much better if man would listen to the voice of the Spirit speaking to his own soul. But since he will not so listen, God has graciously given him the more imperfect revelation of the letter.' "In Chrysostom," says Neander, “we recognize an interpreter of Scripture who had been formed in the Antiochian school, where we find him admitting without scruple the existence of many discrepancies in the Gospel narratives, as to unimportant matters relating to times and places, and in particular forms of expression. This agreement in essentials, with diversity in things not essential, he regards as a proof of the credibility of the narratives. He holds that the only thing important is agreement in the essential matter, in that which serves to the end of salvation, whereupon Christianity reposes. Under this head he places the incarnation of God; the miracles of Christ; his resurrection and ascension; the fact that he gave precepts serving to salvation; the fact that the New Testament stands not in contradiction with the Old." "

In these days of ecclesiastical machinery, of petty ambitions, of superficial piety, and low ministerial ideals, it would be well for us to go back to the study of the life, writings, and spirit of St. John Chrysostom to see if we might not become baptized with some of his courage, purity, and devotion. This man was a martyr to the cause of Christian holiness, fidelity, and charity. He was relentlessly persecuted by men of his own calling, by men who could not appreciate his holiness, and his liberality to the

1 Homily on Matthew, i., at beginning; Post-Nicene Fathers (New York), Vol. x. p. I.

Neander, l. c., Vol. ii. p. 390. The enterprise of the Christian Literature Co., 35 Bond street, New York, has now made available to the Amer ican reader all the more important works of Chrysostom. See Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, edited by Dr. Schaff, first series, Vols. ix.-xiv., 8vo., 1888-90. These works ought to be read again and again by the preacher, and they are invaluable to the historical and theological student. Thomas Aquinas declared he would rather possess the homilies on Matthew than be master of all Paris.

followers of Origen. Against these persecutors, however,
he said nothing. In God was his trust, and in the darkest
hour God's presence and smile was his light and joy.
"Preacher and Saint, whose name is eloquence,

Well called they 'Golden' thine impassioned tongue
On which Truth sat, and glowing manly sense,

And words that stand the fire-in wisdom strong,
And strong in charity."

ARTICLE V.

DIVINE LIMITATION.

BY THE REV. JOHN MILTON WILLIAMS, A. M., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.

WHILE we all recognize omnipotence, or infinite power, as one of the essential attributes of the divine nature, no one, probably, includes in the meaning of the word ability to do any and every thing that may be named or imagined. All sensible men admit that whatever involves absurdity, or self-contradiction, is not an object of power, comes not within the scope of this attribute; consequently non-ability to effect such results involves no limitation of power. We do not, therefore, disparage this divine perfection in saying, though the language may seem irreverent, that God cannot make the part greater than the whole, make a crooked line the shortest distance between two points, make the diameter of a sphere greater than the circumference, or add to the age of a living organism a century in an hour; for the reason that physical power has no tendency to accomplish such fanciful results, more than it has to understand a syllogism, or solve a problem in mathematics. It is, therefore, no contradiction of terms, and involves no derogation of infinite perfection, to say, the Infinite One is environed by myriads of limitations.

The fact that God is a moral being, subject, like ourselves, to the restraints of obligation, is a divine limitation. The moral law revealed in the human reason, and in the Sacred Scriptures, is an intuition of the infinite reason, and a part of the divine nature. It is coexistent with God, and is as uncreated and changeless as God, and imposes its obligation upon him, precisely as upon other

moral beings. God acts under immeasurable responsibility. His moral character is the golden chain which binds the moral universe to himself. "The Judge of all the earth will do right," and render himself worthy the highest acclaim angels ever utter. "Just and righteous are thy ways, thou King of saints." This is a natural as well as moral limitation, inasmuch as God cannot swerve from the line of perfect rectitude, without involving consequences we shudder to contemplate.

The objection that the divine will creates law, makes right, is per se the ultimate right, and therefore it is absurd to say, God can do wrong, not only antagonizes an intuitive truth, but environs him in still greater limitations, as it renders him incapable both of merit and moral action. Necessary action is not moral action. He who cannot do both right and wrong is not a responsible being.

It is also evident that God has limited himself by the freedom with which he has invested moral beings. The best definition of freedom is, "power of contrary choice," or ability, in any circumstances, under any pressure, human or divine, in which it is possible to choose at all, to choose in either of two directions. He who cannot do this, as choice in its very nature implies an alternative, cannot choose at all. His actions are merely mechanical, and he ceases to be a moral agent. It therefore follows that any being in possession of freedom can resist the Holy Ghost, and choose in opposition to the will of God; for any influence beyond that which he can resist, defeats its own end, and precludes both choice and moral action. Compelling a man to do right involves the double absurdity of compelling him to act uncompelled, and making him meritorious for what he cannot avoid. In the nature of things God cannot make a man sinful or holy. This awful prerogative is limited to the subject himself. Man only can determine his own character, for the sufficient reason that he cannot be praiseworthy or blameworthy for what another does.

God's natural ability, it must be admitted, is, in the very structure of mind, limited. Is his moral ability? Can he not, through the influence of truth, reclaim any fallen being, and accomplish in the moral world whatever he desires accomplished? Yearning over lost men, as no mother ever yearned over her children, he does not save all. Though he "willeth that all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth," uncounted mul titudes live and die unrepentant and unforgiven. That this results from obstacles, in the way of saving all, absolutely insuperable, the character of God, the obligations of the divine law, and the whole trend of revelation place beyond rational doubt.

There are two conceivable ways of accomplishing results; as, for example, building a house. One is by directly willing it into being, without the intervention of means. The other is through natural law and legitimate instrumentality. It is certainly admissible to inquire whether God, in the accomplishment of ends, is not limited to the latter, and whether here is not another divine limitation.

There were two conceivable modes of converting water into wine: one, by a simple volition, as one moves a limb; the other, through agencies adapted to secure the result. Did our Lord simply will the water to turn to wine, and did it obey his behest? Did he simply bid the billows on midnight Galilee be still, and did they obey his word? Or did he secure these results as we secure results, through the instrumentality of second causes? There has ever, to my mind, been grandeur in the thought that God speaks, and it is done; that at his word a new and completed solar system would take its place in the great field of space, obedient to the creator's word, as the cultured archangel. But is there not more poetry than truth in such sentiments?

Were we to remove a house, we should remove the obstacles, put rollers under it, and apply force. The ques