Page images

The Albany Law Journal.

in this State to remarry, and remarrying here, was guilty of bigamy — and very doubtful law it is, too, But whether England would have imported our no

tions into its own law is outside any reasonable conALBANY, JULY 21, 1888.

sideration, because Mr. Marlborough has done nothing against any law of his own country or of this. So for aught we see, Mrs. Marlborough has made a

valid sale of herself to the dirtiest little cad and CURRENT TOPICS.

| brute in all Great Britain. TWO very exciting, not to say alarming legal I disclosures were made during the last week, one of which seems to prove to be something in the The other disclosure is more serious, and more nature of a “mare's nest.” Needless to say it was likely to be founded on fact, because not originated made by a newspaper, and it is not at all surprising but only reported by a newspaper. Messrs. Banks, that it was made by the Herald. It was nothing law-book publishers of this city, have been trying less than the discovery that the recent marriage of to get a bill through Congress for the purchase by the Duke of Marlborough in this State was illegal, the government of certain sets of the United States void and bigamous. Interviews with counsel learned | Supreme Court Reports, of which they are the pubin the law were held, and it was reported that they lishers. Whereupon the “Co-Ops,” of Rochester, didn't know about it - which was true enough inform Congress that they have published a recent or doubted, or feared, etc. One gentleman had sat | edition of these reports from certified copies of the up nights with our statutes on the subject, and records, and that a comparison with the official smelled bigamy. If he had given five minutes of series published by Banks shows that the reporters, daylight attention to the English statutes his fears | Wallace and Otto, took unwarrantable liberties with would have been dispelled. It is plain that the the records, making material changes, and omitting first inquiry is, has Mr. Marlborough done any a great many cases. It is alleged that the changes thing contrary to the law of his domicile? For if are not merely grammatical or rhetorical, but vital not, there is nothing to talk about; he certainly 1 and essential, and that they occur in thousands of has done nothing contrary to our laws. We never instances, and that the omissions amount to hunprohibited his remarrying, and if his own law did dreds. It is hard to believe this, but some examnot, that is the end of the matter. Now by the ples are given of material alterations of the statelaw of England he was not prohibited from re- ments of facts made by the judges. For example, marrying during the life of Lady Blandford. In it is alleged that in the celebrated Kilbourne conHammick's Law of Marriage (1887), page 29, it is tempt case, where Mr. Justice Miller wrote, "did said: "Liberty to divorced persons to marry again arrest said Kilbourne using no more force than was is given by the Divorce Act of 1857, which pro- necessary,” the unfaithful steward, Otto, took his vides (section 57) that when the time limited for pen and wrote quickly, “went to him and did then appealing against any decree dissolving a marriage and there gently lay his hands on him to arrest him, has expired, and no appeal has been presented; or and did then and there arrest him by his body,' when any such appeal has been dismissed; or when etc.- how could he arrest him by his soul? There in the result of any appeal any marriage has been | certainly is a vast difference between “gently" and declared to be dissolved; then, but not sooner, it “no more force than was necessary.” So Otto is shall be lawful for the respective parties to marry said to have changed, in the same statement. again as if the prior marriage had been dissolved “which are the same trespasses complained of,” to by death. The statute therefore allows divorced "the same several supposed trespasses," etc. It persons to enter into fresh nuptials as soon as the may be that the “Co-Ops” have put their best foot marriage has been conclusively rescinded, and they | forward, and that these are the most serious may marry whom they please, the intermarriage of changes, but they say not. They say the official the delinquents not being prohibited.” The case is edition is not to be relied on as a transcript of the thus free of the possible complications which might | records. If what they allege about the omission of have arisen from his remarrying against the law of opinions not withheld by direction of the judges is his domicile and that of this state prohibiting re- | true, that alone ought to be enough to condemn marriage in such circumstances by its own citizens, | Wallace and Otto. As for Wallace, we can believe Whether the English courts would have held his almost any thing of a reporter who injected part of marriage void because of the New York statute not a scene from Shakespeare into the report of Parker in terms applying to foreigners, and having of v. Phetterplace, and who stuffs the report of Burr course no extra-territorial force, we need not | v. Duryee with five pages of his own explanation bother our brains. By our own law, in the Van and history of the art of felting. Probably his own Voorhis case, remarriage in Connecticut, where sensations on being turned out or required to resign there is no such prohibitory clause in the statute, is

added to his stock of knowledge on the subvalid, although made to evade our own laws. And | ject of “felt." Nothing is alleged against the acthe Faber case, cited by anxious counsel, simply held curacy and taste of the present reporter, Mr. Davis. that a citizen of this state forbidden by a divorce | We shall watch this " battle of the books " with

Vol. 38 - No. 3.

curiosity, and if it turns out that the official series as Aaron Burr, Ambrose Spencer, Thomas Addis is inferior in accuracy and fullness to that pub- | Emmett, Thomas J. Oakley, Samuel A. Talcott, lished by private enterprise, it will not be the first Greene C. Bronson and Samuel Beardsley adorned time in the history of reporting, nor probably the the offlce. At thirty-four he removed to this city. last.

At thirty-nine he was United States senator. At

forty-six he was governor. At fifty he was viceThe last number of the “American Statesman” president, at fifty-four president. Mr. Shepard gives series, published by Houghton, Miflin & Co., is a a clear and interesting account of the State polibiography of Martin Van Buren, by Edward M. tics of his day, with its “hardly-remembered jarShepard. This “ favorite son” of New York was | gon of Lewisites and Burrites, Clintonians and Livone of the most successful men in our political | ingstonians, Republicans and Federalists, Bucktails history, acquiring wealth, celebrity as a lawyer, and and Johnsonians and National Republicans, Demothe highest political promotion, by the discreet use crats and Whigs, Loco-focos and Conservatives, of moderate talents, great sense and exquisite tact. Barnburners and Hunkers." He makes an amusing As a mere politician he ranks with Jefferson and mistake in his account of the origin of the term Lincoln, the greatest. He grasped the glittering “Inco-focos” in 1835, by speaking of the putting bauble of the presidency when really great leaders, 1 out of the "gas” in Tammany Hall. We take it like Webster, Clay and Calhoun, died without the that the ouly gas there in those days was that emitsight. When we consider the nonentities of his ted by the sachems, which has never been turned day who achieved this final success, it is probable off from that day to this. He is also in error in dethat no one will dispute his superiority to Harrison, scribing the “little magician " as "slender.” He was Tyler, Polk, Taylor, Fillmore, Pierce and Buchanan, distinctly plump, not to say rotund. In 1845, when and his right to rank with Jackson and Adams the the writer was a ten-year old boy, he called with younger, and that in many respects he was superior his father on the retired president at Lindenwald. to even these. Mr. Shepard has contrived a very As he approached the house he saw a little, elderly readable chapter on Van Buren's legal career, which man in gray clothes working in the garden. After was a remarkably shining and meritorious one. Mr. | waiting some fifteen or twenty minutes the same Shepard makes the statement that he was the only | little man approached him, carefully dressed in full great lawyer who ever reached the presidency, and black, with spotless linen, and for half an hour the perhaps he is right, although it must be said for writer and his father were entertained with that Pierce that he was an exceptionally excellent ad | easy and charming grace, and that simplicity and vocate, one of the best in New England. Van absence of pretension which always characterized Buren at forty-five had the most lucrative practice him. One prediction which he made on that occain this State, and carried a handsome fortune to the sion did more honor to his good nature than to his White House, where he savingly increased it. He foresight, when he said to the writer, “it is quite came from a county which has produced more cele possible that you may yet be president.” We brated lawyers than any other of the State, except publish in another column some extracts from Mr. possibly Oneida, the names of most of wliom are Shepard's excellent memoir concerning Van Buren's now forgotten, but among whom we now recall legal carcer, cordially recommending the book and Van Ness, Elisha Williams, Vanderpoel, Benjamin the whole series as the best and most convenient reF. Butler, Ambrose L. Jordan and “Prince John" view of American political history. Mr. S. R. Gray - a man of far greater genius than his father - and has the book on sale in this city. coming down to our time, Henry Hogeboom. Mr. Shepard strikingly observes: “At an early day the legal profession reached in our country a consum

NOTES OF CASES. mate vigor. Far behind as Americans were in other learning and arts, they had, within a few I IN People v. Common Council, Michigan Supreme years after they had escaped colonial dependence, 1 Court, June 8, 1888, it was held that a statute judges, advocates and commentators of the first refusing to any one engaged in selling liquor the rank. Marshall, Kent and Story were securely right to become surety on the bond required for a famous, when hardly another American of their license to sell liquors is invalid. The court said: time out of political and public life was known.” “ It is claimed by the counsel for the relator that Van Buren's superiority was soon manifest. His said provision of the act is unconstitutional and void, rival, Williams, who by tradition is described as a in that it is in conflict with the provisions of the very brilliant man, said to him, “I get all the ver- Constitution of this State that i no person shall be dicts and you get all the judgments.” It is inter- deprived of life, liberty or property without due esting to read that Van Buren was early surrogate process of law,' and also that it is in conflict with of his county. He had no early advantages of edu- the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the cation, but he made himself by reading “a well, even United States, that no State shall make or enforce an amply educated man." At thirty-one he was a any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuState senator, and in the Court of Errors distin- nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall guished himself by his opinions. At thirty-three any State deprive any person of life, liberty or he was attorney-general, at a time when such men property without due process of law, nor deny to

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-power on the supervisors to deprive a person of the tion of the laws.' The act requires the sureties to right to carry on his business; (2) that though a be residents and freeholders of the township, village law may be fair on its face, and impartial in appearor city in which the business is proposed to be car- ance, yet if it be applied and administered by pubried on, and each of whom must justify in real es- lic authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, tate situate in the same county. These provisions so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimigo to the sufficiency of the sureties, and the facili- | nation between persons in similar circumstances, ties of collecting a judgment from them, and are material to their rights, the denial of equal justice reagonable restrictions upon the right to carry on is still within the prohibition of the fourteenth the business. The provisions however of this act amendment; (3) that the fourteenth amendment is probibiting a person, because of the business in not confined to tbe protection of citizens, but exwhich he is engaged, from entering into contracts tends to all persons.” This we regard as doubtful of a certain class, the same being open to all other law. We see no objection to the requirement, as a persons, would be a violation of the constitutional police measure, that a rumseller must give others principle that no person shall be deprived of life, than rumsellers for sureties. Otherwise the priviliberty or property without due process of law. lege of carrying on the traffic may depend only on The right to sign a bond, or to enter into any other agreement among themselves, and be against the contract, cannot be made to depend upon the busi- will of all the rest of the community. The laundry ness in which one is engaged. The right to sell case is not parallel. liquor in this State is made lawful, under certain conditions and restrictions, by the act itself. “Lib In Re Benson, United States Circuit Court, S. D. erty is something more than mere freedom from New York, April 9, 1888, 34 Fed. Rep. 649, it was physical restraint. It means freedom to go where | held that a printed theatre ticket in the usual form, one may choose, and to act in such manner, not in- and stamped upon its face with an inscription in consistent with the equal rights of others, as his the style of a seal setting out the name of the manjudgment may dictate for the promotion of his hap- ager in printed characters, is the subject of forgery piness; that is, to pursue such callings and voca at common law, and under the treaty of extradition tions as may be most suitablle to develop his capaci- between the United States and the Republic of ties, and to give them their highest enjoyment.' Mexico of December 11, 1861 (12 Stat. at Large, Field and Strong, JJ., in Munn v. Ilinois, 94 U. S. 1199), “printing" being “writing" in the legal 142. We agree with the learned counsel for the sense of that term, and a signature by impression relator that property does not consist merely of the from a stamp being a valid signature. The court title and possession. It includes the right to make said: “The relator next contends that forgery at any legal use of it, and the right to pledge or mort-common law cannot be predicated of such a ticket gage it, or to sell and transfer it. The right to as this because it did not contain a contract. There contract a debt or other personal obligation is in was no consideration expressed in it, nor did it concluded in the right to liberty, and one's payment of tain any promise. The very definitions however bis debts, and therefore the basis of one's credit, which he cites under his first point speak of the the right to contract a debt, or to enter into a bond written instrument as one which, “if genuine, or other writing or obligation, is also a right of might apparently be of legal efficacy, or the foundaproperty. Signing bonds for other parties may be tion of a legal liability,” or “by which another may the result of friendship, or because of business in- be prejudiced.” It is not necessary that the subject terests; but the right to pledge one's estate is as of forgery be shown to be a complete executory much a right of property as either the title or pos. contract expressing a consideration, Instruments session. This provision is also a plain violation of of evidence by which a contract is proved may be the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of forged just as well as the contract itself if wholly the United States. A somewhat similar question expressed in writing. See opinion of Judge Brown, came before the Supreme Court of the United in this circuit, in Re Tully, 20 Fed. Rep. 812. States in the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. There is a line of authorities, many of which are 356. An ordinance of the city and county of San cited by the relator, which hold that where the Francisco made it unlawful for any person to carry | forged instrument purports to be a contract, and is on a laundry business within the corporate limits void on its face, it is not the subject of forgery. without having first obtained the consent of the | Thus, in King v. Jones, 1 Leach, 204, the bogus board of supervisors, unless the laundry was located | bank-note was void on its face. It would not have in a brick or stone building. It appeared that there been a bank-note if genuine, and no outside testiwere about 320 laundries in San Francisco; that 310 mony could have made it such. In Re Mitchell, of them were in wooden buildings; that 240 of Fost. Cr. Law, 119, the forged order was held not them were owned and conducted by Chinamen; to be an order within the terms of the special statthat 200 of said Chinamen had applied to the board | ute under which the prisoner was indicted. Here, of supervisors for permission to do business; and as relator contends, the case must be decided by that all of said applications, with one exception, the rules of the common law. In Rex v. Pateman, were denied. Held (1) that the ordinance was in- | Russ. & R. 455, the bogus instrument was unsigned, valid, because it undertook to confer arbitrary and therefore, if genuine, did not purport to be a promissory note. In King v. Moffatt, 1 Leach, 431, of all rights under the contract, that he will not get the bill of exchange, if real, would not have been married for two years, the company will pay $1,000 valid because it failed to comply with statutory re- to his wife, the amount to be collected by an assessquirements. No evidence could make it valid. In ment upon the associates, if not already in the treasQueen v. Closs, 1 Dears. & B. Cr. Cas. 460, the court ury, is not a oontract of insurance, but a contract in merely held that a picture was not a document or restraint of marriage, unlawful and void. The writing. In Re Windsor, 10 Cox C. C. 121, the court said: “No word is spoken of insurance. That prisoner was discharged because the false entries it is a wagering or gambling contract, and void which he made did not purport to be made by an- | upon grounds of public policy, because in restraint other. In People v. Savage, 5 N. Y. Crim, 543, of marriage, there is no room for doubt. The same where defendant was charged with forging and al- or similar contract has been held to be void in tering a pawn ticket, the conviction was reversed | White v. Benefit Union, 76 Ala. 251, and in Chalfant because the district attorney and the court were ap- v. Payton, 91 Ind. 202; S. C., 46 Am. Rep. 586. parently satisfied with the soundness of the conten- The counsel for both parties agree that the contract, tion of prisoner's counsel that by the Penal Code of for one reason or another, is illegal, but the counsel New York, under which the trial was had, the defi- for the State contends that whether the contract be nition of forgery is much narrower than at common legal or illegal, it is a contract of insurance, and law. In People v. Martin, 36 Hun, 462, the railroad that as such it falls under the supervision of the bonds were unsigned, and the same was the case in commissioner. It is not to be conceded, we think, Cunningham v. People, 4 id. 457. In People v. Fitch, that this contract, in the sense of any modern use of 1 Wend. 198, the prisoner altered the date of an the term, is an insurance policy. No loss, or casuorder drawn by him, accepted, paid, and thereto- | alty, or peril is named for which any indemnity is fore returned him. In People v. Wilson, 6 Johns. promised. It is more of a betting contract on a fu320, the bank-note being for less than one dollar, ture event. It is true that there was formerly a its circulation was forbidden by statute. In People class of betting contracts styled “insurances,' and v. Ilarrison, 8 Barb. 560, the acknowledgment was that a narrow line once existed between gambling defective on its face. In People v. Mann, 75 N. Y. / and betting contracts and those then denominated 484, the prisoner, a county treasurer, signed his own contracts of insurance; and the case of Paterson v. name to the obligation. Conviction was reversed | Powell, 9 Bing. 320, relied on by the State, shows becanse the instrument did not purport to be the how far a court was induced to go to determine act of another. It was false assumption of author- | that a contract similar in principle to the present ity, not forgery. It is moreover well settled by au- was an insurance policy, in order to declare it void. thority that where the forged instrument is not | The statute (4 Geo. III, c. 48) rendered speculative void on its face, but only incomplete or uncertain, insurance contracts void, and strange to say, alextrinsic evidence may be introduced showing its lowed all contracts founded on mere bettings and validity. Such an incomplete instrument may be gamblings to be valid. At this day the contract the subject of forgery. There is nothing upon the | in that case, with all its imitations of the thing, face of these tickets which proclaims them void. would hardly receive the appellation of an insurThey are in the usual form of such instruments ance policy. It does not seem probable that the which do not ordinarily contain the expression of a Legislature intended to commit to the care of the consideration, or a distinct agreement expressed in commissioner the business of illegal or illegitimate words to admit the holder. None the less the insurance companies. It would be tolerating in. holders of them, if genuine, would find them of le-stead of condemning them. He has the power to gal efficacy, if the performance being given they issue and suspend licenses. But there must be were arbitrarily refused admission, and came into cause for either act. Rev. Stat., ch. 49, $$ 73, 75. court to enforce their rights. In addition to the His business is to deal with such companies as can, numerous authorities in suppport of these proposi- when licensed, issue legal policies. His act cannot tions cited in the complainant's brief it will be suffi- confer legality upon companies doing illegal busicient to refer to People v. Stearns, 21 Wend. 409; ness. The State seeks to recover a penalty of fifty Commonwealth v. Ayer, 3 Cush, 151; McCrea v. dollars because the defendant acted without an offiMarsh, 12 Gray, 211; Dreu v. Peer, 93 Penn. St. cial license, while the policy, if to be called such, 234; Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 Mees. & W. 838; Tay- | issued by him, would be unlawful and void whether ler v. Waters, Taunt. 374; Burton v. Sherpf, 1 | | he was acting with or without a license. It would Allen, 133; Magorerning v. Staples, 7 Lans. 145.” be inconsistent to collect a penalty of an agent for See same point, 37 ALB. Law Jour. 524.

not doing business under a void license." See

James v. Jellison, 99 Ind. 292; S. C., 48 Am. Rep. 151.
In State v. Torle, Maine Supreme Judicial Court,
March 13, 1888, it was held that a written agree CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS USE OF
ment between an association and its members which

PREMISES - DISCRIMINATION. provides that if a member pays an initiation fee and MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUD. COURT, JUNE 1, 1888. certain annual dues for nine years, and until he is

OLD COLONY R. Co. v. TRIPP. married, and also an assessment on the marriage of

| Under the Public Statute of Massachusetts, chap. 112, $ 188, any associate, and promises on pain of forfeiture

providing that every railroad corporation shall give to

[ocr errors]

all persons or companies reasonable and equal terms, | It is its duty to furnish reasonable facilities and acfacilities and accommodations for the transportation of commodations for the use of all persons who seek for themselves, their agents and servants, and of any mer- transportation over its road. It provided its depot for chandise and other property, upon its railroad, and for the use of persons who were transported on its cars to the use of its depot and other buildings and grounds, and or from the station, and holds it for that use, and it at any point where its railroad connects with another | has no right to exclude from it persous seeking access railroad, reasonable and equal terms and facilities of in- to it for the use for which it was intended and is held. terchange," held, that a railroad company might make a | It can subject the use to rules and regulations; but contract giving to a particular person the exclusive right by statute, if not by common law, the regulations to come upon its premises and solicit patronage from 1 must be such as to secure reasonable and equal use of passongers arriving at or leaving the station, and could the premises to all having such right to use them. See maintain an action of tort for trespass against the owner | Pub, St., chap. 112, $ 188, Railroad Co. v. Gage, 12 of express teams-& common carrier of passengers and Gray, 393; Spofford V. Ruilroad Co., 128 Mass. 326. their baggage to and from a railroad station--for using, | The station was a passenger station. Passengers takwithout the consent of the company, the latter's grounds, ing and leaving the cars at the station, and persons buildings and platforms for the purpose of soliciting the setting down passengers or delivering merchandise or patronage of passengers.

baggage for transportation from the station, or taking

| up passengers or receiving mercbandise that had been At the trial in the Superior Court there was evi

| transported to the station, had a right to use the stadence that the plaintiff was a railroad corporation,

tion buildings aud grounds, superior to the right of with all the powers and subject (to all the duties of

| the plaintiff to exclusive occupancy. All such persons railroad corporations in this Commonwealth; that

had business with the plaintiff which it was bound to Brockton was one of the largest stations on its road;

attend to in the place and manner which it had prothat it had been the practice of the defendant and

vided for all who had like business with it. The deother proprietors of job wagons, for four or five years

fendant was allowed to use the depot for any business prior to August 1, 1886, to go to the Brocktou station,

that he had with the plaintiff. But he had no busiand wait for trains, and to ascertain if the passengers

ness to transact with the plaintiff. He had no merhad any baggage or other merchandise for them to

chandise or baggage to deliver to the plaintiff or to recarry; that the plaintiff, on or about August 1, 1886,

ceive from it. His purpose was to use the depot as a made a contract with A. S. Porter & Sons, of Brock

place for soliciting contracts with incoming passenton, to carry all baggage and merchandise brought by

gers for the trausportation of their baggage. The railpassengers to the station in trains to such places in

road company may be under obligation to the passenthe city of Brockton as such passengers might desire,

ger to see that he has reasonable facilities for procurand to provide all necessary and sufficient means

ing trausportation for himself and his baggage from therefor, to be paid for by the passengers employing

the station when his transit ends. What conventhem; that afterward the plaintiff notified the de

iences shall be furnished to passengers within the stafendant and all other proprietors of job-wagons not to

tion for that purpose is a matter wholly between come upon the plaintiff's premises in Brockton for the

them and the company. The defendant is a stranger purpose of soliciting baggage or merchandise from

both to the plaintiff and to its passengers, and can passengers arriving in trains at the station, and in

claim no rights against the plaintiff to the use of its formed them of the contract made with Porter &

station, either in his own right or in the right of pasSous, but allowing them however to come to the sta

sengers. The fact that he is willing to assume relation to deliver baggage and merchandise for passen

tions with any passenger which will give him relations gers, and to take away baggage and merchandise for

with the plaintiff which will iuvolve the right to use passengers for which they might have previous orders,

the depot, does pot establish such relations or such but not to solicit baggage or merchandise to be car

right; and the right of passengers to be solicited by ried away; that defendant, after receiving said notice,

drivers of hacks and job-wagons is not such as to give continued to come upon the premises and solicit bag.

to all such drivers a right to occupy the platforms and gage and merchandise, upon the platform of the sta

depots of railroads. If such right exists, it exists, tion, from passengers, upon the arrival of trains, and

under the statute, equally for all, and railroad comrefused to depart therefrom when requested, although

panies are obliged to admit to their depots, not only he was not there at the time to carry baggage or mer

persons having business there to deliver or receive chandise for passengers going in the trains, or to take

passengers or merchandise, but all persons seeking baggage or merchandise for passengers upon orders

such business, and to furnish reasonable and equal received away from the premises. Upon the forego

facilities and conveniences for all such. ing facts, the presiding judge ordered a verdict for 1 The only case we have seen which seems to lend any the plaintiff for a nominal sum, and reported the case

countenance to the position that a railroad company to the Supreme Judicial Court.

has no right to exclude persons from occupying its deJ. M. & T. C. Day and Hosea Kingman, for defend- | pots for the purpose of soliciting the patrouage of pasant.

sengers is Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, in which

it was held that an in-holder had no right to exclude J. H. Benton, Jr., and C. W. Sumner, for plaintiff.

from his inn a stage driver who entered it to solicit W. ALLEN, J. Whatever implied license the de- I guests to patronize his stage, in opposition to a driver leixant may have had to enter the plaintiff's close of a rival line who had been admitted for a like purhad been revoked by the regulations made by the | pose. It was said to rest upon the right of the pasplaintiff for the management of its business and the sengers rather than that of the driver. However it use of its property in its business. The defendanten- | may be with a guest at an inn, se do not think that tered under a claim of right and can justify his entry passengers in a railroad depot have such possession of only by showing a right superior to that of the plain-| a right in the premises as will give to carriers of bag1. The plaintiff bas all the rights of an owner in gage, soliciting their patronage, an implied license to possession, except such as are inconsistent with the enter, Irrevocable by

enter, irrevocable by the railroad company. Barney publio use for which it holds its franchise; that is, 1 v. Steamboat Co., 67 N. Y. 301; S. C., 23 Am. Rep. 115. with its duties as a common carrier of persons and 1 and Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sum. 221, and cases directly herchandise. As concerns the case at bar, the plaini in point. See also Com. v. Power, 7 Metc. 596, and VII 18 obliged to be a common carrier of passengers. | Harris v. Stevens, 31 V t. 78.

« PreviousContinue »