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Circuit Court could sell, and that the court erred in its decree whereby it dissolved the injunction, which restrained the sheriff from selling the lands of the wife to satisfy the debts of the husband, who had no interest in the land * * subject to levy and sale for his debts; " and he then says that the right to the rents, issues and profits of the land had never vested in the husband. And this may be said to be generally true of this right of tenancy by the curtesy initiate, when intercepted by an act of this kind. Says Bishop on this subject: "After, not the marriage only, but the birth of a child also, capable of becoming heir to the wife's land, the husband has added to his estate for the joint lives of himself and wife the possibility of holding the land for his own life subsequently to her death, conditioned on his surviving her-that is, this is one way of stating the doctrine; and if this is the correct way, it would seem to follow that curtesy initiate stands on the same ground as dower, and legislation may cut it off at any time before it becomes consummate." 2 Bish. Mar. Wom., § 43. And Wells, in his book on the Separate Property of Married Women, says: "The very direct consequence of giv

less degree, the control of her property, free from the interference of her husband, is to postpone his rights of curtesy until her death, and hence to render it contingent on his surviving her." Wells Mar. Wom., § 38. The same view is generally held as to the right of the husband to reduce into possession the choses in action of the wife. It is not generally regarded as a vested right which may not be lawfully taken away or impaired by the Legislature. 2 Bish. Mar. Wom.. $$ 45, 46; Schouler Husb. & Wife, § 156; Henry v. Dilley, 25 N. J. Law, 302; Goodyear v. Rumbaugh, 13 Penn. St. 480; Mellinger v. Bausman, 45 id. 522; White v. White, 47 Vt. 502; Clarke v. McCreary, 12 Smedes & M. 347. Va. Sup. Ct. App., Aug. 23, 1888. Alexander v. Alexander. Opinion by Hinton, J.

consideration for this support, are still supposed to be
performed in his behalf, and in his interest, except
where they are given to her individual estate or sepa-
rate business. The wife has a right to receive her sup-
port at her husband's domicile, unless she has lost it
by misbehavior; and husband and wife together have
a joint interest in and control of the children, which
they cannot of right sever, and which are not, even in
contemplation of law, regarded as distinct, though the
courts are sometimes compelled to treat them as if
they were so, when difficulties arise which make legal
intervention essential to the protection and welfare of
the children." Suyder v. People, 26 Mich. 108; 2 Bish.
Mar. Wom., § 24. "The first section of this act," said
Burks, J., speaking for the court, in Williams v. Lord,
secures a separate estate to the woman in the prop-
erty owned by her at the time of her marriage, and
the rents, issues and profits thereof, and also in the
property acquired by her during marriage as a sepa-
rate and sole trader; while the second section secures
to her such separate estate in all property acquired by
her after and during marriage in either of the modes
desiguated in that section." 75 Va. 398. In this act
the word "acquired" refers to the actual possessioning the wife, as all the statutes now do in a greater or
and control of the property, rather than to the acqui-
sition of mere title. Such seems to have been the con-
struction given to a somewhat similar act by the Su-
preme Court of Vermont. In that case the court held
that under a statute enacting that "all personal prop-
erty and rights of personal action acquired by any
married woman, during coverture, by inheritance or
distribution, shall be held by her to her sole and sepa-
rate use, applies to a distributive share to which she
is previously entitled, but which subsequently comes
into her actual possession, on the ground that while
the right to a distributive share in her father's estate
became vested in the daughter immediately upon the
father's decease, and she became possessed of an undi-
vided portion of the property of the estate, subject to
the right of the administrator to use a'part of the same
for the payment of debts and expenses of administra.
tion, yet the particular property did not become abso-
lutely vested in her until the decree of the Probate
Court making distribution of the estate became abso-
lute." White v. White, 47 Vt. 507. This act, as was
said by Judge Burks in Williams v. Lord, supra,
makes radical changes in the legal capacity and prop-
erty rights of married women in this State. By it she
becomes the absolute owner of all the real and per-
sonal property "which she shall own at the time of
her marriage, and the rents, issues and profits
thereof; and also of all the real and personal prop-
erty or estate thereafter acquired in any of the follow-
ing modes, that is, by gift, grant, purchase, inherit-
ance, devise or bequest," or as a separate and sole
trader; subject only to curtesy consummate in her
husband, in the event that all the prerequisites shall
exist, and he shall survive the wife. Nor do we per-
ceive that there is any thing in the act which neces-
sarily impairs any vested right; for while the inevit-
able effect of any fair construction of the act is to de-
stroy curtesy initiate, and to deprive the husband of
the rights to reduce the choses in action of the wife, in-
cluding herein a legacy or distributive share, into pos-
session, yet it is believed that neither of these incho-
ate rights is a vested right which may not be inter-
cepted by act of the Legislature and taken from the
husband. In Breeding v. Davis, 77 Va. 639, this was
distinctly held to be the case as to curtesy initiate,
where the land descended upon the wife after the pas-
sage of the Married Woman's Act. The language of
Judge Lacy, speaking for the court, is: " It is clear
that the husband has no interest whatever in the lands
of the wife during coverture. * * * Hardin L.
Crum had no interest in his wife's lands which the

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SUBJECT OF HON. T. M. COOLEY'S ADDRESS
BEFORE THE STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.

HON

[ON. T. M. COOLEY has announced the following as the subject of his address before the twelfth annual meeting of the New York State Bar Associa

tion:

"The Comparative Merits of Written and Unwritten Constitutions."

The address will be delivered in the Senate Chamber, Capitol, Albany, on the third Tuesday of January next.

CORRESPONDENCE.

DEVISES AFTER PAYMENT OF DEBTS.
Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

The decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of
City of Rochester v. Smith seems to have made a se-
rious change in the law of testamentary charges on
real estate. It is reported in volume 17, page 146, New
York State Reporter, and in volume 17, page 740,
Northeastern Reporter. The words of the will are as fol-
lows: "After all my just and lawful debts are paid and
discharged, I give and bequeath," etc.
Then follows

a gift of all the testator's property to his wife and two children. In the Fox Will Case, 52 N. Y. 530, the words were as follows: "After all my lawful debts are paid and discharged, the residue of my estate, real and personal, I give, bequeath and dispose of as follows, to-wit." The phraseology in the two cases is nearly identical. In the Fox Will Cuse Judge Andrews said: "The devise being 'after payment of

debts,' was a charge of the debts upon the lands devised." But now Judge Gray, in the case just decided, holds right the other way, to-wit: that a devise after payment of debts does not of itself create a charge. The Fox Will Case seems to have been overlooked. It is not even cited in the points of counsel. If the attention of the court had been called to this and other similar cases, very likely the decision might have been different. Prominent among these other cases is Fenwick v. Chapman, 9 Pet. 461, decided in 1835. This was the language of the will: "And after my debts and funeral charges are paid, I devise and bequeath as follows." Judge Wayne said: "Without any construction of our own upon these words, the effect of them to charge the real estate is settled by decisions which are uncontested and cannot be controverted."

In the decision under review, if we except possibly Harris v. Fry, 7 Paige, 421, no American case is cited in the opinion of the court or in the points of counsel in which the will contained a devise or bequest after payment of debts or legacies. Judge Gray reviews three New York cases. The only one of these which relates to debts is Kinnier v. Rogers, 42 N. Y. 431. In this case the will contained a general direction to pay the debts, followed by the usual clause devising all the rest, residue and remainder. This was not a devise after payment of debts. The distinction between the two classes of cases was carefully observed by Chancellor Kent in the following words in Lupton v. Lupton, 2 Johns. Ch. 614, which until now have been uniformly adopted as the best exposition of the law on this subject: "Where the testator devises the real estate after payment of debts and legacies, or where he devises the real estate after a direction that debts and legacies be first paid, the real estate has been held to be charged. It is not sufficient that debts or legacies are directed to be paid. That alone does not create the charge, but they must be directed to be first or previously paid, or the devise declared to be made after they are paid." We see from this that a devise after payment of debts is one thing, and a devise after

a direction that debts be paid is another and different

thing. In the former case the words themselves, ex proprio vigore, create a change. But in the latter case the debts do not become a charge by devise after a direction to pay them, unless the context is such as to show that the testator meant that they should be first or previously paid. Wood v. Wood, 26 Barb. 356, and White v. Kane, 19 J. & S. 295, were cases of devises after payment of debts, and in both it was held, as Judges Andrews and Wayne held, that the realty was charged. In White v. Kane Judge Van Vorst said: "By force of the language of the testator's will, above given, his lawful debts were charged upon the real estate devised to his wife."

66

ELIAL F. HALL.

TEMPLE COURT, NEW YORK CITY, Nov. 10, 1888.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

again most heartily recommend this series to the profession.

2 AMERICAN STATE REPORTS.

This volume of 1,000 pages gives 200 cases from 73 California, 76 Georgia, 121 Illinois, 112 Indiana, 72 Iowa, 108 New York, 115-117 Pennsylvania State, 15 Rhode Island, 68 Texas, 69 Wisconsin. The selections are judiciously made. The notes and references are frequent. There are very extensive and exhaustive notes on remedies of tax payers for illegal corporate acts, custody of infants, burglary, agreements for ar bitration, stale claims, and summary jurisdiction over attorneys. The fifteen cases from New York exhaust those of importance in that volume. The series is now fairly launched, and gives assurance of great usefulness. Published by Bancroft-Whitney Co., San Francisco.

MILLER ON CONDITIONAL SALES.

This monograph of some 200 pages, by Charles R. Miller, published by Robert Clarke & Co., of Cincinnati, presents an enlarged view of the particular topic which must prove useful. A very considerable and important branch of the law is here reviewed in an intelligent and practical manner. The list of cases commented on covers seven pages.

JONES ON CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

The third edition of a standard and much approved work, with some sixty pages of additions, covering the 800 new cases. Mr. Jones' work needs no certificate of character. In this instance, as in others, it has earned a widespread reputation for judiciousness and Published by Little, Brown & Co., Boston. adaptation to the convenience of the practitioner.

NOTES.

THEY known Bangor lawyer who is noted for his absent mindedness. He went up his own stairs the other day, and seeing a notice on the door, "Back at 2 o'clock," sat down to wait for himself.-Bangor Commercial. We can beat that. A lawyer of this city, having to go to New York at 2:40 P. M., went home at 1 o'clock to change his shirt, completely undressed himself, put on his night-shirt and got into bed. For tunately his wife soon found him and rehabilitated him.

HEY have a good one just at present on a well

While it must be conceded that claims against the government may well be prosecuted under contracts for contingent fees, and that no evil consequences follow that practice, we think the rule does not apply to litigation in which a private person is the defendant. Such persons are often subjected to serious annoyance, and sometimes to actual loss by frivolous and malicious suits, brought upon speculation by unscru pulous attorneys, who hope to force a compromise out of which they may at least get their fees. Sometimes such actions create clouds upon title to real estate, which can only be removed by a final judgment. Such suits, brought by irresponsible plaintiffs, through ir responsible attorneys, constitute a real grievance for which the ordinary process of the law affords no remDesty. Book III, containing 3-6 Paige. Lawyers' Co-edy. The strict enforcement of the ancient rule will

NEW YORK CHANCERY REPORTS.

Reports of Cases Adjudged and Determined in the Court of Chancery of the State of New York. Complete edition, copiously annotated by embodying all equity jurisprudence with tables of cases reported and cited. By Robert

operative Publishing Co., Rochester, N. Y.

On the appearance of Book I of the above series we spoke at length of its merits (37 Alb. L. J. 364), and as the work progresses we find no reason to say that the successive volumes are not kept up to the high standard of editorial merit shown in the first book. We

operate to a certain extent to prevent these evils to limit unnecessary litigation, and to relieve the profes sion from the reproach of being always ready to undertake, upon speculation, any sort of case out of which there is a chance of making money.-Central Law Journal.

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We seldom feel called on to differ from the ac

Journal.complished editor of the Albany Times on a point

The Albany Law Journal.

RE

ALBANY, NOVEMBER 24, 1888.

CURRENT TOPICS.

of law, but in regard to the constitutional amendment just submitted to the people we are constrained to demur to his conclusions. He says: "The Citizen, commenting upon the probability of its defeat, says: 'This is to be deplored, as the amendment was intended to give the governor the power to create a second Court of Appeals to clear EPOSING on the shelves of the State law the calendar which is now years behindhand.' library, in close proximity to the yawning This is such a misleading statement of the provischinks in the walls of the Capitol's "golden corri- ions of the amendment that its adoption as a fact dor," are above a thousand volumes in one series, by the voters, as it seems to be by so intelligent a with backs resembling in breadth that of the pres- gentleman as the editor of the Citizen, would easily ent chief magistrate of this republic, or that of a have accounted for its defeat. The amendment did dowager at Saratoga Springs in the watering sea- not propose what the Citizen here states in such son. These huge volumes are seldom quoted, ex- haphazard fashion. The only power to be vested cept with dust. They are what bibliomaniacs term in the governor was to be placed there by the Court "unique" only one copy of each - but none the of Appeals itself at stated times when it should feel more valuable on that account. They are the cases the necessity, not of creating a second Court of and briefs of counsel in the Court of Appeals. We Appeals, but of designating seven justices of the have given our readers a taste from them now and present Supreme Court to assist the present Appeals then, as in the "rock and rye" case, or in that of Court. Nothing more, with no additional salary the " woman with child." It is now our chief oc- | attached, or additional officers, except a crier and cupation to read through these records in regular such attendants as might be necessary. On the course, in the preparation of a new edition of the contrary, the salary of such justices would in some reports of that court, and although as a general cases have been reduced to that of the Appeals thing it is not enlivening, yet now and then we find judges while performing this extra work. And it a gleam of humor or a trace of literary scholarship, is possible that the Supreme Court justices may like a Chinese lantern in a graveyard. We always themselves have put in a little oar here and there seize on these with avidity. The subject of our to defeat the amendment on that account." There present gleaming is not at first glance entertaining, is probably very little difference of opinion among because it is the meaning of the word "sober," but the lawyers on this subject. They almost unanithat distinguished humorist, Mr. Oakey Hall, con- mously condemn the scheme, we believe. What trives to extract some fun out of it, quite appropri- we need in this emergency is not a temporary ate to the reminiscences of the late political cam- makeshift but a permanent addition to our judicial paign. In Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 398, the force sufficient to transact the business, which, it action was for libel in publishing of a political can- is conceded, the present court is not and never will didate that "he did a good thing in his sober be able to perform; a court of judges known to the moments," by getting blood-money from the boys people beforehand as those who will sit if they apin blue; with innuendo that this meant that the peal; a court devoted to this peculiar work alone plaintiff was in the habit of getting intoxicated. and fitted by experience to deal with it; a court of Mr. A. Oakey Hall in his brief observed: "When the same members, and not shifting at the pleasure Martin Van Buren spoke of the sober second of the governor. The people have recently elected thought of the people, was it with belief that they twelve additional Supreme Court judges in order had recovered from the intoxication of Whig peach to keep up with the work of that court, and yet brandy and hard cider, or from the ira-est-brevis the amendment proposed to take some of them furor of party rancor? The poet speaks of 'Eve-away for long periods to do other work, thus leavning's sober mantle;' and novelists speak of the heroine who becomes the 'sober' matron, etc., etc. Except for the enormous verdict obtained " ($5,000), "the idea of so broadly submitting an interpretation of the word 'sober' would be simply ludicrous. But there can be little that is funny in any transaction that is unjustly expensive. Says Macaulay of Hallam, the historian of the middle ages and the English Constitution: 'His language is weighty, his eloquence high, grave and sober,' etc. Again, the same author speaks of the 'sober' majesty of Clarendon. There was not a sober person to be had; all was tempestuous and blustering.' Dryden. See her sober over a sampler, or gay over a jointed baby.' Pope."

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ing the Supreme Court business again to fall in arrears. There is no need of any certificate from the Court of Appeals as to the necessity of additional judges, for the necessity is apparent, of long standing, and threatens never to be less. The Times is wrong about the salary question. The salaries of the Court of Appeals judges are larger than those of the Supreme Court judges except in the city of New York. We think the Times is also wrong in assuming the defeat of the amendment. It has probably been carried. There has been a general impression that it must receive a majority of all those voting for members of Assembly. The language of the Constitution is a little obscure: "If the people shall approve and ratify such

amendment or amendments, by a majority of the electors qualified to vote for members of the Legislature, voting thereon, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the Constitution." This clause defines the qualifications of those entitled to vote on amendments, namely, such as are required of those voting for members of Assembly; and then it designates the requisite number, namely, a majority of such qualified electors voting thereon, i. e., on the amendment. Such is the practical construction it has always received, we believe, as for example in the election of the twelve additional Supreme Court justices. This is an anomalous state of the law. One man can possibly change the Constitution! It ought not so to be. If a majority of the voters at an election do not take interest enough in the question to vote upon it, the fundamental law of the State ought not to be changed. A strong argument can be made in opposition to this construction of the Constitution, but we guess this is what the convention

meant.

more.

California is the land of prodigious vegetable productions and extensive publishing enterprises. The Bancroft Company - not the Bancroft-Whitney Company of San Francisco, have issued a prospectus of a new series of reports, to be called the "American Law Reports." The prospectus bewails the enormous and constantly increasing number of reports, and proposes to alleviate it by issuing some Not a series of selected leading cases, from the beginning of our system down to this time, but rather an extensive digest"clear, concise and accurate analyses of all the important original decisions." The language quoted is the closest description of the intended publication which we can find in this rather vague and visionary prospectus. It is proposed to give ten volumes to the first half century of our reports, twenty-five to the second, fifty or seventy-five" to the third. Inasmuch as the Bancroft-Whitney Company and Mr. John D. Parsons, Jr., have already given us nearly if not quite all the important cases in full, with extensive notes, down to the present time, in the American Decisions and American Reports, which have been widely sold, our soul cries out against this new infliction. Spare us, good Bancroft! Devote thyself to thy little history of California in one hundred volumes, which is mercilessly grinding its way like a car of Juggernath, and let us poor lawyers sweat under the burdens we already

and "

have.

As for this old stuff we need no more of it. Something too much of it already. Let the dead cases bury their dead. The old reports in this State are practically superseded by those of the Court of Appeals. It is noticeable in the briefs in that court that the old reports are seldom cited. It is true, as the prospectus states, that the old cases are the foundations of the law, but they have been adopted in the new cases, and are no longer indispensable indeed, are only valuable in a historical view. In our opinion, very few lawyers,

who want the old cases at all, will be content with mere analyses, however well executed. The neces sity of buying the current reports will not be diminished in the slightest degree by publishing the old, or an analysis of them. We must be permitted to doubt the assertion in the prospectus that such a publication "seems to be demanded from every quarter." The only demand that reaches us from any quarter is to discourage the publication of any reports except the current decisions, and cheap and compact editions of old ones in full, with notes and references to the new ones.

NOTES OF CASES.

TN Bell v. Mahn, Pennsylvania Supreme Court,

IN Btober 1, 1989, it way vend that an opera is a

"theatrical exhibition" within the meaning of an act providing for licenses for theatrical exhibitions, circus performances and menageries. The court said: "A theater, among the ancients, was an edi fice in which spectacles or shows were exhibited for the amusement of the spectators, but in modern times a theater is a house for the exhibition of dramatic performances. A theatrical exhibition must be either such as pertains to a theater or to the drama, for the representation of which the theater is designed. Webster. A drama is a story represented by action. The representation is as if the real persons were introduced and employed in the action itself. It is ordinarily designed to be spoken, but it may be represented in pantomine, when the actors use gesticulation, sometimes in the form of the ballet, but do not speak; or in opera, where music takes the place of poetry and of ordinary speech, and the dramatic treatment is essentially different from either. An 'opera' is defined: ‘A musical drama, consisting of airs, choruses, recitations, etc., enriched with magnificent scenery, machinery and other decorations, and representing some passionate action.' Webster. The spoken drama therefore, and the opera, agree in the method or manner which is essential to the dramatic art, viz., imitation in the way of action. In the former, it is true, the actor observes the rules of rhetoric and of oratory, and follows the special laws of dramatic delivery; while in the latter he employs the power of music, both vocal and instrumental, as a medium of artistic and passionate expressionmusic however which is not arranged with reference mainly to its melodic interest, but in such form as to express not only the words but the thoughts, emotions and passions of the mind, such as joy, grief, hope, despair, etc., which the idea or conception of the play may involve. The wordsetting, the orchestrazation, the musical intervals, and the composition generally, are all arranged to serve the exigency of the passing sentiment, and to turn the subject of the story into the action of the play. In short, the opera is composed with reference to the declamatory power of music. It is contended on part of the defendant that the essential

be effectively given, the opera would seem to be
embraced within its meaning. The Legislature hav-
ing determined as to the propriety and policy of
requiring a license fee for all theatrical exhibitions,
it would be difficult to state any reasonable ground
for a distinction between the spoken and the lyri-
cal drama which would justify the exaction of a
license fee from one and the exemption of the
other. They are exhibitions of the same general
character, and there is no reason why one should
bear the public burden more than the other. Both
are places of popular amusement, and both collect
large assemblages of the people, and require addi-
tional police protection. These considerations are
proper in determining the intent of the Legislature.
It may be that in the discussion of this case we have
gone out of the record somewhat. In this we have
followed the example of the learned and able coun-
sel in the arguments which they have submitted."
Negro minstrelsy is a "theatrical entertainment."
Taxing District v. Emerson, 4 Lea, 312.
dancing is an "entertainment of the stage." Gallini
v. Labone, 5 T. R. 242. But not as matter of law,
when disconnected from acting. Wigan v. Strange,
L. R., 1 C. P. 175. A circus on a stage is a "the-
atrical performance." Cheney v. Stetson, Mass. Supe-
rior Ct., 1878, Gray, C. J. Tumbling is not an
Rex v. Handy, 6 T. R. 287.

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element of the opera is music; and of the drama,
plot and action, dialogue and declamation; that
the music of a modern opera is not simply an acces-
sory to the play; that the libretto is but a peg on
which to hang the music; that an opera is essen-
tially a musical work, and its performance cannot
be called a dramatic representation, and in that
sense a theatrical exhibition. A quotation from
Zell's Encyclopædia to this effect is given in sup-
port of this contention. While this may be true as
to the works of some of the composers of opera
music, or as to individual selections from them, it
is certainly not the general principle upon which
this particular head of musical composition pro-
ceeds. In the recent American reprint of the En-
cyclopædia Britannica we find it stated, as the gen-
eral and well-recognized principle of the opera,
that the exigencies of the action and the require-
ments of the text should rule the musical designs
in a lyrical drama, and that the instrumental por-
tions of the composition should, quite as much as
those assigned to voices, illustrate the progress of
the scene and the significance of the words.' This
principle, which is said to have been anticipated
by Montaverde as early as 1607 in his opera of Ari-
anna, was recognized and followed a century and a
half later in the works of Ritter Von Gluck, and is
the governing principle in all the musical composi-tertainment of the stage.
tions of the late Richard Wagner designed for the
opera. Such,' says the Britannica, referring to
this fundamental principle, must be the true faith
of the operatic composer. It has again and again
been opposed by the superstitious that feats of vo-
cal agility, and other snares for popular applause,
were lawful elements of dramatic effect; but it has
ever inspired the thoughts of the greatest artists,
and revealed itself in their work, and no one writer
more than another can claim to have devised, or to
have first acted upon this natural creed.' The
opera is essentially and in every point of view a
dramatic composition, and its representation a dra-
matic exhibition. It is a matter of common knowl-
edge that some of the most famous dramatic char-
acters of modern times have developed their ex-
quisite powers upon the operatic stage. It may of
course be conceded that music is in some sense an
essential element in the opera. In this respect it is
distinguished from the spoken drama, but the fun-
damental and really essential element of both is
action. The opera-house and the theater alike
comprehend the stage, proscenium boxes, orches-
tra, pit or parquette, and the galleries. The scenic
representation is of the same general character, and
the stage machinery and decorations of the same
order. The ordinary theater is adapted to the per-
formance of the opera, and it is well known that
this form of exhibition, especially of the light opera
and the opera comique, rendered 'partly in song
and partly in dialogue,' forms in these days a
prominent feature of theater work. Therefore
whether the term 'theatrical' in the act of 1845 be
deemed a qualification of the scenic representation,
or of the house and its adaptations in which it may

Ballet

"en

In Re Thomas, 36 Fed. Rep. 242, upon a motion to disbar attorneys for malpractice, it was shown that they were notified that the deposition of a witness for whom they had sought would be taken by the adverse party. Being desirous of knowing what he would testify they sent an agent to see him, with instructions to try to incline him as favorably toward their client as possible. Their agent induced the witness to keep out of the way, making him drunk for the purpose, and got him to come to the city where one of the attorneys was, and have a consultation with the latter at his office. There was no evidence that the attorneys directed the witness to be made drunk, or to be kept out of the way, nor that he should be bribed or intimidated. Held, not sufficient misconduct for disbarment.

Mr. Justice Miller said: " Mr. Thomas' view of some of these things may be unfortunate; and his explanation of why he did some of these things does not, in my opinion, come up to the highest standard of honor in the legal profession. He has views about those things which I would not approve. He has notions about the rights and duties of an attorney to look after his client's interests, and to seek interviews with his opponent's witnesses, and to bring them to his office, and things of that kind, which I do not think are justifiable. But we cannot expect every attorney of the court to be imbued with the very highest standard of legal ethics, and it would be a very dangerous rule that would throw every man over the bar whose views upon that subject were of a lower grade than those of gentlemen of a higher notion of the moral

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