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days. Held, that the sentence was null and the action CRIMINAL LAW - ADULTERY – INDICTMENT.-U1of the mayor arbitrary and oppressive. The ordi- der a statute providing that “a man with another nance in question is evtitled a “ Dog Ordinance," and man's wife, or a woman with another woman's husmerely provides for the killing of dogs running at band, found in bed together, under circumstances large on the streets, but denounces no penalty what- | affording presumption of an illicit intention, shall each ever against the owners of such animals or against any | be punished," etc., an indictment charging that the one for a violation of the ordinance. Nor are we respondent “ being they and there a man" was found pointed to any law of the State and kvow of none in bed with anotber mau's wife, “under circumstances under which the action of this officer can obtain the affording presumption of an illicit and felonious in. least justification or its enormity be palliated. La. tention," is bad for lack of allegation as to what the Sup. Ct., Feb. 13, 1888. State v. Vay. Opinion by “illicit intention" was. The rulo as to when it is suffTodd, J.
cient to charge an offense in the words of the statute ('OPYRIGHT – SHEET MUSIC – PERFORATED STRIPS was stated in State v. Higgins, 53 Vt. 191, being quoted FOR ORGANETTES.-The manufacture and sale of per from Mr. Pomeroy, and was thus: “ Whether an inforated strips of paper to be used in organettes, and dictment in the words of a statute is sufficient or not, by which a certain tune is produced, is not a violation depends on the manner of stating the offense in the of the copyrighted sheet musio of the same tune. statute; if every fact necessary to constitute the This case has been thoroughly presented to the court. | offense is charged, or necessarily implied by following It is admitted that the plaintiffs are the owners of a the language of the statute, the indictment in the valid copyright in a certain song and musical compo- | words of the statute is undoubtedly sufficient; othersition entitled “Cradle's Empty, Baby's Gone," and wise not." That rule, in substance, bas always been that the defendant makes perforated papers, which the test applied to indictments in this State. Uuder when used in organettes, produce the same music. | it this indictment is insufficient. The word “illicit,': The sole questiou in issue is whether these perforated as its derivation indicates, means that which is unlawsheets of paper are an infringement of copyrighted | ful or forbidden by the law. Bouv. Law Dict. ; Webst. sbeet music. To the ordinary mind it is certainly a | Dict. It is not claimed that every illicit intention difficult thing to consider these strips of paper as sheet would warrant a conviction under this statute. It music. There is no clef, or bars, or lines, or spaces or must be a particular unlawful intention. Therefore other marks which are found in common printed inu as the indictment stands, all the allegations might be sic, but only plain strips of paper with rows of boles true and the respondent be not guilty. The illicit inor perforations. Copyright is the exclusive right of tention might have been to steal, burn or murder, as the owner to multiply and to dispose of copies of an well as to have unlawful sexual connection). Vt. Sup. intellectual production. Drone Copyr. 100. I cannot | Ct., Feb. 24, 1888. State y, Miller. Opinion by Veaconvince myself that these perforated strips of paper zey, J. are copies of sheet music within the meaning of the copyright law. They are not made to be addressed to DEDICATION — USE OF ALLEY — LAYING SEWERthe eye as sheet music, but they form part of a ma PIPES ACROSS.-A grantor of a block of city lots laid chine. They are not designed to be used for such | out an alley and dedicated it for the use of all the lots purposes as sheet music, nor do they in any sense OC in the block. It did not appear that the dedication cupy the same field as sheet music. They are a mecbani. was for any particular purpose or under any restriccal invention made for the sole purpose of performing tions. For many years the alley was used as a pastunes mechanically upon a musical instrument. The sage-way, and for drainage of waste water. Held, bill itself states that they are adapted and intended for that the laying of underground sewer-pipes across it a use wholly different from any use possible to be made by the owner of part of the lots was a reasonable and of the ordinary sheet music. Their use resembles proper use. We must assume that the alley was demore nearly the barrel of a hand organ or music box. | sigued for the use of the lots in common, for such purIt is said that sheet music may consist of different poses as an alley may ordinarily be applied. Nor is any characters or methods, as for example the Sol Fa inference of the existence of any restriction to be method, and that the perforated strips of the defend drawn from the manner in which the alley was used, ant are simply another form of musical notation; but for the use of it has been in accordance with the genthe reply to this is that they are not designed or used eral purpose stated. At first ashes were thrown upon as a new form of musical notation. If they were, the it to keep it dry, and people passed and repassed along case would be different. Again it is said that they | it at their pleasure. Ditches were dug from time to can be used as sheet music the same as the Sol Fa | time upon it for drainage of the waste and surface method; but the answer to this is that they are not so water accumulated on the lots. It seems to have been used. While it may not be denied that some persons, used as any other alley similarly situated. Finally it by study and practice, may read music from these was pared with brick, and continued in this condition perforated strips, yet as a practical question in the until the defendant put in his sewer. If it was not remusical profession, or in the sale of printed music, it stricted in its dedication, and has been used for the may be said that they are not recognized as sheet mu general purpose of an alley, the mere fact that it bas. sic. The question is not what may be done as an ex- as yet been used only for a passage-way and for drainperiment, but whether, in any fair or proper sense age of the surface water, would not of necessity rethese perforated rolls of paper, made expressly for use strict it to these purposes in the future; the use to in a musical instrument, can be said to be copies of which it may be applied would depend upon the sheet music. The complainants further suggest that growth of the city, the improrement of the adjacent the Sol Fa cops, or the raised copy for the blind, do property, and the municipal regulations affecting the not take the place of printed music, in reply to which public health. Upon what evidence can it be said that it may be said that their purpose and object is to sup the property holders adjacent to this alley were simply ply the place of printed music, and that they subserve entitled to a passage-way, and to the drainage of the the same purpose. I find no decided cases which, di surface water? If it might be used for the drainage rectly or by analogy, support the position of the plain of surface water, why not for the drainage of any tiffs, and it seems to me that both upon reason and other accumulations which might come upon the authority they have failed to show any infringement | premises in the ordinary and natural user of the propof their copyright. Muss. U. S. Cir. Ct., Jan. 27, 1888. erty? The occupancy of the alley for drainage purKennedy v. McTammany. Opinion by Colt, J. | poses, by putting in connections with the city sewer,
would seem to be a most reasonable and proper use of that in the absence of proof the law of a foreign State the alley, under the terms of the dedication, and to be will be presumed to be the same as that of the forum. in conformity also with the general purposes to which But an examination of a number of such cases bas de. it bas heretofore been applied. Penn. Sup. Ct., Feb. monstrated that only in exceptional instances is the 13, 1888. Appeal of McElhone. Opinion by Clark, J. doctrine as applied iuccusistent with the rule an
nounced in Hydrick v. Burke, supra, and like cases. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION - EVIDENCE - PLAIN.
In many of the cases it will be found that a commonTIFF'S TREATMENT WHILE IN PRISON.-In an action
law principle, unaffected by statute, governed the for malicious prosecution, plaiutiff testified, against
question where the cause was tried, and the announcedefendant's objection, as to his surroundings and
ment of the rule, that the law of the forum would be treatment while in prison. Held, that the evidence
presumed to be the law of the foreign State, was only was not admissible, as defendant was uot liable for
another mode of saying that the common law was prethe oonduct of public officials over whom he had no
sumed to be in force in the foreign State. Thus in control. Peun. Sup. Ct., Jau. 3, 1888. Zebley V.
the case of Cox v. Morrow, 14 Ark. 603, the rule is anStorey. Opinion by Paxson, J.
nounced to be that the law of a foreign State is pre. MARRIAGE - CONFLICT OF LAWS - PRESUMPTIONS sumed to be the same as that of the forum, unless the AS TO LAWS OF OTHER STATES.-In Arkansas it is a contrary is made to appear. But the court proceeded presumption of law that the common law prevails
to settle the rigbts of the parties acquired under a without change in other States, and the husband's North Carolina will of personalty; and under a Teurights in property acquired by a married woman in nessee marriage, according to tbe common law, u1janother State is presumed to be governed by the com- affected by statute, there being no proof of what the mon law in the absence of proof of what the law of law of North Carolina or Tennessee was. But one of that State is. It is enough, for the purpose of this the parties in that case who took under the will died case, to cite Hydrick v. Burke, 30 Ark. 124; Dyer v. domiciled in Texas, and the law of Texas not being Arnold, 37 id. 22; and Gainus v. Cannon, 42 id. 503. proved, the court permitted the statute of descents They are also cases involving similar questions. In and distribution of Arkansas to govern. But it must each case money came to the wife in anothor State, be remembered that Texas did not derive her juriswhere the husband and wife were theu domiciled, aud prudence from the source whence comes the common was invested in property in this State after the parties law, and for this reason no presumption could be inremoved here. In each of the cases, as in this, there dulged that that system prevailed there. The plainwas a fuilure to provo what the law of the State was tiff had not established his case by the law of Arkanwhere the property was acquired, and it was ruled sas, and there was no room for the indulgence of a that the presumption would be indulged that the presumption that he could recover by any other law. marital rights of the husband were governed by the 15 Cal. supra; Greepl. supra ; Flato v. Mulhall, 12 Mo. common law in the State where the property was ac. 5:22. It may be that Chief Justice Watkius, who dequired; that by that law the money due to the wife, livered the opinion of the court in Cox V. Morrow, when collected, became the property of the husband, and whose learning and wisdom give him place in the and remained his after removal into this State. The front of our jurisprudence, intended to obviate the burden of proof in such cases is upon the wife to show constantly increasing difficulties and absurdities that that the property became and remained her separate the courts are led into by indulging the presumption property. To the same effect see Tinkler v. Cox, 68 of the prevalence anywhere of the common law with. III. 119; Litchtenberger v. Graham, 50 Ind. 288; Oli. out change since the revolution (see Newton v. Cocke, ver v. Robertson, 41 Tex. 422. Especially applicable 10 Ark. 169,) by fixing a rule commendable for simto the facts of this case is the language used by the plicity in its application, to the effect that parties by court in Gainus r. ('annon, in speaking of money re submitting their rights to our tribunals for deceived by the wife in the State of Mississippi: “The termination elect thereby to have them determined husband was entitled, by marital right, to receive his by the laws of our courts, unless they adduce in eviwife's distributive share of her father's estate, and deuce proof of different rules which should govern. the payment to her was payment to himself. She had | But in the case of Du Val v. Marshall, 30 Ark. 240, no right to receive and hold it in opposition to him. | Judge Walker, who sat in the case of Cox v. Morrow, * * * It was voluntarily paid to her, with her hus. speaking for the court, interprets that case as holding band's assent, and became his by force of the common that in the absence of proof to the contrary, the law, unless he, then or subsequently, by some agree. courts of this State will presume the commou law to ment valid between them, constituted himself her be in force in another State. Looking alone to the trustee." Schouler Dom. Rel., $ 82. We know judi application of the law made in the determination of cially from the history of the country that the com that cause, we cannot say that such is not the judgmou law is the basis of Tennessee's jurisprudence. It ment of the court. The rule as announced by Judge that State has departed from the common principles Walker has been often applied by the court. In the of that system, the fact must be proved. We cannot case of Seaborn v. Henry, 30 Ark. 469, a broader rule take judicial notice of statutory changes that may is announced, but all that was determined in that case have been made, nor can we presume that the same was that in a suit on a Texas judgment a recovery innovations have been made in that State as in our could be had here unless the defendant showed that own. The familiar doctrine that a state of thiags no recovery could be had on the judgment by the law once existing is presumed to continue until a change of Texas. That it does not necessarily follow from or an adequate cause of change is showu is indulged in this that we should indulge the presumption that the regard to the existence of the common law in those law of Texas is the same as the law of ArkanStates which recognize that system as the source of sas, as was said in that case, we have the autheir jurisprudence. It rests upon the party who ag. 1 thority of Chief Justice Kent and of Lord Eldon. serts that a different rule prevails to prove it. This Thompson v. Ketcham, 8 Johns. 146; Male v. Roberts, has been frequently ruled by this court, and is in ac- | 3 Esp. 163. See too Grider v. Driver, 46 Ark. 88. cord with the weight of authority elsewhere. See Ark. Sup. Ct., Feb. 4, 1888, Thorn v. Weatherlev. Norris v. Harris, per Field, J., 15 Cal. 252; cases colo Opinion by Cockrill, C. J. lected, 2 Cent. Law J. 379; 1 Greenl. Ev., & 43, note a; Lawson Pres. Ev. 366, et sea: Reg. v. Nesbitt, 2 Dowl.MASTER AND SERVANT-EVIDENCE-DECLARATIONS
L. 529. The cases are numerous in whicb it is said | OF FOREMAN.-Where the foreman in charge of work
was upon the ground, and immediately or within half this he is borne out by the cases, as will be seen by au hour after the injury directed the detect causing reference to Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, wbere they the injury to be repaired, his declarations as to the are largely collated and commented upon. The New unsafe condition of the appliance, made during this England idea is that creating villages and cities by time, are properly admissible as part of the res gesta. legislative actiou does not by implication impose upon Colo. Sup. Ct., Jan. 27, 1888. New York & Colo. Min. them civil liability for the neglect of corporate duties Syndicate & Co. v. Rogers. Opinion by Helm, J.
in respect of those matters that are governmental in
their nature, and which they administer, as it were, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-COASTING IN STREETS - for and in behalf of the State, such as the control of VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE.-Municipal corporations, streets and the like; while on the other band, in rein the absence of a statutory enactment, though neg. spect of these matters tbat are not governmental in ligent in not enforcing an ordinance, are not liable their nature, but are for the private advantage and for injuries caused by coasting in the public streets in emolument of the municipality, such as water works violation of such ordinance. It is said that this case and the like, they are held liable much as an individis distinguishable from allothers on this subject, in that ual or a private corporation aggregate would be. But here a majority of the citizens and tax payers approved it is unnecessary to pursue the subject further, for we of the practice of coasting. But this makes 110 legal dit regard the question settled in this State by Welsh v. ference; for a city cannot be affected in such matters Village of Rutland, 56 Vt. 228. The only answer the by the individual actions of its citizens, any more tban plaintiff makes to that case is that the village was only a town can be by such action of its citizens, and it has a quasi municipal corporation, and was so regarded by always been held that a town cannot be thus affected. the court, aud that the case was such as to render It is true that there is a difference between cities, seemingly unnecessary the discussion as to the liabilwhich are voluntary corporatious, existing by speciality of such corporations in respect of such matters. charters, and towns, which are involuntary corpora. But the village of Rutland is as much a municipal cortions, with privileges and duties more limited and re poration proper as the city of Burlington is, and stricted than those of cities; but does that difference | its chartered powers and privileges are much the go to the extent claimed here? for it is certain that a same, barring the form of government; and although town would not be liable in a case like this. The fun: l in that case the chief justice speaks of quasi corporadamental proposition of the plaintiff is that inasmuch tions as if the village was one, yet the court did not so as the law confers upon the city power and authority regard it, and he evideutly is speaking in a general over its streets, it therefore by implication imposes way of public corporations as distinguished from priupon it a duty to prevent the nuisance of coasting vate corporations aggregate; not intending to assign thereon, and that for an injury resulting from a neg the village to that class of public corporations tecbui. ligeut omission of such duty, an action lies; in other cally called "quasi corporations,” because on account words, that the duty creates the liability. And the of the limited number of their corporate powers, they argument is that the grant to cities of corporate frau rank so low in the scale of corporate existence. Couuchise is usually made only at the request of the citi. ties, school districts, and perhaps towns, are of this zens to be incorporated, and is supposed to be a valu. class. But cities and incorporated villages are uo. able privilege, and a consideration for the duties im where called or treated as “ quasi corporations,” but posed; that larger powers of self-government are as municipal corporations proper-as having the most given to them than to towns and counties-larger of corporate life; but they are all public corporations, privileges in the acquisition and control of corporate and agencies in the administration of civil governproperty; special authority to use their streets for the ment. And further on in the opinion the chief juspeculiar convenience of their citizens in various ways tice speaks of municipal corporations, and argues not otherwise permissible; that a grant from the State along the line of the law applicable to such corporaof a portion of the sovereign power, and an acceptance tions proper; which shows that the case was not put thereof for these beneficial purposes, raise an implied upon the ground that the village was a quasi corporapromise on the part of the corporation to perform its tion. As to its not having been necessary for the corporate duties, not for the bonefit of the State only, | court to discuss the subject, it is sufficient to say tbat but for the benefit of every individual interested in
the case was treated as involving the question, and their performance as well; and that having accepted the point was fully discussed and decided; and on a valuable franchise ou condition of performing cer- this further discussion and consideration we are contain public duties, they stand like private corporations firmed in the correctness of our former views, and reaggregate, and are held to contract for the perform affirm them.. Vt. Sup. Ct., Feb. 7, 1888. Weller v. ance of those duties. The decisions in this country City of Burlington. Opiniou by Rowell, J. on this subject are not uniform, and Judge Dillon groups them into the following classes: (1) Those in Post-OFFICE-USE OF MAILS TO DEFRAUD—" HEIRS which neither chartered cities nor counties are held to ENGLISH FORTUNES.''-An indictment under secto an implied civil liability ; (2) those in which both tion 5480, Rev. Stat. U. S., alleged that Joseph Hoefchartered cities and counties are thus held for neglect 1 linger, * * * on the eighth day of August, 1887, of duty; (3) those in which municipal corporations * * * having then and there devised a certain proper, such as chartered cities, are thus held for dam scheme and artifice to defraud certain persons to the age caused to travellers for defective and unsafe streets graud jurors unknown, by falsely pretending, in and under their control, but which deny that such liabil. through certain letters, to be seeking information that ity attaches to counties and other quasi corporations would show and lead said persons to believe thut they in respect of highways and bridges under their con were heirs to large fortunes in England, and requesttrol. He says this last distinction has received judi ing the inclosure of a sum of moues by baid persous to cial sanction in a large majority of the States where him (the said Hoeflinger), with intent fraudulently to legislation is silent as to corporate liability, but that obtain and retain said sum of money so inclosed, said the reason for the distinction is not so satisfactory as scheme and artifice to be effected by opening correcould be desired. But in New England, he says, towns spondence * * * with * * * Baid unknown and cities are treated alike in this respect, and that persons by means of the post-office establishment of there is no implied liability here upon either for in- | the United States, did wrongfully and unlawfully juries refulting from defective streets and sidewalks, * * * place in the post-office at the city of St. Louis but that such liability is wholly statutory. And iu * * * for mailing, eto., a certain letter, * * *
to-wit," and then set out in haec verba the contents of offenses are committed, and that he made no coma letter addressed to Newton M. Abbett, Indianapo- | plaint or protest at the time the blows, since comlis, Indiana. Held, on demurrer to indictment (1) plained of, were given. Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. that the indictment sufficiently described a scheme or 472. Ind. Sup. Ct., Feb. 9, 1888. Vanvactor v. Stale. artifice to defraud tbat was to be accomplished by Opinion by Niblock, J. using the post-office establishment of the United TRADE-MARKS -- INJUNCTION TO PROTECT - EVIStates; (2) that it was unnecessary to aver that the DENCE.---Complainants were manufacturers of silk statements contained in such letter were false, inas-thread, and on the best quality of thread used a parmuch as the offense described by the statute did not ticular device. Defendant, acting for a third person, depend upon the question whether the letter placed in sold a quantity of thread bearing this device, under the mail in execution of the fraudulent scheme con- | the belief that it was the best quality of complainants' tained true or false statements. U. 8. Dist. Ct., E. D. manufacture; but it was discovered afterward that Mo., 1887. United States v. Hoeflinger. Opivion by thə silk was of a quality very much inferior, that it Thayer, J.
was in fact complainants' silk, but had been redyed; SCHOOLS — AUTHORITY OF TEACHER – CORPORAL
and defendant then took back the silk and held it for PUNISHMENT.-A pupil having been guilty of insubor
the true owner. Held, that this would not be suffidination, his teacher, the appellant, after consulting
cieut grounds for an injunction restraining defendant with the township trustee, offered him his choice of a
from selling an inferior silk with the device used for whipping or expulsion. He chose the former, which
complainaute' best quality. Penn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 6, was inflicted with a two-pronged switch from a tree,
1888. Appeal of Wilcox. Opinion per Curiam. nine sharp blows being received. The pupil made no
WILLS — CONTRACT TO MAKE A WILL - VALIDITY.outcry, and the next morning came back to school as
A written contract, to make a will and bequeath the usual without showing any iwury. The whipping wag one-half of all one's estate to another. 18 not void. painful, and some abrasion of the skin was produced ;
Something is said about the policy of upholding conbut there was nothing to show any intevtional, undue
tracts such as that under consideration. However severity or improper motive on the part of the
this may be, it is now too well settled to be open to teacher. Held, that the evidence did not justify a
question that a person may make a valid contract, conviction of assault and battery. The switch used
binding himself to make a particular disposition of his was not an inappropriate weapon for a boy of Pat. | property by last will and testament. The only inquiry rick's age of sixteen years and apparent vigor. Pat which the law justifies in case of an agreement to derick's offense as a breach of good deportment in a
vise or bequeath property, founded on a valid conschool was not one to be overlooked or treated lightly.
sideration, is as to the validity of the agreement, and It was calculated, and was most likely intended to hu
dedio hu. | whether or not it was entered into fairly, without surmilitate Vanvactor in the presence of his pupils, and
prise or imposition, and whether it is reasonable and not its tendency was to impair his influence in the govern
against public morals. Caviness v. Rushton,101 Iud. 501; ment of his school. The motive was apparently re
Wallace v. Long, 5 N. E. Rep. 6GG; Watsou v. Mahan, venge for having been required to stand by the stove
20 lud. 2:23; Bell v. Hewitt, 24 id. 280; Lee v. Carter, for a time, as a punishment for a previous violation of
52 id. 342; Johnson v. Hubbell, 10 N. J. Eq. 332; 66 good order. When the alternative of leaving the
Am. Dec. 773; Wright v. Wright, 31 Mich. 380; Sutton school or taking a whipping was presented to him,
v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 101; Logan v. McGinnis, 12 Penn. Patrick did not object to it, either as unreasonable or
St. 27. Since the chief incentive to the acquisition of uniust. After consultation and mature deliberation, he property is the right that every man has to dispose of decided to accept a whipping, on condition that it be
that which he accumulates in the manner he may administered privately. In a spirit of evident for
judge best, it has been well said that "it is not only in bearance, the request thus implied was acceded to.
harmony with sound principle that a person may With all these preparations in view. Patrick had no make a valid agreement, binding himself to dispose of reason to expect that the chustisement would be his property in a particular way, by last will and tesmerely formal and painless ceremony. The legitimate
tament, but it is supported by an almost unbroken object of chastisement is to inflict punishment by the current
current of authorities, both English and American." pain which it causes as well as the degredation which
66 Am. Dec. 784. If such an agreement is in writing, it implies. It does not therefore necessarily follow
so as to satisfy the statute of frauds, or if it has been that because pain was produced, or tbat some abrasion
performed in such a manner as to be taken out of the of the skin resulted from a switch, a obastisement was
operation of the statute, an action for its specific eneither oruel or excessive. When a proper weapon has
forcement may be maintained, or au action for dam. been used, the character of the chastisement, with
ages may be maintained in special cases. Wright v. reference to any alleged cruelty or excess, must be de
Tinsley, 30 Mo. 389; Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37: termined by the nature of the offense, the age, the
Wallace y. Long, supra. The case of Schutt v. Misphysical and mental condition, as well as the personal
sionary Soc., 41 N. J. Eq. 115, is in many respects attributes of the pupil, and the deportment of the
analogous to the present case. In the case cited a conteacher, keeping in view the presumptions to which
tract between an uncle and nephew, whick bad been we bave alluded. All the circumstances lead us to the
consummated by correspondence, was enforced, the conclusion that it Vanvactor really gave harder blows re
| result of the correspondence being an agreement on than ought to have been given, the error was one of
the part of the uncle to make his nephew heir to his judgment only, and hence not one of improper or un- los
estate, on condition that the latter would comply with jawful motive. The statement of Patrick that Val- | the requests of the former. Ind. Sup. Ct., Feb. 8. 1888. vactor laid on the blows hard, as if he was angry, was,
Roehl v. Haumesser. Opinion by Mitchell, C. J. when explained and taken in connection with other evidence as stated, too trivial to materially conflict with the conclusion thus reached. It must be borne
OLD SURVEYS. in mind that Patrick was not peremptorily required lo submit to corporal punishmeut, but that he LAPPENING a few days since into the office of Mr. accepted tbat kind of punishment with all its un- | 11 N. C. Moak, wo chanced to observe his memopleasant consequences, iu preference to a milder aud ravda for the trial recently of a case at Schobarie, inlatterly a much more usual and more approved method volving surveys of Bouck's and of Lawyer's patentsin of enforcing discipline in the schools when grave | 1759 and 1765. By his permission we give them below
for the benefit of counsel who may be called upon to Order of General Term reversed, order of Special investigate old lines, and to young lawyers as an ex- | Term modified in accordance with the report of the ample of Mr. Moak's preparatious for the trial of a referee, and as modified affirmed with costs as to apcause.
pellaut iu both courts-In re City of Rochester to ac
quire water rights; William Hamilton, appellant, v. MEMORANDA FOR EXAMINATION OF SURVEYORS.
George K. Smith, executor, etc., respondent.---Order Azimuth: Gillespie, Surveying (ed. 1887), p. 170. Car. of General Terın reversed, and judgment of trial court hart's Plaue Surveying, p. 217. Webster's Dict. In affirmed with costs-Charles W. Tarbell, appellant, v. short, the bearing of a liue.
Royal Exchange Shipping Company, limited, respondChaiu: 1. Not of proper length.
ent.-Judgment and conviction of larceny from the
mer and winter, extent of. Trautwine Merwiu, appellant. Judgment affirmed with costs-
Caroline M. H. Searing, appellant, v. Village of Sara-
| toga Springs, respondent. Judgment of Albany Cirused. Baldwtn v. Brown, 16 N. Y. 359. cuit and Geueral Term, in favor of plaintiff's recovery Chain bearers uot tightening chain.
of $3,500 damages for injuries caused by the driver of 5. Errors from failure of chain bearers to a car too hurriedly starting his team, affirmed with
properly level chain. Trautwine, 98, 153. | costs-Jennie Hope, respondent, v. Troy & LavsingRemedied by increasing length. Traut-burgh Horse Railroad Company.-Order affirmed wine, 98.
and judgment absolute ordered for defeudant with defects in: Trautwine, 165-6; Gillespie, costs-Edward N. Waltermire, appellant, v. Maria 164-6; Colvin, 83, 84.
Waltermire, respondent.-Judgment reversed and
point each time to same point on com- } Kearney, appellant.-Judgment affirmed with costs
-Henry Bester and others, appellauts, v. Henry S.
accurately the part of the circle to which | with costs-Gideon S. Wheaton, respondent, v. Dela
it points, Gillespie, 111; Colvin, 84. ware & Hudson Canal Company, appellant. Held, raileccentricity: Centre pin not in centre. road companies liable for accidents and injuries occaGillespie, 104-6.
sioned by horses on highways being frightened by the
Gillespie, 104-6; Trautwine, 166; Colvin, | ment affirmed with costs-Edmund Coffin, Jr., appel-
-Appeal dismissed with costs, People, ex rel. Jo-
point properly, must be re-magnetized. , and others, police commissiouers, etc., appellants.
Company, appellant. — Order affirmed with costs
Colvin, 83, 84; Gillespie, 164-176. Iu arine C. Platt and another, respondents. —Appeal
ply to the General Term for a rehearlng, on the ground
that the motion was umnecessary, the original appeal daily: Trautwine, 165; Gillespie, 111-2, from the order of confirmation having been in sub
177: Carhart's Surveying, p. 201. stance au appeal from the report and appraisal--In re electric: Trautwine, 166.
Application of the Staten Island Rapid Transit Comirregular: Gillespie, 176.
pany to acquire lands, etc. --Order affirmed with local attraction: Trautwine, 166; Colvin, costs-People, ex rel. Newton A. Calkins, appellant, 84.
v. Supervisors of Greene county, respondents.--Apsecular: Giliespie, 177, 180.
peal dismissed with costs-Simon August and others, remedy for; making uniform: Gillespie, appellants, v. National Park Bank of New York, re184.
spondent. Judgment affirmed with costs--Leonard Errors: Humoring. Trautwine, 90.
V. Gardner and another, respondents, v. Gabriel Old fences : Gillespie, 127.
Schwob and others, appellauts. -- Order dismissing Old lines: Gillespie, 127-8, 180, 181-3, 498, 509.
appeal vacated-Gundloch v. Hensler.- Motion to Old lines: Finding variations by; Carbart's Survey. I dismiss granted without costs-Badger v. Appleton.
ing. 210; Colvin's Report, 1886, appendix, 83, 84. - Motion to dismiss granted without costs--Bank of
to Monday, the 1st day of October, at 10 o'clock, A. M. MAGNETIC DECLINATIONS (OR VARIATIONS) AT AL of that day, at the Capitol, in the city of Albany,when BANY.
the call of the new calendar will be resumed. In 1875
.... 9° 57' west. In 1880...
.. 9° 90' west. In 1885...
.... 10° 19' west. In 1890 ................................ ... 10° 46' west.
NOTES In 1895 .................
. 10° 7' west.
IN Pegram v. Storlez, Supreme Court of Appeals of
1 West Virginia, Feb. 28, 1888 (6 S. E. Rep. 485), the COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.
opinion covers seventy-two pages in fine type, one page
of which is taken up with citations alone. The question TAE following decisions were handed down Friday, I was of exemplary damages under the Civil Damage June 29, 1888:
Act. This is opinion-writing ruu mad.