up the judgment here complained of. Upon the trial the defendant excepted to the rulings of the court, giving the instruction asked for by the Commonwealth, and refusing to give the instructions asked for by him, and he also excepted to the overruling by the court of his motion to set aside the verdict and grant to him a new trial. The first error assigned is the action of the court in overruling the demurrer to the first count of the indictment. It is objected that the indictment does not charge a conspiracy to do any unlawful act, and does not particularly state the means to be used by the conspirators to break up and destroy the business of Baughman Brothers, and show that the means to be used were unlawful. The objection cannot be sustained; it is wholly groundless and gratuitous, as is plainly manifest by the first count in the indictment (which we have purposely set out in full), to which the defendant pleaded, and upon which the issue was made up and tried, and under which the defendant was found guilty. It charges directly that the defendant and others did unlawfully and maliciously, wickedly and corruptly, knowingly and intentionally combine, conspire and confederate together to injure, ruin, break up and destroy Baughman Brothers in their business as printers and stationers;" and that they did this by unlawfully, wickedly, maliciously, knowingly, intentionally and corruptly making threats to a great number of persons mentioned and others unknown to the grand jurors, all of whom had been and were at the time regular customers and patrons of the said Baughman Brothers; and that they did then and there, by their said unlawful, malicious, wicked and corrupt threats, and by their said unlawful acts, as hereinbefore set forth, do a serious injury to the business of the said Baughman Brothers, and a still greater injury to the peace, dignity and good name of the Commonwealth of Virginia, to the evil example of all her people. This specially and exactly charges a criminal conspiracy unprovoked, wanton and unlawful, both as to the end aimed at and the means used to accomplish it. It charges a combination of this defendant and his co conspirators to ruin, break up and destroy the busi ness of Baughman Brothers; and it charges the means used and the success of the unlawful endeavor operated upon the peaceful and honest industries of the customers and patrons of Baughman Brothers. A conspiracy or combination to injure a person in his trade or occupation is indictable. In the case of Rex v. Eccles, 1 Leach, 274, several persons were indicted for conspiring to impoverish a tailor and to prevent him by indirect means from carrying on his trade. They were convicted, and upon a motion in arrest of judgment it was objected (as in this case) that the indictment ought to have stated the acts that were committed to impoverish the tailor aud prevent him from carrying on his trade in order that the defendants might thereby have had notice of the particular charges they were called upon to answer. But Lord Mansfield, without hearing the prosecution, said: The conspiracy and object of it are both stated in the indictment, but it is contended that the means by which the intended mischief was effected ought also to have been particularly set forth, as in the case of Rex v. Sterling; but this is certainly not necessary, for the offense does not consist in doing the acts by which the mischief is effected-for they may be perfectly indifferent-but in conspiring with a view to effect the intended mischief by any means. The illegal combination is the gist of the offense." Buller, J., said: "The indictment states that the defendants, intending, unlawfully and by indirect means, to impoverish the prosecutor, unlawfully did conspire, etc. But nothing need to have been stated about the means, for the means are matter of evidence, to prove the charge and not the crime itself. The indictment therefore rather states too much than too little." This case was under consideration in the recent case of Mogul Steamship Company v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 15 Q. B. Div. 476, decided in 1885, when Lord Coleridge, C. J., said of the case: "It seems to both of us to be within the principle of an old case decided by Lord Mansfield, the King v. Eccles, 1 Leach, 200, 274, 276, * * and so far as I know, the case itself is as good law now as when Lord Mansfield enunciated it, and could be upheld at the present day. It seems to me also to be within the principle neatly stated by Tindal, C. J., in the Queen v. O'Connell, 11 Clark and F. 334, as to what is evidence necessary to make out conspiracy; and also of the opinion of Lord Fitzgerald in the case of Regina v. Parnell. The Times of January 25-26, 1881. If the judgment of the learned judge is correct-and I do not mean to intimate the slightest doubt as to its correctness-that a conspiracy to do the thing which has been called by the name of boycotting is unlawful and an indictable offense; and if so, then a thing for which an action will lie, an action may well lie for that which is complained of here." "A combination is a conspiracy in law, whenever the act to be done has a necessary tendency to prejudice the public or to oppress individuals by unjustly subjecting them to the power of the confederates and giving effect to the purposes of the latter, whether of extortion or mischief." Wharton's Crim. Law, vol. 3, § 23, 22 (6th ed.). In section 2304 of same writer it is said the unlawful purpose may be "some object of the confederation which it would be unlaw. ful for them to attain either singly, or which, if lawful singly, it would be dangerous to the public to be attained by the combination of individual means." See 3 Greenl. Ev., § 90. In the case of Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Cox C. C., Baron Bramwell said: "The liberty of a man's mind and will, to say how he should bestow himself and his means, his talents and his industry, was as much a subject of the law's protection as was that of his body," and "if any set of men agree among themselves to coerce that liberty of mind and thought by combination and restraint they would be guilty of # a criminal offense-namely, that of conspiring against the liberty of mind and freedom of will of those towards whom they conducted themselves. He was referring to coercion and compulsion, something that was unpleasant and annoying to the mind operated upon, and he laid it down as clear and undoubted law that if two or more persons agreed that they would by such means co-operate together against that liberty, they would be guilty of an indictable offense. The public had an interest in the way in which a person disposes of his industry and his capital; and if two or more persons conspired, by threats, intimidation or molestation to deter or influence him in the way he should employ his industry, his talents or his capital, they would be guilty of a criminal offense. This was the common law of the land," etc. In the case of State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. L. 157, it was held to be "an indictable conspiracy for several employees to combine and notify their employer that unless he discharged certain enumerated persons they will in a body quit his employment." In his opinion in that case Chief Justice Beasley said: "There are a number of cases in which neither the purpose intended to be accomplished nor the means designed to be used were criminal, which have been regarded to be criminal," quoting State v. Norton, 3 Zab. 44; and citing Rex v. Lord Gray, 3 Hargrave's State Trials, 519; Rex v. Sir Francis Deleval, 3 Burr. 1434, he says: "These are all cases, it will be noticed, in which the act which formed the foundation of the indictment would not in law have constituted a crime, if such act had been done by an individual, the combination being alone the quality of the transaction which made them respectively indictable." "The purpose designed to be accomplished becomes punitive, as a public offense, solely from the fact of the existence of a confederacy to effect such offense." "The doctrine of criminal conspiracy rests upon the obvious proposition that the power of many for mischief against the one is so great the State should protect the one. Therefore the general principle on which the crime of conspiracy is founded is this, that the confederacy of several persons to effect any injurious object creates such a new and additional power to cause injury as requires criminal restraint, although none would be necessary were the same thing proposed or even attempted to be done by persons singly." "Now that many acts which, if done by an individual, are not indictable, are punished criminally when done in pursuance of a conspiracy among numbers, is too well settled to admit of controversy. In many cases an agreement to do a certain thing has been considered as the subject of an indictment for conspiracy, though the same act, if done separately by each individual, without any agreement among themselves, would not have been illegal." State v. Rowley, 12 Conn. 112-13; Reg. v. Duffield, 5 Cox C. C. 432; State v. Crowley, 41 Wis. 271. The next error assigned is the action of the court in giving the instruction asked for by the Commonwealth, as follows: "If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant Crump entered into an agreement with one or more of the defendants whereby they undertook to coerce the firm of Baughman Brothers to discharge from their employment, against the will of the said firm, certain persons then in their employment and to take into their employment certain other persons that the said Baughman Brothers did not wish to take into their employment, then they are instructed that said agreement was unlawful; and if they believe further from the evidence that in pursuance and to carry out said agreement, he, the defendant, threatened any of the customers of the said Baughman Brothers they (the said persons making said agreement) would injure the business of * upon Lord Earne's tenants, and the tenantry sud- such customers by intimidating their customers and making them afraid to continue their patronage of the customers of the said Baughman Brothers, then they must find the defendant guilty." The instruction plainly and correctly expounds the law against unlawful combination and guilty conspiracy to inter-cott's harvest was brought in and his potatoes dug by fere with, molest, break up and ruin the legitimate, licensed-business of peaceable, useful, industrious and honest citizens, and to accomplish this end by the threat and intimidation of doing "all in their power" of the conspirators to "break up and destroy the business" of all the existing or future customers of Baughman Brothers, who should thereafter buy "any thing from the said firm of Baughman Brothers, or employed them, the said Baughman Brothers, in their said business as printers." And the instruction, so far from being a mere declaration of abstract law, is a direct and proper application of the law to the case put in the indictment and made by the evidence. It is next to impracticable to extend this opinion by reciting the evidence in detail further than we shall do when we come to consider the error assigned upon the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence in the record to justify the verdict. The instructions which were asked for by the defendant and refused by the court were properly refused, as they did not correctly expound the law, and were unwarranted by the evidence. And more than the defect of having no predication in the evidence, they utterly and adroitly ignore the facts proved-of the evil intent of the defendant and his confederates to do a wanton, causeless injury and ruin, to compel and coerce Baughman Brothers to give up the control and conduct of their own long-established, useful and independent business to the absolute dictation and control of a combination of the defendant and others, styling themselves "Richmond Typographical Union, No. 90," and to do this by the obtrusion, terrorism, excommunication and obloquy of the "boycott" against Baughman Brothers and all their customers in Richmond, Lynchburgh, and throughout Virginia and North Carolina ad infinitum, till they force the conquest and submission of all resistance to their demands and self-constituted management. A reign of terror, which if not checked and punished in the beginning by the law will speedily and inevitably run into violence, anarchy, and mob-tyranny. We come now to the main question involved in this appeal, whether the evidence set forth in this record presents a conspiracy at common law. The determination of this question is indeed the object sought, as we not only infer from the paltry fine of $5 imposed by the verdict, but by the intimation in argument by the able and accomplished counsel for the defendant. Is boycotting as resorted to and practiced by the conspirators in this case, allowable under the laws of Virginia? We may For a legal definition or explanation of the meaning and practical meaning of the cabalistic word, as well as for a pertinent exposition of the law applicable to the facts of this case, we refer to the admirable opinion of Judge Wellford of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, in the case of Baughman Brothers v. Askew, 195 Va. L. J. (April), and also to the decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut in the case of State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 76. In that case the court says: gather some idea of its (boycotting) real meaning however by a reference to the circumstances in which the word originated. These circumstances are thus narrated by Mr. Justice McCarthy, an Irish gentleman of learning and ability, who will be recognized as good authority: 'Captain Boycott was an Englishman an agent for Lord Earne, and a farmer at Lough Mark, in the wild and beautiful district of Connemara. In his capacity as agent he had served notice the armed Ulster laborers, guarded always by the lit- In the case of State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. L. 151, Chief Justice Beasley, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It appears to me that it is not to be denied that the alleged aim of this combination was unlawful-the effort was to dictate to this employer whom he should discharge from his employ. This was an unwarrantable interference with the conduct of his business," etc. If the manufacturer can be compelled in this way to discharge two or more hands, he can by similar means be coerced to retain such workmen as the conspirators may choose to designate. customers may be proscribed, and his business in other respects controlled. I cannot regard such a course of conduct as lawful." So his Chief Justice Shaw, in the case of Com. v. Hunt, 4 Metc. 111, says: "The law is not to be hoodwinked by colorable pretenses-it looks at truth and reality through whatever disguises it may assume. It is said that neither threats nor intimidations were used, but no man can fail to see that there may be threats, and there may be intimidations, and there may be molesting, and there may be obstructing (which the jury are quite satisfied have taken place from all the evidence in the case), without there being any express words used by which a man should show any violent threats toward another, or any express intimidation." "An intention to create alarm in the mind of a manufacturer, and so to force his assent to an alteration in the mode of carrying on his business, is a violation of law." Regina v. Rowland, 5 Cox C. C. 436, 462-63; Doolittle v. Schanbacher, 20 Cent. L. J. 229. Upon the trial of boycotters in New York, Judge Barrett said: "The men who walk up and down in front of a man's shop may be guilty of intimidation, though they never raise a finger or utter a word. Their attitude may nevertheless be that of a menace. They may intimidate by their numbers, their pleadings, their methods, their circulars and their devices." It matters little what are the means adopted by combinations formed to intimidate employers or to coerce other journeymen if the design or the effect of them is to interfere with the rights or to control the free action of others. No one has a right to be hedged in and protected from competition in business; but he has a right to be free from wanton, malicious and insolent interference, disturbance or annoyance. Every man has the right to work for whom he pleases, and for any price he can obtain; and he has the right to deal with and associate with whom he chooses, or to let severely alone, arbitrarily and contemptuously, if he will, anybody and everybody upon earth; but this freedom of uncontrolled and unchallenged self-will does not give or imply a right, either by himself or in combination with others, to disturb, injure or obstruct another, either directly or indirectly, in his lawful |