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day, and in certain conditions of the atmosphere, it was very offensive in the front of their dwelling, must be given the credit that such evidence is always entitled to. The fact that the dwelling of the complainant is the only one in that immediate vicinity cannot in the least detract from or diminish his rights as a citizen in a case of this character. The defendants anxiously insist that if the injunction is made perpetual it should be without costs, because the suit was instituted without justifiable cause, and has been prosecuted more for the costs than for any beneficial purpose. Counsel pressed the point that if the complainant had any rights he was pursuing them with a malicious intent and spirit, and therefore he should not be encouraged by awarding to him the ordinary fees fixed by law which attend such a litigation. This view cannot be entertained. Davis v. Flagg, 35 N. J. Eq. 491; Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 N. Y. 39; Kiff v. Youmans, 86 id. 329; Nichols v. Pinner, 18 id. 303. The defendants were warned of the wrong they were doing the complainant before he filed his bill, and they persisted in the course which the court now finds itself called upon to condemn."

which the person setting the fire should not be held responsible. 1 Thomp. Neg. 144. Our cases are in harmony with the general principles herein announced. Smith v. Thomas, 23 Ind. 69; Pennsylvania Co. v. Hensil, 70 id. 569; City of Greencastle v. Martin, 74 id. 450; Billman v. Railroad Co., 76 id. 166; City of Crawfordsville v. Smith, 79 id. 308; Railroad Co. v. Buck, 96 id. 346; Bloom v. Insurance Co., 97 id. 478; Pennsylvania Co. v. Whitlock, 99 id. 16. Heavenridge was clearly an intervening as well as an independent human agency in the infliction of the injuries of which the plaintiff complained."

Apropos of the right of foot-travellers in streets, in Undhejem v. Hastings, Minnesota Supreme Court, June 11, 1888, an action for an injury caused by defendant's negligently driving his buggy against plaintiff in a public street, it not appearing that the street was much thronged with vehicles, held, that it was not negligence per se in plaintiff to go along in the street, for a lawful purpose, without looking behind him to see if vehicles might be approaching from that direction. The court said: "The plaintiff, carrying his dinner-basket, and on his way to his home, entered a street car on Twentieth avenue north, in the city of Minneapolis. Finding he was on the wrong car he immediately left it while it was going rapidly, intending to take another car. In leaving it he dropped some articles from his basket upon the ground and at once went back, walking along the street-railway track picking up the dropped articles, and without looking behind him, when the defendant, who was in his

A rather amusing application of the doctrine of remote cause was made in Alexander v. Town of New Castle, Indiana Supreme Court, May 29, 1888, where it was held that a town is not liable to one who is injured by falling into an excavation in the street when the fall was wholly occasioned by the act of another, who willfully seized plaintiff and threw him into the pit. The court said: "Wharton in his work on the Law of Negligence, at sec-buggy, driving rapidly along the street toward him tion 134, says: 'Supposing that, if it had not been for the intervention of a responsible third party, the defendant's negligence would have produced no damage to the plaintiff, is the defendant liable to the plaintiff? This question must be answered in negative, for the general reason that causal connection between negligence and damage is broken by the interposition of independent responsible human action. I am negligent on a particular subjectmatter as to which I am not contractually bound. Another person, moving independently, comes in and either negligently or maliciously so acts as to make my negligence injurious to a third person. If so, the person so intervening acts as a non-conductor, and insulates my negligence so that I cannot be sued for the mischief which the person so intervening directly produces, he is the one who is liable to the person injured. I may be liable to him for my negligence in getting him into difficulty, but I am not liable to others for the negligence which he alone was the cause of making operative.' So if a house has been negligently set on fire, and the fire has spread beyond its natural limits by means of a new agency; for example, if a high wind arose after its ignition and carried burning brands to a great distance, thus causing a fire and a loss of property at a place which would have been safe but for the wind, the loss so caused by the wind will be set down as a remote consequence for

from the direction behind him, drove so that the buggy-wheel struck plaintiff's leg and broke it. Plaintiff did not see the horse or buggy till he was struck, nor did he look in the direction from which it came after he let go of the street car. The court below held that to go along the street picking up the articles he had dropped without looking to see if any vehicle might be coming along the street behind him, was so clearly negligence that there was no question upon it for the jury to pass upon. In this the court erred. It cannot be laid down as a rule that in all cases, without regard to the extent to which the street is usually traveled, it is negligence for one ou foot to cross it or walk in it without looking in each direction to see if a vehicle may be approaching. To do so upon a crowded city street, where vehicles driven rapidly pass each way every instant, and where the crowd of vehicles prevent the drivers seeing readily a person on foot in a part of the street other than the crossings, and where, consequently, danger is nearly always present, might be so patently negligent that a reasonable mind could come to but one conclusion; while it would be otherwise if the street were but little frequented. In the latter case it might or might not be negligent, depending on other circumstances; such, for instance, as the length of time spent in the street without looking around. Conduct that would be manifestly negligent in crossing or going

along a railroad track owing to the magnitude of the danger to be apprehended, and the difficulty of escaping it, might raise no imputation of negligence in crossing or traveling along a common country road. It does not appear that Twentieth avenue, at the place where the injury was sustained, was much traveled. The only evidence touching the point was that of plaintiff, that 'there were no other teams or conveyances on the street,' indicating that it was not thronged to such extent as to call necessarily for the conclusion that no prudent man would have gone along the street as plaintiff (he being there for a lawful purpose) without looking behind to see if vehicles might be approaching. The question of his negligence was, on the evidence, for the jury."

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The action was against the defendant and his wife for libel, and for malicious damage to a document.

At the trial before Mathew, J., and a jury, it appeared from the opening speech of the plaintiff's counsel that the plaintiff, a domestic servant, had been in the employ of a lady who had since gone abroad, and who gave him a good character in writing. The plaintiff afterward entered the service of the defendant on the faith of the character, which he handed to the defendant. Finding that the place did not suit him, the plaintiff gave notice to leave. After the notice had been given, the defendant one morning summarily dismissed the plaintiff, charging him with having been absent from the house during the night without leave. The plaintiff asked for his character, which was delivered to him by the defendant's wife, when it was found that the defamatory words complained of had been written upon it by the defendant.

The words were to the effect that plaintiff had been dismissed for staying out all night without leave.

On the opening the learned judge held that there was no publication, and with respect to the claim for maliciously damaging the character, that it was the property of the plaintiff, but that he could not recover more damages than a shilling. The verdict was entered accordingly.

Bassett Hopkins, for plaintiff.

Roland V. Williams, for defendant.

HUDDLESTON, B. Two questions arise in this case. First, whether there was a publication under the circumstances; and secondly, whether the learned judge was right in taking upon himself the issue as to the amount of damages to which the plaintiff was entitled. With respect to the first of those points this is, as far as we know, the first time it has ever been alleged in cases of this kind that the handing over of a libel by the libeller to his wife is a publication. I think that

the question can be decided on the common-law principle that husband and wife are one. The uttering of a libel to the party libelled is clearly no publication for the purposes of a civil action. And if a libel is uttered on a privileged occasion to a husband when his wife is present, it has been held that her presence does not take away the privilege.

In Odgers on Libel and Slander (2d ed.), p. 153, there is a reference to Trumbull v. Gibbons, 3 City Hall Recorder, 97, an American case, of which there is a note in Townshend on Slander and Libel, as follows: "Gibbons wrote defamatory matter of Trumbull, and had fifty copies printed in pamphlet form in Massachusetts. Forty-five copies he retained and five he sent to his wife in New Jersey, indorsing four of them with the names of certain persons, acquaintances of his wife, but without any instructions to the wife as to how she should dispose of the copies so sent to her. The wife delivered two of the copies in New Jersey to the persons whose names were indorsed thereon, and the others she delivered in New Jersey to Trumbull, who exhibited them to various persons. On Trumbull suing Gibbons in New York for libel, it was contended for defendant (1) that there was no publication by defendant, (2) or no publication within the State. The second point was overruled, and as to the first it was held that the delivery of the manuscript to be printed was a publication, although a delivery to a wife in confidence would not be a publication, yet in the case then before the court the wife acted as the agent of her husband, and her delivery of the pamphlets amounted to a publication by the defendant. Trumbull v. Gibbons, supra."

We think it our duty to hold, that according to a well-recognized principle, husband and wife are in the same position, and therefore that the uttering of a libel by a husband to his wife is no publication, in cases apart from the Married Women's Property Act, and that on that ground the decision of the learned judge was right.

With respect to the other questions it was a matter of much more difficulty, viz., how for the learned judge at the trial was justified in taking on himself the duties of a jury with respect to damages.

For the defendant it is contended, first, that the document defaced was not the plaintiff's property; and next, that the act done to it was not done maliciously or mischievously, but bona fide and without malice. The learned judge held that the testimonial so handed over by the plaintiff to the defendant was and remained the property of the plaintff. I do not at present think that we are in a position to say that the learned judge was right or wrong on the point. There is much in the argument of the learned counsel that it would be a question for the jury, looking at all the circumstances, whether when the plaintiff handed over the testimonial to the defendant he did so with the intention of passing the property in it. There is a material distinction between the letters ordinarily written in answer to an inquiry as to a servant's character-which would probably be the property of the master proposing to engage the servant-and a general testimonial of good character, which is, I should think, intended to be used as a voucher on future 00casions. In this case the lady who gave the testimonial was abroad, and could not be applied to for a renewal of it. There might have been a question for the jury whether under the circumstances the handing over of the testimonial was a deposit, or a parting with the property so as to vest it in the defendants. If the jury found that it was merely a deposit, the illustration given in argument of handing over the diploma on an application for a situation would apply. However the learned judge decided that point in favor of the plaintiff. The next point is that the learned judge

took upon himself to decide the amount of damages. We think that was a matter entirely for the jury. The learned judge seems to have thought that the only measure of damage was the expense of obtaining a renewal of the character. But it cannot be said that that expense would be no more than a shilling. There might be much expense in finding out where the lady was,

trial, and the verdict and judgment for the defendant
on the first part of the claim will stand.
Judgment accordingly.

[See Larison v. State, 36 Alb. L. J. 77.-ED.]

АСТ.

and in communicating with her. Further if the injury | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OLEOMARGARINE found that the indorsement was malicious they might have given large damage, Under these circumstances we think that on the ground that there was no publication the verdict must be entered for the defendant on the claim for libel, aud that the other issues must be sent down to be retried by a jury.

The

MANISTY, J. I come to the same conclusion. case, although in one view a comparatively small one, involves a very important principle. On the first point the maxim and principle acted on for centuries is still in existence, viz., that as regards this case, husband and wife are in point of law one person. The earlier authorities on this point are collected in Montague Lush on Husband and Wife, at p. 3.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, APRIL 9, 1888.

POWELL V. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA.* FIELD, J. (dissenting). The plaintiff in error was indicted in one of the courts of Pennsylvania for selling as an article of food two cases of oleomargarine butter, containing five pounds each, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $100. The case being taken to the Supreme Court of the State, the judgment was affirmed, and to review it the case was brought to this court. The statute under which the conviction was had was passed on the 21st of May, 1885, and went into effect on the 1st of July following. It declares in its first section "that no person, firm or corporate body shall manufacture out of any oleaginous substance or any compound of the same, other than that produced from unadulterated milk, or cream from the same, any article designed to take the place of butter or cheese, produced from pure, unadulterated milk, or cream from the same or of any imitation or adulterated butter or cheese, nor shall sell, or offer with intent to sell the same as an article of food." In for sale, or have in his, her or their possession, another section the act made a violation of these provisions a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than $100, nor more than $300, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than ten nor more than thirty days, or both such fine and imprisonment, for the first offense, and imprisonment for one year for every subsequent offense. The act, it is to be ob

It would be enough to say that that is the law and the ground of the law. But what is the real foundation of it? It is, after all, a question of public policy, or as it has been well called, social policy. No doubt that principle has been interfered with by judge-made law. Public opinion has altered in some circumstances, and no better illustration of that can be given than the change of view as to deeds of separation between husband and wife. But if the public policy is considered, what is there to show any change in judicial opinion or public policy with respect to communications between husband and wife hitherto held sacred? It has been argued that in some cases it might be well that publication of slander by a man to his wife should be actionable. But look at the other side; would it be well for us to lay down now that any defamation communicated by a husband to a wife was actionable? To do so might lead to results disastrous to social life, and I for one would be no party to mak-served, is not designed to prevent any deception in the ing new law to support such actions. I may say incidentally that there is no pretense for arguing that this action could be maintained against the female defendant, for all that she did was to hand the alleged libel

to the plaintiff himself, so judgment should have been entered for her. Then as to the other question. The learned judge proceeded on the ground that there was no evidence of damage. If that was so, what becomes of the cause of action? The allegation is that the defendant maliciously-for mischievously may be put

out of consideration-defaced the testimonial. That involves two questions; first, whether the indorsement was written maliciously or bona fide on a document not the property of the plaintiff. The learned judge held that the document was the property of the plaintiff, and must also have held that the indorsement was maliciously written, but he thought that the damages were only a shilling. I think the question of property was for the jury. Under certain circumstances the testimonial might be the property of the defendant. It might be that the testimonial was only deposited with the defendant, and was the prop erty of the servant. But that is a question of fact and not of law. The next point is more serious. The learned judge held that there was no evidence of damage, but to sustain the verdict on this part of the claim the act of indorsing must have been done maliciously. The damage was a question for the jury. So I think that in coming to the conclusion that there was no evidence of damage, and therefore taking on himself to give a verdict for a shilling, the learned judge was wrong and therefore that the issues on the second part of the statement of claim must go down to a new

manufacture and sale of the article of oleomargarine butter, or any attempt to pass it off as butter

made of milk or cream. The title would indicate that the act was intended for the protection of the public health, and to prevent the adulteration of dairy products, and fraud in the sale thereof. It is probable that the original draft of the act had such a purpose, and that the title was allowed to remain after its body was changed. Be this as it may, the act is one prohibiting the manufacture or sale, or keeping for sale, of the article, though no concealment is attempted as to its character, nature or ingredients. Its validity is rested simply upon the fact that it has pleased the Legislature of the Commonwealth to declare that the article shall not be manufactured or sold or kept for sale within its limits. On the trial the defendant offered to prove by competent witnesses that the article healthy, and was as wholesome and nutritious as butmanufactured was composed of ingredients perfectly ter produced from pure milk or cream; but the court refused to allow the evidence on the ground that it was immaterial and irrelevant. It was sufficient, in its judgment, that the Legislature had passed the act, to render a disregard of its provisions a public offense. The defendant also offered to prove that the article sold by him was a part of a large and valuable quantity manufactured prior to the passage of the act of

May 21, 1885, in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth relating to the manufacture and sale of the article: but this offer was also rejected on the same ground, as immaterial and irrelevant. The case is therefore to be considered as if the proof offered *For majority opinion see 37 Alb. L. J. 370.

had been received. Scotland Co. v. Hill, 112 U. S. 183, 186.

cal interest were necessarily subject to the State regulation, and whether that was wisely or unwisely enacted, it was not a question which could come under the consideration of this court. The government created by the Constitution was not designed for the

The States required no aid from any external authority to manage their domestic affairs. It was only for matters which affected all the States, or which could not be managed by them in their individual capacity, or managed only with great difficulty and embarrassment, and a general and common government was desired.

Two questions are thus distinctly presented: First, whether a State can lawfully prohibit the manufacture of a healthy and nutritious article of food designed to take the place of butter, out of any oleagin-regulation of matters purely local in their character. ous substance, or compound of the same, other than that produced from pure milk or cream, and its sale when manufactured; aud second, whether a State can without compensation to the owner prohibit the sale of an article of food, in itself healthy and nutritious, which has been manufactured in accordance with its laws. These questions are not presented in the opinion of the court as nakedly and broadly as here stated, but they nevertheless truly indicate the precise points involved, and nothing else. Upon first impressions one would suppose that it would be a matter for congratulation on the part of the State that in the progress of science a means had been discovered by which a new article of food could be produced, equally healthy and nutritious with, and less expensive than one already existing, and for which it could be used as a substitute. Thanks and rewards would seem to be the natural return for such a discovery, and the increase of the article by the use of the means thereby encouraged. But not so thought the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. By the enactment in question it declared that no article of food to take the place of butter shall be manufactured out of any other oleaginous matter than that which is produced from pure milk or cream, or be sold within its limits or kept for sale, under penalty of fine and imprisonment.

If the first question presented can be answered, as it has been by the court, in the affirmative, I do not see why it is not equally within the competency of the Legislature to forbid the production and sale of any new article of food, though composed of harmless ingredients, and perfectly healthy and nutritious in its character; or even to forbid the manufacture and sale of articles of prepared food now in general use, such as extracts of beef and condensed milk, and the like, whenever it may see fit to do so; its will in the matter constituting the only reason for the enactment. The doctrine asserted is nothing less that the competency of the Legislature to prescribe, out of different articles of healthy and nutritious food, what shall be manufactured and sold within its limits, and what shall not be thus manufactured and sold. I have always supposed that the gift of life was accompanied with the right to seek and produce food, by which life can be preserved and enjoyed, in all ways not encroaching upon the equal rights of others. I have supposed that the right to take all measures for the support of life, which are innocent in themselves, is an element of that freedom which every American citizen claims as his birthright. I admit that previous to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution the validity of such legislation was to be determined by the Constitution of the State, and that its tribunals were the authoritative interpreters of its meaning. This court could exercise no appellate jurisdiction over the judgments of the State courts in matters of purely local concern. Their judgments in such cases were final and conclusive. If the legislation of the State thus sustained was oppressive and unjust, the remedy could be found only in subsequent legislation, brought about through the influence of wiser views and a more enlightened policy on the part of the people. From the structure of our dual government, in which the United States exercise only such powers as are expressly delegated to them by the Constitution, or necessarily implied, all others not prohibited to the States being reserved to them respectively or to the people, the great mass of matters of lo

Only such powers of internal regulation were therefore conferred as were essential to the successful and efficient working of the government established, to facilitate intercourse and commerce between the people of different States, and to secure to them equality of protection in the several States, and only such restraints were placed upon the action of the States as would prevent conflict with its authority, to secure the fulfillment of contract obligations, and insure protection against punishment by legislative decree or by retrospective legislation. By the first section of the fourteenth amendment, which had its origin in the new conditions and necessities growing out of the late civil war, further restraints were placed upon the power of the States in some particulars, a disregard of which subjected their action to review by this court. That section is as follows: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the eqnal protection of the laws." It is the clause declaring that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law" which applies to the present case. This provision is found in the Constitutions of nearly all the States, and was designed to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of life and liberty, and the arbitrary spoliation of property. As I said on a former occasion, it means that neither can be taken, or the enjoyment thereof impaired, except in the course of the regular administration of the law in the established tribunals. It has always been supposed to secure to every person the essential conditions for the pursuit of happiness, and is therefore not to be construed in a narrow or restricted sense. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 366.

By "liberty" as thus used is meant something more than freedom from physical restraint or imprisonment. It means freedom, not merely to go wherever one may choose, but to do such acts as he may judge best for his interest not inconsistent with the equal rights of others; that is, to follow such pursuits as may be best adapted to his faculties, and which will give to him the highest enjoyment. As said by the Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Marx: "The term 'liberty' as protected by the Constitution, is not cramped into a mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, as by incarceration, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which ho has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare." 99 N. Y. 386. And again in Re Jacobs: "Liberty in its broad sense, as understood in this country, means the right, not only of freedom from actual servitude, imprisonment or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties, in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful

calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or vocation." 98 N. Y. 98.

With the gift of life there necessarily goes to every one the right to do all such acts, and follow all such pursuits, not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as may support life and add to the happiness of its possessor. The right to pursue one's happiness is placed by the Declaration of Independence among the inalienable rights of man, with which all men are endowed, not by the grace of emperors or kings, or by force of legislative or constitutional enactments, but by their Creator; and to secure them, not to grant them, governments are instituted among men. The right to procure healthy and nutritious food, by which life may be preserved and enjoyed, and to manufacture it, is among those inalienable rights, which in my judgment no State can give, and no State can take away, except in punishment for crime. It is involved in the right to pursue one's happiness. This doctrine is happily expressed and illustrated in People v. Marx, cited above, where the precise question here was presented. That case arose upon an indictment for a violation of a provision of an act of the Legislature of New York, entitled "An act to prevent deception in the sale of dairy products," a section of which was almost identical in language with the first section of the act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania under consideration. The defendant was convicted by the Court of General Sessions of New York. The conviction was affirmed by the General Term of the Supreme Court, and from that decision an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment was reversed. The court was of opinion that the object and effect of the act, notwithstanding its title, was not to supplement existing provisions against fraud and deception by means of imitation of dairy butter, but to prohibit the manufacture and sale of any article which could be used as a substitute for it, however openly and fairly the character of the substitute might be avowed and published, to drive the substituted article from the market, and protect those engaged in the manufacture of dairy products against the competition of cheaper substances capable of being applied to the same uses as articles of food. At the trial, and on the argument of the appeal, the ground was taken, that if such were the case, the manufacture or sale of any oleaginous compound, however pure and wholesome, as an article of food, if it was designed to take the place of dairy butter, was by that act made a crime; and the court said: "The result of the argument is, that if in the progress of science a process is discovered of preparing beef tallow, lard or any other oleaginous substance, and communicating to it a palatable flavor, so as to render it serviceable as a substitute for dairy butter, and equally nutritious and valuable, and the article can be produced at a comparatively small cost, which will place it within the reach of those who cannot afford to buy dairy butter, the ban of this statute is upon it. Whoever engages in the business of manufacturing or selling the probibited product is guilty of a crime; the industry must be suppressed; those who could make a livelihood by it are deprived of that privilege; the capital invested in the business must be sacrificed; and such of the people of the State as cannot afford to buy dairy butter must eat their bread unbuttered."

And after referring to the State Constitution, which provides that no member of the State shall be disfranchised, or be deprived of any of the rights and privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers; and to the clause which declares that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; and to the first section of the article of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution

the court said: "These constitutional safeguards have been so thoroughly discussed in recent cases that it would be superfluous to do more than refer to the conclusions which have been reached bearing upon the question now under consideration. Among these no proposition is now more firmly settled than that it is one of the fundamental rights and privileges of every American citizen to adopt and follow such lawful industrial pursuit, not injurious to the community, as he may see fit." And referring to various decisions as to the meaning of liberty, among which was one that the right to liberty embraces the right of man "to exercise his faculties and to follow a lawful vocation for the support of life," the court said: "Who will have the temerity to say that these constitutional principles are not violated by an enactment which absolutely prohibits an important branch of industry for the sole reason that it competes with another, and may reduce the price of an article of food for the human race? Measures of this kind are dangerous even to their promoters. If the argument of the respondent in support of the absolute power of the Legislature to prohibit one branch of industry for the purpose of protecting another with which it competes, can be sustained, why could not the oleomargarine manufacturers, should the obtain sufficient power to influence or control the legislative councils, prohibit the manufacture or sale of dairy products? Would arguments then be found wanting to demonstrate the invalidity, under the Constitution, of such an act? The principle is the same in both cases. The numbers engaged upon each side of the controversy cannot influence the question here. Equal rights to all are what are intended to be secured by the establishment of constitutional limits to legislative power, and impartial tribunals to enforce them."

The answer made to all this reasoning and this decision is that the act of Pennsylvania was passed in the exercise of its police power; meaning by that term its power to provide for the health of the people of the State. Undoubtedly this power of a State extends to all regulations affecting, not only the health, but the good order, morals and safety of society; but a law does not necessarily fall under the class of police regulations because it is passed under the pretense of such regulations, as in this case, by a false title, purporting to protect the health, and prevent the adulteration of dairy products, and fraud in the sale thereof. It must have in its provisions some relation to the end to be accomplished. If that which is forbidden is not injurious to the health or morals of the people, if it does not disturb their peace or menace their safety, it derives no validity by calling it a police or health law. Whatever name it may receive, it is nothing less than an unwarranted interference with the rights and the liberties of the citizen.

In Re Jacobs the law possed was entitled "An act to improve the public health by prohibiting the manufacture of cigars and preparation of tobacco in any form in tenement houses in certain cases, and regulating the use of tenement houses in certain cases." It prohibited the manufacture of cigars or preparation of tobacco in any form on any floor, or in any part of any floor, in any tenement house, if such floor, or part of such floor, was occupied by any person as a home or residence for the purpose of living, sleeping, cooking or doing any household work therein; and declared that every person who was guilty of a violation of the act, or of having caused another person to commit such violation, should be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished by a fine of not less than $10 nor more than $100, or by imprisonment for not less than ten days nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. The tenement house used had four floors, and seven rooms on each floor,

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