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power on the supervisors to deprive a person of the right to carry on his business; (2) that though a law may be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet if it be applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment; (3) that the fourteenth amendment is not confined to the protection of citizens, but extends to all persons." This we regard as doubtful law. We see no objection to the requirement, as a police measure, that a rumseller must give others than rumsellers for sureties. Otherwise the privilege of carrying on the traffic may depend only on agreement among themselves, and be against the will of all the rest of the community. The laundry case is not parallel.

In Re Benson, United States Circuit Court, S. D. New York, April 9, 1888, 34 Fed. Rep. 649, it was held that a printed theatre ticket in the usual form, and stamped upon its face with an inscription in the style of a seal setting out the name of the man

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' The act requires the sureties to be residents and freeholders of the township, village or city in which the business is proposed to be carried on, and each of whom must justify in real estate situate in the same county. These provisions go to the sufficiency of the sureties, and the facilities of collecting a judgment from them, and are reasonable restrictions upon the right to carry on the business. The provisions however of this act prohibiting a person, because of the business in which he is engaged, from entering into contracts of a certain class, the same being open to all other persons, would be a violation of the constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The right to sign a bond, or to enter into any other contract, cannot be made to depend upon the business in which one is engaged. The right to sell liquor in this State is made lawful, under certain conditions and restrictions, by the act itself. 'Liberty is something more than mere freedom from physical restraint. It means freedom to go where one may choose, and to act in such manner, not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his hap-ager in printed characters, is the subject of forgery piness; that is, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitablle to develop his capacities, and to give them their highest enjoyment.' Field and Strong, JJ., in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 142. We agree with the learned counsel for the relator that property does not consist merely of the title and possession. It includes the right to make any legal use of it, and the right to pledge or mortgage it, or to sell and transfer it. The right to contract a debt or other personal obligation is included in the right to liberty, and one's payment of his debts, and therefore the basis of one's credit, the right to contract a debt, or to enter into a bond or other writing or obligation, is also a right of property. Signing bonds for other parties may be the result of friendship, or because of business interests; but the right to pledge one's estate is as much a right of property as either the title or possession. This provision is also a plain violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. A somewhat similar question came before the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356. An ordinance of the city and county of San Francisco made it unlawful for any person to carry on a laundry business within the corporate limits without having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors, unless the laundry was located in a brick or stone building. It appeared that there were about 320 laundries in San Francisco; that 310 of them were in wooden buildings; that 240 of them were owned and conducted by Chinamen; that 200 of said Chinamen had applied to the board of supervisors for permission to do business; and that all of said applications, with one exception, were denied. Held (1) that the ordinance was invalid, because it undertook to confer arbitrary

at common law, and under the treaty of extradition between the United States and the Republic of Mexico of December 11, 1861 (12 Stat. at Large, 1199), "printing" being "writing" in the legal sense of that term, and a signature by impression from a stamp being a valid signature. The court said: "The relator next contends that forgery at common law cannot be predicated of such a ticket as this because it did not contain a contract. There was no consideration expressed in it, nor did it contain any promise. The very definitions however which he cites under his first point speak of the written instrument as one which, "if genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy, or the founda tion of a legal liability," or "by which another may be prejudiced." It is not necessary that the subject of forgery be shown to be a complete executory contract expressing a consideration. Instruments of evidence by which a contract is proved may be forged just as well as the contract itself if wholly expressed in writing. See opinion of Judge Brown, in this circuit, in Re Tully, 20 Fed. Rep. 812. There is a line of authorities, many of which are cited by the relator, which hold that where the forged instrument purports to be a contract, and is void on its face, it is not the subject of forgery. Thus, in King v. Jones, 1 Leach, 204, the bogus bank-note was void on its face. It would not have been a bank-note if genuine, and no outside testimony could have made it such. In Re Mitchell, Fost. Cr. Law, 119, the forged order was held not to be an order within the terms of the special statute under which the prisoner was indicted. Here, as relator contends, the case must be decided by the rules of the common law. In Rex v. Pateman, Russ. & R. 455, the bogus instrument was unsigned, and therefore, if genuine, did not purport to be a

promissory note. In King v. Moffatt, 1 Leach, 431, of all rights under the contract, that he will not get the bill of exchange, if real, would not have been married for two years, the company will pay $1,000 valid because it failed to comply with statutory re- to his wife, the amount to be collected by an assessquirements. No evidence could make it valid. In ment upon the associates, if not already in the treasQueen v. Closs, 1 Dears. & B. Cr. Cas. 460, the court ury, is not a contract of insurance, but a contract in merely held that a picture was not a document or restraint of marriage, unlawful and void. The writing. In Re Windsor, 10 Cox C. C. 121, the court said: "No word is spoken of insurance. That prisoner was discharged because the false entries it is a wagering or gambling contract, and void which he made did not purport to be made by an- upon grounds of public policy, because in restraint other. In People v. Savage, 5 N. Y. Crim. 543, of marriage, there is no room for doubt. The same where defendant was charged with forging and al- or similar contract has been held to be void in tering a pawn ticket, the conviction was reversed White v. Benefit Union, 76 Ala. 251, and in Chalfant because the district attorney and the court were ap- v. Payton, 91 Ind. 202; S. C., 46 Am. Rep. 586. parently satisfied with the soundness of the conten- The counsel for both parties agree that the contract, tion of prisoner's counsel that by the Penal Code of for one reason or another, is illegal, but the counsel New York, under which the trial was had, the defi- for the State contends that whether the contract be nition of forgery is much narrower than at common legal or illegal, it is a contract of insurance, and law. In People v. Martin, 36 Hun, 462, the railroad that as such it falls under the supervision of the bonds were unsigned, and the same was the case in commissioner. It is not to be conceded, we think, Cunningham v. People, 4 id. 457. In People v. Fitch, that this contract, in the sense of any modern use of 1 Wend. 198, the prisoner altered the date of an the term, is an insurance policy. No loss, or casuorder drawn by him, accepted, paid, and thereto-alty, or peril is named for which any indemnity is fore returned him. In People v. Wilson, 6 Johns. 320, the bank-note being for less than one dollar, its circulation was forbidden by statute. In People v. Harrison, 8 Barb. 560, the acknowledgment was defective on its face. In People v. Mann, 75 N. Y. 484, the prisoner, a county treasurer, signed his own name to the obligation. Conviction was reversed becanse the instrument did not purport to be the act of another. It was false assumption of authority, not forgery. It is moreover well settled by authority that where the forged instrument is not void on its face, but only incomplete or uncertain, extrinsic evidence may be introduced showing its validity. Such an incomplete instrument may be the subject of forgery. There is nothing upon the face of these tickets which proclaims them void. They are in the usual form of such instruments which do not ordinarily contain the expression of a consideration, or a distinct agreement expressed in words to admit the holder. None the less the holders of them, if genuine, would find them of legal efficacy, if the performance being given they were arbitrarily refused admission, and came into court to enforce their rights. In addition to the numerous authorities in suppport of these propositions cited in the complainant's brief it will be sufficient to refer to People v. Stearns, 21 Wend. 409; Commonwealth v. Ayer, 3 Cush, 151; McCrea v. Marsh, 12 Gray, 211; Drew v. Peer, 93 Penn. St. 234; Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 Mees. & W. 838; Tayler v. Waters, 7 Taunt. 374; Burton v. Sherpf, 1 Allen, 133; Magoverning v. Staples, 7 Lans. 145." See same point, 37 ALB. LAW Jour. 524.

In State v. Towle, Maine Supreme Judicial Court, March 13, 1888, it was held that a written agreement between an association and its members which provides that if a member pays an initiation fee and certain annual dues for nine years, and until he is married, and also an assessment on the marriage of any associate, and promises on pain of forfeiture

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promised. It is more of a betting contract on a future event. It is true that there was formerly a class of betting contracts styled 'insurances,' and that a narrow line once existed between gambling and betting contracts and those then denominated contracts of insurance; and the case of Paterson v. Powell, 9 Bing. 320, relied on by the State, shows how far a court was induced to go to determine that a contract similar in principle to the present was an insurance policy, in order to declare it void. The statute (4 Geo. III, c. 48) rendered speculative insurance contracts void, and strange to say, allowed all contracts founded on mere bettings and gamblings to be valid. At this day the contract in that case, with all its imitations of the thing, would hardly receive the appellation of an insurance policy. It does not seem probable that the Legislature intended to commit to the care of the commissioner the business of illegal or illegitimate insurance companies. It would be tolerating instead of condemning them. He has the power to issue and suspend licenses. But there must be cause for either act. Rev. Stat., ch. 49, §§ 73, 75. His business is to deal with such companies as can, when licensed, issue legal policies. His act cannot confer legality upon companies doing illegal business. The State seeks to recover a penalty of fifty dollars because the defendant acted without an official license, while the policy, if to be called such, issued by him, would be unlawful and void whether he was acting with or without a license. It would be inconsistent to collect a penalty of an agent for not doing business under a void license." See James v. Jellison, 99 Ind. 292; S. C., 48 Am. Rep. 151.

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all persons or companies reasonable and equal terms, facilities and accommodations for the transportation of themselves, their agents and servants, and of any merchandise and other property, upon its railroad, and for the use of its depot and other buildings and grounds. and at any point where its railroad connects with another railroad, reasonable and equal terms and facilities of interchange," held, that a railroad company might make a contract giving to a particular person the exclusive right to come upon its premises and solicit patronage from passongers arriving at or leaving the station, and could maintain an action of tort for trespass against the owner of express teams-a common carrier of passengers and their baggage to and from a railroad station-for using, without the consent of the company, the latter's grounds, buildings and platforms for the purpose of soliciting the patronage of passengers.

At the trial in the Superior Court there was evidence that the plaintiff was a railroad corporation, with all the powers and subject to all the duties of railroad corporations in this Commonwealth; that Brockton was one of the largest stations on its road; that it had been the practice of the defendant and other proprietors of job wagons, for four or five years prior to August 1, 1886, to go to the Brockton station, and wait for trains, and to ascertain if the passengers had any baggage or other merchandise for them to carry; that the plaintiff, on or about August 1, 1886, made a contract with A. S. Porter & Sons, of Brockton, to carry all baggage and merchandise brought by passengers to the station in trains to such places in the city of Brockton as such passengers might desire, and to provide all necessary and sufficient means therefor, to be paid for by the passengers employing them; that afterward the plaintiff notified the defendant and all other proprietors of job-wagons not to come upon the plaintiff's premises in Brockton for the purpose of soliciting baggage or merchandise from passengers arriving in trains at the station, and informed them of the contract made with Porter & Sons, but allowing them however to come to the station to deliver baggage and merchandise for passengers, and to take away baggage and merchandise for passengers for which they might have previous orders, but not to solicit baggage or merchandise to be carried away; that defendant, after receiving said notice. continued to come upon the premises and solicit baggage and merchandise, upon the platform of the station, from passengers, upon the arrival of trains, and refused to depart therefrom when requested, although he was not there at the time to carry baggage or merchandise for passengers going in the trains, or to take baggage or merchandise for passengers upon orders received away from the premises. Upon the foregoing facts, the presiding judge ordered a verdict for the plaintiff for a nominal sum, and reported the case to the Supreme Judicial Court.

J. M. & T. C. Day and Hosea Kingman, for defendant.

J. H. Benton, Jr., and C. W. Sumner, for plaintiff. W. ALLEN, J. Whatever implied license the defendant may have had to enter the plaintiff's close had been revoked by the regulations made by the plaintiff for the management of its business and the use of its property in its business. The defendant entered under a claim of right and can justify his entry only by showing a right superior to that of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has all the rights of an owner in possession, except such as are inconsistent with the public use for which it holds its franchise; that is, with its duties as a common carrier of persons and merchandise. As concerns the case at bar, the plaintiff is obliged to be a common carrier of passengers.

It is its duty to furnish reasonable facilities and accommodations for the use of all persons who seek for transportation over its road. It provided its depot for the use of persons who were transported on its cars to or from the station, and holds it for that use, and it has no right to exclude from it persons seeking access to it for the use for which it was intended and is held. It can subject the use to rules and regulations; but by statute, if not by common law, the regulations must be such as to secure reasonable and equal use of the premises to all having such right to use them. See Pub. St., chap. 112, § 188, Railroad Co. v. Gage, 12 Gray, 393; Spofford v. Railroad Co., 128 Mass. 326. The station was a passenger station. Passengers taking and leaving the cars at the station, and persons setting down passengers or delivering merchandise or baggage for transportation from the station, or taking up passengers or receiving merchandise that had been transported to the station, had a right to use the station buildings and grounds, superior to the right of the plaintiff to exclusive occupancy. All such persons had business with the plaintiff which it was bound to attend to in the place and manner which it had provided for all who had like business with it. The defendant was allowed to use the depot for any business that he had with the plaintiff. But he had no business to transact with the plaintiff. He had no merchandise or baggage to deliver to the plaintiff or to receive from it. His purpose was to use the depot as a place for soliciting contracts with incoming passengers for the transportation of their baggage. The railroad company may be under obligation to the passenger to see that he has reasonable facilities for procuring transportation for himself and his baggage from the station when his transit ends. What conveniences shall be furnished to passengers within the station for that purpose is a matter wholly between them and the company. The defendant is a stranger both to the plaintiff and to its passengers, and can claim no rights against the plaintiff to the use of its station, either in his own right or in the right of passengers. The fact that he is willing to assume relations with any passenger which will give him relations with the plaintiff which will involve the right to use the depot, does not establish such relations or such right; and the right of passengers to be solicited by drivers of hacks and job-wagons is not such as to give to all such drivers a right to occupy the platforms and depots of railroads. If such right exists, it exists, under the statute, equally for all, and railroad companies are obliged to admit to their depots, not only persons having business there to deliver or receive passengers or merchandise, but all persons seeking such business, and to furnish reasonable and equal facilities and conveniences for all such.

The only case we have seen which seems to lend any countenance to the position that a railroad company has no right to exclude persons from occupying its depots for the purpose of soliciting the patronage of passengers is Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, in which it was held that an inn-holder had no right to exclude from his inn a stage driver who entered it to solicit guests to patronize his stage, in opposition to a driver of a rival line who had been admitted for a like purpose. It was said to rest upon the right of the passengers rather than that of the driver. However it may be with a guest at an inn, we do not think that passengers in a railroad depot have such possession of a right in the premises as will give to carriers of baggage, soliciting their patronage, an implied license to enter, irrevocable by the railroad company. Barney v. Steamboat Co., 67 N. Y. 301; S. C., 23 Am. Rep. 115, and Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sum. 221, and cases directly in point. See also Com. v. Power, 7 Metc. 596, and Harris v. Stevens, 31 Vt. 79.

Marriott's case, ubi supra, Palmer v. Ry. Co., L. R., 6 C. P. 194, and Parkinson v. Ry. Co., id. 554, are cases in which injunctions were granted under the statute; in the former case, for refusing to admit to the station yards vans containing goods for delivery to the railway company for transportation by it; in the latter case, for refusing to deliver at the station, to a carrier authorized to receive them, goods which had been transported on the railroad.

We have not been referred to any decision or dictum in England or in this country that a common carrier of passengers and their baggage to and from a railroad station has any right, without the consent of the railroad company, to use the grounds, buildings and platforms of the station for the purpose of soliciting the patronage of passengers, or that a regulation of the company which allows such use by particular persons and denies it to others, violates any right of the latter. Cases, at common law or under statutes, to determine whether railroad companies, in particular instances, gave equal terms and facilities to different parties to whom they furnished transportation, and with whom they dealt as common carriers, have no bearing on the caso at bar. The defendant, in his business of solicitor of the patronage of passengers, had no relations with the plaintiff as a common carrier, and had no right to use its station grounds and buildings.

It is argued that the statute gave to the defendant passengers. See also In re Painter v. Ry. Co., 2 C. B. the same right to enter upon and use the buildings | (N. S.) 702; Barker v. Ry. Co., 18 C. B. 46. Besides and platforms of the plaintiff which the plaintiff gave to Porter & Sons. The plaintiff made a contract with Porter & Sons to do all the service required by incoming passengers in receiving from the plaintiff and delivering in the town baggage and merchandise brought by them; and prohibited the defendant and all other owners of job-wagons from entering the station for the purpose of soliciting from passengers the carriage of their baggage and merchandise, but allowed them to enter for the purpose of delivering baggage or merchandise or of receiving any for which they had orders. The statute (Pub. St., chap. 112, § 188) is in these words: "Every railroad corporation shall give to all persons or companies reasonable and equal terms, facilities and accommodations for the transportation of themselves, their agents and servants, and of any merchandise and other property, upon its railroad, and for the use of its depot and other buildings and grounds, and at any point where its railroad connects with another railroad, reasonable and equal terms and facilities of interchange." A penalty is prescribed in section 191 for violations of the statute. The statute, in providing that railroad corporations shall give to all persons equal facilities for the use of its depot, obviously means a use of right. It does not intend to prescribe who shall have the use of the depot, but to provide that all who have the right to use it shall be furnished by the railroad company with equal conveniences. The statute applies only to relations between railroads as common carriers and their patrons. It does not enact that a license given by a railroad company to a stranger shall be a license to all the world. If a railroad company allows a person to sell refreshments or newspapers in its depot, or to cultivate flowers on its station grounds, the statute does not extend the same right to all persons. If a railroad company, for the convenience of its passengers, allows a baggage expressman to travel in its cars to solicit the carriage of the baggage of passengers, or to keep a stand in its depot for receiving orders from passengers, the statute does not require it to furnish equal facilities and conveniences to all persons. The fact that the defendant, as the owner of a job-wagon, is a common carrier, gives him no special right under the statute. It only shows that it is possible for him to perform for passengers the service which he wishes to solicit of them.

A majority of the court are of the opinion that there should be judgment on the verdict.

FIELD, J. (dissenting). The chief justice, Mr. Justice Devens, and myself think that our statutes should receive a different construction from that given to them by a majority of the court. Pub. St., chap. 112, § 188, provides that "every railroad corporation shall give to all persons or companies reasonable and equal terms, facilities and accommodations for the transportation of themselves, their agents and servants, and of any merchandise and other property upon its railroad, and for the use of its depot and other buildings and grounds, and at any point where its railroad connects with another railroad, reasonable and equal terms and facilities of interchange.' Section 189 of the same chapter provides that " every railroad corporation shall promptly forward merchandise consigned or directed to be sent over another road connecting with its road, according to the directions contained thereon, or accompanying the same, and shall The English Railway and Canal Traffic Act (17 & 18 not receive and forward over its road merchandise Vict., chap. 31) requires every railway and canal comconsigued, ordered or expressly directed to be repany to afford all reasonable facilities for traffic, and ceived and forwarded by a different route." By secprovides that "no such company shall make or give tion 191, id., a railroad corporation which violates any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to these provisions is liable for all damages sustained by or in favor of any particular person or company, or reason of such violation, and to a penalty of $200, any particular description of traffic, in any respect which may be recovered to the use of the party whatever." In re Marriott v. Railway Co., 1 C. B. (N. | aggrieved, or to the use of the Commonwealth. These S.) 499, was under this statute. The complaint was sections are taken from St. 1874, chap. 372, §§ 138, 139, that the omnibus of Marriott, in which he brought 141, and St. 1880, chap. 258. Section 188, Pub. St., chap. passengers to the railroad, was excluded by the rail112, was first enacted by St. 1867, chap. 339. This secway company from its station grounds, when other tion does not in terms require that the persons or omnibuses, which brought passengers, were admitted. companies to which the corporation is required to An injunction was ordered. In re Beadell v. Railway give "reasonable and equal terms, facilities and Co., 2 C. B. (N. S.) 509, was a complaint, under the accommodations," shall own the merchandise which statute, that the railway company refused to allow is transported; nor is it limited to the delivery of the complainant to ply for passengers at his station; merchandise to be transported by the railroad corit having granted the exclusive right of taking up pas-poration. In the clause relating to connecting railsengers within the station to one Clark. The respondent allowed the complainant's cabs to enter the station for the purpose of putting down passengers, and then required him to leave the yard. An injunction was refused. One ground on which the case was dis-livering passengers and merchandise to and in receiv. tinguished from Marriott's is that the complainant was allowed to enter the yard to set down passengers, and was only prohibited from remaining to ply for

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roads, the section plainly means that railroads shall give to other railroads connecting with them, and shall receive from such other railroads reasonable and equal terms and facilities of interchange, both in de

ing them from the railroads with which they connect. The provision that every railroad corporation shall give to all persons or companies reasonable and equal

terms, facilities and accommodations for the use of the depot and other buildings and grounds, must include the use of the depot and other buildings and grounds for receiving passengers and merchandise from a railroad at the terminus where the transportation on the railroad ends, as well as for delivering passengers and merchandise to a railroad at the terminus where such transportation begins. As the last clause of the section makes provision for carriers connecting by railroad, we think that the preceding clause was intended to make provision for other connecting carriers, and to include public or common carriers, as well as private carriers actually employed by passengers, or by the owners or consignees of merchandise. Stages and expresses are the only common carriers of passengers and of merchandise to and from many places in the Commonwealth, and in connection with railroads, often form a continuous line of transportation. The statute, we think, was intended to prevent unjust discrimination by a railroad corporation between common carriers connected with it in any manner, and to require that the railroad corporation should furnish to such carriers reasonable and equal terms, facilities and accommodations in the use of its depot and other buildings and grounds for the interchange of traffic.

A railroad corporation can make reasonable rules and regulations concerning the use of its depot and other buildings and grounds, and can exclude all persons therefrom who have no business with the railroad, and it can probably prohibit all persons from soliciting business for themselves on its premises. Whatever may be its right to exclude all common carriers of passengers or of merchandise from its depot and grounds who have not an order to enter, given by persons who are or who intend to become passengers, or who own or are entitled to the possession of merchandise which has been or is to be transported, it cannot arbitrarily admit to its depot and grounds one common carrier and exclude all others. The effect of such a regulation would be to enable a railroad corporation largely to control the transportation of passengers and merchandise beyond its own line, and to establish a monopoly not granted by its charter, which might be solely for its own benefit and not for the benefit of the public. Such a regulation does not give "to all persons or companies reasonable and equal terms, facilities and accommodations," "for the use of its depot and other buildings and grounds," in the transportation of persons and property. See Parkinson v. Railway Co., L. R., 6 C. P. 554; In re Palmer v. Railway Co., id. 194; Express Co. v. Railroad Co., 57 Me. 188.

In re Marriott v. Railway Co., 1 C. B. (N. S.) 499, was an application for an injunction under St. 17 and 18 Vict., chap. 31, § 2, and an injunction was issued compelling the company to admit the complainant's omnibuses into its yard, "at all reasonable times, for the purpose of forwarding, receiving and delivering traffic upon and from its said railway, and in the same manner and to the same extent as other public vehicles of a similar description are admitted into the said yard for that purpose." In that case the company had made arrangements with one Williams to provide sufficient accommodations, by means of omnibuses, for passengers over a part of the route on which the complainant's omnibuses ran, but it appears that there were passengers from Twickenham and Hampton Wick whose sole reliance was upon the complainant's omnibuses. Williams' omnibuses were admitted within the yard, to set down and to receive passengers, but the complainant's omnibuses were not permitted to enter the yard for either purpose. The court held that as it did not appear that there was any public benefit which justified the course pursued

by the company, the arrangement with Williams was an "undue and unreasonable preference and advantage" in his favor within the meaning of the statute. In re Beadell v. Railway Co., 2 C. B. (N. S.) 509, and In re Painter v. Railway Co., id. 702, were both applications under the same statute. In one of these cases the railway company had agreed with a cab proprie tor, in consideration of £600, to allow him the exclusive liberty of plying for hire within its station; and in the other, similar exclusive privileges had been granted to a limited number of cab proprietors. The application of a cab proprietor to be admitted on equal terms was refused in each case, on the ground that it was not shown that the arrangement made by the companies was not beneficial to the public, and it was said that "the statute in question was passed for the benefit of the public and not for that of individuals." The later English cases we have cited seem to show that, under the English statute, the public convenience or inconvenience is not exclusively the test, but is only one element to be taken into account in considering what is an undue and unreasonable preference, aud that a common carrier may be regarded as representing all those persons who choose to employ him. While the English statute provides against undue and unreasonable preferences and advantages, it does not in terms provide that all persons and companies shall have reasonable and equal terms, facilities and accommodations for the use of the depot and other buildings and grounds of a railroad corporation. The statute relating to expressmen, construed in Express Co. v. Railroad Co., ubi supra, is in this respect similar in terms to Pub. St., chap. 112, § 188.

It is undoubtedly a convenience to passengers on a railroad that common carriers of passengers or of baggage and other merchandise should be in waiting on the arrival of trains at a station, although no order requiring the attendance of such carriers has been previously given. While the statute requiring a railroad corporation to give to all persons and companies reasonable and equal serms, facilities and accommodations for the use of its depot and other buildings and grounds, must, from the nature of the subject, be so construed as to permit the corporation to make such reasonable regulations as are necessary to enable it to perform, without inconvenience, its duties as a common carrier, and as the size and condition of its depot and other buildings and grounds require, yet the facts stated in the report cannot be held sufficient to warrant the plaintiff in admitting one company of expressmen to and excluding all others from the advantages of bringing express wagons within its grounds, and of accepting or of soliciting employment as a common carrier of baggage from the passengers arriving at its depot. The report does not show that any inconvenience to the railroad company or to the public using the railroad was occasioned by the defendant's entering the grounds of the company for the purpose of soliciting employment as a common carrier of baggage. Upon the facts as they appear in the report, it cannot be said that within any reasonable construction of the statute, reasonable and equal facilities were granted to the defendant, and to A. S. Porter & Sons, or that any necessity existed for giving a preference to the latter.

In Hale v. Digby, 27 Wkly Rep. 884, it was held that if a railway company licensed one person to ply with carriages within its station yard, a person not so licensed commits a trespass in entering the yard, against the prohibition of the company, although the license given was an undue preference within the meaning of St. 17 and 18 Vict.. chap. 31, § 2. See Barker v. Railway Co., 18 C. B. 46. That statute authorized an application to the Court of Common Pleas, or to a judge of that court, by any person com

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