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made in the prospectus inviting subscriptions for the ties of citizeus of the United States, nor shall any debentures. It is there said : “This is what is called State deprive any person of life, liberty or property an action of deceit; the plaintiff alleging that without due process of law;" aud also in violation of statements were made by the defendants which were the clause of the Constitution providing for the exuntrue, and that he had acted on the faith of these tradition of fugitives of justice from one State to statements so as to incur damage for which the de another, aud the laws made for its execution. As to tendants were liable. In order to sustain such an ac the fourteenth amendment, it is difficult to perceive in tion the plaintiff must show that the defendants in what way it bears upon the subject. Assuming, wbat tended that the people should act on the statements, is not conceded, that the fugitive has a right of asythat the statements are untrue in fact, and that the lum in West Virginia, the State of Kentucky bas defendants knew them to be untrue,or made them up passed no law which infringes upon that right or upon der such circumstances that the court must conclude any right or privilege of immunity which the accused that they were careless, whether they were true or can claim under the Constitution of the United States. not." The judgment against the directors personally The law of that State which is enforced is a law for was affirmed, all the judges concurring.

the punishment of the crime of murder, and she has We might extend these quotations to much greater merely sought to enforce it by her officers under prolength, but deem it unnecessary to do so, as we think cess executed within her territory. She did not auour conclusions are in accord with reason and the es thorize the unlawful abduction of the prisoner from tablished principles of justice. Forms of action do West Virginia. As to the removal from the State of not obtain in our practice. All suits aro actions on the fugitive from justice in a way other than that the case, and we think it can make no material differ which is provided by the second section of the fourth ence in deterınining the questions here involved, article of the Constitution, which declares that “a whether the suit is called an action for deceit, an ac- person charged in any State with treasou, felony, or tion to recover damages for the violation of a trust, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found an action to recover damages for negligence in the per in another State, shall, on demand of the executive auformance of a duty. We have examined with much thority of the State from which he fled, be delivered care all authorities cited by counsel for appellees in up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of their able and exhaustive brief that are accessible to the crime," and by the laws passed by Congress to us, but none of them, wo think, militate against the carry the same into effect, it is not perceived how that correctness of the conclusions expressed in this opin- fact can affect his detention upon a warrant for the ion. If this was a suit brought by a stockholder to | commission of a crime within the State to which he is recover damages resulting to the corporate property, carried. The jurisdiction of the court in which the many of appellees' authorities would apply, and we indictment is found is not impaired by the manner in would hold with those authorities, that appellant could which the accused is brought before it. There are not maintain an action for his individual benefit many adjudications to this purport cited by counsel alone.

on the argument, to some of which we will refer. The For the reasons stated, we are of opinion that there first of these is that of Ex parte Scott, 9 Baru. & C. is error in the judgment of the court below, and that 446. There it appeared that the prisoner, who had it should be reversed, and cause remanded.

been indicted in the King's Bench for perjury, and for STAYTON, C. J. Report of Commission of Appeals whose apprehension a warrant had been issued, was examined, opinion adopted, judgment reversed, and arrested by the officer, to whom the warrant was speccause remanded.

ially directed, at Brussels, in Belgium, and conveyed (See Cowley v. Smyth, 46 N. J. L. 380; S. C., 50 Am. | | to England. A rule nisi was then obtained from the Rep. 432; Westervelt v. Demarest, 46 N. J. L. 37; 8. C., court for a writ of habeas corpus, and the question of 50 Am. Rep. 400; Cole v. Cassidy, 138 Mass. 437 ; S. C., her right to be released because of her illegal arrest in 52 Am. Rep. 284; Clark v. Edgar, 84 Mo. 106; S. C., 54 a foreign jurisdiction was argued before Lord TenterAm. Rep. 84.- ED.)

den. He held that where a party charged with a crime was found in the country, it was the duty of the court to take care that he should be amenable to justice,

and it could not consider the circumstances under UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AB

which he was brought there, and that if the act comSTRACT.

plained of was done against the law of a foreign coun

try, it was for that country to vindicate its own law, JURISDICTION-FEDERAL QUESTION-ABDUCTION OF and the rule was discharged. The next case is that of ESCAPED CRIMINAL FROM SISTER STATE.-A criminal State v. Smith, which was very fully aud elaborately having escaped from justice to another State, pending considered by the chancellor and the Court of Apextradition proceedings, was forcibly seized by an peals of South Carolina. 1 Bailey, 283. 1 hough this agent appointed by the governor demanding his extra- case did not arise upon the forcible arrest in another dition, carried to the State where he had been in- jurisdiction of the offender to answer an indictment, dicted, and was there arrested on a legal warrant. but to answer to a judgment the conditional release Held, that he could not be released on a petition of from which he had disregarded, the principle involved habeas corpus to a Federal court, on account of the

was the same. Smith had been convicted of stealing a personal injuries received from private persons acting slave and sentenced to death. He was pardoned on against the laws of one State and without authority condition that he would undergo coutiner

condition that he would undergo confinement during from the other,or because of the indignities committed a designated period, and within fifteen days afterward against the State from which the prisoner was re leave the State and never return. The pardon was acmoved, the illegal mode in which he was brought cepted, and the prisoner remained in confinement for from the other State violating no right secured by the

the time prescribed, and within fifteen days afterward Constitution orlawa of the united States but solely removed to North Carolina, and remained there some concerning that State, which may bring the persone years, when he returned to South Carolina. The gov. abducting the prisoner to justice. It is contended ernor of the latter State then issued a proclamation that the detention of the appellant is in violation of stating that the prisoner was in the State in violation the provisions of the fourteenth amendment of the | of the condition of his pardon, and offering a reward Constitution, that no State shall make or enforce for his arrest. Smith afterward returned to North any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni. | Carolina, where he was forcibly seized by parties from

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“It may be regarded as a well-settled principle that separate and distinct from that sustained by the others,
for every fraud or deceit which results in consequen- and that the action was well brought against the de-
tial damage to a party he may maintain a special ac- fendants.
tion in the case. The principle is one of natural jug The case of Morgan y. Skiddy, 62 N. Y. 325, was an
tice long recognized in the law. And it matters not, action brought by a purchaser of stock of a corpora-
80 far as the right of action is concerned, whether the tiou against the diriсtors personally to recover the
means of aocomplishing the deception be complex or money paid for the stock, upon the ground that plaiu-
simple, a deep-laid scheme to swindle or a direct false. | tiff had been induced to purchase the stock by false
hood, a combined effort of a number of associates, or statements made in a prospectus issued by the defend.
the sole effort of a solitary individual, provided the ants. It was said: “If the plaintiff purchased the
deception be effected, and the damage complained of stock relying upon the truth of the prospectus, he has
be the consequence of the deception. A valid act of a right of action for deceit against the persons, who
incorporation, or an invalid or pretended right to ex- with knowledge of the fraud and with intent to de-
ercise corporate franchises, is alike powerless to se ceive, put it in circulation. The representation was
cure the guilty from the consequences of their fraudu. made to each person comprehended within the class
lent conduct, when it has been kuowingly resorted to of persons who were designed to be injured by the
as the mere means of chicane and imposition, and prospectus, and when a prospectus of this character
used to facilitate the work of deception and injury. has been issued, no other relation between the parties
Were it otherwise, it would be a reproach to the law. peed be shown except that created by the fraudu-
If the defendants, with design to defraud the public | | lent and wrongful act of defendants in issuing or cir-
generally, have knowingly combined together, and culating the prospectus, and the resulting injury to
held forth false and deceptive colors, and done acts the plaintiff. It is hardly necessary to say that a di-
which were wrong, and have thereby injured the rector of a company who knowingly issues or sanc-
plaintiff, they must make him whole by responding to tions the circulation of a false prospectus, containing
the full extent of that injury, and they cannot place untrue statements of material facts, the natural ten-
between him and justice, with any success, the char-dency of which is to mislead and deceive the commu.
ter of the bank, whether it be valid or void, forfeited, nity, and to induce the public to purchase its stock, is
or in case. * * * Nor is it material that there responsible to those who are injured thereby. Mere
should have been an intention to defraud the plaintiff exaggerated statements of the prospects of a new en-
in particular. If there was a general design to defraud terprise will not subject those who make them to lia-
all such as could be defrauded by taking their paper bility; but no material misstatement or coucealment
issues, it is sufficient, and the plaintiff may maintain of any material fact ought to be permitted. The di.
his suit if he has taken the paper and suffers from the rectors of a company are supposed to know the facts
fraud. It is first said that to allow billholders who touching its condition and property, and their state-
have been defrauded to sue the members of the com ments in respect to its officers naturally attract pub-
pany individually at law will produce endless litiga. lic confidence. If they fraudulently unite in an at-
tion; and when applied, the remedy cannot do equal tempt to deceive the public, and by false statements
justice to all the creditors or to the members of the of facts to give credit and currency to its stock, it is
company. It may be that numerous suits will be but simply justice that they shall answer to those
prosecuted. * * * And yet the doctrine that be who have been deluded into giving confidence to
cause they have cheated many they are safer than they

them.”
would be if only one man had suffered, does not at Į The case of Shea v. Mabry, 1 Lea, 319, was an action
tain in courts of justice. Again it is said the fund by a judgment creditor of a corporation against the
sought is a trust fund, and a bill in chancery is the directors to recover the amount of the judgment,
proper remedy. There would be much propriety in upon the ground that the directors had misapplied or
the position were it in point of fact true that a party converted the assets of the company. It was there
who has been defrauded by the act of another who held that “ directors of corporations are not mere fig-
has no redress save out of a fund composed solely of ure-heads. They are trustees for the company, for
the proceeds of the imposition. In that case strict the stockholders, and for the creditors. The must not
equity might require that all those whose injuries bad only use good faith, but also care, attention and cir-
been the source of the fund should share equitably in cumspection in the affairs of the company, and par-
it. But the rule that a person sustaining damage by ticularly in the safe-keeping and disbursement of
fraudulent acts of another can only look to a particu funds committed to their custody and control. They
lar fund of the wrong-does for redress never existed must see that the funds are appropriated, as intended,
any where."

to the purposes of the trust; and if they misapproThe cases of Cross y. Sackelt and IVard v. Sackett, 2 priate them, or allow others to divert them froni these Bosw. 615, were actions brought by purchasers of purposes, they must answer for it individually. Igstock of a corporation to recover a director's money norance will not excuse when they have the means of paid for the stock, upon the ground of false represen- knowledge." tations made by the directors, in a prospectus and The case of Delano v. Case, decided by the appelother advertisements, as to the value of the stock. In late court of Illinois, and reported in the Bankers' these cases it was held that the actions could be main- | Magazine for March, 1886, page 686, was an action by a tained, and that “there is no wrong or fraud which general depositor against directors of a bank for perthe directors of a joint-stock company, incorporated mitting it to be held out to the public as solvent when or otherwise, can comuit, which cannot be redressed in fact it was at the time insolvent. It was there by appropriate and adequate remedies."

held that the directors were individually liable to the The case of Cazeaux v. Mali, 25 Barb. 578, was an depositor. The judgment of the appellate court was action brought by a stockholder of a corporation affirmed by the Supreme Court in June, 1887. 12 N. E. against the officials and directors to recover of them Rep. 676. personally the loss sustained by plaintiff by deprecia- The case of Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, decided by tion in the value of stock, caused by the fraudulent the Court of Appeal of Eugland in March, 1885, and issue of stock beyond the authorized amount. It was published in the Central Law Journal of January 22, there held that the action was properly brought by the | 1886, page 81, was an action by a purchaser of debenplaintiff in his own name, without joining the other tures of a corporation against the directors to recover stockholders; the injury to each stockholder being of them personally damages for false representations

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made in the prospectus inviting subscriptions for the ties of citizens of the United States, nor shall any debentures. It is there said: “This is what is called State deprive any person of life, liberty or property an action of deceit; the plaintiff alleging that without due process of law;" and also in violatiou of statements were made by the defendants which were the clause of the Coustitution providing for the exuntrue, and that he had acted on the faith of these tradition of fugitives of justice from one State to statements so as to incur damage for which the de another, and the laws made for its executiou. As to tendants were liable. In order to sustain such an ac the fourteenth amendment, it is difficult to perceive in tion the plaintiff must show that the defendants in what way it bears upon the subject. Assuming, what tended that the people should act on the statements, is not conceded, that the fugitive has a right of asythat the statements are untrue in fact, and that the lum in West Virginia, the State of Kentucky has defendants knew them to be untrue,or made them un. passed no law which infringes upon that right or upon der such circumstances that the court must conclude any right or privilege of immunity which the accused that they were careless, whether they were true or can claim under the Constitution of the United States. not." The judgment against the directors persovally The law of that Stato which is enforced is a law for was affirmed, all the judges concurring.

the punishment of the crime of murder, and she has We might extend these quotations to much greater merely sought to enforce it by her officers under prolength, but deem it unnecessary to do so, as we think cess executed withiu her territory. She did not auour conclusions are in accord with reason and the es thorize the unlawful abduction of the prisoner from tablished principles of justice. Forms of action do West Virginia. As to the removal from the State of not obtain in our practice. All suits aro actions on the fugitive from justice in a way other than that the case, and we think it can make no material differ which is provided by the second section of the fourth ence in deterinining the questions here involved, article of the Constitution, which declares that “a whether the suit is called an action for deceit, an ac person charged in any State with treasou, felony, or tion to recover damages for the violation of a trust, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found an action to recover damages for negligence in the per in another State, shall, on demand of the executive auformance of a duty. We have examined with much thority of the State from which he fled, be delivered care all authorities cited by counsel for appellees in up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of their able and exhaustive brief that are accessible to the crime," and by the laws passed by Congress to us, but none of them, we think, militate against the | carry the same into effect, it is not perceived how that correctness of the conclusions expressed in this opin fact can affect his detention upon a warrant for the ion. If this was a suit brought by a stockholder to commission of a crime within the State to which he is recover damages resulting to the corporate property, carried. The jurisdiction of the court in which the many of appellees' authorities would apply, and we indictment is fouud is not impaired by the manner in would hold with those authorities, that appellant could which the accused is brought before it. There are not maintain an action for his individual benefit many adjudications to this purport cited by counsel alone.

on the argument, to some of which we will refer. The For the reasons stated, we are of opinion that there first of these is that of Ex parte Scott, 9 Barn. & C. is error in the judgment of the court below, and that 446. There it appeared that the prisoner, who had it should be reversed, and cause remanded.

been indicted in the King's Bench for perjury, and for STAYTON, C. J. Report of Commission of Appeals whose apprehension a warrant had been issued, was examined, opinion adopted, judgment reversed, and arrested by the officer, to whom the warrant was spec. cause remanded.

ially directed, at Brussels, in Belgium, and conveyed (See Cowley v. Smyth, 46 N. J. L. 380; 8. C., 50 Am. to England. A rule nisi was then obtained from the Rep. 432; Westervelt v. Demarest, 46 N. J. L. 37; S. C., court for a writ of habeas corpus, and the question of 50 Am. Rep. 400; Cole v. Cassidy, 138 Mass. 437; S. C., her right to be released because of her illegal arrest in 52 Am. Rep. 284; Clark v. Edgar, 84 Mo. 106; S. C., 54 a foreign jurisdiction was argued before Lord TenterAm. Rep. 84.- ED.]

den. He held that where a party charged with a crime was found in the country, it was the duty of the court to take care that he should be amenable to justice,

and it could not consider the circumstances under UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AB

which he was brought there, and that if the act comSTRACT.

plained of was done against the law of a foreign coun

try, it was for that country to viudicate its own law, JURISDICTION-FEDERAL QUESTION-ABDUCTION OF and the rule was discharged. The next case is that of ESCAPED CRIMINAL FROM SISTER STATE.--A criminal State v. Smith, which was very fully aud elaborately baving escaped from justice to another State, pending considered by the chancellor and the Court of Apextradition proceedings wag forcibly seized by au peals of South Carolina 1 Bailey, 283. Though this agent appointed by the governor demanding his extra case did not arise upon the forcible arrest in another dition, carried to the State where he had been in jurisdiction of the offender to answer an indictment, dicted, and was there arrested on a legal warrant. but to answer to a judgment the conditional release Held, that he could not be released on a petition of from which he had disregarded, the principle involved habeas corpus to a Federal court, on account of the

was the same. Smith had been convicted of stealing a personal injuries received from private persons acting slave and sentenced to death. He was pardoned on against the laws of ove State and without authority condition that he would undergo confinement during from the other,or because of the indigpities committed a dosignated period, and within fifteen days afterward against the State from which the prisoner was re- leave the State and never return. The pardon was acmoved, the illegal mode in which he was brought | cepted, and the prisoner remained in confinement for from the other State violating no right secured by the

the time prescribed, and within fifteen days afterward Constitution or laws of the United States, but solely

removed to North Carolina, and remained there some concerning that State, which may bring the persons

years, when he returned to South Carolina. The govabducting the prisoner to justice. It is contended

ernor of the latter State then issued a proclamation that the detention of the appellant is in violation of stating that the prisoner was in the State in violation the provisions of the fourteenth amendment of the of the condition of his pardon, and offering a reward Coustitution, that no State shall make or euforce for his arrest. Smith afterward returned to North any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni- | Carolina, where he was forcibly seized by parties from

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South Carolina, without warrant or authority from Upon this the court said: “The pursuit of the prigany officer or tribunal of either State, except the oner into North Carolina and his arrest there was cerproclamation of the governor of South Carolina, and taivly a violation of the sovereignty of that State, and was brought into the latter State and lodged in jail. was an act which cannot be commended. But tbat He sued out a writ of habeas corpus, and was brought was not the act of the State, but of a few of its citibefore the chancellor of the State, and his discharge zeus, for which the Constitution of the United States was moved on the ground that his arrest in North | has provided a reparation. Il gives the governor of Carolina was illegal, and his detention equally so. that State the right to demand them of the governor The motion was refused, and the prisoner remauded. of this, and imposes on the latter the obligation to The chancellor gave great consideration to the case, surrender them; but until it is refused there can be and in the following extract from his opinion fur no cause of complaint." And the motion was renishes an answer to the principal objections urged in fused. In the case of State v. Brewster the same docthe case at bar to the detention of the appellant: "The trine was amounced by the Supreme Court of Verprisoner,'' said the chancellor, “is charged with a fel- mont. 7 Vt. 118. There it appeared that the prisoner onious violation of the laws of this state. It is an charged with crime had escaped to Canada, and was swered that other persons have been guilty, in rela- brought back against his will, and without the contion to him, of an outrageous violation of the laws of sent of the authorities of that province, and he bought another State, and therefore he ought to be dis to plead his illegal capture and forcible return in bar charged. I perceive no connection between the prem of the indictment; but his application was refused, ises and the inference. Tbe chiet argument is drawn the court observing that the escape of the prisoner from the supposed consequences which are likely to into Canada did not purge the offense, nor oust the follow by bringing our government into collision with jurisdiction of the court, and he being within its jurothers. This is less to be apprehended among the isdiction, it was not for it to inquire by what means States of the Union, where the Federal Constitution or in what manner he was brought within the reach of makes provisiov for a satisfaction of the violated jur justice. Said the court: “If there were any thing isdiction. But suppose the case of a foreign State. | improper in the transaction, it was not that the prisThere is no offense in trying, and if he be guilty, con oner was entitled to protection on his own account. victing, the subject of a foreign goverument, who has The illegality, if any, consists in a violation of the been guilty of a violation of our laws, within our jur sovereignty of an independent nation. If that nation isdiction. Or if he had made his escape from our jur complain, it is a matter which concerns the political isdiction, and by any accident was thrown within it | relations of the two countries, and in that aspect is a again; if he were shipwrecked on our coast, or fraud subject not within the constitutional powers of this ulently induced to land, by a representation that it court." In State v. Ross the Supreme Court of Iowa was a different territory, with a view to his being declared the same doctrine, and stated the distinction given up to prosecution—there would be no reason between civil and criminal cases where the party is for exempting him from responsibility to our laws. In | by fraud or violence within the jurisdiction of the the case we are considering the prisoner is found in | court. 21 Iowa, 467. The defendants were charged our jurisdiction in consequenco of a lawless act of vio with larceny, and were arrested in Missouri and lence exercised upon him by individuals. The true brought by force and against their will, by parties cause of offense to the foreign government is a lawless acting without authority, either of a requisition from violation of its territory. But a similar violation of a the governor or otherwise, to lowa, where an indictforeign jurisdiction might be made for other purposes, ment against them had been found. In Iowa they and it would not be in the power of our tribunals to were rearrested, and turned over to the civil authoriafford satisfaction. An individual might be kidnap ties for detention and trial. It was contended that ped and brought within our territory for the purpose their arrest was in violation of law; that they were of extorting money from him, or murdering him. It brought within the jurisdiction of the State by fraud would not seem to be an appropriate satisfaction to and violence; that comity to a sister State, and a just the injured government to exempt a person justly lia appreciation of the rights of the citizen, and a due reble to punishment under our laws, where we have no gard to the integrity of the law, demanded that the means of giving up to punish inent those who have court should under such circumstances refuse its aid; violated its laws. But there is no difficulty among the and that there could be no rightful exercise of jurisStates of the Union. Upon demand by the State of diction over the parties thus arrested. But the court North Carolina those who have violated its laws will answered that "the liability of the parties arresting be given up to punishment." 1 Bailey, 292. Subse. I them (the defendants) without legal warrant. for false quently the prisoner was brought before the presiding imprisonment or otherwise, and their violation of the judge of the Court of Appeals of the State to auswer penal statutes of Missouri, may be ever so clear, and to a rule to show cause why his original sentence yet the prisoners not be entitled to their discharge. should not be executed and a date fixed for his exe The offense being committed in Iowa, it was punishcution. He showed for cause that he had received an able here, and an indictment could have been found executive pardon, and had performed all the condi. without reference to the arrest. There is no fair antions annexed to it, except the one which prohibited alogy between civil and criminal cases in this respect. his return to the State, which it was submitted, was In the one (civil) the party invoking the aid of the illegal and void. And for further cause he showed court is guilty of fraud or violence in bringing the dethat he had been illegally arrested in North Carolina fendant or his property witnin the jurisdiction of the and brought within the jurisdiction of this State court. Iu the other (criminal) the people, the State, against his own consent, and it was therefore insisted is guilty of no wrong. The officers of the law take the that he was not amenable to the courts of South Caro requisite process, find the prisoners charged within the lina, but was entitled to be sent back to North Caro jurisdiction, and this too without force,wrong, fraud or lina or to be discharged, and sufficient time allowed violence on the part of any agent of the State or offihim to return thither. The judge held the grounds to cer thereof. And it can make no difference whether be insufficient, and the defendant then moved the the illegal arrest was made in another State or another court to reverse his decision on substantially the same government." Other cases might be cited from the grounds, and among them that he was entitled to be State courte holding similar views. There is indeed discharged in consequence of baving been illegally ar an entire concurrence of opinion as to the ground rested in North Carolina and brought into the State. upon which a release of the appellant in the present

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case is asked, namely, that his forcible abduction from was affirmed. He then brought the case to this court, another State and conveyance within the jurisdiction where it was contended that under the treaty of exof the court holding him, is no objection to his deten tradition with Peru he had acquired by his residence tion and trial for the offense charged. They all pro in that country a right of asylum, a right to be free ceed upon the obvious ground that the offender against from molestation for the crime committed in Illinois the law of the State is not relieved from liability be -a right that he should be forcibly removed from cause of personal injuries received from private par Peru to the State of Illinois only in accordance with ties, or because of indignities committed against an- 1 the provisions of the treaty; and that this right was other State. It would indeed be a strange conclusion one which he could assert in the courts of the United if a party charged with a criminal offense could be ex States. But the court answered that there was no cused from answering to the government whose laws language in the treaty on the subject of extradition he had violated because other parties had done vio | which said in terms that a party fleeing from the lence to him, and also committed an offense against Uuited States to escape punishment for a crime bethe laws of another State. The case of Ker v. Illi- came thereby entitled to an asylum in the country to nois, decided by this court, 119 U. S. 437, bas a direct which he had fled; that it could not be doubted that bearing upon the question presented here, wbether & the government of Peru might of its own accord,withforcible and illegal capture in another State is in vio out any demand from the United States, have surlation of any rights secured by the Constitution and rendered Ker to an agent of Illinois, and that such laws of the United States. In that case it appeared | surrender would have been valid within Peru; that that Ker was indicted in Cook county, Ill., for embez | it could not therefore be claimed, either by the terms zlement and larceny. He fled the country and went of the treaty or by implication, that there was given to Peru. Proceedings were instituted for his extra- to a fugitive from justice in one of those couutries dition under the treaty between that country and the any right to remain and reside in the other; and that United States, and application was made by our gov- if the right of asylum meant any thing it meant that. erument for his surrender, and a warraut was issued So in this case it is contended that because under the by the president, directed to ona Julian, as messenger, Constitutiou aud laws of the United States a fugitive to receive him from the authorities of Peru, upon his from justice from one Siate to another can be sursurrender, and to bring him to the United States. rendered to the State whera the crime was commitJulian, having the necessary papers, went to Peru, but

ted, upon proper proceedings taken, he has the right without presenting them to any officer of the Peru- of asylum in the State to which he has fled, unless revian government, or making any demand on that gov moved in conformity with such proceedings, and that ernment for the surrender of Ker, forcibly arrested his right can be euforced in the courts of the United him, placed him on board the United States vessel States. But the plain answer to this contention is Essec, then lying in the harbor of Callao, kept him a l that the laws of the United States do not recognize close prisoner until the arrival of that vessel at Hono any such right of asylum as is here claimed on the part lulu, in the Hawaiian Islands, where after some deten of a fugitive from justice in any State to which he has tion, he was conveyed in the same forcible manner on fled; nor have they, as already stated, made any proboard another vessel, in which he was carried & pris- vision for the return of parties, who by violence and over to Sau Francisco, Cal. Before his arrival in that without lawful authority have been abducted from a State the governor of Illinois bad made a requisition State. There is therefore no authority in the courts of on the governor of California, under the laws of the theUnited States to act upon any such alleged right. In United States, for bis delivery as a fugitive from jus-1 Ker v. Illinois the court said that the question of how tice. The governor of California accordingly made an far the forcible seizure of the defendant in another order for his surrender to a person appointed by the country, and his couveyance by violeuce, force or governor of Illinois to receive him aud to take him fraud to this country, could be made available to reto the latter State. On his arrival at San Francisco sist trial in the State court for the offer se charged he was immediately placed in the custody of this agent, upou him, was one which it did not feel called upon who took him to Cook county, where the process of to decide, for in that transaction it did not see that the criminal court was served upon him, and he was the Constitution, or laws, or treaties of the Uuited held to answer the indictment. He then sued out a States guarantied to him any protection. So in this writ of habeas corpus before the Circuit Court of the case we say, that whatever effect may be given by the State, contending that his arrest and deportation State court to the illegal mode in which the defendfrom Peru was a violation of the treaty between that ant was brought from ancther State, no right, secured goverument and ours, and that consequently his sub under the Constitution or laws of the United States, sequent detention under the process of the State was violated by his arrest in Kentucky, and imprisoncourt was uulawful. The Circuit Court remanded him ment there, and the indictments found against him to jail, holding that whatever illegality might have for murder in that State. It follows that the judgattended his arrest, it could not affect the jurisdiction ment of the court below must be affirmed. May 14, of the court or release him from liability to the State 1888. Mahon v. Justice. Opiniou by Field, J.; Bradwhose laws he had violated. He then applied to the ley and Harlan, JJ., disseuting. Cirouit Court of the United States for a writ of habeus corpus, asking his release upon the same ground; but the court refused it, holding that it was not compe

ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DEtent to look into the circumstances under which the

CISIONS. capture and the trausfer of the prisoner from Peru to the United States were made, nor to free him from ANIMALS - ORDINANCE RESTRAINING DOGS FROM the consequences of the lawful process which had RUNNING AT LARGE-PUNISHMENT OF OWNER – ILLEbeen served upon him for the offeuse which he was GALITY.-Under an ordinance of the city of Baton charged with baving committed in the State of Illi Rouge, the owuer of a dog was ordered by the mayor Hois. When arraigned on the indictment in the trial 1 of the city to produce the animal at his office that it court he raised similar questions on a plea in abate- | might be killed. The dog was brought to the mayor's ment, which was held bad on dem urrer, and after office in compliance with the order, but the killing conviction he carried the case on a writ of error to was prevented by an injunction from a competent the Supreme Court of the State, where the same con- court. Thereupon the owner of the dog was sen. clusion was reached, and the judgment against him tenced to imprisonment in the parish jail for twenty

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